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Trouble is not always a recipe for disaster 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 1 
Prelude 
 
 
I'm a bit of a troublemaker. I just knew something was going to happen and then 
when it did happen I just got involved from there. They [the police] hit, well, a 
teenager … Then people started throwing stuff, from there. They broke into a shop 
and got glass bottles, an off-licence and got all the glass bottles, laid it down, gave it 
out and started throwing it from there and then riot police came from there. I was in 
the shop myself, getting glass bottles as well, throwing it from there. 
They [the police] mostly aggravate teenagers these days, and they'll stop you for no 
reason, and they'll rough you up [laughs], just rough you up for no particular reason. 
People were screaming out: “This is for Mark [Duggan].” They were shouting it out. 
I knew a lot of people that was there but … not a lot, like 10 people, just mostly 
attacking the police. But you saw everybody beside you, behind you, everywhere that 
you knew mostly. Everyone was involved; it wasn't just black. 
“Rioters Profile: ‘I’m a bit of a troublemaker,’” by Helen 
Carter, published in the Guardian, Monday, December 5, 
20111 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/dec/05/english-rioter-riots-tottenham-troublemaker. 
This is a fragment of an interview with a man from Tottenham who was involved in the first of the 
London riots in the summer of 2011. The interview forms part of the research project  “Reading the 
Riots: Investigating England’s summer of disorder,” a collaboration of the Guardian and the London 
School of Economics. See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/series/reading-the-riots. 
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 3 
Introduction 
          
 
 
1. The uncivil revolt of young urban troublemakers 
Mayhem caught Britain by surprise in the summer of 2011. Extensive rioting and 
looting spread across several cities after Mark Duggan, a young man of mixed race, 
was shot to death by the police in a poor housing project in North East London. An 
initially peaceful protest march following his death got out of hand and marked the 
beginning of several violent days and nights during which the police were attacked, 
cars were burned and shops were plundered. The extent of the expressed violence and 
lawlessness came as a shock2 and led to public condemnations of the “opportunistic 
theft”3 of the involved “vandals,” “thugs” and “hooligans.”4 The events brought into 
mind the similarly extensive riots around Paris and other French cities in 2005.5 Both 
cases are recent symbols of unexpected violent disorder, which seems to strike blindly, 
without any motives except for criminal intent, and without any signs of a legitimized 
revolt. It is the reception of such events which I wish to put to the test in my 
dissertation, by investigating the political implications of disruptive agency as it is 
instigated by rebellious adolescents with an immigrant background. What follows 
should not be read as a celebration of violence or criminality, but as a critical 
examination of the immediate political exclusion of unruly actions and expressions.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See: “Shock and anger as city awakes to worst scenes since the Blitz,” London Evening Standard, August 9, 
2011. http://www.standard.co.uk/news/shock-and-anger-as-city-awakes-to-worst-scenes-since-the-blitz-
6430993.html. 
3 See: “London violence: ‘needless opportunistic theft,’” Herald de Paris, August 8, 2011. 
http://www.heralddeparis.com/london-violence-needless-opportunistic-theft/143750. 
4 See: “The criminals who shame our nation,” Telegraph, August 9, 2011. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/8691352/The-criminals-who-shame-our-
nation.html. 
5 See: “UK riots parallel France,” New Zealand Herald, August 11, 2011. 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10744251. 
 4 
Several occasions of urban riots and other civil disturbances, predominantly involving 
young people, have disrupted public peace and reclaimed the streets, in both 
“Western” and “Eastern,” or “Arab,” cities, over the last years. These events have led 
some to conclude that we increasingly live in a time of riots (Badiou 2012). Despite 
the fact that these events have differed largely from one another, involving different 
actors, ignited by different circumstances and taking place in different countries, an 
initial dichotomy can be distinguished in the reception of these events. Some are 
understood as having a clear political significance, while others are not. Certain cases 
of civil disturbances in which public space is taken out of its neutral position, like the 
occupation of squares, and the sometimes violent street marches associated with the 
Occupy and Indignado movements, as well as the Arab spring, are understood within 
a political context, since they lay claims on a necessary change of society. On the other 
hand, a political dimension seems to be missing in all spontaneous events of 
disruption in which economic commodity goods are stolen and public property is 
demolished, while no political claims are expressed. Riots, which are first of all 
characterized by their spontaneous emergence, differ from the actions of pre-
organized, politically conscious social movements or pressure groups because no 
communiqués are spread, no spokespeople are put forward to address the press and 
no banners are carried. In these cases, one does not speak of political disturbances 
caused by dissatisfied citizens, but of the social dissolution of society. Such sudden 
attacks on civil peace are a clear cause for moral panic and are met with a strong and 
undisputed condemnation of the events in both the public and the political debate. 
 
In most of such cases of spontaneous civil disturbances in Western European cities, 
the instigators have been youngsters with an immigrant background from deprived 
urban areas. One can think here of the riots which took place around Paris in 2005,6 
in Amsterdam in 2007, 7  in Copenhagen in 2008 8 , in London in 2011 9  and in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See: “Timeline: French riots; a chronology of key events,” BBC, November 14, 2005. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4413964.stm. 
7 See: “Moroccan-Dutch youth riot in Amsterdam following fatal incident,” October 16, 2007, 
http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/240329/Moroccan_Dutch_youth_riot_in_Amsterdam_following
_fatal_incident. 
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Stockholm in 2013.10 In some cases, like the so-called “Facebook riots” in Haren,11 
and a similar case in Hamburg in 2011,12 it was ethnic Dutch, middle-class teenagers 
who violently clashed with the police and caused massive destruction of public and 
private property. In all cases, a collective of angry youngsters made itself momentarily 
visible in public space by violently occupying the streets and boldly defying state 
authorities, while not being recognized as a coherent social group in society under 
“normal” circumstances. The young rioters often made extensive use of social media 
to find each other in non-virtual space and took a contradictory position towards 
traditional media, like television; both defying its interference and enjoying the 
visibility of their deeds it afforded.  
 
Commentators and political representatives tend to analyze such events not in relation 
to, but in opposition to society as lawless deeds, inspired by personal frustrations or 
desires of abnormal young people who do not know how to behave like good citizens. 
Their abnormality is seen as being caused by social and educational deficiencies, 
alcohol and drug abuse, criminal tendencies and/or an aggressive, antisocial youth 
culture. The reaction of Nicolas Sarkozy, then French Minister of Internal Affairs, to 
the Parisian riots in 2005 and the reaction of David Cameron, English Prime Minister, 
to the London riots in 2011 are exemplary in this respect.13 Sarkozy described the 
youth involved in the French riots as criminal gang members and scum from whom 
the country should be liberated. English Prime Minister David Cameron analyzed the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See: “Danish youths riot for 7th night, several arrested,” Reuters, February 17, 2008. 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2008/02/17/idINIndia-31995320080217. 
9 See: “UK riots: London in lockdown, but violence flares across UK,” Guardian, August 10, 2011. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/09/uk-riots-police-tough-lockdown. 
10 See: “Stockholm sees fourth night of rioting”, CNN, May 24, 2013. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/23/world/europe/sweden-rioting  
11 See: “Puinhoop resteert na urenlange Facebook-rellen in Haren,” NRC, September 22, 2012. 
http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2012/09/22/puinhoop-resteert-na-urenlange-facebook-rellen-in-haren/ and 
“Burgermeester Haren: ‘Zeer gewelddadig tuig zocht bewust confrontatie,’” AD, September 9, 2012.  
http://www.ad.nl/ad/nl/11474/Facebookrellen/article/detail/3320643/2012/09/22/Burgemeester-
Haren-Zeer-gewelddadig-tuig-zocht-bewust-confrontatie.dhtml. 
12 See: “1,500 Party Crashers Riot Over Viral Facebook Invite,” June 6, 2011, 
http://allfacebook.com/viral-facebook-invite-1500-party-crashers_b45784. 
13 See: “Inflammatory Language,” Guardian, November 8, 2005. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2005/nov/08/inflammatoryla; “England riots: Broken society is 
top priority - Cameron,” BBC, August 15, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14524834. 
 6 
London 2011 riots as a sign of the “moral collapse” of a “broken society.” By stating 
that this moral collapse is manifested by a lack of parenting skills in “troubled” 
families, and that an “all-out war against gangs and gang culture” is needed, Cameron 
sought the origin of the riots in deviant socio-psychological behavior, youth culture 
and youth delinquency. In the case of the Dutch Facebook riots in Haren, the term 
“moral vacation” was used to describe the attitude of youngsters who use their 
weekend breaks to escape the discipline of work life and engage in a mix of 
lawlessness, disinhibition and aggression after drinking too much (Weenink 2011).  
 
The emergence of such spontaneous events of civil unrest is ascribed to the individual 
deviancy of the young people involved, who are criminalized and pathologized, while 
the relation to the social and political structures of the society in which they are 
embedded is often overlooked. This leads to a representation of the events as a certain 
state of exception that does not fit into the national social consciousness and can only 
be rightly dealt with by effective risk management and a well-prepared practice of 
policing. Authorities investigate who can be held responsible for the failed 
containment of the riots and develop extra security policies to prevent the occurrence 
of new riots. Meanwhile, however, the stories of the young perpetrators themselves 
are often not taken into account.14 After their sudden physical taking over of the 
streets has ended, they remain voiceless in the public debate. Because no further 
insight is provided into the experiences and perception of the instigators of such civil 
disturbances, the perpetrators are immediately isolated as evil strangers or barbarous 
outlaws, who display unacceptable immoral and uncivil15 behavior. Civil disturbances 
and riots are not seen as an aspect of the social dynamics within society, but as a 
threatening destabilization of society by those who do not merit to be seen as fellow 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The joint research project of the Guardian and the London School of Economics, from which I derived 
the quotes used in the prelude to this introduction, is an exception. In the project “Reading the Riots,” 
the accounts of rioters are explicitly investigated in order to gain insight into the events of summer 2011. 
15 I use the term “uncivil” to describe events, people and behavior that are placed outside of a civil order. 
I wish to emphasize the double meaning of the term. Uncivil has both a social and an ethical 
connotation. It indicates the negative of behavior that can be ascribed to a citizen, who is seen as a 
member of a specific society, and as the negative of behavior that is in accordance with the mores of that 
society. It is used to indicate behavior of those who do not fit into the social structure of society and 
those who do not fit into the approved moral codes of that society. 
 7 
citizens, but rather as standing outside of the moral structure and political rules of 
society.  
 
2. Boys from the streets contesting “civilized” politics 
The view that all these events are apolitical and antisocial needs to be questioned. Not 
all of the spontaneous, and seemingly apolitical, civil disturbances mentioned above 
can be put into the same category. In certain cases, an immediate exclusion and moral 
condemnation of the young people involved obscures a certain subversive political 
significance of the events. This is the case in the reception of violent civil unrest, 
instigated by youngsters with an immigrant background who live in deprived 
neighborhoods, which have the reputation of being the breeding ground for a range 
of socio-economic problems. Reports of these events focus on the abnormality of the 
perpetrators due to their ethnic and cultural foreignness and limited integration, which 
is seen as intertwined with a gangster lifestyle and criminal behavior.16 The alleged 
“street culture” reinforces the image of these youngsters as non-participative citizens. 
As Dutch publicist Kaldenbach (2005) describes it, there seems to be a battle going on 
between the “street culture” and the “citizen’s culture.” Such dichotomies contribute 
to an image of these adolescents as “undesired aliens,” regardless of their official 
citizenship status. These adolescents are perceived as “problem cases” or “risk 
groups,” who are not seen as, and often do not see themselves as, full members of the 
political community, as they do not vote, are not active in political parties and are 
generally not associated with active, civilized behavior (Duprez 2009). This reputation 
reinforces a double exclusion. Young urban troublemakers of immigrant descent are 
excluded from the domain of good citizenry due to their deviant identity and their 
deviant agency.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See: “Rioting in France: What’s wrong with Europe?,” November 7, 2005, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/rioting-in-france-what-s-wrong-with-europe-a-383623.html;  
“David Starkey on UK riots: ‘The whites have become black,’” Guardian, August 13, 2011. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/video/2011/aug/13/david-starkey-whites-black-video; “How gangs 
have taken the place of parents in urban ghettoes,” Independent, August 10, 2011. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/how-gangs-have-taken-the-place-of-parents-in-urban-
ghettoes-2335074.html. 
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Other than countercultural groups with a clear political ideology, like social 
movements and identity-based interest groups, these young urban troublemakers are 
seen as people who do not only express an undesirable or unacceptable political 
agency, but rather express no political agency at all.17 They abide by neither the rules 
of the parliamentary political game nor the rules of the extra-parliamentary political 
game. These foreign-looking young men evoke a broadly present feeling of distrust 
and a wish to keep them at a distance, even when they are nowhere in sight. It is 
exactly this reputation of disturbing, non-participative and apolitical citizens that 
makes it easy to label these boys as outsiders to the political domain and the 
community of “civilized citizens.” I raise the question of whether they are rightly seen 
as outsiders to the political community, or whether their agency is not recognized as 
political because we have a selective understanding of “civil” politics, which is framed 
by dominant power plays and discourses.  
 
I choose to use the term “young urban troublemakers” to designate the protagonists 
of this research. As will become clear, the term “troublemaker” does not have a 
singular significance within the context of my research. It first of all signals the general 
sense of moral disapproval with which the agency of youngsters involved in civil 
disturbances is met. The term also enables me to point out the fact that the civil 
disturbances, which are the object of study, not only consist of riots, but also of other 
forms of “trouble” that are caused in the public domain. At the same time, I intend to 
deconstruct the negative moral connotation of the term “troublemaker” by focusing 
on the productive sides and critical potential of subversive agency. In the preface to 
“Gender Trouble,” Judith Butler (1990, vii) describes trouble as a scandal of sudden 
intrusion and unanticipated agency, and a place of contestation of authority. In her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In this study, I problematize the connotation of agency as always intentional and the product of a 
conscious subject, deliberately and rationally mastering its actions. When we come across the notion of 
political agency, it often designates the political decisions- and claims-making of members of a certain 
political community who either operate within the field of a certain form of political governance (in the 
Rawlsian tradition) or who claim the right to make changes in this field of political governance (in the 
Arendtian tradition). Whether we speak of deliberative political agents or political change agents, we 
usually imagine rational subjects who operate on the basis of autonomous decisions. I intend to explore 
the possibilities of a political agency, which is not necessarily expressed in affirmative action, but which is 
more unintentional and more inter-dependent on the relation with others. 
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work, trouble disturbs the binary and seemingly stable and uncontested relation 
between men and women. Despite the fact that gender issues are not discussed in my 
research, trouble plays a similar role here. Butler investigates the ways in which gender 
categories and hierarchies can be troubled. I investigate in which ways general 
assumptions about citizenship and political agency can be troubled. In my work, 
trouble disturbs the dominant and usually uncontested division between “good 
citizens” and “deviant young outlaws.” It is the young urban troublemaker who takes 
such dominant presumptions out of their untroubling comfort zone and forces others 
to critically reconsider their political implications.  
 
The young urban troublemakers presented in my research are all male because, in the 
reception of civil unrest, public disturbances and riots, the instigators, who stand in 
the foreground, are usually men. This does not mean that young women do not play a 
role in any of the disruptive events discussed in this dissertation, nor do I wish to 
deny that it would have been interesting to examine female views on civil disturbances 
in “problem neighborhoods.” However, in this study, I have chosen to predominantly 
focus on the lived experiences and accounts of those who are generally perceived as 
the ones causing the trouble. In accounts of disruptive events, it is always young men 
who dominate both the image of the events and their reception, also in the perception 
of those who are close to the events themselves, as it became clear to me in the many 
conversations conducted during my research. I have chosen to limit myself to a 
discussion of both the lived accounts of the most obvious troublemakers and the 
political context of their disruptive agency. 
 
In this dissertation, I explore the unruly political meaning of the disturbing, and even 
violent, presence of young urban troublemakers in the public domain, and I propose 
to see such disruptions as a subversive form of civil engagement. I use the term 
“unruly politics” to designate the political agency of people who are not recognized as 
worthy, or formal, political actors within the domain of institutional politics and who 
express agency which interferes in the political organization of society, while it does 
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not abide by the formal, moral and legal rules of accepted practices of civil 
engagement and political participation. We cannot investigate this possible unruly 
political meaning if we a priori dismiss the involved actors of all unorganized civil 
disturbances as not having any relation to the practice of active citizenship and 
politics.  
 
Can certain discredited behavior have political significance outside of an institutionally 
endorsed understanding of politics? Can young urban troublemakers be seen as unruly 
political agents and, if so, does their political agency speak of a resistance against, or 
denunciation of, an unjust state of affairs in institutional politics? It is these questions 
which need to be asked in the analysis of unorganized civil disturbances and riots, and 
which are often left insufficiently addressed. In the following chapters, I will offer 
insight into a framework of concepts that enables an investigation of these questions. 
Within this framework, it is crucial to not only reserve political sense to those 
recognized citizens who display the “right” kind of civil participation and political 
awareness, but to break open a selective understanding of “civil” politics, which is 
framed by dominant power plays and discourses. The political space needs to be 
opened up to those who are overlooked in, or explicitly excluded from, the civil 
community and the practice of good citizenship and institutional politics. The 
possibility that civil engagement can be subversive and that political agency can also 
take unruly forms is central to the analysis elaborated in my thesis.  
 
3. The difference between institutional and unruly politics 
The conceptual framework, which I have developed in order to evaluate the possible 
political significance of unorganized civil disturbances, is derived from a more general 
discussion about the relation between politics as the institutional organization of 
society and possibilities for unruly political agency in people’s everyday lives. I 
investigate how we can recognize the political sense of said unruly political agency and 
whether this recognition can contribute to a critical attitude towards coercive images 
of good citizenship and a unified, homogeneous political community. The immediate 
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moral condemnation of young urban troublemakers cannot be seen apart from larger 
processes of in- and exclusion, which go hand in hand with the building of national, 
imagined communities in Western European neoliberal democracies (Anderson 1991). 
Uncivil contestations of exclusion generally do not make any political sense to the 
majority of the political community, nor are they seen as expressions of civil 
engagement, because the dominant understanding of valid political agency is framed 
by institutionalized politics, as I will clarify in the third part of my dissertation. The 
dynamics between an institutional political climate of risk management and 
compulsory integration, on the one hand, and the emergence of “disturbing” agency 
of people who refuse to conform to the standard, and are therefore stigmatized or 
marginalized, on the other hand, form the basis of this research. Certain agency, 
which is normally judged for its criminal and/or violent character, can nevertheless 
raise issues of social injustice and political inequality. My research questions originate 
from a fascination with “troublemakers” who, sometimes painfully, make it clear 
where dominant presumptions on accepted civic and political participation grate 
against the equal right to existence and valuation of different people in a pluriform 
society. It is driven by an urge to understand how the shift from “otherness” to 
“undesired strangeness” comes about; why certain believes, attitudes and forms of 
behavior are easily accepted within a framework of “good citizenship,” while others 
are dismissed as “alien,” “uncivil” or even “barbarous.” I approach these processes of 
in- and exclusion from a political perspective and focus on the difference between 
participation in society that is seen as disruptive, counterproductive and threatening 
and civil participation that is seen as contributing to the building of a healthy national 
community and bearing witness to the right kind of political awareness.  
 
However, I do not only intend to shed a light on the difference between accepted and 
non-accepted forms of societal participation; I also aim to investigate how 
mechanisms of in- and exclusion associated with political communities could be 
altered in order to create space for the acknowledgment of the experiences of those 
who are unjustly marginalized within the current political status quo. I explore how 
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the political meaning of contested forms of civic participation can be recognized in 
order to acknowledge the social situation we share with those who take part in society 
in a troublesome or disturbing way. It is exactly the disturbing interventions of those 
who do not conform to the image of the good citizen which can create an awareness 
of the shortcomings of the political organization of our society. It is exactly in the 
“unworking” of seemingly evident and unifying community bonds that we are forced 
to listen to certain uncomfortable truths about experiences of injustice and inequality 
that remain hidden under “normal” circumstances. It is my aim to open the 
perception of the reader to these disruptive accounts of injustices in order to 
acknowledge them as truthful testimonies of the political and social fabric we share, 
whether we see one another as troublemakers or good citizens. The construction of 
the political community can be critically examined by acknowledging accounts of the 
lived experiences of troublemakers as valid counter-narratives, expressing 
discomforting truths about the way we live together and organize our society. These 
counter-narratives cannot be simply dismissed as detached from society due to their 
uncivil and troubling nature. As much as the counter-narratives of young urban 
troublemakers disturb our image of the good citizen, I intend with this dissertation to 
disturb our image of the right kind of political agency and open a perspective on 
unexpected and unruly political possibilities. 
 
In this study, I bring specific accounts of lived experiences in conversation with 
philosophical concepts. I engage the words and thoughts of people on the streets with 
more academic philosophical lines of thought in order to compose a situated 
intervention in the discourse of political theory. In order to open up our 
understanding of politics to unruly expressions, I develop a theoretical framework 
around the notion of political agency, which is informed by various narratives.18 These 
narratives are composed from the words of male adolescents from two different 
neighborhoods, but also consist of images, lyrics and story lines from popular culture, 
which appeal to the young people with whom I have spoken. I conducted a series of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The way I approach the narratives, which play a role in my research, will be described in more detail in 
Section 1.1 of the methodological reflections, Chapter 2. 
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interviews with young men, between the ages of 15 and 25, in one Dutch and one 
French neighborhood: Kanaleneiland in Utrecht and Grigny in the banlieues of Paris. 
Both cities have been in the news over the recent years as a result of public 
disturbances caused by young inhabitants from these so-called “problem 
neighborhoods.” 19  I have chosen to interview people in these two particular 
neighborhoods, not only because of the media attention they received, but also 
because they are exemplary for the different discussions and problems related to the 
governing of deprived urban areas. In both urban contexts, policymakers and social 
workers are working to develop different strategies in order to prevent new cases of 
urban disturbances. An encounter with both neighborhoods and their inhabitants 
enabled me to analyze the relationship between the disruptive agency of young urban 
troublemakers and institutional politics and policies; this relationship is characterized 
by both governing policies, which are designed to monitor and discipline young urban 
troublemakers and contain their interference in public space, and a mechanism of 
opposition – “us” versus “them” – in which antagonistic perspectives on politics play 
an important role. 
 
Seen from a theoretical perspective, my research can be situated as an intervention in 
the philosophical debate on what is named a political difference between politics as a state-
oriented and institutionalized strategy for the organization of society and the political, 
an ontological dimension of social processes which is unexpected, pluriform, 
disruptive and/or agonistic (Schmitt 1996; Marchart 2007). Several critical thinkers 
who play a role in my research have focused in their work on a non-formalized, non-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In relation to Grigny, see for example: “CCLXXXIII. Les nuits de Grigny. (Des émeutes nocturnes 
dans une banlieue parisienne),” April 28, 2008, http://geographie.blog.lemonde.fr/2008/04/28/cclxxxiii-
les-nuits-de-grigny-des-emeutes-nocturnes-dans-une-banlieue-parisienne/ ; “Un CRS de Grigny: ‘Ils 
veulent se faire un flic,’” June 2, 2011, http://www.marianne.net/fredericploquin/Un-CRS-de-Grigny-
Ils-veulent-se-faire-un-flic_a31.html ; “Trois policiers blessés lors d’échauffourées,” August 25, 2012,  
http://www.letelegramme.com/ig/generales/france-monde/france/grigny-essonne-trois-policiers-
blesses-lors-d-echauffourees-25-08-2012-1817319.php. In relation to Kanaleneiland, see for example: 
“Inwoners van Kanaleneiland bang voor nieuwe rellen in Utrecht,” June 20, 2007, 
http://forums.marokko.nl/showthread.php?t=1476206&s=aafe1cfd2362ba845f1bb7ed3c2cf0f7; “Rellen 
tijdens ARK festival,” June 19, 2011, http://dnu.nu/artikel/4670-rellen-tijdens-ark-festival-update; 
“Jongeren Kanaleneiland keren zich tegen de politie,” April 10, 2007, 
http://www.rtvutrecht.nl/nieuws/149899. 
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institutionalized understanding of political agency as resistance against both the 
democratic or motivational deficit in politics and the domination of a coercive notion 
of the good citizen. Like these thinkers, I look at this issue through a 
postfoundationalist lens (Marchart 2007). This provides an opportunity to critically 
examine the ontological assumptions that lie at the basis of a foundational rhetoric 
about the cultural and moral roots of a national community of good citizens and its 
uncontested political organization. In the following chapter, I will discuss this notion 
of the political difference in more detail and deal with the theoretical work of several 
thinkers who explore how moments of the political can disturb the current state of 
affairs in politics. I will also reveal the urgency of injustices done to those who do not 
have a voice in that current state of affairs. Such political moments are unruly by 
nature because they intervene with the governance structures of institutional politics, 
as it is played by the rules. With my dissertation, I wish to contribute to a more 
detailed understanding of the nature of such possible political moments, which can 
disrupt politics in the permanent state of surveillance and normative assimilation, as it 
characterizes contemporary Western European democracies. I aim to explicitly 
animate and enrich this debate by engaging a theoretical analysis with the lived 
accounts of those who stand at the center of such disruptive political events. 
 
4. Politics, the political and their interaction: Outline 
The relation between politics and the political forms the background against which my 
dissertation is set. Different accents in the distinction between politics and the 
political are highlighted in the four different parts of my dissertation. Before 
introducing these parts, I will first explicate how the different chapters should be read 
in relation to the dynamics between politics and the political. Chapter 1. and 2. consist 
of a continued, more detailed theoretical and methodological introduction of my 
research. Chapter 3. and 4. place the accent on the incompatibility of the domain of 
politics and the “world of experience” of the excluded. Here, I explore the dominance 
that politics, as the institutional organization of society, has over societal relations. I 
also explore how this dominance is either escaped or sabotaged by those who do not 
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conform to the norm of the average, good citizen. This part features the majority of 
my fieldwork, with each of the two chapters focusing on one of the two 
neighborhoods where I conducted my research. In these chapters, I extensively 
discuss the stories of the young men I interviewed, as well as the reactions from the 
institutional domain to their presence and position in society. In Chapter 5. and 6., I 
focus on the possible disruptive impact of the political, as it emerges in acts of 
dissensus. I analyze these acts of dissensus as momentary and situated events in which 
the often illegal and violent interventions of those who have no part in politics appeal 
to a status of justice and equality which has not been achieved in the present political 
situation. I focus on the “chaos” and “violence” instigated by youngsters from 
deprived urban areas and the impact it has on their environment and the public 
debate. I investigate various examples of popular culture in which this impact is 
reflected. In Chapter 7. and 8., I explore ways in which politics and the political 
interact with each other. I focus on the possibilities for an attitude of resistance 
against, or denunciation of, an unjust state of affairs in politics which could originate 
in a moment of recognition of the political significance to the agency of a precarious 
political subject. In this part, I move beyond the narratives of my interlocutors in 
order to imagine possible future practices of radical democracy which remain 
unimaginable to the youngsters I interviewed.  
 
My dissertation is divided in four parts, consisting of eight chapters in total. This 
introduction opens the first part, in which I present the theoretical and 
methodological approaches to this research. In Chapter 1., the theoretical positioning, 
I will explicate how a certain political myth about shared normative and cultural 
foundations is installed in order to enforce a sense of belonging to a unitary political 
community, while this myth simultaneously excludes those who deviate from the 
image of the good citizen. The exclusionary tendencies of such a founding fiction in 
politics can be criticized by deploying a postfoundationalist perspective on the 
difference between politics and the political. In Chapter 2., the methodological 
positioning, I will focus on the process of this research and discuss the central role of 
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notions like troublemaking, listening to words and counter-narratives, as well as an 
experienced notion of truth in the process. I will also explicate the technical details of 
my fieldwork. 
 
In the second part of my dissertation, consisting of Chapter 3. and 4., I focus on the 
relation between the “community of experience” of young inhabitants of Grigny and 
Kanaleneiland, and the domain of institutional politics in which these experiences are 
embedded. I investigate the role of an antagonistic tension between “us” versus 
“‘them,” in which the youngsters’ sense of belonging is embedded. The world of “us” 
offers a framework of values and rules of conduct which shapes their life attitude and 
identity as well as practices to make a living. However, I will state that this world of 
shared experiences does not lead to the formation of a collective identity organized 
around demands of an emancipatory politics in the populist tradition. The solidarity, 
which exists in the world of us, is in general not politically instrumentalized in relation 
to state institutions. The traditional, working class trust in popular politics has largely 
disappeared from neighborhoods like Grigny and Kanaleneiland. The belief in a 
radical popular political transformation has disappeared under the all-encompassing 
gaze of governmental mechanisms of surveillance and control, which are aimed at 
disciplining at-risk youths in order for them to take individual responsibility for their 
social situation and display a generally accepted form of civic participation. 
 
In the third part of my dissertation, consisting of Chapter 5. and 6., I explore a 
possible political sense to the agency of young urban troublemakers, which is both 
distinguished from the aspirations of organized popular political movements and 
state-endorsed political participation. Even though the boys whom I interviewed did 
not speak of their own agency as having political potential, I characterize them as 
contemporary “rebels without a cause,” whose disruptive behavior can be understood 
from a political perspective precisely because it disturbs the hegemonic order of 
society from which they feel excluded, despite their lack of organization. The boys’ 
habit of “making chaos,” and recurrent cases of urban riots are not supported by a 
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clear expression of political claims or a political program, but can nevertheless be 
understood as meaningful in relation to a notion of “the political” as an unexpected 
event and disturbing social process. In addition, I discuss how it is exactly the kind of 
seemingly senseless violent outbursts, as displayed in recurrent urban riots, which can 
illuminate the shortcomings of the dominant legal order. The fact that such actions 
seem senseless to authorities and the general public, and even cause moral panic, 
proves that those who are involved in these kinds of riots cannot equally take part in 
the organization of society and see violent and disturbing behavior as their only 
possible recourse for focusing attention on their presence and experienced injustices. 
 
In the fourth part, consisting of Chapter 7. and 8., I discuss the conditions under 
which recognition could emerge for the political meaning of seemingly senseless, 
disruptive behavior of young urban troublemakers, and how this recognition could 
lead to a critical evaluation of an imagined political community of good citizens. This 
recognition relates back to a vulnerable co-existence in the world, preceding the 
formation of a specific formal political order, and preceding the formation of 
communities based on a shared culture or identity. At the site of this recognition, a 
precarious political subject emerges which reflects a substantial lack of a shared 
identity, but can nevertheless open a perspective on a possibly shared agency, working 
towards another world in which experienced injustices no longer take place, but in 
which ongoing antagonisms are still preserved. The recognition of the participation of 
young urban troublemakers in such a possibly shared agency starts with an openness 
to the often dissonant and uncivil voices of these youths in the public domain. I 
propose to see the disruptive, and sometimes violent, interventions of young urban 
troublemakers as expressions of a “scandal of truth” which put general conventions of 
good citizenship on the line because they confront us with the fact that there are 
different truths to be told about different communities of experience underneath the 
myth of national unity and solidarity. A critical investigation of our imagined, unified, 
political community can start by listening to such scandals of truth. It is at this site of 
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active and unruly investigation where the difference between “politics” and the 
“political” materializes. 
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Interlude 
 
 
 
The music video accompanying the song “Schuif aan de kant” (Move over), by Dutch 
rapper Appa, begins with a short fragment from the popular game show “Get the 
Picture,” dating from 2004. Contestants have to guess a word that matches the 
description given by the game show host. The game show host asks for a word 
beginning with the letter “a” which describes someone who is not adjusted to life in 
society. The contestant, a young blond girl, hesitates for just a second and opts for 
the word “allochthonous,” the standard, policy-related word for describing someone 
with an immigrant background who lives in the Netherlands. Nervous laughter by the 
audience and the game show host follows. The contestant realizes her mistake. The 
correct answer was “antisocial,” of course…  
 
 
Move over, if you see me as a problem 
If you refuse to cooperate, I move right through you 
Hard times, and life doesn’t get better 
You’re nowhere registered, no health insurance 
It’s like your life is cursed 
And you go crazy from the unpaid fines 
Unemployment is a fact, shit is bad, man 
So I take the mic and I work it 
Guy, don’t talk bullshit 
This is the Westside spit shit 
If you want to fuck I show you the red-light district 
And if you want to come you ask for directions 
For a body and a donnie you get a needle in your neck 
And your poetie is gone before you know it 
Or you get swindled in a dark alley 
I cannot be dodged, always to be found in the neighborhood 
I never go out, that’s for sure 
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Because I don’t get in anyways 
I stand before, behind, and on the streets 
Don’t show emotions, so how can I instigate hate? 
Such bullshit, I don’t know what’s the point 
They call me a terrorist, while the media blows everything up 
Light-colored skin, that’s my background, so look 
Guys have our backs in every deprived neighborhood 
Because they feel what I describe here for sure 
So there is surely a chance that you don’t understand this20 
    
- Appa, “Schuif aan de Kant” (Move over) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 My translation. Original text: “Schuif aan de kant, als je me ziet as een probleem/ Weiger je mee te 
werken ga ik dwars door je heen/ Moeilijke tijden en het leven word niet beter/ Je staat nergens 
ingeschreven bent niet ziekenfonds verzekerd/ En het lijkt alsof je leven zogenaamd vervloekt is/ En je 
wordt helemaal leip van de openstaande boetes/ Werkloosheid is een feit, shit is erg man/ Dus ik, pak de 
mic en ik maak er werk van/ Jonge lul niet (ash kat khowef)/ Dit is die Westside spit shit/ Als je wil 
fokken wijs ik je de red light district/ En als je dan ook wil komen jonge dan vraag je de weg/ Voor een 
body van een donnie krijg je een naald in je nek/ En is je poetie weg zonder dat je het weet/ Of word je 
opgelicht in een donkere steeg/ ben niet te ontwijken altijd in de wijk te vinden/ Ik ga nooit uit, ga daar 
nou maar van uit/ Want ik kom toch niet binnen/ Ik sta voor, achter en op de straten/ Toon geen 
emotie dus hoe kan ik aanzetten tot haat/ Wat een teringzooi, ik weet niet waar het op slaat/ Ze noemen 
mij terrorist terwijl de media alles opblaast/ Lichtgetint, da’s mijn achtergrond dus kijk/ Gasten staan 
achter ons in elke achterstandswijk/ Want zij voelen zeker wat ik hier nu beschrijf/ Dus er is vast een 
kans dat jij dit niet begrijpt,” source: http://songteksten.net/lyric/4624/57741/appa/schuif-aan-de-
kant.html. 
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Chapter 1  
          
At the threshold between politics and the political: 
Theoretical positioning 
 
 
 
…there is no foundation: there is only the “with” – 
proximity and its distancing – the strange familiarity of all 
the worlds in the world. (Nancy 2000, 187) 
 
 
In this chapter, I will sketch the theoretical outlines of the debate about the difference 
between “politics” and the “political,” as it is approached through a 
postfoundationalist lens. This debate forms the theoretical background of my thesis 
because it offers the opportunity to speak about the political significance of uncivil, 
illegal and disruptive agency that is not embedded in an institutional political context 
and often explicitly confronts or challenges such institutional politics. Here, I will 
discuss the position of various authors who have played a crucial role in defining this 
“political difference” (Marchart 2007). They have done so by focusing on the role of 
the political as a dynamic in human interactions that escapes a “static” organization of 
politics, both in the sense of a state-induced management of political issues and in the 
sense of immobilizing or capturing human interactions in a certain prescribed order. 
The idea of a political element in human interactions that is not already fully captured 
within politics as an institutional model of organization is important to me in 
formulating my own understanding of the practice of “unruly politics.”  
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Before I offer my own take on this practice at the end of the chapter, I will first 
examine various ways in which the dominance of a “founded story” of politics can be 
critically questioned. I will begin by exploring how a dominant model of political 
participation is rooted in presumptions about a shared basis of culture and morals, 
resulting in a coercive image of the good citizen. I will then proceed to examine how 
from a postfoundational perspective on both politics and society one can question the 
exclusionary effects of such imagined, necessarily shared, political foundations. 
Thinkers who adopt such a postfoundational perspective alternatively propose to see 
the foundations of politics as contingent, which implies that tensions, inherent to the 
practice of politics, can never be completely resolved by referring back to a certain 
undisputed basis or standard. Both in line of the work of Carl Schmitt and Jean-Luc 
Nancy, however different their positions, the political seems out of reach, in a 
situation in which institutional politics as a model of management or policing claims 
to present a dominant order in which each political expression should be inscribed. At 
the end of this chapter, I will introduce my own perspective on the relation between 
politics and the political. In the practice of “unruly politics” the political is not lost, 
but emerges in a confrontational relationship with institutional politics. This 
perspective will be further developed in my thesis. 
 
1.1. The threat of a democratic deficit 
Western European societies are currently shaped under the influence of various, 
divergent developments. While societies are becoming more diverse due to a 
continuing influx of migrants and the fading away of nation-state borders in the 
increasingly globalized dynamics of political governance and economy, Western 
European nation states also seem to feel the need to return to a certain original, stable, 
homogeneous and uncontested sense of community. These seemingly oppositional 
tendencies often reinforce each other. The interrelatedness between diversity and 
openness as a consequence of globalization, on the one hand, and sidedness and 
protectionism as a consequence of a nostalgic longing for a unified nation state, on 
the other, has an impact on political attitudes and strategies. Where various belief 
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systems and ways of life were previously given public space under the pretext of 
liberal politics, liberal values and principles are now presented as a core aspect of the 
Western European identity, which needs to be subscribed to by all citizens (Joppke 
2004). In various Western European countries, an enforcement of new nationalisms 
and right-wing populist party politics is nourished by a quest for cultural heritage and 
xenophobic sentiments (Modood & Werbner 1997; Holmes 2000; Brubaker 2001; 
Gingrich & Banks 2006). In this climate, societies are often becoming more plural, 
while at the same time less tolerant. A lifestyle, religious conviction or social attitude 
that deviates from the norm is often met with xenophobic reactions in which 
“otherness” is readily associated with “undesired strangeness.” This alienation of the 
other can be perceived in a variety of societal developments and is not only aimed at 
ethnic minorities. This process of alienation ranges from the criminalization of radical 
left-wing activists and second- and third-generation immigrants to the moral 
containment of religious minority groups and lower-class youth culture.  
 
At the same time, the political process has become more complex and diffuse under 
the influence of globalization and the dominance of neoliberal governance. 
International relations, power plays and governing bodies have an impact on the 
political decisions of national governments. Within neoliberal governance, the political 
and economic sphere have become more closely entwined, and civic organizations 
have entered the domain of political governance. Within this setting, the recent 
economic crisis has further complicated the relationship between citizens and political 
institutions. In these times of economic crisis and social uncertainties, Western 
European citizens feel that their governments have failed on the promises made 
during the heydays of the welfare state. While citizens demand that the government 
secure their basic needs, the government is urging citizens to assume their own 
responsibility in creating an economic and social safety net. There seems to be a 
mismatch in the logic of supply and demand within the political organization of 
society (Norris 2011). At the same time, the whereabouts of citizens are closely 
monitored by the state in order to prevent them from conducting certain activities – 
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ranging from underground economies to civil disobedience and terrorism – which 
could undermine the current neoliberal, democratic governance. A gap seems to be 
emerging between the domain of political governance and the worries and interests of 
citizens. 
 
.... the institutions of secular liberal democracy simply do not sufficiently motivate 
their citizenry. On the contrary, at this point in time, the political institutions of the 
Western democracies appear strangely demotivating. There is increasing talk of a 
democratic deficit, a feeling of the irrelevance of traditional electoral politics to the 
lives of citizens, and an uncoupling of civil society from the state, at the same time as 
the state seeks to extend ever-increasing powers of surveillance and control into all 
areas of civil society. I think it might be claimed that there is a motivational deficit at 
the heart of liberal democratic life, where citizens experience the governmental norms 
that rule contemporary society as externally binding but not internally compelling. 
(Critchley 2007, 7) 
 
Chantal Mouffe speaks in a similar way of a democratic deficit; the democratic system 
in which we live does not leave room for people to be truly engaged in politics 
(Mouffe 2005:4). Politics is too much associated with the institutional realm itself, 
while the need for people to fortify and defend democracy and its institutions seems 
to be forgotten. In these times of diminishing interest in the practice of politics, 
people seem to be most easily mobilized to protect their own feelings of home and 
safety (Duyvendak 2011). Out of fear of losing voters to new populist parties, 
traditional parties apply populist strategies in order to motivate the electorate and give 
it the impression that governance is developed in the interests of the average citizen. 
To give an example:21 in 2011, Dutch Deputy Prime Minister Maxime Verhagen of 
the Christian Democratic Party spoke in a speech about the times of discomfort in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 In this chapter, I use various examples from a Dutch context in order to illustrate tendencies which are 
noticeable in a wider Western European context. I have chosen to use these examples because I am best 
acquainted with the nuances of the political debate and expressions of popular culture in the Netherlands. 
By embedding these examples in a more general sociological and philosophical analysis, I hope to clarify 
their relevance in relation to developments beyond the borders of the Dutch nation state. 
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which we live.22 People distrust society and feel insecure and threatened by strange 
influences beyond their control. Such feelings of discomfort should be taken seriously 
by politicians, according to Verhagen. However, only populist parties seem to be able 
to channel feelings of discomfort in a fruitful way, at the expense of traditional parties 
like the Christian Democrats. To regain the support of the electorate, these traditional 
parties should offer citizens a “founded story,” that provides direction. This story 
should be reassuring to those who “think it is going too fast with Europe, the internet 
and the world economy” and should speak of “a shared foundation of Western 
cultural values.” Despite the fact that citizens should assume their own responsibility 
in designing society, politicians should be at a “distant proximity” in order to provide 
directions. Larger political issues can only be resolved when people feel safe in their 
own environment, according to Verhagen.  
 
Paradoxically enough, this rhetoric about the comforting direction provided by the 
state goes hand in hand with a strong government-supported discourse on the 
citizens’ own responsibility in keeping society “liveable.” Key concepts like 
“participation” and “good and active citizenship” are used to describe the model 
citizen who not only passively respects, but actively lives up to the founding principles 
of society and helps others to do the same (Newman & Tonkens 2011). Under 
influence of these tendencies, a certain coercive image of the “good citizen” is created 
that reflects a focus on dominant cultural and moral affiliations. Citizenship does not 
only refer to those with the right papers living within the borders of the nation state, 
but also to those who make up an imagined national community of like-minded 
people with a similar identity (Anderson 1991). An ascription to the body of “good 
citizens” increasingly depends on one’s integration into the dominant culture and 
one’s public exposure to the right kind of “civilized” behavior (Flint 2009). Those 
who deliberately or unintentionally rebel against the dominant currency of what is 
understood as “good citizenship” become the object of concerned media reports, 
extensive monitoring and strict safety regulations. Consequently, those deemed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Source: “Toespraak Maxime Verhagen over populisme,” NRC, June 28, 2011. 
http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2011/06/28/toespraak-maxim-verhagen/. 
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express “uncivil” behavior are not only looked at with disapproval, but are excluded 
from the national community. 
 
1.2. Earn your citizenship! 
The promotion of a certain standard of good citizenship, embedded in an imagined 
political community, is meant to engage people both politically and socially in civil 
society, and prevent its fragmentation. However, the more ideas of good citizenship 
are institutionally standardized, the more this leads to a “dividing” thinking about 
social processes, in which everything that diverges from the norm is deliberately 
thought outside of the “real” society. Dutch sociologist Willem Schinkel (2007) sees 
this kind of reasoning as symptomatic for our contemporary thinking about society. 
Society tends to be envisioned as a homogeneous organism whose well-being can be 
threatened by strange influences from outside. Society is imagined as a structured 
whole, with a clear identity and purpose, which allows us to decide who will be 
admitted as a participant and who can be rejected. In times in which major political 
ideologies have lost their credibility, or in times of discomfort, as they are described in 
the speech of the former Dutch vice-premier, a story must be created to unite people. 
We suffer from a collective identity crisis. We are no longer directed towards the same 
goal, but turn around in circles without any sense of direction. The only motivation 
left to us is individual prosperity, according to Schinkel. We have lost sight of any kind 
of common values. Society has become a body without a destination (Schinkel 2007, 
26). New cement is therefore needed to keep the foundations of society from 
disintegrating. Society must be depicted as a robust unity with a strong identity in 
order to take people’s minds away from the possible meaninglessness, purposelessness 
or even finiteness of society. We cannot stand the thought that the foundations of our 
society are relative and have no transcendental value. Such a thought would cause us 
to lose faith in society altogether.  
 
At the same time, this faith already seems to be lost. We are only able to picture the 
unity of society in negative terms by pointing a finger at that which threatens this 
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unity from the outside, as Schinkel notes. Society has become a hypochondriac body 
because it can not look its own contingency in the face, and it therefore constantly 
searches for scapegoats to blame for threatening its health. The possibility that society 
is not an eternal given, but rather a temporary and situated constellation of social 
relations that could come to an end at a certain moment, just as it started at a certain 
moment, seems unacceptable. To escape the idea of the finitude of society, we 
continuously imagine viruses and parasites threatening to attack us from the outside. 
We develop an obsession with social hygiene.23 Every risk has to be excluded in order 
to keep the carefully constructed organism of society in healthy shape. If they cannot 
be excluded, strange elements have to be neutralized by integrating them. A 
continuously repeated emphasis in the public debate on the need for integration is a 
consequence of this reasoning. In support of the logic of this call for integration, a 
certain community of naturally solidary and allied people is envisioned. The bond 
between those who make up this community is presented as evident, while it can only 
be traced back to the collective imagination.  
 
Society is thus founded on a “confiction,” according to Schinkel. With this neologism, 
a composition of the prefix “con,” related to the Latin “cum,” and the noun “fiction,” 
Schinkel wishes to denominate a fiction that legitimizes the origins, shared values and 
identity of society in order to keep people together. A fiction, which literally has a 
binding force, tying people together (“cum”). The togetherness of all taking part in 
society, as members of a club, is constructed as a foundational narrative. This 
narrative clarifies the connection between those making up a community. However, 
the term has a double meaning, both implying the above connotation and that of 
“conviction.” The bond does not only presume a certain natural solidarity within a 
community; it simultaneously convicts, or condemns, its members to support this 
presumed natural bond, while others are kept at a distance because they are seen as 
natural outsiders (Schinkel 2007, 38). In a sense, not only strangers are “convicted” as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 This obsession with hygiene plays a part in all forms of organization, as becomes clear from De 
Hygiënemachine (The hygiene machine) by Ten Bos and Kaulingfreks (2001), which focuses on examples 
from the world of corporate organizations and management. 
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unwanted outsiders, but also those who are portrayed as natural members to a society 
are “convicted” to support the bond, which sustains their identity.  
 
Insiders and outsiders of society thus seem to be convicted to one another. This 
conviction makes the confiction of society less one-dimensional than it seems when 
we focus on its founding significance with respect to an imagined homogeneous and 
sane community. French philosopher Michel Serres (2007) has already emphasized 
that human relations take the form of the ambiguous relationship between the host 
and the parasite. This relation is not only abusive, but also implies certain forms of 
exchange. Not only does the parasite make use of the resources of the host, it also 
pays the host back with an unexpected currency. The presence of the parasite adds a 
new dimension to the natural habitat of the host and therefore opens new possibilities 
for relationships. Serres’ line of thinking invites us to reconsider who is the host and 
who is the parasite in a seemingly one-way structured parasitical relationship. It could 
be the one seen as the parasite, who provides the one seen as the host, with new 
meanings and information, and it could therefore be the host making use of the new 
input of the parasite. The host thus becomes a parasite in his/her own way, and the 
parasite becomes the one making a contribution. This complex interplay between 
abuse and contribution takes place in every social relationship. It could therefore very 
well be the parasite who provides society with an account of its own unity, precisely 
by interfering with this unity. The parasite becomes the scapegoat that justifies 
society’s self-proclaimed homogeneity and inter-connectedness. At the same time, this 
ambiguous side of societal relationships tends to be just as difficult to accept as the 
contingency of the foundations of society. We therefore focus on the one significance 
of the confiction/conviction, while we neglect the other. Those who are not described 
as protagonists in the story of society’s natural origin are easily removed from the 
script of an ideal present day community. The strong symbolism of such storytelling is 
not hypothetical, as it is reflected in various narratives we encounter on a daily basis.  
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In 2010, a commercial was launched for Milner cheese, depicting Dutch society in its 
ideal state.24 According to the vision of Milner, the ideal version of the Netherlands 
would look like an old-fashioned village, where all men are blond and brawny farmers 
and all women are equally sexy blondes, with Frisian names. The ideal Dutch village in 
the commercial had one dark-haired female inhabitant, named Fatima, until she was 
cut out of the commercial, allegedly because the length of the commercial had to be 
shortened to comply with television standards. 25  This omission in favor of a 
homogeneous image seems to be symbolic for Dutch relations with the 
“allochthonous,” who can be integrated if sufficient assimilation to national traditions 
is shown, but who can just as easily be excluded from an imagined national 
community. Even when the “allochthonous” is born in the Netherlands, has the 
Dutch nationality and has lived all his or her life there, (s)he is often still seen as the 
stranger or Other, who stands outside of society, and still has to be incorporated in 
the domain of good citizens. As I have already pointed out in my introduction, this 
reasoning particularly takes place in the case of youngsters from immigrant families. 
The exclusionary tendencies applied to youngsters with an immigrant background are 
of central importance to my research. These youngsters have often been born and 
raised in the Netherlands and have the Dutch nationality, but are not readily accepted 
as good citizens because they do not sufficiently identify with the native Dutch 
culture. In order to become part of society, these youngsters still have to integrate and 
adapt themselves to the manners of the autochthonous, of those who are already 
“home,” because they are the “natural” inhabitants of the area; those who are “born 
from the soil” (Geschiere 2009).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The nostalgic imagination of an authentic national identity seems to have become a popular marketing 
tool. Nationalistic trends emerge regularly in a commercial context and in popular culture. In the Dutch 
case, one can think of a variety of examples, such as the popular TV shows Boer zoekt vrouw (Farmer seeks 
wife), a dating show for Dutch farmers, and Ik houd van Holland (I love Holland), a game show about 
Dutch traditions, or the commercials for milk by Campina (milk from Dutch cows is healthier than milk 
from foreign cows), for tea by Pickwick (the Dutch write history again by creating real Dutch tea, made 
by real Dutch people) and for soup by Unox (Chinese tomato soup tastes best in your own Dutch 
kitchen, overlooking a windmill). 
25 Source: “Fatima uit Milner reclame gesneden”, October 21, 2010, http://sargasso.nl/fatima-uit-milner-
reclame-gesneden/. 
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The term “allochthonous” has come to designate much more than a person with one 
or more parents born outside of the country of residence.26 According to Dutch 
sociologist El Hadioui (2010), “allochthonous” is not only associated with an ethnic 
category or a migrant background, but also with deviant behavior. In his research, he 
has come across various youngsters from different schools in Rotterdam who identify 
themselves as “allochthonous” because they adhere to a deviant attitude, related to 
street culture, even when they come from “autochthonous” Dutch families. Also, 
teachers easily associate the word “allochthonous” with disturbing or violent behavior, 
a lack of education, street language and a macho attitude – the same deviant elements 
which are often associated with street culture or “ghetto” culture. An intuitive 
association is thus developed between the “allochthonous” and the non-participating 
stranger, and the “autochthonous” and the good citizen. Those who belong to the 
domain of street culture therefore do not take part in society. In the Netherlands, this 
conception has taken a firm root in the political discourse, as illustrated by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The terms autochtoon and allochtoon are used in the Netherlands in official policy documents and in the 
public debate to designate those who are native Dutch and those who have their roots elsewhere. The 
Central Office for Statistics (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek), the organization that is responsible for 
national statistical research of the Dutch population, uses a standard definition of the term allochtoon in 
order to be able to measure the number of inhabitants in the Netherlands who are non-native. According 
to this definition, someone is allochtoon if at least one of his/her parents are born abroad. The CBS also 
makes a distinction between “Western” and “non-Western” allochtonen, with Indonesia and Japan falling 
in the Western category, surprisingly enough, and Turkey belonging to the non-Western category, 
together with all other countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia. The CBS mentions a “different socio-
economic and cultural position” as the reason for this distinction. The more a group within Dutch society 
is similar to the native Dutch in relation to these two denominators, the more likely this group will be 
categorized as “Western.” See: http://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/26785779-AAFE-4B39-AD07-
59F34DCD44C8/0/index1119.pdf, accessed January 23, 2013. Second- or third-generation immigrants 
from countries like Morocco and Suriname who are born in the Netherlands, and whose parents were 
also born in the Netherlands, are officially autochtoon according to the definition, but are often labeled as 
allochtoon because of their color. The term, and its general use for people of color, has a stygmatizing 
effect. If someone is mentioned as allochtoon, the consequent reasoning is often that this person cannot 
simultaneously be seen as Dutch. The use of the term allochtoon has often led to criticism because of its 
negative, exclusionary connotation. Former Minister of Integration Rita Verdonk refused to stop using 
the term in 2005 because she said it was needed in order to define for whom integration policies were 
needed. She did not consider the use of language in the policy sphere to be of influence on the daily use 
of language. This debate is rekindled from time to time. Source: “Verdonk houdt vast aan begrip 
allochtoon,” De Volkskrant, August 19, 2005. 
http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2824/Politiek/article/detail/663431/2005/08/19/Verdonk-houdt-
vast-aan-begrip-
allochtoon.dhtml?utm_source=scherm1&utm_medium=button&utm_campaign=Cookiecheck.  
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following quote from a policy document of the Social Democratic Party on the 
treatment of Dutch-Moroccan criminal youngsters: 
 
The problem is that street culture is more and more evolving into a rock-hard, 
macho, ghetto culture. Respect for societal institutions, not in the last place the 
police, is nowhere to be found. Limits to the use of violence are fading. An 
intimidating group culture, which is detached from society’s reality. (Policy report of 
the Dutch Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid) entitled De vrijblijvende aanpak voorbij 
(Beyond a non-committal approach), November 2008)27 
 
The deviant behavior of said youngsters is seen as behavior that already stands fully 
outside of social reality. In order to become full members of the national community, 
they have to distance themselves from street culture and integrate into the citizens’ 
culture. 
 
This approach to young people with an immigrant background who live in an urban 
context is exemplary for a way of thinking in which deviant behavior is not imagined 
as a contested part of society, but rather as external to society. Only those displaying a 
certain recognizable attitude are included in the social domain. Citizenship becomes 
“virtualized” in this context, according to Schinkel. The meaning of citizenship has 
shifted from a formal and juridical status of those who rightfully live within the 
borders of the nation state, to a status of moral and cultural acceptance, which can be 
gained if sufficient integration is shown. Becoming a formal citizen who legally 
inhabits the nation state does not mean that one is perceived as a citizen who also 
makes a valued contribution to civil society. One can be in the possession of a formal 
citizenship status, but this does not automatically imply that one is seen as a “good” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 My translation. Original Text: “Het probleem is dat de straatcultuur steeds meer een keiharde macho 
ghettocultuur wordt. Respect voor maatschappelijke instituties, niet in de laatste plaats de politie, is ver te 
zoeken. Geweldsdrempels worden steeds lager. Een intimideren groepscultuur losgezongen van de 
maatschappelijke werkelijkheid,” Source: 
http://www.pvda.nl/renderer.do/menuId/200001362/clearState/true/sf/200001362/returnPage/20000
1362/itemId/220348214/realItemId/220348214/pageId/200001377/instanceId/200001356/,accessed 
January 23, 2011. 
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citizen who is accepted as a part of civil society. Citizenship is “turned into a 
possibility instead of an actuality, and … a virtue. This way citizenship, which is 
increasingly problematic as a mechanism of in- and exclusion of the nation-state, 
becomes a state-controlled mechanism of in- and exclusion of society” (Schinkel 
2010). It is therefore no longer sufficient to be a formal citizen – one has to express 
active citizenship in a moral sense. Since citizenship is seen more and more as an ideal 
of citizen-participation or a virtue, it becomes a prescription, meant to guide one’s 
attitude and behavior.  
 
The virtualization of citizenship signaled by Schinkel is complemented by what other 
social scientists characterize as a “culturalization of citizenship” (Duyvendak, 
Hurenkamp & Tonkens 2010). Cultural elements largely determine whether someone 
can be seen as a “good” citizen. It is not only a certain level of self-sufficiency and 
active participation in the area of employment, housing and social security that 
determines one’s successful realization of good citizenship, but also one’s adoption of 
the mores of the dominant culture. 
 
Culturalization refers to the ever more insistent efforts in Dutch society to persuade 
members of the many different diasporic communities in the country to “feel at 
home” in the Netherlands – and in the Netherlands only; and to become loyal, active 
and productive citizens bound to the soil and to the moral economy of a reinvented 
Dutch nationalism. Hence, the culturalization of citizenship: the increasing anxiety 
about and problematization of cultural difference in multicultural and multi-religious 
societies, like the Netherlands, and the growing insistence on the need to educate 
immigrants culturally and morally, “integrate” them into the moral community, and 
thus mold them into assimilated citizens. (Mepschen 2009:4) 
 
This trend of virtualization and culturalization of citizenship is reflected in a political 
debate, which is strongly affected by neo-nationalism (Verkaaik 2010). An obsession 
with the relationship between “natives” and “newcomers” has caused a shift in 
traditional political approaches. Issues, which were previously explained in terms of 
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class dynamics, are now analyzed in the context of what Slavoj Zizek calls “the 
culturalization of politics,” in reference to Wendy Brown. Brown defines the 
culturalization of politics as “the reduction of political motivations and causes to 
essentialized culture” (Brown 2006, 20). Under influence of this reduction, an 
emphasis on cultural origins dominates the analysis of political inequalities and 
injustices. Looking through a culturalizing lens, such inequalities and injustices are 
presented as consequential to certain cultural identities and therefore as insolvable by 
a change of the political organization of society. If cultural identities are seen as pre-
constitutive to social interactions, political inequalities have to be tolerated as a given, 
inscribed in the logics of the distinction between the authentic political community 
and its outside (Zizek 2008). “The cause of this culturalization is the retreat, failure, of 
direct political solutions (Welfare State, socialist projects, etc.). Tolerance is their post-
political ersatz,” according to Zizek (ibid., 660).  
 
The Dutch naturalization exam and the subsequent ceremony are a clear example of 
the way in which this neo-nationalist culture is politically consolidated. Aspirant 
Dutch citizens are not only required to answer questions about Dutch history and 
legislation in the naturalization exam, but also about Dutch cultural characteristics, 
values and norms.28 The procedure by which one can gain an official citizenship status 
clearly shows how the demarcation between those who are allowed to take part in the 
Dutch imagined community is drawn along cultural lines. Issues of equal access to 
work, social services and mechanisms of representation are pushed to the background. 
The contribution, whereby one is encouraged to give to the Dutch nation, is 
specifically framed within a certain cultural setting. If one lacks insight into this 
setting, or, even worse, contests this setting, one is not invited in. A consequent lesser 
privileged position in society is accepted as a logical consequence of a failing cultural 
assimilation.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Dutch production company NTR, which produces cultural and educative television programs, made a 
citizenship test based on the official test and posted it on the internet in 2005 so that all Dutch citizens, 
including autochtoon citizens, could test their own level of integration. The test became a hit and many 
people who were born and raised in allochtoon Dutch families, were surprised to find that they failed the 
test. For the test, see: http://educatie.ntr.nl/nationaleinburgeringtest/. 
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The experiences of Iraqi-born poet Rodaan al Galidi are typical in this respect. He has 
lived in the Netherlands for over ten years and writes internationally acclaimed novels 
and poetry in the Dutch language. For years, Al Galidi lived in a refugee center, 
waiting for a decision on his status as an asylum seeker. During this period, he was not 
allowed to make any preparations for a more permanent stay in the Netherlands. Since 
he could not take any lessons to learn the language, he taught himself – with success. 
Al Galidi won prizes with his oeuvre, both in and outside the Netherlands. However, 
Al Galidi failed his citizenship test in 2011 because he could not, or refused to, give 
the right answers to questions, which he thought to be very culturally selective and 
stigmatizing. Al Galidi publicly criticized the barriers upheld for immigrants and 
asylum seekers in becoming accepted Dutch citizens. “‘I had to wait nine years in a 
refugee centre to prove I was a refugee,' Al Galidi is quoted as saying. ‘And then I get 
45 minutes to prove I am a good citizen? Bit of a shame that.’”29  
 
1.3. Politics, caught in an event of differentiation 
In reaction to the excessive preoccupation with the integration of “outsiders,” Willem 
Schinkel proposes to unmask the confiction of a unitary civil society by placing the 
concept of society itself between brackets. In the tradition of Zygmunt Baumann, one 
can better speak of the social as a contingent, but complex process which is always 
dynamic, instead of imagining society as a static entity with a univocal identity, 
according to Schinkel. Social processes are fluid and cannot be caught in pre-
manufactured blueprints (Bauman 2000, 2). Relations between people emerge from an 
endless complexity of possible interactions. Since the focus moves here from people’s 
identities to their relations within a dynamic network, society should no longer be seen 
as built upon a moral or cultural community, with clearly distinguishable members. A 
sense of belonging to a certain community cannot be simply captured in a binary 
division between “in” or “out” (ibid., 176). Any configuration of the social can never 
be seen apart from its constitutive outside, from the possibilities out of which a 
temporary selection is made. “Inside” and “outside” are therefore not dimensions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Source: “Prize-winning author fails Dutch integration test,” Dutch News, November 18, 2011. 
http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2011/11/prizewinning_author_fails_dutc.php. 
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which exclude each other, but rather complementary dimensions of the social. In the 
dynamic process of the social, the borders between “inside” and “outside” are 
constantly blurred. Illegal immigrants live their lives inside of Western democracies, 
work, send their children to school and have contact with their neighbors, despite any 
culturalist discourse on citizenship. 
 
An awareness of the complex interplay of “inside” and “outside” is characteristic for 
the tradition of poststructuralist philosophy, to which Schinkel’s analysis is partly 
indebted. The notion of difference plays a central role in this tradition of thinking. Not 
its essential elements, but the relation between different elements is seen as 
constitutive for every identity. The identity of people, but also of social phenomena, 
like “society,” is not pre-constituted like an entity which can be understood as 
independent and unitary, before it engages with an “outside.” Every idea of “entity” 
and “identity” is always already influenced by a process of relationality, which moves, 
interferes and shapes its very being, and the meaning which is ascribed to it. Both 
sensemaking and identity formation are not building activities in which static elements 
are put together in a structured and systematic way, but rather the contingent interplay 
of constellations, of yet again other constellations, of what we come to identify as 
knowledge and being in the process.  
 
Within sensemaking and identity formation, a certain selection is always made from 
these endless possible constellations. In an indistinct field of difference, we would not 
be able to be aware of ourselves, let alone be able to orientate ourselves. An awareness 
of the constitutive role of difference does not imply that mechanisms of in- and 
exclusion no longer exist. It is not the existence of in- and outsides that is 
problematized in poststructuralist thinking, but rather the natural or fixed nature of 
the demarcation between in- and outsides. The selection processes by which we 
identify and analyze ourselves and our surroundings could always be constructed in a 
different way. An awareness of other possibilities of difference and the contingent 
nature of every identitary selection enables us to critically perceive seemingly self-
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evident relations between in- and outside. In an act of deconstruction, we can trace 
back the process of selection, which leads to certain distinctions between in- and 
outside and simultaneously provide insight into other possible constellations and 
distinctions. Accordingly, Gilles Deleuze (2004) states that everything is always in a 
certain state of becoming. When we critically examine the notion of society from this 
perspective, it is therefore not the question of completely doing away with 
mechanisms of in- and exclusion, but of realizing how such mechanisms of in- and 
exclusion are developed and how they could be changed. We should thereby keep in 
mind that an ultimate origin or foundation of the social constellations, which we 
designate as “society,” can never be traced. 
 
Schinkel’s proposal to deconstruct the confiction of a unitary society can therefore be 
characterized as an example of postfoundational thinking that is directly opposed to 
the political rhetoric of a regression to the foundations of a superior Western, Judeo-
Christian Leitkultur, as illustrated by the speech given by former Dutch Deputy Prime 
Minister Maxim Verhagen. Postfoundational thinking offers an opportunity to 
critically examine the ontological assumptions that lie at the basis of such foundational 
rhetoric as well as imagine alternative explanations for the emergence of a social 
phenomenon like society and its political organization. In an extensive discussion of 
postfoundational thinking, Oliver Marchart (2007) first of all stresses its engagement 
with metaphysical patterns of thought in order to clarify that postfoundational 
thinking reaches beyond epistemological paradigms. Any foundational figure in the 
way we structure our thinking about being and the world (or being in the world) is 
questioned in postfoundational thinking, which is first of all inspired by Martin 
Heidegger’s work, according to Marchart.  
 
In the tradition of Heidegger’s thought, postfoundational thought departs from the 
idea that the origins of being and the world cannot be traced back to a singular 
principle, since any kind of origin is always differentiated at an ontological level. The 
structure of the irreducible ontological difference between Being, the ontological 
 37 
category with a capital letter, and beings, ontic occurrences in the world, as described 
by Heidegger, returns in postfoundational thinking (Heidegger 1962, 26). We can 
never touch upon the pure ontological status of Being in itself. Being can only be 
grasped through its manifestations in the world. The essence of Being itself is always 
absent. We should not try to understand the notion of Being by “telling a story,” or 
tracing the origins of certain entities back to another entity, in the hope of finding a 
final, original entity of Being itself (ibid.). The search for any finality in our 
understanding of Being therefore necessarily ends in an abyss, in which an unmediated 
access to Being itself is always in retreat (ibid., 23). This means that we can think 
about grounding, but that the final fulfillment of this thought is always at a distance, 
escaping our sight, like we can never see the bottom of the abyss when we stare into 
it. We can imagine the bottom is there, but even when we throw a coin down into the 
dark, we do not hear the sound of anything hitting firm ground.  
 
Postfoundational thought tends to favor dynamic reflections on the origins of Being 
and the world over static figures. The ontological difference should therefore not be 
understood as a black and white distinction between two separate phenomena that 
have already occurred on their own before being brought in touch with each other. A 
search for autonomous foundations at the ontological level never finds it destination, 
but always remains on the move between ontic occurrences, which can never be left 
behind, and an ontological core, which can never ultimately be reached. The 
ontological difference is the event of differencing itself in which its points of 
departure and arrival are continuously withdrawing (Marchart 2007, 23). It is always 
the interplay between the fleeting notion of Being and the existence of beings that 
defines our thinking. The notion of the event plays a crucial role in this movement of 
thought. Being-in-the-world happens30 like an event happens; it is connected to a 
specific setting in time and space (Heidegger 1962, 427). The “historicity” of the event 
– its embeddedness in time and space – is both happening and fleeting, as well as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Heidegger uses the German verb Geschehen here, and emphasizes its connotation with Geschichte, history. 
This happening within the context of history, as a sequence of time and space, is translated using the 
term “historizing” (Heidegger 1962, 41). 
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relational and interpretable, and is therefore always announcing a change of shape. It 
is compatible with the fluid imagining of the social, as proposed by Bauman and 
Schinkel.  
 
The idea that the social and the political happen, like an event happens, in a moment 
that is embedded in a specific spatial-temporal setting offers the possibility of critically 
evaluating the static imagination of a political community and the mechanisms of 
exclusion attached to it. The “historicity” of the event implies that it cannot be 
captured in one universal or eternal interpretation. However, this event-ness of the 
social and the political does not imply that it happens completely non-committal. For 
Heidegger, existence in the world is inextricably attached to the notion of care, or an 
engagement with Being (Dreyfus 1991, 239). When we indecisively float along with 
occurrences in the world, we can never experience an authentic self-hood, according 
to Heidegger. To be in the world does not only imply to live in the moment. Existing 
in the world comes with the realization towards which different possibilities this 
existence could lead in the future (Heidegger 1961, 372). When we actively engage 
with our own potentiality of being-in-the-world, we can see that existence is actually 
stretched between a being here and now, in this very moment, and a being ahead of 
oneself (ibid, 279), in a resolute anticipation of what could follow. This implies that a 
critical evaluation of eternal, or transcendental foundations of society and politics, 
does not necessarily result in an attitude of “anything goes,” but can result in an active 
engagement with different social and political constellations which could or should be 
realized. Like any recount of an event, the evaluation of a political process should 
depart from the awareness that various interpretations are possible. This evaluation 
should therefore be open-ended and ready to accept the possibility of antagonistic 
tensions, but this open-endedness does not imply that no ideological wishes or 
expectations can be expressed.  
 
In order to relate a metaphysical approach of differentiation to an evaluation of 
politics, postfoundational thinking draws upon the political difference between 
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“politics,” which can be seen as a conception based on a firm ontological ground, 
offering solid certainties, and “the political,” which is a conception set in a liquid 
ontological condition, which continuously happens in unpredictable ways, never 
excluding possibilities of disruption and conflict. It should be noted here that 
postfoundational thought is radical in its deconstruction of every simplified and final 
idea of grounding, and therefore does not propose the political as a defining concept 
that should replace politics in our understanding of political reality. Postfoundational 
thinking rather proposes a thorough investigation of the relationship between two 
radically different dimensions of political reality and the way in which the dynamics 
between the two constructs political practices and frames representations of political 
reality. Our understanding of politics is thus split from within (ibid., 6). 
Postfoundational thinking about politics is therefore again a thinking of difference. 
 
Postfoundational thinking can be seen as a remedy to the kind of exclusionary 
political discourse that refers back to an imaginary final ground of society. It should 
not, however, be mistaken for an anti-foundationalism, which denies the existence of 
any grounding in political thinking. Postfoundationalism should be understood as a 
critical investigation into the ontological construction of grounds which seem 
“natural” and self-evident, but nevertheless serve as a rhetorical strategy to exclude 
certain people, behavior or thoughts.   
 
The ontological weakening of ground does not lead to the assumption of the total 
absence of all grounds, but rather to the assumption of the impossibility of a final 
ground, which is something completely different as it implies an increased awareness 
of, on the one hand, contingency and, on the other, the political as the moment of 
partial and always, in the last instance, unsuccessful grounding. (Marchart 2007, 2)  
 
Every foundation will therefore be a partial foundation within a field of competing 
foundational attempts. (ibid., 7)  
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Marchart refers in this respect to Judith Butler, who speaks of “contingent 
foundations” (Butler 1995). An awareness of the contingency of foundational claims 
makes it possible to question the power plays in which they were constructed. The 
supposedly unquestionable normative universality of such claims has to be critically 
evaluated, according to Butler (1995, 7). The category of the universal is a treacherous 
one, because it tends to discredit cultural conflicts in the name of a “culturally 
imperialist notion of the universal.” 
 
We have, I think, witnessed the conceptual and material violence of this practice in 
the United States’s war against Iraq, in which the Arab “other” is understood as to be 
radically “outside” the universal structures of reason and democracy and, hence, calls 
to be brought forcibly within. (Butler 1995, 7) 
 
Postfoundationalism can be used to criticize a thinking, which places certain “others” 
“outside” of the domain of political legitimacy, or even outside of the domain of 
humanity. However, Butler notes that, in the line of thinkers like Ernesto Laclau, 
Chantal Mouffe, William Connolly, Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, 
“the political field is of necessity constructed through the production of a determining 
exterior” (Butler 1995, 20). To re-emphasize this: the very notions of “inside” and 
“outside” are therefore not abandoned in a postfoundational perspective, but their 
relation is carefully analyzed to designate where the distinction between inside and 
outside is used for exclusionary arguments or to legitimize the forced incorporation of 
strange elements into a desired whole. Butler describes here the critical potential that a 
recognition of political difference has to offer. We can understand what is political 
because we can differentiate the political from its constitutive outside. It is the 
question in what way and to what purposes this constitutive outside is framed. “Here 
I would like to suggest a distinction between the constitution of a political field that 
produces and neutralizes that constitutive outside and a political field that produces and 
renders contingent the specific parameters of that constitutive outside” (Butler 1995, 20). 
This difference is reflected in the distinction Schinkel makes between the imagination 
of society as a unitary entity, obsessed with the integration of external elements, and 
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the understanding of the social as a dynamic and contingent process in which borders 
between inside and outside are constantly blurred. This analysis has consequences for 
the valuation of traditional conceptions of politics. A postfoundational perspective 
teaches that the contingency of distinctions between in- and outside does not 
immediately have to be resolved, but that we can also experience this contingency as 
an inevitable part of the event-character of politics, even though it causes uncertainty, 
unpredictability and agonistic tensions.  
 
1.4. Of friends and enemies 
At the beginning of the chapter, I explained that the answer regarding the democratic 
deficit in present day parliamentary politics is predominantly sought in a founded 
story about a strong political community. This search for solid foundations leads to 
the virtualization and culturalization of citizenship and politics, with the consequence 
that the search for solutions to problems of inequality, injustices and discrimination is 
given less priority by traditional political institutions and organizations. This shift in 
priorities can both lead to stronger mechanisms of exclusion and an even further 
decline of the legitimation of the state in the eyes of those who do not make up the 
core of the imagined, strong, political community. They see the security of their basic 
needs shrink under the pressure of a preoccupation with integration and active 
citizenship, and they seek their own ways to cope with this development outside of 
the domain of institutional politics. Hence, we see that both majorities and minorities 
lose their faith in traditional political practices. The gap between political institutions 
and the people they are supposed to represent is growing, despite the wish to bridge 
this gap by evoking a unitary community of good citizens. An investigation into the 
notion of political difference can explain both how traditional political institutions 
lose their credibility and how an interest in non-institutional politics is building up. 
The debate about the political difference departs from the distinction that can be 
made between politics, as the organization of society, and the political, as an essential 
element of the way people relate to each other, even before these relationships are 
institutionalized. 
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An emphasis on the difference between politics and the political suggests that the 
institutional organization of society, as it is expressed in politics, does not always do 
justice to power relations between people as they are played out in daily life, outside of 
an institutional setting, reflecting the political. Thinkers examining this political 
difference agree that political issues are not always addressed and resolved within the 
domain of institutional politics. Investigations into the difference between politics and 
the political are concerned with the possibility that a balance of justice and equality in 
human relations is corrupted by decision-making in favor of the privileged within the 
organization of state politics; simultaneously, they acknowledge that political meaning 
cannot only be claimed within the institutional domain. Those thinkers who are 
influenced by the work of Carl Schmitt, such as Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and 
Slavoj Zizek, emphasize that the domain of state politics should not be considered as 
the only domain in which political issues are productively addressed. They are 
skeptical about the idea that one, unitary political organization can be developed that 
safeguards the interests of all people equally. Antagonisms between different groups 
of people with different interests can never be fully prevented or resolved, in their 
opinion. These thinkers stress that antagonisms can be a driving force for fruitful 
political agency. Such fruitful political agency explicitly opposes itself to state 
doctrines of political unity. Just as we have seen in the case of a foundational 
confiction of society, the idea of overcoming such antagonisms in one, unitary 
political body is an all too idealistic dream, which in fact counteracts the strive for the 
emancipation of those who suffer from unequal political power dynamics. In order to 
change the situation of those who are marginalized or excluded, emancipatory politics 
should be developed that do not strive for a total political consensus, but rather clearly 
choose sides for the precarious classes. One should not aim to resolve antagonisms in 
a lasting consensus, but one should aim to bend antagonistic relations to the benefits 
of the oppressed, according to those who emphasize the opposition of politics to the 
political in a Schmittian tradition.  
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Carl Schmitt stated in the preface to his discussion on the notion of the political that 
the era of the state as a model for political unity has come to an end (1996). We do, 
however, continue to speak about politics in terms which are related to a state-
monopoly on its meaning. Schmitt’s discussion of the political has to be understood 
as an attempt to define the interrelational essence of the political, before it is 
incorporated in the structure of a state. A reference to the state is no longer useful to 
serve as a foundation for a specific distinguishing character trait of the ‘political’, in a 
situation in which the state influences all domains of society (ibid., 22). If the state 
interferes in issues of religion, economics and cultural expression, everything becomes 
potentially political, and relations to the state or state institutions can no longer mark a 
distinction between the political and the un-political. Schmitt therefore looks for a 
distinctive characterization of the political that precedes and underlies the functioning 
of the state. For him, the dynamics between friend and enemy is what makes relations 
essentially political. All political notions are polemical. “Words such as state, republic, 
society, class, as well as sovereignty, constitutional state, absolutism, dictatorship, 
economic planning, neutral or total state, and so on, are incomprehensible if one does 
not know exactly who is to be affected, combated refuted or negated by such a term” 
(ibid., 31). 
 
Schmitt sees these polemics as separate from any normative judgment. A fictional 
imagination of the character of the enemy, which exceeds the bare possibility of 
antagonistic relations, does not form a necessary part of the structure of the political. 
Categories of judgment as they are applied in the field of morals, esthetics or 
economics have to be kept strictly separated from the domain of politics. The 
enunciation of an enemy therefore does not imply that the enemy has to be seen as 
bad, ugly or unprofitable (ibid., 26, 27). The cultural and moral loading of the present-
day political practice, as described at the beginning of this chapter, is not in any way a 
natural consequence of political struggles or antagonistic relations, in the vision of 
Schmitt. The enemy is the constitutive outside from which one can distinguish one’s 
own political position, and with whom various levels of conflict are possible. The wish 
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to permanently eliminate the enemy is but an ultimate standpoint in the possibilities of 
conflict. In order to prevent such possible conflicts from taking place, state politics is 
in general exclusively focused on consensus building, and therefore denies an 
important part of the political, according to Schmitt. The urge to deny or defy the 
existence of possibilities of conflict is motivated by an intermingling of normative 
hopes and fears in the domain of political relations. Real possibilities of struggle are 
annulled in a unitary conception of the state. However, the possibility of struggle 
within the state should not be denied in favor of an ideal vision of consensus. This 
ideal implies an imagination of a state without real politics, and this is an unrealistic 
option.  
 
Without adopting Schmitt’s general, strict distinction between political and moral 
judgments, I subscribe to his denunciation of a practice of consensus building, which 
does not emerge from an active engagement with adversaries, but which legitimizes 
itself by sidelining those who would likely oppose the proposed consensus because 
they are morally or culturally disapproved as political agents. Schmitt’s claim that 
antagonistic relations are internal to state politics broadens the field of political agency 
to those who are opposed to politics as it is represented within state institutions. It 
follows that an understanding of politics cannot only be defined by subjects who are 
related to the state, but also by others who might find themselves at a distance from – 
or in opposition to – the state. Even those who are not recognized by the state can 
perform political agency. Schmitt aims to open the field of political agency to those 
who do not hold professional or institutional political positions. Political agency does 
not have to be played by the rules of the institutional game, but emerges in all kinds of 
human relations, including those which are not explicitly organized to be political. If 
this possibility is not recognized, and the state claims the sole right to shape politics, 
we enter a situation in which every difference between friends and enemies is 
excluded, and options for the emergence of the political are excluded as well. In such 
a situation, the political becomes neutralized or colonized, so to say, by state politics 
(Marchart 2007, 44).  
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Despite Schmitt’s recognition of political subjects who oppose state politics, his 
discussion of the political is still developed in reference to sovereign state structures. 
Leftist commentators on the work of Schmitt, like Slavoj Zizek and Chantal Mouffe, 
have stressed the agency of revolutionaries and dissidents as crucial in the exploitation 
of internal antagonisms within state structures for the aim of emancipation. However, 
seen from this perspective, the emergence of politics with an emancipatory potential 
becomes a rare occasion. The colonization of the political potential by state discourses 
on consensus is omnipresent. Some therefore say that we have entered a post-political 
time (Swyngedouw 2007; Zizek 2000). In such a post-political time, what we know as 
the practice of political governance has become a professionalized mode of 
administration in which social interactions and economic production are efficiently 
ordered and monitored, but in which there is no space for ideological debates. The 
ultimate political goal seems to have become a technocratic consensus on how to 
make the machinery of governance policies run smoothly, without having to bother 
with internal antagonistic tensions between different ideological positions. In the case 
of the Netherlands, Schinkel speaks of a depoliticized model of governance, in which 
political parties no longer try to distinguish themselves from other parties by 
presenting original, long-term visions on society, but only focus on maintaining their 
position in power (Schinkel 2012, 54). The goal of party politics is displaced from the 
social realization of ideologies, to the survival of the political party itself, regardless of 
its vision (ibid., 15). In such a depoliticized society, the lack of political agency is 
masked by extensive policing methods of the state which aim to manage safety and 
security in order to prevent any real disturbances or conflicts from emerging. In a 
depoliticized state, those who pretend to be political subjects act “polite,” in 
accordance with such management techniques of policing (Marchart 2007, 43). 
Friend-enemy relations are hidden under a veil of conventional differences of opinion, 
harmless forms of minor disagreement, which remain within the framework, as it is 
provided by the rules of the game of state politics. Such management strategies of 
policing, and such an attitude of politeness, renders the emergence of any real political 
agency that truly opposes the dominance of the state impossible. 
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The political practice is reduced to negotiating the circumstances which are best for 
improving “liveability” within the borders of a given system of management. Political 
disagreement with the conditions under which political life is framed within such a 
system of management is not rendered possible. Changing the parameters of existing 
power plays of governance, in search for new and more just constellations of politics, 
has become unimaginable. In short, the post-political time has foreclosed any 
fundamental conflicts within the field of politics and has therefore fully dismissed the 
political difference between politics and the political. In the process, the majority has 
lost sight of the political and is fully focused on politics as a model of state policing, 
according to analysts of the post-political time. For political agency to return in such a 
situation, a certain amount of “unruliness” is necessary. I think that this unruliness has 
never fully disappeared from the political domain. It is not only revolutionaries who 
fight in an antagonistic battle for emancipation of the underprivileged. Unruly politics 
is also expressed in minor everyday struggles for a more dignified life. These unruly 
politics confront institutional politics, but are neither completely detached nor 
diametrically opposed to institutional politics, as an interpretation of the lost 
revolutionary force of rare occurrences of the political suggests. Before focusing in 
more detail on this confrontational relation between politics and the political, I will 
examine one more line of thought in which the political is perceived as being 
obscured by an all-encompassing managerial model of politics. This line of thought is 
distinct from the Schmittian approach. 
 
1.5. The political in retreat 
Jean-Luc Nancy and Philipe Lacoue-Labarthe (1997) speak of the “retreat of the 
political” in relation to a situation in which the political is colonized by state politics.31 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Jean-Luc Nancy and Philipe Lacoue-Labarthe collaborated intensively within the setting of the Centre 
for Philosophical Research on the Political between 1980 and 1984. Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe founded 
the center in the aftermath of a seminar on the work of Derrida, focusing in particular on his essay 
entitled “The ends of man,” which is primarily concerned with the relationship between the philosophical 
and the political. Based on the discussion of Derrida’s text, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe decided to 
approach questions of the political purely from a philosophical perspective, while leaving aside an 
empirical scientific perspective on the political. With this approach, they wished to distinguish themselves 
from those who work on political questions in the area of political theory or political science. To focus 
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Under these circumstances, the political has disappeared in the all-encompassing 
presence of politics. Paradoxically, they embark on their investigation of the retreat of 
the political by stating that we live in a situation in which “everything is political.” The 
political cannot be properly addressed in a time in which “everything is political.” This 
statement is not far removed from the analysis of our present time as “post-political.” 
Both propositions aim to explicate that politics as a managerial model of organization 
is omnipresent in society and therefore disables an understanding of society along the 
lines of differentiation between a regulated political organization of society and social, 
cultural and economic interactions, which stand outside of such regulations. The 
model of liberal democracy is a good example in this sense. It pretends to be 
characterized by an endless variety of different positions, but it is only within one 
governmental order that these positions can be accepted as minor variations on the 
same theme of political organization.  
 
According to Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, we live in a time in which the model of 
neo-liberal democracy is dominant both in the political and moral sense. This state 
model and its preoccupation with “good governance” has become a “totalitarian” 
phenomenon, which holds up the myth of a unitary political community in which 
issues of injustice can be resolved by the right political management. They use the 
notion of totalitarianism here not in the context of a totalitarian state, but to 
denominate an all-encompassing mechanism of the organization of politics in which 
the political is obscured. Hence, totalitarianism has become “the unsurpassable 
horizon of our times” (ibid., 125). Politics can only be understood as a “totalitarian 
phenomenon” which “excludes every other area of reference” (ibid., 110), because it 
is “ceaselessly merging with all sorts of authoritative discourses (in the first place, 
socio-economic, but also technological, cultural, psychological, etc.) and, despite the 
‘media’ circus or the ‘spectacularization’ of an absent public space, everywhere 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
on the “reciprocal involvement of the philosophical and of the political” (Nancy & Lacoue-Labarthe 
1997, 108) means to acknowledge that one cannot study the political as an object, as a social 
phenomenon, by applying an external position as a political scientist. The act of thinking about the 
political is always already political in itself, according to Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe.  
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converting itself into a form of banal management or organization” (ibid., 125-126). 
Since politics has been reduced to an issue of the right kind of governance within a 
pre-given vision of how society should be organized, there is no space to look for new 
political ways to transform the world. Possibilities for a revolutionary impact of the 
political in relation to the existing situation are excluded. The “enlightened” idea of 
revolutions that lead to progress in human development, and therefore do away with 
existing inequalities and injustices, is exhausted, but nevertheless informs the current 
status of politics. As a consequence, the practice of politics in neoliberal democracies 
is based on an ideological position that is closed. Simultaneously, there are no ideas 
which can inspire “a political solution to inhumanity” (ibid., 110), as it still exists in 
those democracies that claim to have reached completion in the area of good 
governance. We are “enclosed in the closure of the political,” since we are too blinded 
by the “obviousness” of politics to have sight of the political. The totalizing 
tendencies of regulative politics therefore make it impossible to capture anything with 
a more essential, pre-regulative political meaning.  
 
In reaction to this situation, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe choose to search for “the 
essence of the political” in their work. The “retreat of the political” has a double 
meaning for Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe. They propose to recognize the “retreat of 
the political” not only as a closure, but also as a re-tracing, or a re-marking, of the 
essence of the political.32 In order to do this, we have to again pose the question of 
the political in new ways, even if this seems impossible. Hence, the retreat of the 
political can also be understood as a necessary deconstruction of the political, as 
Lacoue-Labarthe called it (ibid., 96). An empirical approach to the political, as it can 
be expressed in political science, for example, is no longer possible, according to 
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, because this would irrevocably bring us back to dealing 
with the obvious, i.e. with politics, instead of the political, which remains hidden in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 In French, this double meaning is apparent in the word retrait itself. In English, however, the meaning 
of “retreat” as a certain “re-treatment,” or a re-working of something which was previously established, is 
not directly contained by the word retreat itself. I use the words “re-tracing” and “re-marking” here to 
designate this second meaning. 
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the study of matters of current political organization. At the same time, their own 
work should not be seen as a “pulling back into the position of the philosophical” 
(ibid., 107). It is not the case that philosophy is used to present the political in a new 
theoretical form; rather, the re-tracing of the position of the political, which has 
already shaped our thought, is a philosophical enterprise for Nancy and Lacoue-
Labarthe. It is precisely by engaging with the political in a movement of philosophical 
retreat from the status quo of politics that we can understand how the omnipresence 
and obviousness of this same politics has become a totalitarian unity.  
 
The “essence” of the political should not be understood in a foundational sense here. 
It is not a transcendental, single idea with capital letters, like God, Man or History, 
insofar as such ideas sustain the very idea of totality itself. It is precisely this idea of 
totality which Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe criticize. The essence of the political 
cannot be positively defined; it is always in retreat. The essence in retreat is a 
“dimension of a specific alterity” (ibid., 129), which can never be captured on its own. 
This alterity is found in the fractured relation of the political with itself; the political is 
always altering, differentiating from itself and therefore always losing something of its 
essence. Nevertheless, the retreat of the essence of the political should not be 
lamented. The questioning of the essence of the political should not be understood as 
a nostalgic attempt to re-illuminate a certain transcendental foundation of the political 
in the practice of politics, but rather as a retracing of the “immense failure” of any 
project that attempts to ground the political. The political is therefore paradoxically 
characterized by an essential lack of ground. Just as Schinkel emphasizes that the idea 
of society as a unitary whole is “grounded” in a mythical foundation, Nancy and 
Lacoue-Labarthe emphasize that the idea of politics as a unitary whole is “grounded” 
in a mythical foundation.  
 
Like Schinkel, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe are interested in an understanding of the 
social as a relationship rather than as an entity, as a “social bond” and not “as a 
presupposition, and yet as impossible to deduce or to derive from an initial 
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subjectivity” (ibid., 117). Especially for Nancy, the concept of community is essential 
in understanding any political situation, since we are always in relation to others and 
yet are always aware of our differences. Nancy does not understand community as a 
homogeneous entity. What is retreating in community, as it is understood by Nancy, is 
the subject. A political community is not deliberately established by a substantive 
subject, which chooses to enforce a natural bond with like-minded people. Such a 
natural bond can neither be traced nor completed within a community, since our 
sense of community rather originated in a shared co-existence in the world, which 
happens unexpectedly. The idea of a community as a homogeneous group of people 
who share a similar identity and the same way of living betrays the way a community 
“works” or “unworks” the being together of people. Instead of thinking about the 
homogenizing effect of a community, Nancy (1991) rather points at the “inoperative” 
effect of a community. Being in common is radically different from a common being. 
Our being in common in the world points us at the fact that we do not share the same 
substantial identity, but that we rather share a lack of such a substantial identity 
(Nancy 1991, xxxviii) When we are aware that we are always already together in a 
world, this does not mean that we recognize a similarity in each other which makes it 
easy to live with one another. It rather makes us aware that we are always already 
different and at the same time always already in a relation to one another. This 
relationship is an open and disturbing relationship, one which causes rapprochements 
and repulsions, understanding and miscommunications.  
 
The recognition of this openness of relations between people hints at the essence of 
the political, according to Nancy. “…: the political is the place where community as 
such is brought into play” (Nancy 1991, xxxvii). However, it is brought into play in its 
retreat. The retreat of the oneness of community, like the retreat of the political, 
emerges as a disruption, since it cannot be executed nor claimed by any subjective 
authority. As soon as people are focused on a common being, a fusion into one 
identity, the possibilities of the political are excluded. The retreat of both community 
and the political takes place in a constitutive lack of subjectivity; it does not lead to 
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any substantial identity. The understanding that we co-exist with others with whom 
we do not share any necessary similarities disturbs any formation of a unitary political 
subjectivity or political claim. “…the question of a disjunction or a disruption” is 
“more essential to the political than the political itself” (Nancy & Lacoue-Labarthe 
1997, 118). This same notion returns in the work of other thinkers like Jacques 
Rancière, who deals with the political as a disruption of the state of affairs in politics 
(1999), and Martin Crowley, who focuses on the lack of subjectivity in a politics of 
l’homme sans, a political protagonist without a substantive identity or autonomy (2009). 
Both the disruption and the lack of subjectivity do not designate a simple anarchy, as 
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe have already stated (Nancy & Lacoue-Labarthe 1997, 
118), but can spark a critical denunciation of injustices and inequalities that are 
sustained by state dominated politics. It is from an understanding of community as 
“inoperative,” and the political as disruptive, that we can criticize foundational notions 
of the political community and the good citizen, which lead to the exclusion of those 
who do not conform to the norm.  
 
1.6. Unruly politics 
The question that remains is what this postfoundational criticism could signify for the 
development of a certain political agency that emerges at the side of those who are 
excluded from the domain of institutional politics. The analysis of the retreat of the 
political, as presented by Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, serves well to nourish a critique 
of coercive and state-dominated discourses on politics, but it is less clear if, and how, 
those who are not represented within state politics can act out politically in a situation 
characterized by the retreat of the political. It is difficult to imagine what a political 
agency that expresses the interests and demands of those in a precarious position 
would look like, based on a recognition of the constitutive lack of political subjectivity 
and substantial identity within an inoperative community. Other thinkers who focus 
on the political difference explicitly search for a positively formulated political agency, 
which detaches itself from the colonization of the political in repressive practices of 
state politics. One can think here of Laclau and Mouffe, who depart from a Schmitt-
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inspired interpretation of antagonism as a productive force in politics in order to 
envision a radical, emancipatory political practice based on the positive, strategic use 
of the opposing position of those who are marginalized and excluded by an enemy 
with hegemonic power within the domain of state politics. However, in the work of 
these thinkers, the political difference implies a large distance between politics and the 
political, making effective emancipatory political agency a rare phenomenon. 
 
In contrast with these writers, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe evoke the political 
difference, not to analyze the empirical reality of political processes or prescribe new 
forms of political agency, but to diagnose the way we think about social and political 
processes. They opt for this approach because it is their conviction that the 
possibilities for an empirical investigation of political processes are exhausted, as long 
as the “essential” ungroundedness, contingency and plurality of the political cannot be 
thought. By focusing on our thinking about political processes, mythical illusions 
about a unitary society and its final ground can be unmasked to give room for a 
recognition of the plurality and contingency of the empirical reality of social bonds. 
Processes of in- and exclusion can be understood as constructions of a specific kind 
of thinking, which could be reformed if we change this way of thinking. Those who 
are excluded in fact never exist outside of a pluralist social bond, even when they are 
perceived as outsiders to a unitary whole. Framing in terms of in- and exclusion 
should be problematized by a “singular-plural” thinking about community and the 
political.  
 
However, this exclusive focus on the structure of our thinking could lead to a 
disregard of “ungrounding” experiences, which originate in clashes between everyday 
struggles for a dignified life, and the regulative tendencies of centers of institutional 
power. Regardless of a recognition of irreducible difference in our thinking, structural 
conflicts between aims of unitary consistency and hopes for liberation from such aims 
continue to shape political power plays. It is, paradoxically enough, the emphasis on 
irreducible difference in our thinking about the political which makes it difficult to 
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evaluate the moments in which the political as experience interacts with homogenizing 
structures of politics. A shift in our thinking about the political does not immediately 
change the practice of institutional politics, which remains based on foundational 
imaginations. Experiences of marginalization originate in a confrontation with this 
logic of institutional politics. Oliver Marchart fears that the theoretical approach of 
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe leads to what he calls “philosophism,” which does not 
sufficiently help us to act upon this confrontation. According to Marchart, Nancy’s 
theory does not deal sufficiently with the constitutive role of conflict and antagonism 
in social and political relations. “While Nancy touches on these categories, what he 
refers to as division and ‘Streit’ not only remains under-theorized, but also is in 
constant danger of being ‘philosophized’, that is to say, of being emptied of all politics 
and turned into a purely philosophical matter of thinking.” (Marchart 2007, 81) In 
similar accord, Nancy Fraser is skeptical about the philosophical investigations of 
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe. By investigating the political from a philosophical 
perspective, they seem to wish to discover important political insights without getting 
their hands dirty in an actual political struggle (Fraser 1989, 87). Because they focus on 
the conditions for the possibility of the political, and not on cases of actual struggle, 
Fraser blames them for a certain academic disdain for ontic occurences on the 
crossroads of politics, history and society (ibid., 4-5). According to Fraser these 
philosophers seem to prefer the political without politics. 
 
The question thus becomes how thinking about the retreat of the political relates to 
experiences of the emergence of the political, as a situated and momentary 
disturbance of the organization of politics. Since politics as an imposition of 
institutional order is the actual state of affairs, we cannot just do away with it by 
means of philosophical analysis that recognizes the ontological potential of disruption 
and emancipation in the concept of the political, while staying away from tracing its 
emergence within the world of ontic appearances. How can the political – an essential 
concept with a fleeting status – be grasped to deal with injustices which take place in 
the ontic domain of politics? If an emergence of the political in the domain of politics 
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cannot be materialized, are interventions, which can possibly disturb politics, not 
necessarily un-political or anti-political (Viriasova 2011)? These questions become 
relevant because politics and the political clearly cannot be seen as independent from 
each other. The political can only be understood in relation to politics, which it both 
underlies and momentarily disturbs.  
 
In my thesis, I further explore the hypothesis that a confronting engagement between 
politics and the political can be materialized. I focus on the emergence of events and 
actions, which have a political meaning, even if they are usually placed outside of the 
domain of state-oriented politics and are therefore seen as devoid of political meaning. 
Such events and actions are no rare occurrences inspired by a revolutionary desire, but 
take place in many everyday struggles whose political implications are easily 
overlooked. These events and actions take place in uncivil and subversive ways, but 
are not apolitical because they are inspired by a concern for justice, equal access to 
social and economic resources and equal chances to lead a dignified life. These 
unconventional expressions of political agency disrupt dominant mechanisms of 
institutional governance, and it is exactly in this disruption that they can open new 
insights into a possibly emancipatory criticism of the existing political status quo. 
Since politics and the political  are always related to each other, I wish to identify the 
situations, events or moments in which something occurs at the level of ontic politics, 
while nevertheless being sparked by the ontological dimension of the political. It is 
therefore not only an understanding of the political which I seek to elaborate, but 
rather an understanding of actual manifestations of the dynamics between politics and 
the political which illuminate mechanisms of in- and exclusion as well as initial 
attempts to fight these mechanisms. To speak in terms of Jean-Luc Nancy, it is 
neither politics nor the political which is the topic of my research, but rather the space 
in between – the threshold at which both politics and the political break into each 
other and the social bond between people can be rearranged.  
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The political agency which emerges at this threshold between politics and the political 
could be named unruly politics. Unruly politics either neglects or disturbs the domain 
of consensus-building in legally accepted political institutions. Unruly politics is about 
the actions of people who do not play by the rules of the game of institutional politics. 
It is a name to describe the interventions of those who disrupt the framework of 
institutional power relations, because they are in a position which leaves them no 
other option for influencing the organization of society than to disrupt the status quo, 
which does not represent their needs. Unruly politics is expressed in relationships of 
dissensus, struggle, denial or despair amongst people in society, or between people 
who have no part in the centers of political power and state representatives. It is a 
practice of politics that would not make any political sense if we were to define 
politics only within the limits of the institutional political game.  
 
Unruly politics, as we define it, is political action by people who have been denied 
voice by the rules of the political game, and by the social rules that underpin this 
game. It draws its power from transgressing these rules – while at the same time 
upholding others, which may not be legally sanctioned but which have legitimacy, 
deeply rooted in people’s own understandings of what is right and just. This 
preoccupation with social justice distinguishes these forms of political action from the 
banditry or gang violence with which threatened autocrats wilfully try to associate 
them. (Khanna et al. 2013, 14) 
 
We should not evaluate the political sense of unruly politics by the standards of 
formally structured governance. Unruly politics is not univocally aimed at 
overthrowing the old government and installing a new one, gaining a better position 
for a certain part of the population within the parliamentary system or other goals, 
which can be easily understood as productive, accountable and profitable in the light 
of mechanisms of formal governance. Unruly politics demands “a new mode of 
political enquiry which spills outside of traditional notions of politics, and in which the 
relevance of acts and events is not reduced to the effect they have on formal 
structures of the political establishment” (ibid., 11).  
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Those who express unruly politics engage with the state, but on their own terms (ibid., 
12). Expressions of unruly politics do not let themselves be translated into the 
language of negotiated demands and interests, within a setting of parliamentary 
mechanisms (ibid., 10). They do not abide by the logics of representative politics, but 
rather enunciate a political meaning which is unmediated, which does not let itself be 
represented or translated in another context, in another moment or for the benefit of 
other people. Unruly politics is always situated in a specific time and place, engaging 
specific people. It cannot be reduced to fit into general procedures, designed to bring 
a plurality of people together in one body of manageable citizens. At the same time, 
expressions of unruly politics evoke a deep wish to live a dignified life and be treated 
justly by state representatives, regardless of the particular envisioning of what a 
dignified life might contain in each different situation, for every different person. 
Unruly politics thus has a singular-plural character, to quote Jean-Luc Nancy. It is 
always temporary and effective in its surprise. The more its range expands and it 
becomes publicly known, the more chance it will gradually transform into a more 
conventional mode of political agency and be incorporated into the domain of formal 
politics. It is not carefully designed as a party-political campaign, but rather emerges in 
unexpected events. It does not only take place at sites that are specifically designed for 
public and political debate; it also politicizes spaces which are meant to be neutral or 
private, like the streets, abandoned houses and virtual social network sites. It does not 
originate in the recognition of people who have always shared the same identity, but it 
forms a site of solidarity for people who recognize a similar precarious situation in 
their lived experiences, despite their possibly completely divergent identities.  
 
Unruly political agency is necessarily critical towards the legitimacy of the state, as 
long as the state does not safeguard justice and equality for all, regardless of people’s 
social and economic privileges, or their citizenship status. It explicitly takes place 
outside of governance as it manifests itself in an era of a globalized pursuit of 
neoliberalism and capitalism, and can also be characterized as informal politics. Its 
form of organization has itself a sense of unruliness and originates at a grass root 
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level. The examples I wish to highlight here are less structured and more loosely 
organized than classical social movements. Those who lack a formal citizenship status, 
or who feel impaired in making use of their formal citizenship status, literally gain 
space for their lives in informal ways. Through these same informal channels they 
sometimes have considerable impact on the formal domain of politics.  
 
A variety of scholars have studied the emergence of informal politics in different 
contexts, often focusing on non-Western countries. Informal political struggles are 
here clearly opposed to hegemonic systems of governance, which can be colonial or 
post-colonial, religiously grounded and/or anti-democratic and are often dominated 
by a neo-liberal, capitalist agenda (Gibson 2011; Bayat 1997; Naples & Desai 2002). 
Many of these studies reveal how the struggle of the poor and marginalized to make a 
living in the underground economy is a political act in itself. Informal politics and 
informal economy are thus intertwined (Cross 1998; De Neve 2005; Fernandez-Kelly 
& Schefner 2006; Neuwirth 2011). Unruly politics is not only informal, but it also 
explicitly contests the political process as it takes place within the formal sphere. 
Within a Western context, studies which focus on what could be named unruly 
politics often focus on deliberately anarchist and/or anti-capitalist movements, 
applying a conscious strategy of direct action in opposition to state authorities 
(Katsiaficas 2006; Graeber 2009). New Western social movements often operate 
within an urban context to reclaim “the right to city”33, for those who do not fit into 
the city branding strategies of marketeers (Harvey 2012), and occupy urban space in 
order to protest the political dominance of capitalist financial institutions 
(Blumenkranz et al. 2011).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The term “right to the city” is derived from the work of Henri Lefebvre and was adopted over the last 
years by a number of social movements active within an urban context, in countries such as the United 
States, Germany and South Africa. Generally these movements plead for an open access of the urban 
landscape to different groups of people, regardless of their social status. ‘Right to the city’ movements 
resist gentrification, neoliberal city policies and exclusion of inhabitants based on their race, gender, sex, 
citizenship status and/or income. See for example: www.rechtaufstadt.net 
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In my study, I focus on less deliberately organized occurrences of unruly politics that 
take place in a Western urban context, but whose protagonists are generally not 
involved in recognized new social movements. I explore unruly politics as it can be 
related to those troublemakers who are not often described as political agents due to 
the lack of explicit political claims in their actions. A preoccupation with a lack of 
social justice for those who do not fit the norm of economic success, cultural 
assimilation and civic participation can also be found in actions that are often 
denounced as criminal and destructive from an institutional perspective, such as urban 
riots and public disturbances caused by youngsters with an immigrant background. I 
explore whether such events can be seen as expressions of “unruly” politics, since it is 
exactly the question of who has the right to set the rules of the political game which 
we should be asking ourselves here. In the uncomfortable and disturbing act of street 
disturbances and rioting, it becomes apparent who is excluded from the political 
game, as it is played in the conventional way. Young urban troublemakers often do 
not feel that they are part of the system of political representation at all. This feeling 
of exclusion is a legitimation for rebellious youngsters to design their own rules of the 
game. In this sense, unruly politics is not about creating a state of total anarchy, but 
rather about creating “subversive ruliness.” The translation of justice into a system of 
laws is not dismissed as useless or unnecessary all together; it is the functioning of 
existing laws which is questioned.  
 
The analysis of unruly politics is aimed at finding political meaning beyond the 
borders of formal governance, in the contrast and contraction of politics with the 
political. These considerations should not be understood as a simple celebration of 
violence, illegality and incivility. It is not a matter of celebrating unruliness as the only 
true political option here. As I have emphasized before, unruly politics takes place in 
an inextricable relationship with formal political institutions and cannot be seen as an 
alternative replacement for these institutions. However, a critical examination of our 
imagined political community cannot take place without listening to the voices of 
those who express themselves in unconventional or undesirable ways, but who 
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nevertheless share the social world with us. The analysis of unruly politics enables me 
to take certain agency out of the shadows of censorship and investigate their political 
meaning. Whether we condemn or support their actions, young urban troublemakers 
co-appear in the same society with “familiar”, law-abiding citizens, and we therefore 
have to consider the possible political meaning of their actions before we make 
further judgments.  
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Interlude 
 
 
Imad is picking Sylvain and me up at the RER station. Najib, one of the participants 
of the focus group, is with him in the car. As we drive to the youth center, Amar and 
Najib show us the way. They tell us that the big round-about close to the station is a 
common place to be controlled by the police, and also a common place where the 
trouble starts when the guys from the neighborhood get into a battle with the CRS. 
The youth center is quite a new building. It is a sober, neat, almost sterile looking 
place with white walls and a bright orange oilcloth on the floor. On the ground floor, 
some boys are playing table football. They all come to shake our hands and introduce 
themselves when we come in. We go upstairs to one of the “classrooms” to have our 
meeting. Sylvain introduces me briefly as an exchange student from the Netherlands 
and opens the meeting. I am surprised that nobody seems to wonder what I am 
exactly doing here. My presence is accepted quite naturally. Sylvain explains that the 
common purpose of our research is to gain insight into the thought of the youngsters 
with help of the vocabulary that is important to them. He tells a story about a boy 
from Villiers le Bel34 who said that a hundred journalists had come to his cité last year 
and that everyone wanted to meddle with his neighborhood, even politicians, but that 
nobody had actually taken the time to let him and the other young people finish their 
story – nobody had really listened. Sylvain says that we have come to Grigny to do 
exactly that; to take the time to really listen to the youngsters. The participants of the 
focus group all engage very seriously in the conversation. Nobody interrupts the 
conversation or makes fun of someone else. All listen carefully to one another and 
show a lot of respect to Sylvain, who is leading the conversation, but they do not treat 
him like a superior. One of the participants criticizes him for not finishing his 
questions and speaking too slow. Sylvain makes it difficult for him to gather his 
thoughts like that, he says. I have the impression that all feel free to say what they 
want, but some of the boys clearly speak up more than the rest. Because we are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Major riots took place in Villiers le Bel in 2007 after two boys on a scooter collided with a police car in 
a pursuit. See: “Riot police in France on alert for firearms,” New York Times, November 27, 2007. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/27/world/europe/27iht-france.5.8503581.html?_r=1. 
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asking the youngsters specifically to name words that are important to them and 
describe the meaning of those words, the conversation is taken to quite an abstract 
level. As a philosopher, I feel very comfortable with the almost Socratic exchange of 
thoughts that we are having, trying to precisely describe the different layers of 
meaning that the youngsters attach to a certain word like "family” or “betrayal.” The 
youngsters are speaking more about general conditions or stories from their 
environment than about personal experiences. I suspect that this is also part of their 
way of feeling comfortable in the conversation, not showing too much of their 
personal lives and issues. All in all, this first ‘real’ focus group conversation in Grigny 
feels like a promising start. (Field note, December 9, 2008) 
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Chapter 2 
          
"All Words Are Lived": Methodological Reflections 
 
 
One thing, then, that critical intellectuals do, - apart from speaking to movements, on 
the one hand, and to experts, on the other hand – is to find ways to knit their 
disparate discourses together. In other words, we are engaged in creating bridge 
discourses and in opening new hybrid publics and arenas of struggle. (Fraser 1989, 
11) 
 
The methodological reflections presented in this chapter provide insight into the 
process by which I conducted my research. In the first part of the chapter, I will 
reflect upon the general methodological intentions of my research project, which is 
characterized by a critical intervention with a double purpose. An engagement of 
philosophical theory with the narratives of young urban troublemakers lies at the basis 
of my research. I wish to contribute to conceptual analyses about the political as a 
disruption of the status quo of institutional politics, with concrete descriptions of the 
sites and situations in which such a disruption takes place. The narratives of those 
who are involved in unruly politics can enliven a theoretical debate, which often 
remains rather abstract in the writings of philosophers. At the same time, I wish to 
draw attention to the political potential of the seemingly senseless unruly agency of 
young urban troublemakers in Western European societies, by analyzing this unruly 
agency in the context of theories about the political as a disruption of institutional 
politics. A theoretical analysis of such agency can bring certain hidden political 
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implications to the fore which often remain obscured in purely social scientific 
approaches. This mutual enrichment of theory and lived narratives contributes to a 
critical re-consideration of dominant discourses, both in political theory and in the 
public debate. The theoretically and empirically informed counter-narratives presented 
in my dissertation provide a frank critique of dominant power plays in the name of 
those who have no part in these power plays. This critique can be confronting, unruly 
and even scandalous, but it nevertheless speaks of a politically inspired understanding 
of truth, insofar as it evokes lived experiences and provokes a new experience with a 
political impact.  
 
In the second part of this chapter, I provide insight into the process of my fieldwork 
in Grigny and Kanaleneiland, which enables the reader to judge the trustworthiness 
and internal validity of this part of my research. I describe the various techniques of 
data collection and data analysis, which I have used in order to structure my 
conversations with both young inhabitants and youth workers in the neighborhood. I 
also describe the way in which I was introduced in the field and my relation with 
respondents.35   
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 In this research I alternately use the terms “respondent,” “partner in conversation” and “interlocutor” 
to indicate the people with whom I spoke during my fieldwork in interviews and informal conversations. 
I do not only use the more scientifically loaded term “respondent,” because it is my opinion that this 
term does not capture all dimensions of the conversations I had. I do not perceive myself as the one who 
was only asking questions as a researcher and my partners in conversation as the ones only responding to 
these questions as “respondent.” The dimension of an exchange of thought which characterized many of 
my conversations is not sufficiently captured by this term, which also does not indicate the shift in 
thinking which my conversations sometimes brought about in my own understanding of my research 
themes. In addition, I ascribe an active role to different narratives in my research. I perceive those who 
stand at the source of these narratives, whether they are the people I met during my fieldwork or the 
philosophers I read, as equal interlocutors who helped me shape my own narrative. This more active 
involvement in the process of research with respect to the conversations I had, as well as the complex 
interplay of different modes of thinking confronting each other on both an empirical and theoretical 
level, have to be kept in mind when I use the term respondent, or interchange it with other words to 
indicate my partners in conversation.  
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2.1. Writing an experience-book 
In an interview from 1978, Michel Foucault speaks about the difference between an 
“experience-book” and a “truth-book” or a “demonstration-book” (1991). Foucault 
describes his own books as experiences that transform him and the way he thinks 
about the topics he writes about. In the process of writing, Foucault does not lay out a 
previously, carefully composed line of argumentation; rather, he embarks on an 
experimental itinerary, exploring both the limits of our existing ways of thinking and 
the possibilities for new ways of thinking. Foucault hereby implies that writing is a 
risky business to him. The experience of writing does not confirm the way he 
understands himself and society, but rather dissolves the certainties he had before he 
engaged in the new book project. In this way, writing becomes a “de-subjectifying” 
undertaking, a “‘limit-experience’ that tears the subject from itself” (ibid., 31-32). At 
the same time, Foucault aims to invite others to share this experience. He expresses 
the hope that not only he, but also his readers, will come to understand their 
relationship to their present time in a different light after reading his books. The 
“truth” of certain discourses is transformed in the experience of reading because the 
book turns certain undisputed forms of knowledge around, by examining them from a 
different and unexpected angle. By examining truth through experience, we are able to 
take a certain distance from the way we are used to perceiving certain societal 
mechanisms. This distance allows us to imagine different approaches to these 
mechanisms and perhaps even collective practices which will change these 
mechanisms. The experience of writing is connected to a hope for change of fixated 
ways of thinking. To Foucault, an “experience-book” is, in a certain way, a change 
agent (ibid., 42).  
 
In this interview, Foucault seems to place a classical notion of “truth,” solidified in 
rationality and the subject, in opposition to “experience.” One could interpret his 
statements in such a way that truth, as a transcendental category of theory and logics, 
or truth, as a general conclusion which can be drawn from the proof of empirical data, 
is completely detached from the lived experiences of people and their interpretation 
 66 
of the social and political context in which these experiences take place. Foucault 
ascribes a transformatory potential to the subjective understanding of human 
experiences and interpretations, while “truth” seems to be an immobile, and therefore 
conservative, category. However, this classical notion of truth is not the only notion 
of truth recognized by Foucault. Especially in his later work, Foucault ascribes a 
certain truth value to the experiencing of the limits of dominant, established truths. In 
his description of the practice of parrhesia, or speaking frankly in a political situation 
shaped by hierarchies of power, the notion of truth returns in a different, non-
conformist way (Foucault 2004, 2010, 2011). The truth which arises in this practice is 
not opposed to experience, but manifests itself through experience. It therefore has 
transformatory potential, which Foucault envisions as traversing a classical notion of 
truth. Foucault states that the experience of non-conformist truths can critically 
confront certain fixed, conventional truths and, in this confrontation, take these truths 
out of a comfort zone of seemingly undisputed validity. This confrontation between 
two different kinds of truth has an explicit political significance for Foucault because 
it illuminates what is lacking in a seemingly complete picture of what is accepted as 
“the norm” within society.  
 
Certain previously discredited, obscured or subordinated expressions can break 
through societal conventions, often in a subversive way, and open a perspective on a 
new configuration of power relations. The truth value of the confrontational 
experience with these expressions lies in their appeal to a better, more inclusive and 
more just organization of the polis. Hence, this confrontational truth is not objective 
but politically and morally loaded, and can only be understood through an experience 
in which different actors or forces in society are directly engaged with each other. This 
notion of parrhesiastic and subversive truth-telling will be discussed in more detail in 
the last part of my dissertation. In this last part, I propose to see the unruly and 
uncivil disturbances caused by young urban troublemakers as what Michel Foucault 
calls a parrhesiastic gesture, or the act of telling uncomfortable truths, which put general 
conventions of good citizenship on the line. Here, I introduce the idea of a politically 
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engaged notion of truth which emerges in experience because it forms an important 
part of the methodological stakes of this dissertation. The parrhesiastic gesture is not 
only the object of research, as it also directs my methodological approach. 
 
2.1.1. Threshold experiences within the research process 
In line with Foucault’s description of the experience-book, this dissertation is 
intended as a change agent, provoking a critical perspective on political theory and the 
public debate in France and the Netherlands and possibly inspiring a different social 
and political engagement with young urban troublemakers. By approaching political 
agency from an “unruly” and “uncivil” perspective, I hope to open up space for 
reconsidering fixed notions of accepted political and civil participation. In order to 
bring about this shift of thinking, I not only reconsider the dominant discourse about 
civil participation and political agency, but I also engage with the accounts of those 
young people who both experience and cause trouble at the limits of that dominant 
discourse. 
 
In Foucault’s words, I recognize the experience of writing as a risky business which 
explores the limits of existing ways of thinking and the possibilities for new ways of 
thinking. My research can be seen as taking place at a threshold between my own 
experience of writing as a risky business and the “troublesome” experience I wish to 
evoke for my readers. However, the threshold between my own experience of putting 
my convictions to the test and the experience of others whom I wish to invite to 
reconsider certain dominant ways of thinking is not the only threshold that plays a 
part in this research. My research straddles various thresholds in the middle of social 
reality. My story is shaped from my own words, those of my respondents and those of 
the philosophers studied. It is in the space between personal experiences and 
structural power plays where I study the societal position of my respondents. This 
“experienced” research should not be seen as devoid of any relation to truth. In the 
middle of the triangular engagement between my own narrative, the narratives of 
young urban troublemakers and the narratives of philosophers engaged with political 
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theory, an experience of truth in the parrhesiastic sense could arise. By engaging a 
theoretical philosophical debate with the narratives of those who are the object of that 
debate, I hope to confront the reader with an interplay of parrhesiastic gestures. In 
order to bring about such an experience and validate my research aims, I identify 
those places where the narratives concerning the lived world of my respondents 
resonate with issues as they are discussed in critical philosophical debates on politics 
and citizenship. I mean to speak here about experiences that bring thought, narratives 
and agency together and which capture a moment in the ever-shifting relationship 
between our own lived and subjective standpoint, the discourses that shape our words 
and thoughts and the social reality in which we interact with others.  
 
The engagement with parrhesiastic gestures in my research has consequences for 
judging the validity of my work. The empirical aspects of my research, which present 
various narratives reflecting the experiences of young urban troublemakers, should 
not be seen as constituting an autonomous and conventional empirical investigation 
that can lead to generalizable knowledge, derived from a comparative case-study. 
Rather, they should be seen as interventions which both enrich and confront a more 
theoretical debate about the practice of politics and the community formation around 
citizenship. With this dissertation, I do not aim to present a complete and objective 
analysis of the lived world of young urban troublemakers, nor do I aim to present a 
complete theory of the notion of politics. It is the experience of the limits of 
established truths in the domain of “civil” politics and good citizenship which I intend 
to convey. The validity of this endeavor depends not only on a careful, systematic and 
accurate study of experiences and theoretical ideas, but also on the extend to which an 
appeal to a perspective of political transformation is convincingly presented. Within 
the context of my research, “truth” does not only reveal the meaning and relevance of 
things that have already happened; it also opens up a perspective on the possibility of 
a future transformation of society and its political organization. Political engagement 
is therefore present in the content of the research, as well as in the research process 
itself. 
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2.1.2. Looking through a political lens 
My own initial understanding of the topics which I describe in this dissertation is 
shaped by a theoretical discourse in which philosophical analysis and political 
engagement mutually inform each other. This discourse is characterized by an 
understanding of knowledge as constructed within a network of social relationships. 
These social relationships are never neutral, but always influenced by a certain power 
dynamics. The construction of knowledge, and the analysis of social phenomena, is 
therefore always political. The political therefore not only serves as the topic of my 
research, but it simultaneously shapes the lens through which I study my object of 
research. This double political involvement explains why I, on the one hand, study the 
political significance of civil “trouble” and, on the other hand, intend to cause a 
certain amount of “trouble” within the domain of political theory. It also explains why 
I both study certain uncivil and/or subversive narratives of truth about the lived 
experiences of my interlocutors and intend to present a subversive narrative regarding 
the analysis of possible political agency.  
 
My discussed body of theory can be placed in a post-structuralist and/or post-Marxist 
tradition. Within this tradition, the practice of politics is understood as always set in a 
tense relational field, made up of power struggles between different interest groups. It 
is of importance to study the relation between these interest groups and take the 
dominance of privileged groups over underprivileged groups into account. However 
different the positions of thinkers like Michel Foucault, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal 
Mouffe, Jean-Luc Nancy, Etienne Balibar, Jacques Rancière, Judith Butler and Slavoj 
Zizek may be, all pertain to possibilities for emancipatory political agency that benefit 
those suffering from unequal power relations. Such an emancipatory political agency 
is inspired by a firm belief in justice and equal chances for all, while simultaneously 
dismissing any essentializing ideas about a political community as a homogeneous 
entity or a naïve and utopic idea of a neutral, power-free political sphere. Truly 
democratic and emancipatory political agency should be necessarily critical towards 
the legitimacy of the state, because it is considered with the position of those who are 
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excluded from the dominant order of society and are therefore not properly 
represented within state institutions. This field of theory is therefore explicitly suitable 
for exploring the possibilities of putting political agency into practice outside of 
electoral mechanisms and the institutional domain. My inquiry into unruly politics 
therefore fits into this field and is intended to produce an experience which is 
inherently political in itself. 
 
This intended political experience emerges from not only a body of theoretical 
writings, but also from a resonance between different narratives, speaking both about 
theoretical insights and lived experiences. In general, my approach to narratives is 
politically engaged. Next to the body of theoretical writings, I work with narratives 
about the lived experiences of young men who can be considered urban 
troublemakers. I derive these narratives from interviews conducted in two so-called 
“problem neighborhoods” and from popular culture, including movies, rap texts and 
literature. I present these narratives in my research in order to do justice to the object 
of research, in such a way that the researcher not only speaks for the object of 
research, but also allows the object to speak for him or herself (Maso & Smaling 
1998). However, I do not only intend to present these narratives in an accurate and 
respectful way in order to let the troublemaker speak for himself. In the context of 
this research, narratives are not only accounts of the positions, thoughts and 
experiences of others to whom we can objectively listen. I present narratives in the 
awareness of their political potential and their capacity to resonate with others who 
have different positions, thoughts and experiences.  
 
Through their capacity to resonate, narratives can nourish a political solidarity 
between different people, not only because they can inform an understanding of other 
lives and situations, but also because they can lead to a recognition of certain shared 
experiences across the position of different agents and audiences. A narrative can 
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confront us with the “this-ness”36 of a unique situation, perceived as a whole and 
simultaneously in all its multiple facets, before we rationally dissect it and place its 
elements in a hierarchy of ascribed meanings. The “this-ness” of a distant situation 
which is narrated can resonate with the ‘this-ness’ of life here and now. This 
resonance of a distant situation in life here and now, grasped as “the assemblage of a 
collective being, a mobile conglomerate of sensations, objects and colors,” can cause a 
revolution, according to the Wung Ming Foundation (Wu Ming 1 2011, 11). Wu Ming 
1 refers here to The Invisible Committee, which states that a revolutionary movement 
spreads through resonance between events taking place at different times and in 
different places (2009). Without immediately aiming for a revolution, the narratives I 
present here could resonate in a similar way and therefore have a political impact. The 
narratives I present here are not intended to convey an objective truth about certain 
events or experiences. Rather, they speak of what the Wu Ming Foundation calls a 
truth which is “not limited to the faithful representation of single facts, but (…) about 
their overall significance. A narrative is ‘true’ when it increases our awareness, our 
comprehension (in the etymological sense) of a sequence of facts. In other words, 
while mere reporting has the task of describing facts, narration must also make them 
talk: it must connect events, meanings, and individuals” (Wu Ming 2 2011, 3-4). The 
significance, or comprehension which is mentioned here, is a lived or experienced 
comprehension. When narration makes facts talk, we do not only passively understand 
them, but we are able to see them come to life outside of their deducible factuality. 
Narratives can incite a relational, and hence resonating, experience of truth. This 
notion of truth shares many characteristics with the Foucauldian notion of parrhesiastic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 “This-ness” is another word for the Deleuzian concept of “haecceity,” as it is referred to by Rancière in 
a discussion of the capacity of literature to confront us with “the microevents that weave the impersonal 
fabric 
upon which ‘personal’ experience draws its plots” (Rancière 2008, 243-244). Literature can make us aware 
of the difference between the sequences of such impersonal microevents and our tendency to subjugate 
this “haecceity” to a logic of aims and purposes, which is expressed in personal judgments and decisions. 
“Literature tells the truth and makes us enjoy it to the extent that it releases those haecceities from the 
chains of individualization and objectification. This is the right way of handling the equivalence of art and 
life.” (Ranciere 2008, 243). Here, I deploy this concept not only in relation to literary narratives, but also 
in relation to other narratives. I follow the interpretation of “haecceity” of the Wu Ming Foundation, 
which states that it is precisely a confrontation with the fluid experience of microevents in its totality, 
before this experience is appropriated or personalized, which can spark a political engagement and 
conviction. 
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truth, which is central to my research method. A parrhesiastic truth does not need to be 
proven; it is experienced.  
 
2.1.3. "All words are lived" 
The lived narratives of those seen as young urban troublemakers need to be heard in 
order to investigate how events of unruly politics can critically confront the domain of 
institutional politics. In order to engage the narratives of my respondents with the 
analysis of political power plays, I apply an interpretative approach to the narratives of 
my interlocutors (Morehouse 2012). This approach to the studied narratives is 
embedded in a theoretical philosophical framework pertaining to the difference 
between politics and the political, as described in the previous chapter. Interpretative 
inquiry is not focused on the meaning of the social as such, but rather on the 
construction of meanings, as they are actively ascribed to the social by the people who 
are involved in it. An interpretive approach to this social reality entails a willingness to 
engage with its full complexity and moral implications, and the awareness that one can 
never produce an objective overview when one is standing right in the middle of 
things (Smith 1992).  
 
An interpretative perspective views the world and the observer as situated in a 
practice or activity within a lived world. That lived world is always in medias res, or in 
the middle of things: it is a view that places an agent in a living culture. (Morehouse 
2012, 2) 
 
The work of a researcher is necessarily emerged in, and affected by, the very complex 
network of social relations and meanings which it aims to investigate. An interpretive 
researcher therefore engages in a “double hermeneutics” (Giddens 1976). He/she 
interprets the interpretations of the people he/she meets in the field of research, while 
his own interpretation of this field is simultaneously embedded within the social 
relations and phenomena he/she studies. The interpretive researcher writes an 
account of the way other people write accounts of their lived social reality. The 
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researcher therefore steps into a practice of hermeneutics which already existed before 
his/her arrival and which mutually influences, and is influenced by, his/her own acts 
of interpretation. This interplay of different constructed meanings plays a role in the 
study of lived narratives. 
 
The own accounts of the experiences, as they are lived by the young inhabitants in the 
two neighborhoods in which my fieldwork took place, form the point of departure of 
the first part of my study. I investigate how meaning is constructed through thoughts, 
as they are put into words. This investigation begins with the words used by my 
conversational partners to describe social reality as they experience and understand it. 
In accordance with the interviewing method of anthropologist Sylvain Lazarus, I start 
every interview by asking my respondents to name words which are important to 
them, to describe daily life experiences in their neighborhood (Lazarus 1996). This 
method of interviewing will be described in more detail in the next section. Lazarus 
works from the presumption that an investigation of people’s thought is always a 
rapport du réel, a report of the real. In people’s thinking, reality is, so to say, revealed to 
itself. All people have a proper intellectuality, which is consistent and expressed in an 
original way. The thought of people is always singular and can therefore not be fully 
explained by a scientific description made by social scientists alone. In that case, the 
thought of the people would be objectified and subordinated to the scientific thought 
of the researcher. It should not be the ones known to possess scientific knowledge 
who develop a thought about the thought of the people, but the thought of the 
people itself that should be highlighted (Lazarus 1996, 65). The only way to gain 
insight into people’s thoughts is therefore to listen carefully, literally and symbolically, 
face to face, to the way they express themselves.  
 
The singularity of the proposed attitude is to open up in each moment to the 
necessity and the realisability of the research. The research consists of the 
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engagement with people and with what they think; this engagement constitutes a face-
to-face (ibid., 72).37 
 
In the face-to-face between people and their thought, it is not a matter of reducing 
the confrontation between objective factors regarding people (profession, salary, 
education, area of residence, etc.) and representations, but to question, in the thought 
of people, the relation between people and their thought (ibid., 73).38 
 
By listening in this way, a researcher can discover the space in which the thinking of 
the people investigates itself, so to say, through conversation. People’s expressions can 
thus be recognized as part of a relation of and not to people’s reality. 
 
To understand the young people’s report of the reality they experience in the 
neighborhood in which they live, it is necessary to listen to their thoughts. Their 
thoughts are not just reflections of their opinions or some kind of normative 
imagination without truth value in a scientific context. Nor can their words be 
reduced to a general, objective description of life in a European deprived 
neighborhood. It is rather their real and lived experiences that are articulated in their 
thoughts, and the words they use to express them. This idea is also expressed by the 
youngsters I have interviewed. For instance, Moussa, one of the boys from Grigny, 
said “All words are lived.” This expression makes clear that words are not used to 
draw an objectified representation of reality at a certain distance, but that the words 
are indeed directly intertwined with the lived reality. The “name” which people give to 
their experiences is the place where the singularity of people’s thought happens. It is 
by carefully listening to their words that one can enter their world of experience 
(Lapeyronnie 2008, 43). Words, as they are used to express and interpret a lived 
reality, form the cornerstones of this research. My own practice of interviewing could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 My translation of: “La singularité de la démarche proposée est d’ouvrir à chaque moment à la nécessité 
et à la praticabilité de l’enquête. L’enquête consiste dans la mise en rapport des gens et de ce qu’ils 
pensent; cette mise en rapport constitue un face-à-face.”  
38 My translation of: “Dans le face- à-face entre les gens et leur penseé, il ne s’agit pas de reconduire la 
confrontation entre des facteurs objectifs concernant les gens (métier, salaire, formation, lieu d’habitation, 
etc.) et les représentations, mais d’interroger, dans la pensée des gens, le rapport des gens à leur pensée.” 
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be seen as taking place in an interstice between my own position, that of the young 
people I interviewed and the philosophical theories I have studied. 
 
2.1.4. No subject is its own point of departure 
I perceive my young interlocutors’ narratives in a broader social and political context. 
The meaning that people ascribe to social interactions and experiences through their 
words never stands on its own, but is always constructed within a field of power 
relations. As much as we should acknowledge people’s capability to develop singular 
thinking that cannot be reduced to general patterns of knowledge and information, 
this singular thinking is not developed out of a completely autonomous mind-set, as it 
is self-consciously chosen by an independent subject. Judith Butler reminds us that 
“no subject is its own point of departure” (1995, 7). The idea of an autonomous 
subject can only be upheld, if one forgets the constitutive outside from which it is 
distinguished by differentiation (Butler 1995, 12). This constitutive outside consists of 
all points of view, paradigms of knowledge and social experiences of both the people 
with whom we identify and from whom we distinguish ourselves. Any understanding 
of subjectivity is therefore inherently part of a social bond. This social bond is not 
always consensual. We are just as much bound to others who influence our 
subjectivity because they oppress us, or because we contest them. People’s thought 
and agency should be merited for its singularity, while at the same time taking into 
account how it is constituted by, and framed in, social relations and political power 
dynamics. I therefore aim to understand the thought and agency of young urban 
troublemakers in relation to the larger societal structures in which they are embedded.  
 
In order to compose my own interpretation of the thoughts and words of the young 
people I have spoken to, I also have to take into account the constellation of power 
relations that characterizes the political organization of society in which they live. My 
interlocutors find themselves in a controversial position within society. They hold the 
position of the outsider in relation to dominant conceptions of active political 
participation and good citizenship, and therefore express what Jacques Rancière calls 
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“voices from below” (Rancière 2005, 17). I perceive their stories as “counter-
narratives” (Andrews 2002), which contest the dominance of “mainstream” narratives 
about the conditions of society. An investigation of these narratives as counter-
narratives allows me to explore their political implications and illustrates how 
established truths about politics and citizenship, as produced in dominant discourses, 
are confronted with a gesture of truth-telling in a completely different fashion. The 
accounts of the lived experiences of my partners in conversation have a truth-value of 
their own, since they tell us about the social reality of those to whom we are not used 
to listen. By listening to such counter-narratives, we become aware that the act of 
speaking the truth cannot only be claimed by those who are granted the right to speak 
because they hold a privileged position in society or because they represent what feels 
to be naturally true by the majority. “What is at stake here is the way power intervenes 
in creating conditions of possibility for specific narratives to emerge as dominant and 
for others to be marginalized” (Tamboukou 2008, 102). I approach the narratives of 
my respondents “as narrative modalities of truth production,” embedded in larger 
power dynamics (ibid.). The way they put their own world of experiences into words 
reflects their truth about their lives and their position in society. Listening to their 
words allows me to understand how they see their own place in the power dynamics 
of society.  
 
In order to do justice to both the counter-narratives of my respondents and the 
influence of dominant discourses about political agency and civil participation, my 
own interpretative account has to oscillate between different modes of research. My 
research is structured as a “compositional study” in which a deliberate movement is 
made between theory and empirical materials (Fine & Weis 2005, 65). As much as we 
cannot understand a subject position without considering its constitutive outside, we 
cannot interpret the words and thoughts of people as an object of study without 
investigating their constitutive context. Social relations and human agency, as well as 
political dynamics, are always characterized by connections and fissures between 
“selves” and “others.”  
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The key point here is that social theory and analyses can no longer afford to isolate a 
“group,” or to re-present their stories as “transparent,” as though that group were 
coherent and bounded; instead, we must theorize explicitly – that is, “connect the 
dots” – to render visible relations to other “groups” and to larger socio-political 
formations. (ibid, 66) 
 
A compositional study emphasizes the complementary relation between narrative 
and/or ethnographic material, on the one hand, and social and/or political theory, on 
the other, in order to engage with the full complexity of the dynamics of society. The 
sense of all social phenomena discussed in my research – including experiences of 
injustice, community building, mechanisms of surveillance and agency in the light of 
social change – oscillates between personal experiences, power dynamics and 
discourses. I aim to capture the complexity of this oscillation by engaging both theory 
and ethnographic material in an interaction with each other. It is in the space between 
structural forces and individual lives/agency where I develop my research (ibid., 68). 
 
2.1.5. And back to trouble again 
According to both Jacques Rancière and Sylvain Lazarus, no distinction should be 
made between those who produce theory on social reality and those who are objects 
of such theory. The stories and experiences regarding the politics of people who are 
not supposed to be involved in politics can disrupt a dominant understanding of 
politics, precisely because their interference with thought about politics is unexpected. 
The disruption of their gesture of truth-telling produces unexpected, unwanted and 
often uncivil truths which “happen” like an event happens. Only if an interpretation 
of a social phenomenon arises from the social itself and is not developed on the level 
of transcendental reflections can it inspire actual changes in the social. Thinking about 
the social and the political cannot take place outside of this same social and political. 
As soon as we objectify the social or political from an outside position, we detach 
thinking itself from the reality which it tries to comprehend. However, thinking itself 
is just as real as the things we think about. In this sense, the narratives of the young 
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men I interviewed are not mere illustrations of my own philosophical account. The 
men should rather be seen as partners in a conversation from one troubling thinking 
to another troubling thinking. This does not mean that the conversation has always 
led to a natural understanding, mirroring or consensus; the interaction between 
different thoughts and narratives has also been troubling in itself. But, as it becomes 
clear from the postfoundationalist perspective I discussed in the previous chapter, 
trouble is not always a recipe for disaster. If one engages with the trouble – i.e. is 
ready to undergo and endure it – instead of attempting to either neutralize or banish 
it, this could provide surprising new insights and possibilities for transforming 
established discourses and power structures. This attitude of engaging with and 
enduring trouble is a crucial characteristic of my approach in this research project. 
 
2.2. Context of the fieldwork 
Above, I have discussed my general methodological stance in this research, which is 
characterized by various threshold experiences between my own politically engaged 
position, narratives about the lived experiences of young troublemakers and 
theoretical explorations of the notion of politics/the political. In the second half of 
these methodological reflections, I will zoom in on the process of the fieldwork, 
which I have conducted in order to gain insight into the narratives of young urban 
troublemakers. The following sub-sections are more technical in nature than the 
previous ones and provide more practical insight into the various steps I took in 
arriving at a well-informed interpretation of the lived world of my interlocutors.  
 
2.2.1. Two cases of two neighborhoods 
On a technical level, my fieldwork in Grigny and Kanaleneiland can be characterized 
as two single-site case studies (Stark & Torrance 2005). I do not extensively compare 
the two, but they serve as enrichment of the presentation of two dimensions of the 
way in which the community of experience of young urban troublemakers and 
institutional politics are related to each other, as presented in the second part of my 
dissertation. The different circumstances in both periods of fieldwork and the 
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differences between the focus groups in both neighborhoods would make it very 
difficult to retrieve accurate and generalizable empirical data to allow a comparison 
between the two cases. Within both periods of fieldwork, I therefore focused more on 
internal typicality rather than generalizability (Henn et al. 2006). For the same reason, 
I chose not to write extensively about a comparison of the narratives I retrieved in 
both neighborhoods in my dissertation. After all, as Denzin says, “every instance of 
social interaction, if thickly described, represents a slice from the lived world” (1983, 
133). The two periods of fieldwork should be read as such slices of the lived world, 
experienced by my interlocutors in two different places.  
 
I chose to do field work in both France and the Netherlands because I was interested 
in gaining insight into the dynamics between state institutions and the lived world of 
youngsters with an immigrant background with a reputation for causing public trouble 
within two different Western European national contexts. Because of my own Dutch 
nationality, I first of all wanted to gain insight into the exclusionary/inclusionary 
dynamics of the imagined political community in a society in which I myself occupy a 
position and with which I am best acquainted. I chose to do fieldwork in France 
because regular reference is made to the French situation when cases of urban 
violence or other public disturbances involving youngsters of immigrant descent take 
place in the Netherlands. Especially since the extensive urban riots in the periphery of 
Paris in 2005, the situation in the Parisian banlieues has been used in the Netherlands as 
an example to indicate a tense, hostile relation between urban youth and authorities, 
particularly the police. The French situation is often mentioned as a “worst case 
scenario,” backed up by remarks like “we don’t want a Paris-like situation here’, as I 
will discuss in chapter 5. Such reference implies that the relation between urban youth 
and authorities in the Netherlands is seen as less hostile and violent than in France. 
This led me to the hypothesis that fieldwork in both France and the Netherlands 
would give me the opportunity to investigate two different sides of the relationship 
between institutional politics and disruptive agency of rebellious youth. I chose to 
work in Grigny and Kanaleneiland, in particular, because both neighborhoods have 
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the negative reputation of being so-called “problem neighborhoods” with a majority 
population of immigrant descent and a large number of young inhabitants who often 
cause trouble in public space. Hence, the youth with whom I interacted in both 
neighborhoods are representative for the kind of young urban troublemakers whose 
disruptive agency within society is often seen as apolitical and who I will present here 
as agents of unorganized, unruly politics. The following sections will provide an initial 
introduction to my research sites, before I present a more substantive analysis of my 
fieldwork material in the following part of my thesis. 
 
2.2.2. Fieldwork in Grigny and my introduction to the neighborhood 
Between December 2008 and March 2009, I conducted fieldwork in Grigny, one of 
the southern banlieues of Paris. During this period, I conducted seven interviews with a 
focus group of around fifteen young people from the area, ten individual interviews 
with other youngsters from the area and ten individual interviews with professionals 
working with youngsters in the area. My fieldwork in Grigny was embedded in a larger 
research project, led by anthropologist Sylvain Lazarus, associated with Université 
Paris 8. Lazarus is leading a long-term research project into the lives of youngsters in 
the banlieues of Paris. His research is connected to an international observatory into the 
social dynamics of life in peripheral urban areas that incorporates research from 
France, Brazil and Senegal, known of as l'Observatoire international des banlieues et des 
peripheries. 39  During my time in Grigny, the research team was focusing on the 
relationship between young inhabitants, the police and the state. My own research 
interests fit in well with this project. Sylvain Lazarus invited me to join his research 
team for the period that I was present in Paris.  
 
During my fieldwork, I cooperated closely with Imad, also a PhD student. Imad is in 
his early forties and had been working for the youth service in Grigny until five years 
prior to my period of fieldwork. Imad knows many families living in Grigny and is a 
well-known figure in the neighborhood. He is half-Algerian and half-French, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 For more information, see: http://oibp.wordpress.com/, (in French). 
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therefore has his own migration history. From his own experiences, he relates well to 
the experiences of the young inhabitants in Grigny. Because of his former job at the 
youth services in Grigny, he is also well-acquainted with most of the professionals 
working with youth in the area. Imad introduced me to many people in the 
neighborhood and thus functioned as my gatekeeper (Emmel et al. 2007). I conducted 
all focus group interviews together with Imad and Sylvain Lazarus. This cooperation 
was very beneficial to me, since my far from complete knowledge of the French 
language sometimes hindered me in understanding everything said by my respondents 
during our conversations. The fact that I was not conducting the interviews alone 
made it easy for me to ask for clarification afterwards about certain parts of the 
conversations I had missed. The many informal conversations I had with Imad also 
helped acquaint me with the history of the neighborhood and understand the political 
context in which the youth work in the area is embedded.  
 
2.2.3. Fieldwork in Kanaleneiland and my introduction to the neighborhood 
Between October 2010 and February 2011, I conducted fieldwork in Kanaleneiland, 
Utrecht. During this period, I conducted ten conversations with a focus group of 
about fifteen boys, ranging in age from sixteen to twenty, from Kanaleneiland Noord 
(the northern part of the neighborhood), and I held interviews with fifteen 
professionals working with boys from the area. Over the Christmas holidays, I took 
nine boys from the focus group and four adult supervisors on a four-day visit to Paris 
and Grigny. I organized this trip to Paris and the banlieues in order to offer the boys an 
interesting and informative experience in exchange for their participation in the focus 
group, thus creating a certain reciprocity in my research (Shenton & Hayter 2004). I 
announced the plan to go to Paris in the first meeting, and for all the boys the 
prospect to go on a trip together was an important motivation to take part in the 
meetings. Despite the fact that they knew from the beginning that I was organizing 
the meetings as part of my research, and that I was going to write a book in which the 
meetings would be described, the boys started to see me as someone organizing a trip 
to Paris for them, and not as a researcher.  
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My presence in the neighborhood was not only seen this way by the participants of 
the focus group; local professionals and policymakers regularly addressed me as 
someone organizing a youth activity, and not as a researcher. During my five months 
of fieldwork, I acquired a lot of insight into the relationship between the institutional 
domain, the field of youth work professionals and the boys, as my plan of organizing a 
trip to Paris for a group of “troublemakers” from Kanaleneiland Noord caused both 
controversy and interest. My own project thus became part of the local dynamics 
between policy and practice. I was invited to several meetings with police staff and 
officials from the district department of the municipality as a volunteer in the area of 
youth work, together with other representatives of local organizations working with 
youngsters in the neighborhood. This enabled me to use various observations and 
informal conversations I had with representatives of the district department, youth 
services and the police to complement the analysis of my interviews and focus group 
meetings.  
 
Many of the professionals I have interviewed were also more willing to speak to me 
because they knew “I was organizing something for the boys,” and not only “looking 
for information.” Some of them told me they had grown wary of all the requests of 
researchers who wanted to hear about their work with youngsters in a deprived 
neighborhood. They looked differently at my request for a conversation, however, 
since “I knew the boys myself and even had the guts to take them to Paris.” In the 
interviews, which I conducted after the Christmas holidays, I told my respondents 
about my experiences with the focus group and the trip, which led some of my 
respondents to say that they had experienced our conversation more as an exchange 
of experiences, than as a question-and-answer interview. These circumstances made 
my fieldwork in Kanaleneiland incline in the direction of action research (McNiff & 
Whitehead 2006), instead of ethnographic methodologies alone, such as interviews 
and participatory observations. With the trip to Paris, I created an intervention in my 
field of research. My respondents from the focus group also partly became fellow 
researchers, since they noticed differences and similarities between Grigny and 
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Kanaleneiland, and talked about these observations with me during the trip and in the 
focus group meetings after the trip (Heron 1996). However, my fieldwork cannot be 
fully described as an action research, since the participants in the focus group were 
not the ones who formulated the research question, nor did we together intend to 
establish a significant social change in the environment of the focus group with the 
research project (Freire 1970). The participatory level of the research was therefore 
more limited than usually is the case in action research. One could say that I 
conducted an action-oriented research with a participatory element (the trip to Paris) 
and observational elements (focus group interviews, individual interviews and 
participatory observations in the neighborhood and at meetings). 
 
For my introduction in the neighborhood, I relied on the help of two people in 
particular. Farida, a 43-year-old mother of one of the boys from the focus group and 
an active member of a women’s association in Kanaleneiland, brought me into contact 
with the participants of the focus group. All of the boys are acquaintances of her son, 
and many of the mothers of the boys are clients of the women’s association. During 
my period of fieldwork I assisted Farida with her work at the women’s association 
from time to time. She also introduced me to some of the boys’ mothers. My regular 
conversations with her gave me a lot of insight into the family life in the 
neighborhood. The accounts of her own experiences as a mother and her opinion of 
the behavior and situation of the boys from the group have been very valuable in my 
analysis.  
 
Anis, a 29-year-old consultant in the area of participation, diversity and youth work 
who was born and raised in Kanaleneiland, helped me organize the trip to Paris and 
assisted me in a variety of practical issues, such as the search for a location to conduct 
the focus group meetings. Anis was present at almost all focus group meetings and 
also helped supervise the meetings. My impression is that the presence of a male 
supervisor from the neighborhood and of Moroccan descent made the boys feel more 
comfortable and helped them trust my intentions with respect to the questions I 
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asked. The following situation illustrates this. During one of the first focus group 
meetings, one of the youngest boys, Murad, tried to steal an espresso machine during 
the break. Anis, who was playing football with a few others downstairs, caught him 
putting the espresso machine into a plastic bag. When we started the meeting after the 
break, Anis confronted the whole group with this incident.  
 
I just caught Murad here trying to steel an espresso machine. Now, this is really a silly 
thing to do. It is not necessary to impress or test us like that (meaning Anis and me, 
the supervisors, FK). We are no stupid strangers as you might think, we are all here as 
equals trying to have an interesting conversation together with you. Acts like this 
show no respect to us, nor to the building which we are visiting right now. I do not 
want something like this to happen again.  
 
He then made a joke in the Berber language, which involved making fun of Murad as 
a silly little boy. All the boys laughed and Murad felt pressured by the others to 
apologize for his “silly” behavior. Anis had already built a friendly “man-to-man” 
rapport with the boys by playing football with them and discussing events in their 
families and in the neighborhood. He knows many of their older brothers from the 
times he hung out on the streets himself. This afforded him the natural authority of 
keeping order and reprimanding them, while at the same time having their confidence. 
As a native Dutch woman and an outsider to the neighborhood, I held a different 
position in the meetings. Since Anis helped keep the peace during our meetings, I 
could focus more on the questions I had and could have conversations with the boys 
which were less interfered by correcting remarks on their behavior. In addition, Anis’s 
interpretation of the conversations were often a worthy complement to my own 
thoughts and observations. Just as with Imad in Grigny, our evaluations of the focus 
group sessions contributed to a certain analyst triangulation in my research (Denzin 
1978). 
 
 
 
 85 
2.2.4. The focus groups 
I chose to work with focus group interviews because of the value I attach to the own 
words of my interlocutors in the composition of their narratives. I suspected that my 
respondents would feel more at ease in a larger group of peers than in one-on-one 
interviews with me and would therefore be more inclined to speak in their own, 
natural way about the topics addressed in a focus group. I suspected that in one-on-
one interviews the respondents would adapt their speech in order to relate to 
someone from a different background and from the university. Especially in the case 
of Grigny, I suspected that my respondents would make an effort in one-on-one 
interviews to speak in standard French and use fewer slang words, because of my own 
flawed use of the French language. This indeed proved to be the case once I started to 
conduct additional individual interviews in Grigny. In addition to these 
considerations, I wanted to learn about the collective ascription of meaning to certain 
frequently used words in the neighborhood, by addressing these words in a larger 
group of peers. 
 
I did not record any of the focus group conversations, since the participants in both 
neighborhoods were highly suspicious with respect to possible misuse of their words 
and personal information. During the meetings, I took notes and sometimes I 
recounted parts of the meetings as I remembered them in my voice recorder.  
 
In Grigny, the focus group consisted of around fifteen boys ranging in age from 
seventeen to twentyfive. The meetings were held at one of the youth centers in 
Grigny. The composition of the group changed with each meeting, but most of the 
youngsters kept coming back each time. Sometimes, one of them would bring a friend 
along, or someone who had missed out on the previous meeting would join us again 
in the next. Some of the participants were the younger brothers and sisters of 
youngsters with whom Imad had worked during his years with the youth service in 
Grigny. Others were regular visitors to the youth center, or friends of other 
participants. The familiar acquaintance between Imad and the families of some of the 
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youngsters was a reason for several youngsters in the focus group to trust our 
intentions and take part in our conversations, although most of them had not met 
Imad before they were invited to join in our research. Others told us that they were 
taking part in the focus group out of curiosity about “‘people from the university,” 
and the wish to share their opinions and experiences in their neighborhood with 
“outsiders.” The participants lived in two neighborhoods of Grigny: La Grande Borne 
and Grigny II. All of them had an immigrant background, including Senegalese, 
Malinese, Algerian, Tunesian and Moroccan origins. Most of the participants were still 
in school or looking for a job or an internship. A large part of our respondents had a 
criminal history and often came into contact with the police, but most did not fully 
live their lives in the world of dealing and stealing on the streets. All of them had 
witnessed or had been involved in a variety of public disturbances, which regularly 
take place in Grigny, such as scuffles and verbal fights on the streets and around 
school areas, illegal scooter and car races, the harassment of youth from other areas, 
riots and other violent confrontations with the police. Young people who strongly 
identified with gangs and/or the drug business, or who were drug addicts themselves, 
rarely to never frequented the youth center, and were therefore difficult for me to 
reach. However, I did speak with some of the local dealers and younger members of 
notorious criminal families of the neighborhood. During the focus group 
conversations, we rarely spoke in detail about the personal background of the 
youngsters, but rather focused on their perception of life in the neighborhood and 
general social phenomena dominating their lives as young banlieusards. Most of the 
time, Imad or Sylvain led the conversation. Their status as native French speakers 
made this an obvious choice and enabled me to listen and observe more freely. Our 
conversations had a very open structure and it was often the respondents themselves 
who set the agenda.  
 
In Kanaleneiland, the focus group consisted of roughly fifteen boys, aged sixteen to 
twenty, who all grew up in the same part of Kanaleneiland and who had known one 
another from when they were very small. All of them were of Moroccan descent, with 
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three of them being born in Morocco and the rest being born in the Netherlands. 
They had a reputation in the neighborhood as notorious troublemakers. They did not 
form a fixed group of friends, but they hung out together in different smaller and 
larger groups on the streets, which also included others who did not take part in the 
focus group, and sometimes went on little trips together to other neighborhoods in 
the vicinity or to the city center. They also engaged in more “professional” activities 
together in the criminal sphere. All of them were boys living in a complicated 
situation. None of them were employed, with only three attending school, and the 
others had no fixed daily routine. When we held our meetings at six o’clock on 
Sunday afternoon, most of them would just have gotten out of bed. Their lives took 
place on the streets, where they hung out until deep in the night. The consumption of 
alcohol and soft drugs like hashish and marijuana was a common pastime during their 
nightly trips. The boys all lived with their family, but did not come home very 
regularly. They stayed out in the streets sometimes for days in a row. They were used 
to eating snacks on the go for dinner and squatting abandoned apartments from time 
to time to keep out of the cold and have a more private place to “chill” with their 
friends. All of them engaged in criminal activities such as burglaries, car heists and 
shoplifting. Most of them had a police record, with about half of them having spent 
some time in a juvenile penitentiary. During my period of field research, six of the 
boys were arrested by the police and three of them had to spend a period in prison 
longer than three weeks. Problems in the family sphere were also common. Many had 
a disturbed relationship with their parents. Some came from broken families, or had 
one or more parents living in Morocco. Two of the boys had a parent with a heavy 
psychiatric history. During the research period, two of the boys were placed outside of 
their family homes because the situation at home had become intolerable. The family 
of one of the boys was summoned by the housing corporation to leave the 
neighborhood due to the extensive nuisance they caused. Both Farida and some of the 
participants told me that various boys suffered from psychological or behavioral 
disorders such as ADHD, ADD, post-traumatic stress disorder and mild forms of 
autism. All of them displayed deviant social behavior and had a low IQ.  
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2.2.5. Method of interviewing 
The theory of Sylvain Lazarus, as presented in his book L’Anthropologie du Nom’ (1996), 
formed a guideline for the focus group meetings in both Kanaleneiland and Grigny. I 
did not start the focus group interviews with a previously prepared questionnaire, but 
started by asking the respondents to name words that were important to them in 
describing the life in their neighborhood. After listing these words, I proceeded by 
discussing the meaning and the importance of each word in the perception of the 
respondents. I used every focus group meeting to discuss the meaning of a number of 
the words which were mentioned in the first meeting. By doing so, a network of 
interrelated stories, concepts and statements evolved within which the respondents 
described their life experiences in their area of residence. I then proceeded to ask the 
respondents to reflect on their position in society and their thoughts about politics 
and social engagement from the perspective that they had elaborated before.  
 
In Kanaleneiland, half of the focus group meetings took place before we left for the 
Christmas holiday trip to Grigny and the other half took place afterwards. In addition 
to the same process of interviewing that we had applied in Grigny, in Kanaleneiland 
we focused on the questions the boys wanted to ask their peers in Grigny, in 
preparation for the trip. The boys then answered their own questions with their own 
situation in mind. For example, they were curious how the police treated youngsters in 
Grigny. This question was a starting point for a discussion on the relationship 
between youngsters and the police in Kanaleneiland. After the trip, we continued the 
meetings first with an evaluation of the trip and a discussion of the differences and 
similarities between Kanaleneiland and Grigny, as noticed by the boys. We then 
continued to clarify certain goals the youngsters wanted to achieve for themselves in 
the neighborhood. During the meetings, the boys voiced a lot of complaints about 
their bad reputation in the neighborhood and the lack of activities and support for 
them by the local youth services. During the final meetings, we discussed what 
solutions the boys could think of themselves for these problems. The meetings were 
set up with an open structure and were mainly guided by the words and the questions 
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the youngsters came up with themselves. I kept order in the conversation and asked 
questions for clarification, but did not set an agenda with previously set topics to 
discuss.  
 
In all interviews in both neighborhoods, including the individual interviews, 
respondents were informed of the nature of my research and its intended publication. 
In order to protect the privacy of my respondents, all names mentioned in this 
research are fictional. 
 
2.2.6. Additional individual interviews with youngsters 
In addition to the focus group interviews, I conducted individual interviews with ten 
other young residents in Grigny. In the individual interviews, I applied the same 
method of interviewing as in the focus group interviews. I asked the respondents to 
name their own words of importance to describe their experiences. In addition, I 
asked them to reflect on quotes that I took from the focus group sessions. This 
approach enabled me to see how much the conversations with the focus group were 
representative for other young people from the area. In addition to the words and 
narratives, which the respondents themselves initiated, I asked them to reflect on the 
word “politics,” since this concept played a crucial role in my own thought with which 
I started my research. I also asked my respondents to reflect on the word “riots” 
(émeute in French), since the concepts of riots is closely related to the world of 
experience of youngsters from the banlieues in the perception of the general public, and 
I wanted to learn more about the position of the youngsters in relation to the 
phenomenon of urban violence, as it is expressed in riots. The individual interviews I 
conducted all took place in one of the various youth centers in Grigny. I spent a lot of 
time in these youth centers observing the daily interactions of the young visitors. I 
found my respondents through a certain form of convenience sampling (Bryman 
2008, 183). I approached some of my individual respondents on one of the afternoons 
that I was present in the youth center. Others I met on the streets during one of my 
many walks in the neighborhood. After a while, my presence became known in the 
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area, and youngsters would address me to ask me about my research, or I would 
address those who I had seen before in or around the youth centers, the cafeteria in 
the shopping center and the boxing hall. Some respondents I met because they were 
acquainted with one of the professionals working with youngsters in the 
neighborhood.  
 
In Kanaleneiland, I did not conduct additional individual interviews with other young 
inhabitants of the area, despite my intention to do so at the beginning of my fieldwork 
period. The organization of the trip to Grigny, and hence the action-oriented aspect 
of this part of my research, took up so much time and attention that I did not manage 
to conduct the intended individual interviews with other youngsters. I addition to this 
practical reason, the participants of the focus group formed a more special and 
separate group of young people in the neighborhood than the participants of the 
focus group in Grigny. I conclude this from their own statements and those of the 
acquainted professionals I interviewed. Their reputation of being notorious 
troublemakers, separated from youth perceived as “regular” in the neighborhood, 
made me think that their words and thought would probably not be representative for 
a larger population of young inhabitants in the neighborhood. I therefore chose to 
analyze the focus group input on its own, without comparing it to the words and 
thought of other young residents of the area. 
 
2.2.7. Individual interviews with professionals 
To complement the information I received from the focus group, and to aid in my 
own analysis of the thoughts and behavior of the youngsters, I also interviewed 
professionals working with adolescents in both neighborhoods. I used the same 
method for the interviews as I had applied in my conversations with the youngsters. I 
also asked the respondents to name their own words of importance to describe the 
lives of the young people they worked with, and I asked them to reflect on quotes that 
I took from the focus group sessions. In addition, I spoke about their own work 
experience with my young respondents. I asked the youth workers to explain to me 
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what kind of work they did and how they valued their work. I also asked them how 
they experienced the relationship between them and the youngsters with whom they 
worked and I asked them what kind of approach to the youngsters they experienced 
to be successful. I also focused on the explanations they gave for the behavior and 
problems of their clients and the relationship between their own work, other 
organizations in the neighborhood and the domain of policy and politics.  
 
I had decided beforehand that I wanted to speak to professionals in various 
occupations. I used the “snowball method” to find my respondents for these 
interviews (Given 2008). I asked my first respondents if they knew other professionals 
dealing with boys from the neighborhood who might be willing to do an interview 
with me. In two cases in Kanaleneiland, I found my respondents through my own 
social network. This was the case with someone working for a resettlement 
organization and someone doing psychological diagnoses. The interviews with the 
professionals each lasted between one to two hours. In Grigny, I was permitted to 
record all interviews with professionals. When I explained that my limited knowledge 
of the French language impeded me from capturing all the nuances of the 
conversation immediately, they had no objections to recording. In Kanaleneiland, I 
was only permitted to record two interviews, because in all other cases the 
respondents did not feel comfortable having the conversation on tape. In these cases, 
I took notes during the interview and immediately after the interview I recounted the 
interview myself on my voice recorder, trying to repeat as much of the words used by 
my respondents as possible. A consequence of my recounting of the interviews is that 
a certain initial selection took place between what I clearly remembered from the 
conversation and what I did not.  
 
During my time in Grigny, I conducted ten individual interviews with youth workers. 
Four of them were animators, whose work consists of organizing activities for 
youngsters in the local youth centers. Youngsters come to these places to hang out 
after school. The animators help them with homework, give them advice on personal 
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matters like finding a job or family-issues, give them information on alcohol, drug and 
crime-prevention and supervise the leisure activities at the center, like table football 
and computer games. Two of the animators worked in the center for youngsters 
between the ages of twelve and sixteen and two of them worked in the center for 
youngsters between the ages of sixteen and twentyfive where we held the focus group 
meetings. Four of my partners in conversation were educators, which means that they 
had more responsibilities, a more specialized work description and a broader 
education than the animators. Two of them worked at an information center where 
young people come to find information about employment, education, social security 
and cultural activities. Two of them did outreach work in the neighborhood, where 
they met youngsters on the street or at home and helped them with social problems 
and issues related to work and education. Two of the respondents had a management 
position in local youth work. All of the respondents were male. The interviews with 
the respondents took place at their workplace, in the youth centers and in the 
information centers.  
 
In Kanaleneiland, I interviewed fifteen professionals who worked with boys from the 
area. Four of my respondents were youth workers employed at an established youth 
service organization in the neighborhood. Five respondents were volunteers at smaller 
local youth organizations, or self-organizations related to youth, and organized 
activities for boys or guided boys individually. Two respondents were professionals in 
the area of psychology, with one diagnosing boys who came into contact with the law 
and the other counseling boys and their families. One respondent worked as a daily 
supervisor of groups in a youth penitentiary. One respondent worked for a 
resettlement organization which deals particularly with cases of drug abuse. One 
respondent worked as chief of police in the neighborhood in the recent past. One 
respondent worked as an intern at a local youth organization while finishing his 
education. Two respondents were female; all others were male. The interviews took 
place at the workplace of the respondents or at a cafe or community center in 
Kanaleneiland.  
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2.2.8. Rapport with my respondents 
In Grigny, I found it relatively easy to come into contact with people once Imad, or 
another acquaintance, had introduced me. Imad’s introduction inspired basic 
confidence, due to his good reputation in the neighborhood of being an honest and 
helpful man, as many people told me along the way. Many of my partners in 
conversation told me they trusted the purpose of our research first of all because they 
trusted Amar as a person, even if they did not know him personally, but just from 
stories going around in the neighborhood. This made me realize that the reputation 
one has in the neighborhood is very important and can strongly influence one’s 
interactions.  
 
Over time, I acquired my own minor reputation as a friendly outsider, being nosy with 
all her questions, but harmless in her naivety. This reputation made me experience an 
initial polite but distant attitude from most people I spoke to. I suspect that the initial 
friendliness I encountered was thanks to my non-threatening appearance as a foreign 
young woman with a heavy accent and limited knowledge of the slang words used in 
the neighborhood. From my first appearance, it already became clear that I was a 
complete outsider in the neighborhood, and even in France. As a foreigner, I was first 
of all met with the hospitality of the inhabitants of Grigny, who wanted to make me 
feel at home and give me a good impression of their neighborhood. In addition, 
people did not suspect me of siding with the wrong parties or having a double agenda, 
which did happen to other researchers and journalists who tried to interview young 
people in the banlieues,40 maybe because I was a relatively young and “cute”-looking 
girl. To give an example: one day I decided to go to the canteen at the municipality to 
see if I could meet some youth workers. I met Serge, an employment consultant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 My first introduction to Grigny was the weblog of Dutch journalist Olivier van Beemen, who was 
attacked by a group of young men when he was taking pictures of the library in La Grande Borne for a 
news report in 2007. I told this story to Saïd, one of my respondents and a notorious drug dealer, during 
one of our informal conversations. He smiled at me and nodded in understanding. He would also kick a 
stranger out whom he caught taking pictures in his neighborhood without permission, he said, while 
making a shooting motion with his hands. This reaction expresses the general distrust the youngsters 
have of unknown journalists and researchers. For the weblog, see: 
http://www.parijsblog.nl/labels/banlieue.html. 
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whom I had seen once before. He decided to take me under his wing and I spent the 
rest of the day at his office watching him work with his clients. He invited all his 
colleagues in to have a chat with me since “he was taking care of la petite de Imad,” as 
he called me, who “he had caught wandering about all by herself.” This enabled me to 
make many more acquaintances and learn a lot about the daily work in the youth 
employment center. I experienced these protective feelings and hospitality as an 
advantage. I felt that people spoke very freely in my presence most of the time, 
without measuring their words. My first impression made it possible for me to 
overhear many conversations concerning the youngsters’ opinions of the drug 
business, for instance, which might have been difficult to participate in had I been a 
tough-looking guy. 
 
I was aware of the fact that people in Grigny generally have a strong distrust towards 
journalists and researchers, out of fear that they will reinforce the negative and 
stigmatizing image that is often presented of their neighborhood, or out of fear that 
they will share their information with the police. However, the people I interviewed 
never asked me about my position in relation to the French media or politics, 
assuming that as a foreigner I had limited knowledge of the political dynamics in 
France. I often made use of this initial assumption, by indeed emphasizing my lack of 
knowledge of the ins and outs of French politics, and asking people to explain to me 
the general relations of power and its reflection in the media. This enabled me to gain 
insight into my respondents’ opinion of the political organization of French society. 
In addition, my embeddedness in the larger research project of Sylvain Lazarus 
functioned as a positive visiting card, since the team was trusted of having good 
intentions and being respectfully distant in sharing information with authorities. 
 
I found my partners in conversation to be very open in the interviews I conducted, 
with respect to giving insight into life in general in the neighborhood, the reputation 
of youngsters from the banlieues and the general social position of young banlieusards. 
However, most of my partners in conversation were not very willing to speak about 
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personal experiences. Since the object of the research was to gain an insight into my 
respondents’ take on the general relationship between youngsters and the 
neighborhood, politics, the state and the police, I did not perceive this as a problem. 
However, this hesitation to get personal sometimes made it difficult for me to judge 
whether certain things were related to a common experience in the neighborhood, 
were rather exceptional or were maybe even part of the neighborhood mythology. For 
example, many of my respondents told me stories about gangs operating in the 
neighborhood, fighting each other and punishing disobedient members in a very 
harsh, physical way. When I asked them if they could give examples of when and 
where such things happened, all would say that they had just heard these things in 
stories and that they actually did not know anybody personally who had been involved 
in such events. I did not give such stories, which could only be traced back to 
“hearsay,” a central role in my description of the narratives of my respondents.  
 
The fact that people were very polite and wished to make me feel welcome sometimes 
gave me the impression that they were emphasizing a positive representation of life in 
the neighborhood that was not very realistic, but which they wished to transmit to 
outsiders. This made me have to look behind the “commercial talk.” Strong feelings 
of opposition involving “Grigny against the rest of the world” did not make it difficult 
to speak about injustices and negative experiences in confrontation with the outside of 
the neighborhood, but it took me quite some effort to find people willing to speak 
about their negative experiences inside of the neighborhood. Only further on in our 
conversations, and after repeating questions about the negative aspects of life in the 
neighborhood, did narratives appear which did not sustain a positive image of the 
neighborhood. Nevertheless, I feel that my period of fieldwork has been too short to 
gain a really profound understanding of the internal negative dynamics in the 
neighborhood, including feelings of distrust, discrimination and betrayal within the 
neighborhood itself. 
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In Kanaleneiland, my relationship with the focus group was quite positive from the 
beginning as well. I was met with friendly enthusiasm and curiosity, as a young woman 
from a different environment who was planning to organize something fun for the 
boys. Being an “outsider” to the neighborhood made it natural for me to ask lots of 
questions and be curious about the daily lives of the youngsters, which benefited my 
research aims. In the beginning, I sometimes felt tested. On the one hand, the boys 
tried to make a good impression on me. For example, Nouredine cleaned the table 
and put all the chairs together after the second meeting. “You see,” he said to me, 
“this is team work, this is what we are like in the neighborhood. We always help 
others, we are really good guys.” On the other hand, the boys tested my stamina by 
emphasizing their “difficult” reputation, which would surely cause me, like any other 
adult, to “give up on them and leave.” Especially when accounting for their bad 
behavior, the boys would evoke their difficulty as a natural reason for their behavior. 
During one of the meetings, Rachid and Osman were constantly throwing little balls 
of paper at the other side of the table and at me. I already had warned them to stop 
several times when Rachid said: “You know we are difficult guys, that is why you 
came to work with us on this project, right? If you don’t like the way we behave, you 
should just leave. We are used to that anyway. We won’t blame you.”  
 
Sometimes, I felt particularly tested for being a woman. During the third meeting, 
Murad asked me where we would be sleeping during our trip to Paris and Grigny. I 
told him we would stay in a hotel and the boys would be in double bedrooms. He 
then asked me if I was going to share a room with one of the other supervisors. I told 
him that all the supervisors, including myself, would have their own individual 
bedroom. Murad replied, “Don’t you want to share the room with me? Maybe you 
could become my girlfriend.” When I told him I felt a bit too old for that, and rather 
saw myself in the position of his mother, Murad laughed and said he just wanted to 
give it a shot. Occasions like this occurred often, when one of the boys would make 
semi-flirtatious remarks, or would insinuate that I could help them get in touch with 
other girls who would want to give them some attention. I never experienced this kind 
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of remarks as a serious attempt, but rather as a way to test my authority by making use 
of the obvious characteristics that distinguished me from other present adults, who 
were usually all males. On other occasions, I felt that my being a woman was a reason 
for the boys to pay me extra respect or be helpful. I often arrived in Kanaleneiland 
straight from the university with a bag full of books. One of the boys would offer to 
accompany me to the tram and carry my bag for me, since it would be too heavy for a 
longer walk. Also, during the meetings when the boys would be very boisterous and 
talk loudly, one of them often reminded the others that I could not constantly raise 
my voice loud enough to calm them down since I was “a girl and can not scream and 
be rude like you, guys.” Not only during the meetings, but also during our trip to Paris 
and Grigny, the boys from time to time warned each other to behave, in order not to 
“make her tired and give her a headache.”  
 
In addition to my gender, other factors were a reason for the boys to sometimes 
explicitly pay me respect or emphasize their trust in me. In several conversations, the 
boys told me they trusted me since I showed genuine interest in their lives. They 
concluded this from the open questions I asked them during the meetings and my 
non-judgmental reactions to their stories. As a researcher, it was not my primary goal 
to change their behavior, but rather to understand their world and their way of talking 
about it. This made my approach to the boys less demanding than that of the youth 
workers and other professionals they meet in the neighborhood. After our first 
meeting, Yousef told me: “You don’t seem like a stranger to me, because you want to 
know how we live and you listen to us. You are just nice and you don’t tell us what we 
have to do. You are just someone who tries to understand.” It also helped that I was 
not attached to one of the local youth organizations and did not work together with 
the police. It was also Yousef who told me that many of the boys do not dare to talk 
much with professionals in the neighborhood about themselves because they are 
afraid that information will be passed on to the police or the Youth Care Agency 
(Bureau Jeugdzorg).  
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I once felt really betrayed, because I trusted this one woman and told her everything 
about myself. She said she wanted to help me and be my friend. But later, when I had 
to appear in court, the judge suddenly knew all these things about me that I told her 
in good confidence. These things happen here in the neighborhood, so we do not like 
to talk much to people, you know. (Yousef, 18 years old)  
 
On many occasions, the boys have the impression that people who wish to work with 
them only do so because they are interested in reaching the policy targets that are set 
in relation to the containment and improvement of the behavior of “risk youth.” They 
have the feeling that those who reach out to them do not do so out of genuine 
interest, but to change them. The fact that I, as an independent person, had 
approached the youngsters to get to know them and even go on a trip with them was 
greatly appreciated. When we were in Grigny on the way to the youth center, the boys 
were restless and only talking about their need for food, drinks and marijuana. I was 
irritated and asked them if they could behave like polite visitors for a while and 
whether they were not at least a bit interested to meet the youngsters from Grigny. 
Hamid told me:  
 
Of course we are interested, we are really grateful you know. Nobody ever came to us 
to organize something nice for us. And now you brought us to France. We may not 
show it all the time, but we are really grateful. This is the first time someone actually 
did something for us voluntarily and not to make money in a subsidized program or 
some kind of welfare service. (Hamid, 20 years old) 
 
The fact that I also applied for funds to organize the trip did not play a part in 
Hamid’s reasoning. Since I did not work for one of the known youth work 
organizations, the boys did not associate our trip with the various bigger youth activity 
programs of which they had heard, but in which they had never taken part due to their 
deviant behavior.  
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The trip to Paris and Grigny enabled me to observe the personal interactions and 
behavior of the boys over a longer period of time, and in a different environment than 
the setting of the focus group meetings. During the trip, I had various informal 
conversations with the boys individually, or in smaller groups. This helped me a lot to 
get to know them better and understand their way of thinking in a more profound 
way. During the trip, I was also able to observe in more detail the impact their often 
subversive behavior has on their surroundings and the way the boys deal with 
authority. They were used to Imad and me in the role of supervisors during our focus 
group meetings, but now we, and three other volunteers, were guiding them as 
supervisors on a four-day trip. This lead to situations in which we had difficult 
confrontations with the boys, who tried to stretch or cross the rules that we had 
agreed upon together. This intensification of my role as supervisor did not 
fundamentally change my rapport with the boys, nor the way they perceived me, but it 
did lead to additional observations about their struggle with rules and authority.  
 
2.2.9. Analysis 
In the analysis of the interviews, I continued to work in the line of the method of 
Sylvain Lazarus, as described in Anthropologie du nom (Lazarus 1996). The method of 
analysis I employed has many similarities to techniques that are usually associated with 
a grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss 1967). However, given the strong 
theoretical embeddedness of my research claims and hypotheses, I did not carry out a 
grounded theory approach. I derived my techniques for data analysis from this 
approach, without adopting its general orientation. In my analysis, I made use of open 
and axial coding (Strauss & Corbin 1998). In a grounded theory approach, the 
researcher is the one who distills the words that he or she uses as codes from the 
interview transcripts. I used the important words brought up by my respondents as 
initial codes. In the first stage of open coding, I listed the words and quotes that were 
named as important by my young respondents during our first conversations. I used 
these words and quotes as codes to cluster parts of our reports and transcripts that 
dealt with the same issues. I then proceeded to describe the different layers of 
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meaning the respondents ascribed to these codes. I also added a few codes which I 
derived from my own approach to my research question, including “riots,” “violence,” 
“politics” and “citizenship.” In addition to these codes, many other codes arose from 
the material of our conversations that were not directly related to one of the words 
initially named by my respondents. I found these codes useful in clarifying and 
summarizing certain phenomena that were described by the youngsters to be quite 
logical and therefore less important. Examples are the words “reputation,” “religion” 
and “mobility.”  
 
In the whole process of analysis, I constantly tried to use as a guideline the topics and 
expressions that the young people themselves indicated as dominant in the structure 
of their thought. For example: in our conversations we occasionally spoke about the 
youngsters’ experiences with education. As a researcher, I have the impression that 
education plays a part in the relationship the youngsters have with the state and 
institutional politics. The topic of education could therefore be interesting for my 
research. However, I chose not to focus on education in my analysis because the 
youngsters themselves indicated that education was not an important factor in their 
perception of their world in the neighborhood, nor in their perception of their social 
position in society at large. Since most of my respondents no longer spent much time 
in school, education played no major part in their narratives. In line with this example, 
I chose to emphasize certain topics more than others because of the importance that 
the youngsters themselves ascribed to these topics, aiming to do justice to their own 
sense of logics and coherence. I did not try to give a representation of my material 
based on my own outside perspective as a researcher, but rather tried to allow the 
youngsters’ own perspective on their thought to be reflected in my report of their 
narratives. Of course, this can only be realized to a certain extent, since I was the one 
who wrote this report and performed the analysis, not one of the youngsters 
themselves. 
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After the first stage of coding, I continued with a cycle of axial coding, in which I 
clustered various codes that seemed to me to be related. After narrowing down the 
amount of codes, I wrote down the codes left over on small system cards. These cards 
helped me envision how the words of my respondents were related to one another 
within the structural framework of their thought as it emerged from our 
conversations. I used the cards as a tangible tool by moving them around on the table, 
trying out different compositions and patterns. After I found a pattern that reflected 
the interviews best, I wrote an initial report which I then discussed with the 
participants of the focus group. I organized such feedback moments in both Grigny 
and Kanaleneiland. The participants of the focus group corrected some parts of my 
analysis, asking me to emphasize some topics less and others more, according to their 
own sense of importance, and made some additions, or extra explanations, related to 
my codes. This conversation was very helpful to me in specifying my analysis. After 
this respondent check, I proceeded to analyze the material of the interviews for a new 
cycle (Byrne 2001). I took the same steps in this new cycle as I had taken in the first.  
 
2.3. Uncovering the dynamics between young urban troublemakers and 
institutional politics  
In this chapter, I have introduced the methodological stakes of my research and 
provided insight into the more technical sides of the fieldwork I conducted. In the 
first part of the chapter, I discussed my specific approach to experienced truth claims 
in my research, the triangular nature of the dynamics between the narratives of young 
urban troublemakers, theoretical discourse and my own interpretations, my double 
engagement with “politics” and “trouble,” (as both being the object of research and 
shaping the lens through which I perceive this object) and my contextualized 
approach to lived counter-narratives. In the second part of the chapter, I discussed my 
introduction to the two neighborhoods in which I conducted fieldwork, the process 
and analysis of my interviewing style and the relationship with my interlocutors in 
both areas of fieldwork. 
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After these general and detailed methodological reflections, I will take a substantive 
look at the results of my fieldwork in the following part of my dissertation. The 
narratives and observations I gathered in these two neighborhoods enabled me to gain 
insight into different structural approaches to the relationship between young urban 
troublemakers and state politics in a Western European context. I will investigate the 
dynamics between the lived world of my respondents and state authorities, or the 
domain of institutional politics, in two different national contexts. These approaches 
do not contradict each other, but rather emphasize different accents within this 
relationship. With help of two different bodies of political theory, centered around the 
work of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau in the third chapter and the work of 
Michel Foucault in the fourth chapter, I place the thoughts and experiences of my 
young respondents from both neighborhoods in a more general political perspective.  
 
In both chapters of the second part, the distance between the lived world of these 
adolescents and the domain of politics comes to the fore. In the third chapter, which 
focuses on Grigny, I will introduce the dimension of the youngsters’ antagonistic 
vision of society. Here, I describe how a distinctive community of experience, with its 
own social structure and organization, is developed at a distance from, and in a 
negative tension with, the social structure and organization of society at large. In the 
fourth chapter, which focuses on Kanaleneiland, I introduce the dimension of state-
induced efforts to normalize and integrate young urban troublemakers being side-
stepped or sabotaged by these same youngsters, who refuse to become the object of 
discipline and surveillance in their neighborhood. Here, I describe how the 
antagonistic tension between “at-risk boys” and institutional politics is enforced by 
governing policies aimed at regulating their public appearance and social functioning, 
with the result that they withdraw even further in their own community of experience. 
These two dimensions of the relationship between young urban troublemakers and 
politics clarify the lack of interest, access and representation of this group of deviant 
citizens within the official organizational structures of society. The feeling of being 
treated unjustly by the state is a result of this lack, and a cause of deep frustration on 
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the part of the boys, as well as a cause of claims being made for dignity and success by 
illegal, “uncivil” and disruptive means. 
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Part 2 
          
 
Normalizing politics versus a community 
of experience in the neighborhood 
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Prelude 
 
 
 
Concrete feet in cement, 
Eyes towards the infinite expansion, 
Century XXI, 
Prison of fear and illusions, they would love to make us believe that our lives 
are worth nothing, 
Uprooted children 
Children of high rises, 
Grown up in the violence of a system of broken dreams under the weight of 
their schemes 
Lost in the heart of the machine, the only thing left to us is this flame, 
Breath of life to illuminate the chaos of their world 
Dropped in history. 
Child of the land, prisoner of cement, don’t loose the stars out of sight, 
Between rage and faith, 
Between suffering and hope, 
Between hate and love, 
Between resentment and forgiveness 
Between system and life 
Between our fears and our inspirations, 
Between the earth and the sky… Torn in a permanent duality. 
Between cement and open sky 
 
Keny Arkana, lyrics “Entre les mots: Enfants de la terre” (Between words: 
Children of the land),41 Album: Entre ciment et belle étoile, 2006 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 My translation. Original text: “Les pieds bétonnés dans le ciment / Le regard vert l'infiniment grand, / 
Siècle XXI, / Prison de peur et d'illusion, ils aimeraient nous faire croire que nos vie ne valent rien, / 
Enfants déracinés, / Enfants des grands ensembles, / Elevés dans la violence du système aux rêves 
brisés/ sous le poids de leur schémas, / Perdus au coeur de la machine, il nous reste cette flamme, / 
Souffle de vie pour éclairer le chao de leur monde. / Parachutée dans l'histoire. / Enfant de la terre, 
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prisonnier du ciment, ne perd pas de vu les étoiles, / Entre la rage et la Foi, / Entre la souffrance et 
l'espoir, / Entre la haine et l'amour, / Entre la rancoeur et le pardon,/ Entre le système et la vie, / Entre 
nos peurs et nos inspirations, / Entre la Terre et le ciel... Tiraillé dans une dualité permanente. / Entre 
ciment et Belle étoile...” 
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Chapter 3 
          
A community of experience in Grigny:  
Society divided into a world of “us” versus “them” 
 
 
 
… the status of banlieues as well-delimited spaces with negative connotations 
undermined the possibilities of opening up spaces of politics in such areas. The place 
assigned to them in public space not only debilitated the political significance of 
revolts (which was not the case when the first series of revolts took place in the early 
1980’s), but also undermined more conventional forms of political mobilization. In 
the consolidated spatial order, banlieues had their “proper place”, which resonated not 
with politics but with pointless rioting and increasingly repressive measures. (Dikeç 
2007, 634, kindle edition) 
 
In this chapter, I will introduce the “community of experience” of my young 
interlocutors in Grigny. In their perception, their lived world can be understood as a 
community that has developed in a tense relation to an “outside” world, which is 
dominated by powerful state institutions protecting the interests of richer citizens, 
while the struggling inhabitants of the banlieues are neglected. I name this lived world a 
community of experience because its binding social structure and sense of belonging 
is derived from shared experiences, set within a specific place and context, and shaped 
by complex societal power dynamics – other than in a certain shared natural or pre-
constitutive identity. I will set out my description of this community of experience by 
first introducing the historical, social and political context of the neighborhood of 
Grigny. I thereby pay special attention to the circumstances of growing up in Grigny. 
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I will then proceed to describe the different experiences of injustice, instigated by state 
institutions, the police and the media, with which the community of experience of my 
interlocutors has been confronted. These experiences of injustice play a formative role 
in the sense of community, as they act as a binding factor for different people to 
identify with one another. Simultaneously, they symbolize the harming impact of an 
outside world, for which the community of experience is a safe, comforting and 
dignifying substitute.  
 
In the second half of this chapter, I will describe the feeling of family and solidarity, as 
well as the codes of conduct and values that are shared within this community of 
experience. I will show that the sense of belonging and dignity offered by the 
community of experience can also reinforce the exclusion from larger society of those 
who identify with it. In the last section, I will consider whether the antagonistic 
perspective on society of my respondents from Grigny could be instrumentalized in 
order to improve their position within that same society. I will explore whether the 
community of experience could be operationalized for the purpose of political 
emancipation. I will engage with the theoretical ideas of philosophers Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe with respect to antagonistic, emancipatory politics in order to 
answer this question, and thus use these theoretical reflections to place the previous, 
more anthropological accounts of the community of experience and its struggles in a 
broader political perspective.  
 
3.1. Welcome to Grigny 
 
Today is the first time that I will be visiting Grigny by day, in order to finally see 
something of the neighborhood. I take the RER at Gare de Lyon in the direction of 
Grigny. The journey takes around forty minutes. Along the way the train passes 
several suburbs, some with high, dilapidated apartment buildings, while others look 
like little provincial villages with lots of gardens and small bungalows. I also see large 
industrial areas, like a massive wrecking yard and some factories. Grigny is situated on 
a hill, the train approaches from below and I see an impressive, almost threatening 
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image before me. To the left of the train, on the slope of the hill, lies a typical, small, 
friendly French suburb, like I have seen many times before. To the right of the train, 
a wall of gigantic flats arises on the top of the hill. They are packed closely together, 
set against an ash-gray January sky. Upon arrival at the station, I have to take a very 
long escalator to get from the train track to the station, which is situated next to the 
flats. In multiple ways, it feels like it takes a long way to get here, with the train 
stopping far below the actual buildings of the neighborhood of Grigny II. After 
taking a long ride on the train, and then a long ride on the escalator, I seem to enter 
another world, one which is clearly, physically separated from the bustling, fancy and 
famous metropolis of Paris. So this is the place where the less fortunate residents of 
Ile de France live their lives, far from the eyes of the tourists, businessmen and 
sophisticated Parisians. 
 
I am early, so I take some time to walk around Grigny II. Most flats are around 
eleven stories high, with many satellite dishes stuck to the walls and balconies, which 
are packed with all kinds of stuff. They match pretty well with the stereotypical 
images I have seen from the banlieues in the media. Between the flats, a sort of park is 
constructed with small green lawns and some playgrounds, all set off with high 
fences. It is really quiet on the streets, maybe because it is in the middle of the 
afternoon. I pass by a kindergarten where the kids have just come out to play in the 
schoolyard. I don’t see one white face among them. (Field note, January 10, 2009) 
 
3.1.1. Historical perspective 
A long, long time ago, Grigny used to be a small village clustered around two large 
farms. The inhabitants used to hold rabbits and grow grain, beetroots and potatoes 
until the times of industrialization brought new labor possibilities. Around 1900, the 
long history of immigration began that has marked the appearance and character of 
Grigny up until today. The first immigrants to arrive in Grigny were Italian day 
laborers who came to work in the large sandpits near the village. Those sandpits 
created two lakes, which still exist today and which played an important role in the 
marketing campaign for the residential area of Grigny II. Grigny II is situated next to 
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the present day RER station, the pride of the makeover of Grigny carried out in the 
1970s, and is nowadays one of the most problematic areas in Grigny.42 
 
The first steps to the makeover of the village took place in the 1950s. A highway was 
constructed right next to the village, which nowadays splits the area of Grigny into 
two parts: the old village and Grigny II on one side and another large and now run-
down residential area, La Grande Borne, on the other. Along the highway, new 
factories, like a Coca-Cola factory, were built where the population of the area found 
new employment. In the 1960s, the two large residential areas of Grigny II and La 
Grande Borne were built. Both areas were developed in a time of governmental policy 
to construct new neighborhoods in the surroundings of Paris (Wacquant, 2008). 
These neighborhoods were meant to offer housing to the many immigrants from 
Algeria and other former French colonies who came to France to work in the Renault 
factories and other large industrial areas around Paris (Beaud & Pialoux 2003). Due to 
an acute shortage of housing, they were living in self-constructed bidonvilles around 
Paris where living conditions were deplorable, until they moved to the newly 
constructed banlieues (Bachmann & Le Guennec 1996). Construction of La Grande 
Borne began in 1967, shortly before that of Grigny II. The construction of these two 
neighborhoods led to a massive growth of the number of inhabitants in Grigny. In 
1968, Grigny totaled 2,957 inhabitants, while four years later the number of 
inhabitants had risen to 21,655.43 This sharp increase caused many problems. A lack 
of infrastructure, schooling, health care and employment developed at that time and 
has still not been solved today.  
 
Still, for many of the new inhabitants of La Grande Borne and Grigny II who had 
recently arrived in France or who had come from the bidonvilles around Paris, their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 I received the historical information about Grigny from Elisabeth de Roland, an employee of the 
municipality who was working on a collection of the history of Grigny and is generally known in the area 
as the living memory of Grigny. In addition to documents from her personal archive, I made use of the 
Grigny website, where a lot of historical information about the development of Grigny can be found. 
Source: www.grigny91.fr 
43 Source: www.grigny91.fr 
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moving to Grigny meant an immense improvement of their daily life circumstances. 
Many of the older inhabitants of Grigny therefore have good memories from the 
period of the late 1960s, and often express a certain nostalgia when they compare life 
back in those days to the circumstances in Grigny today. 
 
It used to be lovely in Grigny in the past. I was still very small when we arrived here. 
For the first time, we had our own apartment in La Grande Borne, because before 
that we were living in a hostel in Paris. I remember very clearly how I always used to 
go for shopping with my mom. There used to be only one small grocery store in the 
old village center, right at the same spot where the tropical store is now. La Grande 
Borne was not even completely constructed, and Grigny II did not exist yet. At the 
hand of my mother, I used to slog endlessly through the fields, at least that’s how I 
felt it. With one hand, she would hold mine and with the other she would carry a very 
heavy shopping bag. It was such a long journey, we were endlessly on our way. It 
used to be the countryside here, a paradise for the children. I always played outside 
everywhere with my friends without anybody looking after us. There were hardly any 
cars, let alone any scooters. My parents never used to worry about anything. (Marie, 
46-year-old youth worker) 
 
3.1.2 Deprivation in the banlieues 
Today, the once quiet and modern neighborhoods of Grigny II and La Grande Borne 
are known as two of the poorest and most troubled areas of Paris’s banlieues.  
The inhabitants of Grigny live in difficult living conditions and the area can therefore 
be characterized as a “deprived” neighborhood. The houses are dilapidated and the 
population suffers from many socio-economic problems. The area has around 27,000 
registered inhabitants,44 but the actual number of inhabitants is estimated at around 
32,000 by some of the professionals from the area. Most of the inhabitants have an 
immigrant background. There has been little maintenance of the housing, and cases of 
families with ten children living in three-room apartments are not rare. 
Unemployment numbers are high. At the time of my research, statistics showed a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Census report of 2009. Source: www.insee.fr 
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percentage of unemployment of 35 percent for youngsters between the ages of 15 and 
24. The percentage for the general population of Grigny lies at 20,7 percent.45  
 
The larger area of peripheral neighborhoods around Paris, known as the banlieues, is in 
general associated with deprived living conditions and urban violence.46 These urban 
areas are characterized by various forms of marginalization and exclusion. Paris can be 
characterized as a ville à trois vitesses, a city which is characterized by a threefold 
separation of the population and a city which develops at three different speeds 
(Donzelot 2009). The inner city – the prestigious Paris of tourists, fashion industry, 
cultural heritage and intellectual potential – lies at the heart of rapid urban and 
economic development through a process of gentrification, the middle class moves to 
adjoining neighborhoods which offer a quiet and comfortable living to those with 
decent jobs, and the high rises of the periphery house the lower classes, which are 
stuck in social immobility. Historically, the periphery of the city has been the domain 
of the popular, working class, as is reflected in the denomination of the peripheral 
neighborhoods around Paris as the banlieues rouges; the area where predominantly the 
communist party had its electorate and the influence of socialist worker unions on 
social life was significant until the 1960s/1970s (Bacqué & Fol 2000). When the 
process of de-industrialization transformed economic life of the working class 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Source: www.insee.fr 
46 The periphery of Paris is much more diverse than continuous media reports about the “crisis” or the 
“national disaster” of the banlieues suggest. Not all neighborhoods in the banlieues can be characterized as 
deprived; wealthy communes can also be found in the same periphery. A famous example is the commune of 
Neuilly sur Seine, an upscale residential area where Nicolas Sarkozy was mayor from 1983 to 2002. Even 
the neighborhoods which can be characterized as deprived form a heterogeneous mixture in terms of 
urban texture, economic activities and composition of inhabitants (Wacquant 2008, 135; Stébé 2010). 
What makes the banlieues one homogeneous area is probably, first of all, the place it holds in the collective 
imagination. Myths about the particularity of the banlieue population, and especially its young residents, 
are brought about by this collective imagination (Kokoreff 2003, 10, 11). Patrick Braouezec notes that it 
is too easy to speak of a crisis of the banlieues, since these areas reflect all different layers of society. It 
would be better to speak of a crisis of French society in its entirety, which is most visible in the popular 
neighborhoods situated in the banlieues, and which is expressed by a social, economic and identitary 
transformation of society into a segregated territory with less and less egalitarian and just institutions 
(Braouezec 2006). Despite the diverse urban landscape in the banlieues and its non-homogeneous identity, 
I choose to speak of the banlieues in my dissertation when addressing the living conditions and 
experiences as they take place in the poorer cités, or neighborhoods. I do so first and foremost because 
my interlocutors used this word when they spoke about comparable experiences, values and 
stigmatizations across different deprived neighborhoods in the periphery of French cities, and because of 
the general use of the term to indicate precisely such neighborhoods. 
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population, the social structures and community formation, which revolved around 
the unions, eroded. The economic crisis of the 1980s intensified the social insecurities, 
which emerged in this process of de-industrialization. Also, the capacity to collectively 
organize for political purposes diminished with the erosion of popular social 
networks. The popular classes could no longer rely on a strong political representation 
within the institutional domain and began to suffer from a “technocratic autism,” a 
neglect of the government towards the precarity and worries of the working class 
(Beaud & Pialoux 2003, 383).  
 
The younger generation, in particular, suffered increasingly from the uncertainty 
brought about by short-term contracts, a shrinking job market for the lower educated 
and unemployment. These youth en galère developed a distrust towards authorities and 
a rage inspired by the lack of equal chances (Dubet 1987). These feelings of distrust 
and rage were fuelled by experiences of stigmatization and discrimination. The influx 
of a population with an immigrant background occurred at the same time as the 
process of de-industrialization. This resulted in a territorial and ethnicized stigma of 
the banlieue population as not only poor, but also as culturally and ethnically deviant. 
The banlieues thus became known as “neighborhoods of exile,” areas where there is a 
concentration of those who are despised since they are associated with poverty, crime 
and moral degradation (Dubet & Lapeyronnie 1992). The marginalization of the 
banlieues is characterized by an increased concentration of vulnerable families in 
neighborhoods at a large distance from the city center, from which the middle class 
has moved away. A high number of children per household and an overrepresentation 
of single-parent households are notable in these neighborhoods.47 In Grigny, 23,4 
percent of the families are single-parent families48. Structural unemployment among 
the young majority of the population, the development of a shadow economy which 
largely depends on the drug business, an increase of crime and urban violence, more 
and more frequent police interventions in the neighborhood and social and physical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See: “La population des zones urbaines sensibles,” Insee Première N°1328 (December 2010).  Source: 
www.insee.fr 
48 Source: www.insee.fr, report of 2009. 
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degradation of urban space constituted a train of events which resulted in a climate of 
hostility and distrust in which young banlieusards and state representatives are 
diametrically opposed to each other. In addition to a lack of trust in the police, 
relations between social workers, teachers and youth are also tense. In this context, 
the emergence of urban riots has to be understood (Beaud & Pialoux 2003). Since the 
first cases of urban riots took place in the suburbs of Lyon in the beginning of the 
1980s,49 riots are a recurrent reaction to perceived unjust and racist violence on the 
part of the police. These cases of urban riots have further inspired the image of the 
banlieues as zones de non-droit (Kokoreff 2003), where delinquency and violence 
dominate everyday life and where a new “dangerous class” is left to its own devices, 
literally and symbolically far away from the influence of state authorities 50 . 
Criminologists Alain Bauer and Xavier Raufer came up with a definition of the zones de 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the first cases of urban riots were reported by 
the media. During the rodéo’s de Minguettes in the suburbs of Lyon, groups of young men stole cars and 
engaged in chases with the police. Young people from the area pointed to constant confrontation with 
police brutality in the area as a provocation for these riots. During these events, the first burnings of cars 
were reported and youth violently clashed with riot police. In the “hot summers” of 1980 and 1981, 
similar cases of popular unrest also occurred in other French cities like Paris, Strasbourg and Marseille 
(Jazouli 1992). Since then, cases of urban riots have especially taken place in reaction to the injury or 
death of a young person from the neighborhood at the hands of the police. In 1983, the injury of Toumi 
Djaïda by a police bullet inspired the first Marche des Beurs, in which young Maghrebins marched from 
Marseille to Paris to call attention to the discrimination and subordination of people with an immigrant 
background in France. The burning of cars has become a regular feature of Sylvester celebrations in 
French cartiers sensibles. 
50 Stories about violent crime contribute to this image, as is particularly clear in the case of Grigny. A 
recent example is the armed robbery of an RER train at Grigny station, carried out by a group of about 
twenty masked youth. It was the largest train robbery on such suburban trains in France. This attack led 
to intensified safety measures on the RER train service and a plea for more CCTV cameras on trains and 
stations. The matter was taken to parliament, where right wing politicians accused the government of a 
lack of concern for security issues in the banlieues. After the event, local authorities hastened to say that 
the perpetrators were probably not from the area itself, but the police arrested sixteen youth between 
fourteen and eighteen years old from Grigny II for the robbery. The stolen goods were retrieved in a 
Grigny II apartment, after which the mayor commented. “What they did was not only serious but 
completely stupid. All they will do is increase the discrimination that already exists against people from 
Grigny. They discredit the silent majority of residents who just want to live their lives in peace.Grigny 
might not be Care Bears territory but it isn’t the Wild West either.” See: “Safety fears after gang storm 
Paris train,” The Local: France’s news in English, March 20 2013. http://www.thelocal.fr/20130320/police-
boost-numbers-after-paris-train-robbery, and, “Police arrest 16 youths after Paris train hold-up,” France 
24, March 27 2013. http://www.france24.com/en/20130327-police-arrest-youths-paris-train-rer-hold-
up-crime, and, “Minister of Interior Valls faces criticism from right in wake of train attack,” La Jeune 
Politique, April 9 2013. http://lajeunepolitique.com/2013/04/09/minister-of-interior-valls-faces-criticism-
from-right-in-wake-of-train-attack/ 
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non-droit in 2001: “By ‘non-droit’ we mean the neighborhoods or cités in which certain 
organized groups have installed, by use of intimidation or force, an ‘order’ which is 
parallel to or competing the republican order.”51  
 
3.1.3. Rescue plans for the banlieues 
While the first national attempt to improve the situation in the banlieues was already 
undertaken in the 1980s with the emergence of the politique de la ville,52 the first 
program designed to solve the problems in Grigny that had existed since the end of 
the 1960s was implemented in Grigny in 1994. The program was focused on the 
renovation of housing and public space, greater social mixture, better education, more 
employment and the creation of a real city center. Houses and public space were 
indeed partly renovated, especially in La Grande Borne, and some new schools were 
built, but most of the other problems could not be solved.  
 
Since 2004, another large renovation project53 has been underway in Grigny as part of 
the national plan known of as Espoir banlieues.54 The effects of this project could clearly 
be seen in Grigny at the time of research. Large parts of the buildings in La Grande 
Borne are being renovated and new houses are being built next to Grigny II. There 
are plans for a better traffic connection between La Grande Borne and the other half 
of Grigny on the other side of the highway. Cooperation between governmental 
institutions and private organizations is creating employment for youngsters in the 
building projects in the area, more schools are being built and there are new plans for 
a big shopping mall. Some inhabitants are positive about the plans, but many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 My translation. 
52 To fight the increasing inequalities between the deprived banlieues and the rest of France, a broad 
governmental approach was launched in the 1980s. The national and local governments, together with 
housing corporations and associations of social services, came up with plans to improve not only the 
physical state of the banlieues, but also their negative image and the disadvantaged socio-economic 
position of their inhabitants. A national ministry of urban affairs was implemented in 1991, but many 
other ministries were involved in working on issues of employment, housing, care, schooling, security and 
crime prevention. The term “Zones Urbaines Sensibles” (ZUS) was introduced to indicate the areas with 
the most difficulties. This integrated approach did not always lead to better results and caused an 
overload of bureaucracy in many cases. Source: www.ville.gouv.fr and Bachmann & Le Guennec (1996). 
53 Source: Charte locale d’insertion pour les projets de renovation urbaine a Grigny et Viry Chatillon, 
February 2008. 
54 See: www.espoir-banlieues.fr 
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inhabitants whom I met in Grigny are skeptical about the impact of the plans. The 
skepticism has its origins in a long history of feelings of distrust towards the French 
national government. Grigny has had a communist local government for over forty 
years and has had a tense relationship with the national government for the same 
period of time. The municipality of Grigny has been building up large debts ever since 
the population grew out of proportion at the end of the 1960s, but it has never 
managed to gain sufficient support from the national government to deal with its 
problems.55 When I asked Nabil, one of the youth workers, what he thought about the 
Espoir banlieues plan, his answer was quite representative of what others had told me in 
other conversations: 
 
Nothing at all. Espoir banlieues has not given us hope, not done anything special – it’s 
all bluff. It’s a communication strategy made by a person who is not representative of 
the banlieues, a person who does not have any special qualities: Fadela Amara.56 It’s a 
communication measure, but it does not really change things. (Nabil, 34-year-old 
youth worker) 
 
Besides this political distrust, many of my partners in conversation do not believe that 
existing problems of social isolation, unemployment, drug business, violence and 
other criminality will be solved by the renovation project or the Espoir banlieues 
national plan. They do not believe that the “bulldozer” approach of renovations 
without clear consultation with the inhabitants will resolve the troubles they face in 
their daily lives (Donzelot 2006, 143). Such an approach leads the inhabitants to feel 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Grigny was heading for bankruptcy, as the debts of the commune had risen to almost 16 million euros 
in 2009. The regional prefect proposed to raise taxes on housing to compensate these debts. A 
consequence is that especially the middle class will have to pay for the debts, while at the same time 
Grigny wishes to attract more middle-class families to see to a better social mixture. “La descente aux 
enfers de Grigny” Le Monde 26 (August 2009). Source: 
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2009/08/26/la-ville-de-grigny-geree-par-le-
prefet_1231966_3224.html 
56 Fadela Amara was the Secretary of State of Urban Policies between 2007 and 2010. She was in charge 
of the Espoir banlieues project. Despite her Algerian background, her youth in a deprived housing project 
and her feminist activism in the banlieues for the organization Ni putes, ni soumises, most of my respondents 
in Grigny did not speak highly of her and did not feel represented by her. She was seen as someone who 
used to be “like us,” but who renounced her background to become part of the French political 
establishment. 
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ill-informed about changes to their neighborhood environment. It may even lead to an 
unwanted displacement of already vulnerable families in favor of more middle class 
inhabitants, whose arrival remains to be seen.  
 
3.2. Growing up in Grigny 
There are many young people living in Grigny. Thirty percent of the population is 
under 14 years old and 22 percent of the population is between 14 and 30 years of 
age.57 Growing up in Grigny is no easy task. A variety of problems characterizes the 
lives of the youngsters I met during my research. Many young inhabitants from 
Grigny spend a large part of their time on the streets, where they meet their friends 
and where they can escape the limited space and sometimes depressing or violent 
atmosphere in their family home. Upon arrival in Grigny, the traveler is welcomed by 
groups of youngsters who sit on the stairs at the entrance of the train station, talking, 
playing around or arguing together. The many small parks, squares and corners of the 
neighborhood are used as the outside home base of different groups of friends. It is 
mostly boys who can be seen dwelling in public space. Girls tend to spend more time 
inside the family home. When they go out, they often prefer to go to different 
neighborhoods or to Paris, around the area of Les Halles, where they are less likely to 
bump into a nephew or brother.  
 
3.2.1. Leisure time 
To offer the youngsters a more structured pastime, there are several youth centers in 
Grigny where one can use the computer, play table football, watch a movie, practice 
music or dancing, ask questions about homework or attend prevention workshops 
during afternoons and evenings. There are separate centers for youngsters between 
the ages of 12 and 16 and those between 16 and 25. Most of the youngsters who 
frequent the youth centers are boys, but there are also girls to be found, especially in 
the centers for youngsters between the ages of 12 and 16. Another popular place for 
boys to spend their time is the martial arts sports center, where Thai boxing and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Source: www.insee.fr 
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wrestling is practiced. Besides the youth centers, one chicha café and few snack bars, 
there are no places in Grigny where youth can go out and meet friends in the 
evenings. Some bars which had existed in the past were closed because they had fallen 
victim to armed robberies or other forms of violent crime. 
 
3.2.2. A tense climate in the neighborhood 
Many of the boys from the neighborhood are involved in the drug business, mainly 
the trafficking of soft drugs. The influence of the drug traffic and other criminality 
like burglaries and robberies was often discussed in the interviews I conducted, 
though this was always done without mentioning details that would associate 
particular people to particular cases. Tensions between the police and youngsters due 
to regular surveillance, stop and search actions, and arrests were also named as an 
important problem during the interviews. The prison that is situated not far from 
Grigny is often jokingly described as Grigny III, the extended “residential area” of 
Grigny where many boys from Grigny have spent some time during their adolescence. 
Since the 1990s, there have been frequent cases of riots in Grigny, especially in La 
Grande Borne.58 The neighborhood of La Grande Borne has a quite closed character 
due to the many small residential precincts built around fields and squares. It is 
therefore a difficult neighborhood for the police to control. There is only one main 
entrance road to the neighborhood where young people often clash with the police 
when something happens to arouse tensions, like a random identity check or the arrest 
of a young person from the area. During the extensive banlieue riots in 2005,59 Grigny 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 For a recent example, see: “Emeute à Grigny,” March 3, 2008, http://gangsters-
tueurs.kazeo.com/?page=article&ida=879383  
59 On October 27, 2005, three boys hid in a power substation to escape a police control in Clichy-sous-
Bois. It was in the middle of the Ramadan and the boys were on their way home to break the fast after a 
football match. Two of the boys, Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré, 17 and 15 years old and of Tunesian 
and Mauritian descent, were electrocuted; the third boy, Muhittin Altun,17 years old and of Kurdic 
descent, was severely injured. In reaction to these tragic events, riots erupted in the boys’ neighborhood. 
In the following days, the riots intensified and spread to other parts of the Parisian banlieues and 
eventually also to other cities. Both the political reactions on the riots and the attitude of the police did 
not help to pacify the situation. The minister of internal affairs, Nicolas Sarkozy, speculated about the 
delinquent history of the deceased boys, who did not have a criminal record, and accused those involved 
in the riots of being “racaille” (hoodlums). The police initially denied that the three boys had been chased 
before their electrocution in the power substation. When a tear gas grenade of the riot police exploded at 
the entrance of a local mosque during a memorial service for the deceased boys, the riots further 
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remained quite calm compared to the northern banlieues of Paris where hundreds of 
cars were burned, but incidents like those of 2005 are a familiar part of the history of 
Grigny, as Malik told me: 
 
Riots are nothing new in Grigny. The first big riot already took place in 1993. I 
remember it very clearly. A boy had been shot during an argument in La Grande 
Borne. A couple of guys from the neighborhood went after the shooter. Someone 
had called the police. When the police arrived, more guys went out on the street. The 
weather was warm and the atmosphere tense. They started to throw stones and 
Molotov cocktails at the police and it all exploded. The riots lasted from seven 
o’clock in the evening until three o’clock at night and it took several days for 
everything to calm down. Ever since then there have been a couple of tough riots 
every two years or so. (Malik, 34-year-old rapper and youth worker) 
 
3.2.3. School 
School trajectories do not offer an obvious way out of this violent environment. From 
all the youngsters I met in Grigny, only a few regularly attended school. Most of them 
had dropped out of school at an early age. The story of Sisi is exemplary in this 
respect. I met Sisi in the youth center for 12- to 16-year-olds, where she was helping 
the youth workers Dayo and Christian attend to the youngest children. Sisi had missed 
her opportunity to go to school that year and Dayo and Christian offered her an 
unofficial internship at the youth center to keep her busy. Sisi was 15 years old and 
lived with her mother and seven siblings in a three-room apartment in Grigny II. 
After completing her collège, the first phase of French secondary education, Sisi had 
been looking for a lycée in which to enroll for the second phase. In Grigny, however, 
there are too many youngsters in the age range of a lycéen to be hosted at the limited 
number of schools in the area. Sisi was placed on one of the schools’ waiting lists. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
intensified. Cars were burned, public buildings like schools and libraries were torched and heavy clashes 
with the riot cops took place. President Chirac declared a state of emergency on November 8, making use 
of a law to suppress civil unrest which dated back to the times of the French occupation of Algeria. 
Almost 3,000 people were arrested during the riots, predominantly young inhabitants of the banlieues from 
immigrant families. Almost 9,000 vehicles were burnt. (See also: Mucchielli & Aït-Omar 2006; Chemin 
2005; Kokoreff 2008). 
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During summer break while she was visiting family, the school called her house to 
confirm her application. Nobody answered the phone and Sisi’s place was immediately 
given to another student on the waiting list. When Sisi returned from her family visit, 
it was too late to enroll in another school. Now she had to wait for at least six months 
until she could try again to enroll in a lycée. She had called and written different schools 
further away from Grigny, but her application had been turned down everywhere. 
Schools are not eager to accept students from a neighborhood with a bad reputation 
like Grigny. 
 
The students who are lucky enough to actually enroll at a school suffer experiences of 
prejudices and stigmatization. Many of my respondents told me how they felt 
discriminated and unjustly treated by teachers or fellow students in their school. 
Bouakar is 14 years old and takes the train to school every day, since a school close to 
home was no option for him either. He does not have many friends at his school, but 
spends his free time with boys from his own neighborhood.  
 
At school, people judge you without knowing you. For example, if you live here, and 
there is someone else who lives in a different neighborhood, they will maybe think 
that you are a thief and the other one is calm. Things like that happen. (Bouakar, 14 
years old)  
 
The young inhabitants of Grigny are an example of a larger population of students in 
France who suffer from “double stigmatization”; they face prejudices because of their 
ethnic background and immigrant descent, and also suffer from poor school results 
and a low level of education (Felouzis, Liot & Perroton 2005).  
 
3.2.4. Making money 
Similar prejudices also trouble those youngsters who are looking for jobs and 
internships. Just the area code on your letter of application can be enough to squash 
your chances of getting hired, is an often heard lament. Adil is in his early twenties 
and has been lucky to find a job through his own network. His brother helped him 
 123 
obtain a job at the airport, where he signals the planes on the ground. Adil is very 
happy with his work and takes it very seriously, but at the same time he often feels he 
has to go at great lengths to keep his job. As a beur (Arab) with an Algerian 
background, he feels that he has to make a greater effort than his native French 
colleagues to keep the boss happy.  
 
I always immediately receive a reprimand when I arrive late at work, while my white 
colleague is never even checked, and he arrives late much more often than I do. We, 
as children of immigrants, always have to be better than they are. This really creates 
tensions. (Adil, 23 years old)  
 
Adil thinks that in order to obtain and keep a job, certain skills are required that many 
peers around him do not possess. These young men do not know how to express and 
present themselves correctly. “They speak to their boss like they speak to their 
friends,” Adil says. However, common “street behavior” is not accepted in a working 
environment.  
 
Those who have adapted to the ways of the streets often get involved in the bizness to 
take an alternative route to success. The bizness is the underground economy that 
serves to make a living for those who cannot find a regular job or feel that a regular 
job does not offer sufficient opportunities. The bizness is often seen as an easier, less 
tiresome and more lucrative option for making money, despite the risks attached. 
These risks are seen as an inevitable part of the “job” that can be easily managed with 
the right skills. Once these skills have been mastered sufficiently, work in the bizness is 
not only rewarding on a material level, but it can also bring respect and self-esteem. It 
offers an attainable trajectory to become a successful and respected businessman for 
those who cannot take the normal route and are out of reach of a career in the official 
economy.  
 
When you are making quick money, it is difficult to do something else. It’s a way of 
living, it’s a risky way of living, it’s not easy. It is a profession as, well, dealer. Burglary 
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is a profession. It takes a lot of effort and preparation. You need to put a lot of time, 
energy and attention into it to do it right, just like in other jobs. You need different 
things like organization, a plan, knowledge of the terrain, and speed. And you need 
the courage to take risks – if you do it wrong you end up wrong. (Moussa, 22 years 
old) 
 
Since everyone in the neighborhood lives under difficult economic circumstances and 
official jobs are scarce, those who make money with delinquent activities are not 
widely condemned. The underground economy is not always discredited, and being a 
dealer is often perceived as a proper job, which requires a fitting education and 
competences (Kokoreff 2003, 131). Besides providing the possibility to make a living, 
delinquent activities like dealing also offer the chance to earn respect and admiration. 
Money and drugs can be shared with peers and thus become part of a display of 
generosity and solidarity, which can produce a certain prestige (Lepoutre 1997, 356-
358). Nourredine, one of the local dealers, took this line of thought even further. In a 
way, he lamented that dealing was an illegal job rather than a normal one, because this 
prevents him from helping his community by paying taxes, for example. He wanted to 
make clear that dealing was not only a way to make money for personal needs, but 
also a way to live up to the moral expectations that your friends and family have of 
you. He said that he liked to use the money he makes to help others, but of course he 
could not help those he did not know. He therefore pled for an anonymous collective 
cash at the municipality, where he could leave a share of his profits to help families in 
need. This idea was not a joke to him, but a serious thought.  
 
Making a decent living and having enough money is both a constant struggle and the 
factor which defines your success and respect both in- and outside of the 
neighborhood, in the eyes of Grigny’s young inhabitants. The word money came up as 
one of the most important words for the participants of the focus group. It is one of 
the first necessities of life and therefore something to strive for, not only for 
individual needs but also for the family. The fact that most of the people from the 
neighborhood are poor is experienced as one of the reasons for exclusion. Making 
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money could therefore lead to a better position in society. All my respondents 
emphasized that it is important for them to live at a certain acceptable standard, which 
means not only having enough money to pay for food and the rent, but also having 
enough to go on holidays now and then and pay for new clothes.  
 
Too many people in the banlieues live like it’s the third world, while we are living in 
France.  
 
If I would have money, my whole family would be at ease. (Mor, 18 years old) 
 
Money is the problem and the solution at the same time. If our countries would have 
been rich [the countries of origin for immigrant inhabitants of the neighborhood], 
they would respect us. (Najib, 20 years old) 
 
 Money is important for those that have no recognition. (Abubakr, 19 years old) 
 
Money gives you power, Saïd, another local dealer, told me, whether it is earned in a 
legal or illegal way. The bizness becomes an attractive activity from this perspective. 
Many of the youngsters drop out of school early because, as the reasoning goes, the 
bizness offers more opportunities for the future than an education. According to Seni, 
one of the youth workers in the neighborhood, the young people also had higher 
standards of material desires than when he was at school. They want to have more 
expensive things and therefore have to make more money. The bizness has evolved 
according to this need and the transactions have become bigger. Seni’s observation 
was that more and more young people were dealing cocaine and heroin, while they 
had been dealing hashish before.  
 
The perception of the bizness is not all positive. The money you make is also seen as a 
force that divides people and creates jealousy and distrust between friends. It is a 
source of various fights and the people that work in the bizness are constantly forced 
to look over their shoulder. These problems can take very serious forms, as one of the 
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youth workers told me. Sometimes, conflicts over large transactions in the bizness can 
lead to fights over life and death for the young men from Grigny. Various Wild West 
stories about vendettas between different groups of dealers who owe each other 
money are exchanged in the neighborhood and illustrate the flip-side of working in 
the bizness. Money is therefore seen as a treacherous thing as well, as the above 
mentioned quote from Najib shows. It can serve as a solution, but it can cause many 
problems at the same time.   
 
3.3. A politics of law and order directed at the banl i eues  
The harsh life circumstances, the straightforward attitude of the young residents and 
the dominance of the bizness in the neighborhood have made Grigny known in other 
peripheral neighborhoods of Paris. Grigny has a certain reputation, as Saïd explained 
to me. Young people who are affiliated with drug trafficking or gangs, like himself, 
often appropriate this reputation as something to be proud of. 
 
When I was in jail the last time, it was like everybody there came from Grigny, you 
know. They were all saying that they came from Grigny when somebody asked them. 
It’s because everybody knows that life in Grigny is tough, you know, and you have to 
be tough when you come from there. So they all wanted to be known as guys from 
Grigny. But I really come from there myself and I know everybody here in the 
neighborhood, so I knew that they were all lying. (Saïd, 26 years old) 
 
However, this same reputation is intensified in a completely different way in the 
institutional domain. Since the governance of Nicolas Sarkozy, the reputation of 
banlieues like Grigny as the home base of voyoux (thieves) and racaille (hoodlums) has 
inspired a zero tolerance governmental approach to suburban problems. According to 
Jacques Donzelot, the perception of young banlieusards in French society has changed 
since the 1980s from those who suffer from social injustices, as characterized by la 
galère, to those who are the perpetrators of their own misery and can therefore be 
characterized as racaille (Donzelot 2006). The politique de la ville which was applied in 
relation to the banlieues and which primarily focused on preventive measures had 
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proven to be ineffective in fighting the rising crime rates and drug trafficking in the 
banlieues. A shift in policy formation has been underway since the second half of the 
1990s, placing delinquency at the heart of the problems in the banlieues and imposing a 
harsh penalization of delinquents as the first step to solving these problems. 
According to Dikeç, this shift in policy can also be ascribed to the French republican 
tradition, which prescribes a commonly shared civic identity and culture, in order to 
safeguard the stability of the nation (2007, 470 kindle edition). Particular group 
interests or minority claims do not have a clearly distinguished place in the French 
republican model, which is based on a certain “universal individual-citizen”. People 
who do not conform to the image of the model citizen, such as deviant youths from 
the banlieues, could jeopardize the unity of the republic, and are therefore easily 
perceived as a national threat. 
 
3.3.1. The securization of the banlieues 
The themes of security and immigration began to dominate political debates about the 
banlieues. Nicolas Sarkozy became a strong advocate of this change in policy and made 
clever use of the figure of the racaille from the banlieues as an important threat which 
could make French society deteriorate into public disorder, immorality, lawlessness 
and economic decline (Moran, 2011b). During the riots of 2005, Sarkozy, still minister 
of interior affairs at the time, made his famous racaille remark, which set the tone of 
his political approach to the banlieues, but also sparked outrage amongst its inhabitants. 
When walking around Argenteuil just one day before the death of two boys in Clichy-
sous-Bois set off the riots (October 26, 2005), Sarkozy addressed an inhabitant with 
the following words: “You have enough of those bandes de racailles (bunch of 
scumbags), don’t you? We will get rid of them for you.” With these words, Sarkozy 
put himself on the political map as the man who would clean up the mess of 
unwanted delinquency, illegal immigration, Islamic fanaticism, immoral youth 
behavior, anti-Semitism, oppression of women and the rest of the malaise said to be 
located in the banlieues. In a mixture of nationalistic rhetorics and politics of fear, 
Sarkozy presented himself as the strong man who would safeguard public security 
 128 
(Kokoreff 2008, 12). He thereby aimed to clearly distinguish himself from the social 
and deliberative political culture of the socialist party and offered a hands-on politics 
of intervention, characterized by measures to end criminality (Demiati 2006).  
 
Sarkozy’s repeated promise to clean France from voyoux, criminal immigrant youth, 
took further shape when he became president of France. In 2010, Sarkozy proposed 
to revoke the citizenship of those with an immigrant background who engage in 
repeated criminal acts and violence directed towards the police or other state 
representatives (Laurent 2010). This plan was developed to facilitate the expulsion of 
gypsies and other illegal immigrants from French soil, but it should also be 
understood as supportive of Sarkozy’s tendency to depict youth from the banlieues as 
unintegrated and a threat to the well-being and safety of French society. Under the 
slogan that France should be dealing with “chosen immigration” instead of “enforced 
immigration,” Sarkozy aimed to keep out – or, if necessary, expulse – unwanted 
elements that could disturb national peace and unity.  
 
This feeling of being an “unwanted” element in French society has a strong influence 
on the way youngsters from Grigny perceive institutional politics, and it is coupled 
with the feeling of being dominated by an authoritarian structure of government. In 
the focus group, a hatred and fear of Sarkozy’s style of government was often 
expressed. The boys noted that the means of power are more and more held in the 
hands of a small group of people who have little to no affinity with the population in 
the banlieues. Sarkozy was the leading figure of this centralized elite power at the time 
of research.  
 
We are living in a mini-dictatorship. Sarkozy is forcing his vision upon other people. 
He decides on everything. He chooses the director of Telefrance and Radio France. 
There is no real freedom of expression. That’s why I say it’s a hidden dictatorship. 
(Adil, 23 years old) 
 129 
There is only one person that fixes the laws. Well, I am thinking about Sarkozy. You 
must have seen well what happened when his son’s scooter got stolen and he had this 
whole thing about it.60 There are grave injustices. (Farouk, 18 years old) 
 
3.3.2. A lack of social support and representation 
Sarkozy’s approach falls in line with a devaluation of an understanding in social terms 
of the problems faced by the banlieue population. Investments are made in the 
presence of police in peripheral neighborhoods, while social services, employment 
agencies and youth work are less supported by the national government. As a result, 
the most noticeable and only state representatives whom the inhabitants of 
neighborhoods like Grigny regularly meet are charged with maintaining law and order. 
Social support and representation of the banlieue population within the political 
domain suffer from this development. This gives rise to a vide politique, a lack in 
political representation of those marginalized citizens who were formerly affiliated to 
left-wing parties, but who now do not find a soundboard for their needs and 
motivations in any political party (Le Goaziou 2006, 46). This lack of representation 
motivated Nabil, a youth of Moroccan descent who was born and raised in the area 
and active in a variety of youth work activities, to take part in the local elections as an 
independent candidate. Nabil came a few votes short of actually being elected, 
according to him mainly because he did not have the funds to set up a proper election 
campaign. 
 
I have just simply said that they are not giving us the chance that we deserve; I have 
simply said that the political parties don’t take the right people to represent the people 
here. The problem in France is really simple. It’s not a very complicated problem. It is 
that simple that people make things complicated. The problem is this: no 
representation, nobody really knows what happens in the banlieues, because there are 
no serious spokespersons to speak to the press, or who speak to the politicians while 
they really respect the problem. So in the end we live in a bubble, where everyone 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Sarkozy was accused of misusing police power to retrieve the stolen scooter of his son while he was 
still minister of internal affairs in 2007. See “France’s finest find Sarkozy son’s stolen scooter,” Times, 
January 31, 2007. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1303220.ece 
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decides what happens for us, without us being the ones with the power to decide. 
Everyone decides for us what we have to do, how we have to live, what we have to 
think even sometimes..... It’s because the people who decide for us don’t come from 
our background (ne sont pas de chez nous). That is really, really difficult. (Nabil, 34 years 
old) 
 
While young banlieusards are well aware that the state should represent the will of the 
people in a democracy, they still feel that they can have absolutely no influence on the 
decisions that are taken by the state and that the state absolutely does not represent 
their interests. The state rather seems to be a representative body for those citizens 
who are favored because they subscribe to the norms and values of the well-adjusted 
majority and not those of the cité. Anthropologist Alain Bertho notices a similar 
selective democratic process in which the voices are muted of those who do not 
resemble the ideal image of the good citizen. 
 
The State that is offered to us is no longer the State of everyone: it might be the one 
of the “good citizens,” of the “honest” people, of those who adhere to the norms and 
not only to the laws, to a private morale more than to public regulations.61 (Bertho 
2006, 40)  
 
Nourredine explained the feeling of powerlessness that is generated by the 
unattainability of state power for the banlieue population. 
 
You should not mix up the citizens with the state. The citizens are not the state, the 
ones who decide and give power to the state. The state is for me not a quick fix, like 
when you want something, give it right away, the state is an underlying affair. To be 
able to get in a position where you can have political influence, you have to study a 
lot, you have to say I am like that, you have to study the terrain. It’s like that. For me 
it is the biggest manipulation, it is the biggest voyoucratie (“banditocracy”) there is. We 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 My translation. Original text: “L’État qu’on nous propose n’est plus l’État de tous: il est 
potentiellement celui des ‘bons citoyens,’ des ‘braves gens,’ de ceux qui font allégeance à des normes et 
plus seulement à des lois, à une morale privée plus qu’à des règles publiques.” 
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are obliged, we are the followers. We are like travelers who board a train. There are 
two categories of people: you are that traveler who boards the train and follows and 
shuts his mouth or you are the other extreme. (Nourredine, 26 years old) 
 
3.3.3. Young people’s perception of politics 
Such reflections lead to an extremely negative image of the practice of politics. In the 
eyes of the youngsters, any involvement in the organization of society through 
political means lies beyond their reach. 
  
Politics, that’s shit. (La politique, c’est de la merde.) (Adil, 25 years old) 
 
La politique, c’est de la merde. This might be the most concise and widely shared 
reflection on politics that I heard from my young respondents in Grigny. A general 
distrust, or a lack of interest, was expressed as soon as the subject of politics came up 
in our conversations. In many cases, the youngsters declared that they also did not 
wish to have a say in politics, since they consider politics none of their concern. Their 
general point of view is that politics is performed by people who are miles removed 
from the living environment of the young inhabitants of Grigny, and politics deals 
with issues that stand at an equally immense distance from their own experiences. 
Politics is first of all associated with politicians in the parliament – bourgeois men and 
some women, in business suits and ties, living in the fancy sixteenth arrondissement in 
Paris and speaking another, stiff version of the French language, seasoned with 
incomprehensible words. A bit closer to home politics is associated with the local 
government, la mairie, but also in this case the imagination of politics is associated with 
people who come from a different world. 
 
I don’t believe at all in politics. Everything they say is not true. It’s stuck in the same 
place, it doesn’t move. (Nourredine, 26 years old) 
 
The political people, they are not from our place. (Abubakr, 19 years old) 
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The words of Nourredine and Abubakr are good examples of the tendency to 
associate the rather abstract word “politics” with the people who perform politics – 
the politicians. Politics thus becomes a personified notion in the thought of my 
respondents. In addition to a perceived lack of representation, the youngsters accuse 
all politicians of a rather one-dimensional focus on their own interests, and a 
treacherous discourse that can fling from one position to another, any time it benefits 
them personally. The idea that politicians are always lying has been repeated during 
many of our conversations, and can be related to the feeling that the “truth” about life 
in the banlieues is not recognized outside of the neighborhood. I will return to this 
concern that the truth about life in the banlieues is not recognized in chapter 7. Even 
politicians who are known to come from an immigrant background, and who grew up 
in the banlieues, such as Fadela Amara and Rachida Dati, are not trusted. They are seen 
as turncoats who have forgotten to be loyal to their background and have chosen to 
adapt themselves to a different environment, the domain of difficult political 
language, a posh attitude and opportunistic compromises. These politicians are neither 
trusted to represent the interests of the youngsters, since they no longer speak the 
same language, nor do they identify themselves sufficiently with the people and 
environment to which the youngsters feel that they themselves belong.  
 
Nourredine emphasized this idea that young people from his neighborhood speak a 
completely different language than politicians. There is a stronger contradiction in 
means of communication which prevents young people from the banlieues from joining 
in politics. When the youngsters are not satisfied about something, they often choose 
to express their discontent in violent, direct action. They engage in a confrontation on 
the streets with the police, who represent the state at that moment. Once one has 
chosen this way to communicate one’s discontent, it becomes impossible to engage in 
a rational, deliberate discussion like politicians are used to. Nourredine already saw it 
happening before his eyes. He asked us to imagine a group of guys from his 
neighborhood throwing stones at the police, and then suddenly step forward, take off 
their balaclava to discuss their demands in a quiet and rational way, like a politician 
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would do. Naturally, they would be arrested immediately. This symbolic scene 
illustrates the difficulty in finding a mutual form of communication between the 
young inhabitants of the neighborhood and the representatives of French institutions. 
Unruly and direct expressions of discontent are difficult to bring into accordance with 
the rational negotiation of interests within an institutional discussion. 
 
Politics thus becomes an exclusive, rational and strategic praxis to the benefits of a 
certain elite. Young banlieusards obviously do not belong to that elite, and therefore do 
not consider themselves to possess any possible political agency. They often do not 
vote since representative politics without true representation seems like a waste of 
time to them (Moran 2011a, 308). The political praxis does not seem to leave space 
for a formulation of shared demands and policies. The idea that society is divided 
between those in power, who decide over the lives of the people, and those who have 
little to nothing surfaced often when we were discussing social and political issues. 
Politics is thus seen as a domain of actions and decisions that divides society, rather 
than keeping it together. This point of view led youth worker Christian to designate 
politics primarily as the domain where a division between “us” and “them” becomes 
clear. He perceived an oppositional distinction between the world of political 
institutions and “his” people, rather than a relationship of representation or 
deliberation between the two. He therefore did not consider politics as offering any 
possibilities for meeting the needs of the people to whom he feels he belongs. To him, 
it seemed useless to get involved in any kind of politics. 
 
It is not politics that will change things. France is split in two, there is the state on one 
side and there is us at the other side, and we are the people. (Christian, 30 years old)  
 
The state, for its part, has no idea of the reality in which people in the banlieues live, 
according to most of my partners in conversation. The gap between the state and the 
people has widened due to a lack of knowledge of the terrain when it comes to the 
problems in the banlieues, together with an unwillingness to work on fundamental 
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issues like equality and poverty reduction. Focusing on these issues, in combination 
with a direct and pragmatic approach at the local level, is the only option for 
developing an alternative, better form of politics for the future, in the opinion of my 
respondents. The youngsters are skeptical about the possibilities of realizing such a 
politics. Hector, Dayo and Moussa thought such a politics could only be realized if 
politicians are willing to step into their reality in the neighborhood, to see for 
themselves what life is like from their side of the story. In this context, Hector 
proposed that politicians should maybe come to live in Grigny for a couple of weeks 
to become real “hands-on” experts. Such an approach would open space for a 
“politics of the heart,” led by true compassion for the people in less fortunate socio-
economic situations, as expressed by Kemal. 
 
There should be a politics of the heart. Someone who fights with his heart and 
someone who fights with his head, that’s not the same. Someone who fights with his 
heart will go to the end. The head is limited. It is calculating but it will not go much 
further. At a certain moment it blocks... It is difficult because there are so many lies. 
You know systematically, when the politicians arrive, what they will say to us. (Kemal, 
30 years old) 
 
A change of the institutional political praxis would depend on the willingness of 
politicians to change the system in which they work, and the youngsters doubt 
whether this will happen. They do not see a role for themselves in such a process of 
change and are in general quite skeptical about the possibilities for political change in 
the future. Since they believe that politicians are far from compassionate towards 
people living in more difficult conditions, they do not expect them to engage in a true 
“politics of the heart.”  
 
3.3.4. A negative image of the future 
Already in one of the first focus group conversations, Najib said “only the worst lies 
before us” to express a general pessimism concerning the future of life in the banlieues. 
The others agreed with him on this dark future scenario. In general, the youngsters see 
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existing difficulties continuing in the future. In the broader sense of society, many see 
the distance between the rich and the poor growing, and in a more personal sense 
they see limited opportunities for developing their individual capacities and making a 
decent living in the future. Most of the youngsters do not have much faith that they 
will be given the chance to have their own share in the formation of a better structure 
of society in the future. For something fundamental to change in this perspective, 
something fundamental should change in the state’s influence on the structuring of 
society. The youngsters from Grigny are pessimistic about the capacity of banlieue 
inhabitants to steer matters in the right direction. In their own neighborhood and 
other areas of the banlieues, they don’t see the spirit to join forces to change things. 
Solidarity and dedication to a certain shared cause is hard to find in their opinion. 
Most of the people are busy taking care of their own personal business and need all 
their time and energy to keep their heads above water. Kemal and Marc found that 
this negative attitude has developed as a reaction to too many disappointments when 
it comes to institutional change related to the neighborhood. The hope for a radical 
change in politics, which would bring about less injustice and more equal chances, has 
therefore been abandoned long ago. 
 
3.4. Living in a world of “us” versus “them” 
The inhabitants of neighborhoods like Grigny suffer from a lack of recognition. 
Especially young people have difficulties dealing with their frustrations about 
experiences of discrimination, a lack of equal opportunities to develop themselves and 
a neglect of their deprived living environment. The causes of frustrations that underlie 
sudden outbursts like urban riots go unnoticed, let alone understood, by governmental 
political representatives. Young banlieusards are criminalized, only their voyoux 
reputation is continuously repeated in parliamentary debates and media reports (Body-
Gendrot & De Wende 2003). This criminalization leads to a position of these 
youngsters as citoyens de la seconde zone, defective citizens whose equal worth is not 
recognized. Apart from security-driven interventions, state institutions tend to neglect 
the banlieues and thereby contribute to the widening of the gap, which already exists in 
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a spatial and socio-economic sense between the respected citizenry and those who 
literally live in the ban-lieues, the places that seem to be banned from the recognized 
organization of society, as expressed by French philosopher Mehdi Belhaj Kacem 
(2006). This distance was clearly felt by my partners in conversation in Grigny. The 
boys reflected on their own position in society from an antagonistic point of view, 
characterized by a division of “us” versus “them.” 
 
This division between “us” and “them” is also recognized by French anthropologists 
Michel Kokoreff and Didier Lapeyronnie. Kokoreff particularly denotes the hostility 
between young banlieusards and the police as constitutive for the living conditions and 
social climate in the banlieues. Youngsters rise up in opposition to the police in a fight 
over the territorial appropriation of the neighborhood (Kokoreff 2008, 183-240). 
Lapeyronnie understands the division between “us” and “them” in a broader sense 
and describes how a contrast is upheld by banlieue inhabitants between life inside and 
outside of the neighborhood. This perceived contrast is inspired by experiences of 
discrimination and distrust and hints at the different moral valuation of the superior 
classes and the inhabitants of the “ghetto.” In reaction to an experienced exclusion, 
the ghetto “insiders” tend to create a solidarity which elevates their own moral status 
in disregard of the dominant majority “outside.” The division between “us” and 
“them” thus also serves to establish a certain dignity inside the banlieues (Lapeyronnie 
2008, 166-169). This mechanism will be further explained in the second half of this 
chapter. 
 
3.4.1. Banned from society 
French philosopher Mehdi Belhaj Kacem has used the word banlieues itself to clarify 
what kind of position young people from neighborhoods like Grigny hold in relation 
to the state powers and institutions. In Belhaj Kacem’s eyes, the banlieues are literally 
the ban-lieux, the place where people find themselves banned from the normal 
structure of society. It is the residence of the homo sacer, Giorgio Agamben’s term for 
those people who are placed completely outside of the law and therefore have only 
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their bare life to give meaning to their place in society. They are excluded from the 
structure of law and legitimate participation in society, but as excluded and banned 
people they still are part of social reality. They therefore find themselves in a situation 
that is both in- and excluded. The people who inhabit the banlieues are included as 
outsiders, as those who are excluded62. State powers and institutions tend to point at 
the non-functioning of regular structures in the place of these outsiders. People in the 
banlieues are both left to their own devices and completely dependent on the mercy of 
state institutions. Since the inhabitants of the banlieues have no say in existing political 
or legislative structures, state institutions can completely decide on the chances they 
will and won’t get in society, but at the same time they are left completely free to live 
in their own domain according to their own law (Belhaj Kacem 2006, 17-18). This 
analysis of the banlieues as the place where the out-laws or ban-dits live also explains 
why the young people from these places are so much attracted to an image of the 
voyou, the tough gangster-like self-made man, according to Belhaj Kacem. I will return 
to the attraction of this gangster ideal in chapter 5. 
 
Because the thief (voyou), the rioter, etc., is, well understood, from his point of view, 
the one who knows that he cannot have access to capitalist goods by legal means; and 
takes, in cold blood, the shortest route to seize them.63 (Belhaj Kacem 2006, 25-26) 
 
This analysis can be recognized in the narratives of injustices as they are given by the 
youngsters I spoke to. In their eyes, the relationship between young banlieusards and 
state institutions is one of both complete neglect and complete dependency; on the 
one hand, being completely overlooked and left to one’s own mercy and, on the other 
hand, being completely in the spotlight for control and repression.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 This analysis is comparable to Jacques Rancières discussion of the position of those ‘who have no part’ 
in society, because they are subordinated and overlooked in the decision making process. However, those 
who have no part still have a place in society. They are included in society, but they do not belong to 
society, because they cannot influence society and effectively plead for their rights (Van den Hemel, 2008, 
22-23). I will return to Rancières analysis of the part of those who have no part in chapter 5. 
63 My translation. Original text: “Parce que le voyou, le casseur, etc., est, bien entendu, du point qui est le 
sien, celui qui sait qu’il ne peut avoir accès aux biens du capitalisme par la voie légale; et prend, de sang 
chaud, le chemin le plus court pour s’en emparer.” 
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3.4.2. The world of “them” 
When the youngsters speak about “them,” they often mean everyone who is 
associated with state institutions: politicians, judges, policemen, but also teachers and 
journalists. “They” can also be those who live in different socio-economic 
circumstances, in a different place – the people who live in the countryside or in Paris, 
especially those living in the richer neighborhoods like the sixteenth arrondisement or, 
more generally speaking, the bourgeoisie. The distinction between “us” and “them” is 
not only an objective difference in the eyes of the youngsters, in the sense that “we” 
do things differently than “they” and “we” are different people than “they,” but also a 
normative difference. “They” are against “us,” because they are often seen as 
treacherous, dishonest and egoistic. But, more importantly, the distinction between 
“us” and “them” is not objective because “we” and “they” are always in a certain 
power relation to each other. In this power relation, “they” usually find themselves on 
the beneficial side; “they” are the ones leading the good life, who have the powers at 
hand and are in the position to make decisions that also influence the lives of “us.” 
These decisions are often seen as unjust by the youngsters, causing them trouble in 
the best case but harming them gravely in the worst. According to my partners in 
conversation, the power relation between “us” and “them” is in general completely 
out of balance, which leads to the perception that “they” are at the top of the ladder 
of society, dominating “us” at the bottom in an oppressed position. This figure leads 
to an identification with la France d’en bas (France from below), which was repeated by 
several of my respondents during different conversations. 
 
In the representation of the story of “them,” as expressed by my respondents, the 
injustices imposed upon them by various state institutions take a central position. The 
word “injustice” plays a central role in the youths’ perception of the world of 
institutions and the more wealthy inhabitants of France whom they tend to represent 
better than la France d’en bas. Adil even says that “injustice” is the word that has to 
come first when speaking of how young people from Grigny look at their own 
position compared to that of others in French society. “We are all French,” says Adil, 
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“but in reality this is not the case.” According to him, difference in skin color and 
social class strongly influences how one is treated in French society. Everyone should 
be treated equally, but there is in fact a lot of inequality between people. He considers 
this inequality to be unjust. Injustice is thus experienced as an essential trademark of 
the relationship the young people have with the world outside of the neighborhood, 
and with the domain of politics.  
 
Most of my partners in conversation said that they experience injustice only in relation 
to the outside world, but never inside of the neighborhood, because inside of the 
neighborhood everyone lives under similar circumstances and in similar social 
positions. People from the neighborhood are, so to say, all in the same boat, as Dayo 
explained. 
  
It’s when you go outside that you will find injustice. Between us not really, because 
we are all on the same social level. It’s a bit when you look elsewhere, in the 
administration of justice, our trouble, if it is the same as the trouble of someone who 
comes from the sixteenth [arrondisement in Paris] that person will not have the same 
penalty as us, the penalty would be lighter. But we would get the maximum. I don’t 
know why but it is like that. That should be explained also. 
And then at the level of work as well, if you come from the neighborhood, from 
Grigny or again from the sixteenth, when you have the same papers, that person from 
the sixteenth will have more chance than the one from Grigny. If someone from 
Grigny will change their address, this person will be hired. Discrimination, that’s a bit 
injustice as well, things like that. It’s more when you go out of the neighborhood that 
it will become more difficult, because inside there is not so much injustice. (Dayo, 25 
years old) 
 
Marc, one of the youth workers, told me that all injustices experienced by the 
youngsters come down to one clear and simple explanation. 
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Because you come from the ghetto64 you don’t have the same chances to make it as 
someone coming from a quartier chique, that’s all. (Marc, 30 years old) 
 
The reputation attached to the Grigny area code causes a wide variety of experiences 
of injustice in various interactions with people from other areas. Interventions of state 
representatives within the neighborhood are also experienced as a source of injustice 
and disturb the climate of solidarity which the inhabitants of Grigny strive to uphold 
amongst themselves.  
 
In sections 3.5. to 3.8., I will describe the various experiences of injustice, as they are 
associated by my young interlocutors from Grigny with the world of “them,” and 
their interference with the lives of people from neighborhoods like Grigny. The 
influence of state institutions, especially of the police, play a key role in these 
experiences of injustice, together with the influence of the media. 
 
3.5. “Racism is in the letter of the law” 
The feeling of living under the influence of a monopolized state power strongly 
influences the youngsters’ sense of injustice. The concept of “them,” who are far away 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The term “ghetto” is often used by youngsters to describe their neighborhood in the banlieues. A 
positive appropriation of the negative reputation of their neighborhood as secluded, deprived, dangerous 
and immoral often lies behind the use of this word. Youngsters are inspired by American rap music and 
speak of living in the “ghetto” as an unchosen destiny, of which one can nevertheless be proud. Other 
inhabitants are strongly opposed to the description of their neighborhood as a “ghetto,” since they feel 
that this word only intensifies the imaginary criminalization and marginalization of an area which in 
essence is not much different than other residential areas where people try to make the best of their lives. 
The use of the word ghetto is also controversial in an academic context. Both Eric Maurin and 
Lapeyronnie use the word ghetto to describe the construction of particular urban territories which are 
separated from the rest of society by social, racial and spatial segregation. Maurin stresses the similar 
process of ghettoization which takes place in the United States and France (Maurin 2004). Lapeyronnie 
adds that the ghetto is also constructed from the inside and describes a special place in which people have 
developed particular lifestyles, values and social relations in order to collectively face the difficulties that 
challenge them in society at large. The ghetto also forms a contre-monde (counter-world) in which one can 
feel protected from injustices experienced in the outside world (Lapeyronnie 2008, 11-12). Loïc 
Wacquant is strongly opposed to the use of the term “ghetto” in a French context. Issues related to 
ghettoization like segregation, violence and poverty are of a different intensity in the United States than in 
France, in his opinion. In addition, the development of American ghettos has a different spatial and 
historical background. Racial classification plays a more important role in the United States and the 
ghettoization has been met with different institutional responses in the United States than urban 
segregation in France (Wacquant 2008). 
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and out of reach of the youngsters, deciding upon their lives is first and most 
represented by the state. 
 
 “They.” That’s the state, they are frauds. (Cédric, 16 years old) 
 
The characterization of the state as “frauds” indicates the limited legitimacy young 
inhabitants of Grigny ascribe to state governance. Decisions taken by state institutions 
do not relate to the experiences and needs of young banlieusards, while they explicitly 
favor other groups of citizens. This makes the state biased and not representative of 
all, in their opinion. Some also hold the authoritarian state power responsible for the 
creation of laws that enlarge the inequalities between people in France even more. 
When we discussed the new immigration laws in France, Najib and Mor both agreed 
that racism is inherent in the letter of the law. The boys used their own words to 
describe “institutional racism” (Wieviorka 1998; Khiari 2006; Marlière 2006b), which 
is explicitly attacked by the movement of the Indigenes de la République. This movement 
issued a call to protest against discrimination and racism in 2005 and aims to expose 
the myth of a unified French republic under the motto of égalité, liberté and fraternité and 
places attention on those who can not take part in this myth on account of their 
different race and immigrant background. Inspired by postcolonial thought, the 
statement “Nous sommes des indigenes de la République” aims to create awareness of 
the presence of a part of the population which suffers from a systematic 
discrimination that is upheld by the state (Khiari 2006; Bernault 2009). This part of 
the population is marked by a “double history” of devaluation; often part of colonial 
legacy, they remain victims of a subordinate position in French society because their 
trajectory of emigration/immigration leaves them forgotten in their country of origin 
and neglected in their country of residence (Sayad 2001). Laws like the double peine, 
which makes it possible to expel immigrants who have committed a crime, show how 
this painful history is inscribed in the letter of the law and therefore marks the 
relationship between state institutions and French citizens of immigrant descent. 
Again, under this law, those of a different race are transported to different territories 
 142 
under force by the state, as in the times of slavery (Mbembe 2009). Just like in the 
colonial times, laws have been enacted which do not apply equally to all human 
beings, but make a distinction between people of different descent. Even worse, 
under influence of such laws, certain criminal offences are quickly associated with 
those who are black or Arab. This rationality also affects the practice of policing. 
Racism often plays a part in the way young people from the banlieues are treated by law 
enforcement (Body-Gendrot, 2008). It seems that the maintenance of law and order 
prevails over general human rights when it comes to legal reactions to immigration 
and problems in the banlieues. A colonial rationality continues to mark policies and 
legal procedures in this context (Massiah 2006). 
 
3.5.1. A legal system with two gears 
Others see the injustice most of all in the way in which laws are enforced. Many of my 
partners in conversation in Grigny felt that young people from the banlieues are not 
treated equally before the law and are often punished more heavily for the same 
offence than others. A discussion about the seriousness of different crimes like 
burglary, robbery and white-collar criminality in one of the focus group sessions led 
many of the participants to say that people from the “elite” who commit a criminal 
act, like businessmen who commit fraud, are less punished in their eyes than young 
people with an immigrant background from the banlieues who commit a crime like a 
bag-snatching. Kokoreff has observed the same sentiments, which he described as the 
feeling of falling victim to a justice à deux vitesses, a legal system that has, as it were, two 
gears and accelerates quicker to condemn a young man from the banlieues than a 
fraudulent politician (Kokoreff 2003, 110). Youngsters often have the feeling that they 
are sentenced for who they are, and not for what they have done (Lapeyronnie 2008, 
291). Moussa is convinced that prejudices play a mayor part in the conviction of 
young people from the banlieues. Prosecutors often do not make an effort to really 
look into the details of a case and do not try to look at the defendant as an individual. 
They deal with cases in which witnesses describe the suspect as a black teenager 
wearing a hoody and white sports shoes. Such a description would apply to the 
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majority of the young male population of an area like Grigny and automatically leads 
to police raids in which boys matching the description are randomly arrested on the 
streets. If one of these arrestees already has a criminal record for similar offences, the 
prosecutor readily decides to prosecute the boy in question without gathering any 
further proof or looking into the detailed circumstances of the crime committed. A 
result is that many people are wrongly accused. The judge might do a bit more of his 
or her best to listen to the defense of the accused, but this does not prevent many 
verdicts from being unjust. Many stories are told in Grigny about boys from the 
neighborhood who spent time in jail while everyone was convinced of their 
innocence.  
 
Still, not all laws are seen as causing injustice. Nourredine makes a distinction between 
regular laws and the constitution. The constitution exists to guarantee a humane life 
for everyone and for everyone to be treated equally, according to him. The laws of the 
constitution are made to guarantee the necessities of life for people, such as the right 
to education, housing and respect. The problem with other laws is that they do not 
seem to be made for everyone like the constitution is. This is the reason why non-
constitutional laws can be violated more easily, both for the government and for those 
youngsters who engage in illegal activities. Yet actually all laws should have the same 
value as the constitution, because they should all safeguard equal treatment, in 
Nourredine’s opinion. 
 
A law is not made to be in favor of anyone. The law should always be in favor of 
those who are oppressed. When a law is made, it is made to respect certain people, it 
should not be violated. If you make laws for the one person to be content and the 
other not to be content... There should not be laws about which you could say that 
they will support these people, or those people. (Nourredine, 26 years old) 
 
3.6. “The police is the dog that bites” 
The injustices caused by the administration of justice do not impact the lives of the 
boys from Grigny as much as the injustices experienced in relation to the police. The 
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youngsters still respect the court up to a certain degree because of its authority to take 
decisions, even though these decisions are not always taken on fair grounds. However, 
the police are not respected at all because the police judge, even though they lack the 
authority to do so. This difference is explained in a very explicit way by Moussa. 
 
The administration of justice is like the owner, and the police is the dog. The dog 
bites, but the owner doesn’t. With the owner you could have a normal conversation 
because you are, so to say, on the same human level. With the dog, you can only hope 
that it has been trained well by its owner. (Moussa, 22 years old) 
 
In Moussa’s opinion, the police unjustifiably place themselves above the law. In many 
cases, they have been accused of excessive abuse of power. All of the participants in 
the focus group agreed that the police usually act first, before asking any questions. A 
normal conversation with the police is not possible in the eyes of the youngsters, since 
they let themselves be guided by negative judgments immediately. To them, all young 
men in the neighborhood are suspects. As Abdel described it, “They put everyone in 
the same bag.” Confrontations often escalate because there is little personal contact 
between the youngsters and the police. The young men who hang out on the streets 
are not approached in a personal way, but generally treated as potential delinquents, 
even though a police station was established in Grigny several years ago in order to 
facilitate closer ties between the neighborhood and the police force.  
 
Sebastian, one of the youth workers who was born and raised in Grigny, tells me that 
the situation used to be very different in the days when he was still a young boy 
hanging out on the streets. He remembers clearly that the police officer who used to 
make his regular round in the neighborhood would pay his father a visit when he had 
been speeding with his new scooter. In those days, the state still invested in police de 
proximité, a neighborhood police force.65 The police would still see prevention as its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The idea behind the police de proximité was to create a police force that would be able to establish a 
relationship with the neighborhood by means of the regular presence of the same officers in the same 
neighborhood. By investing in regular and cordial contact with people from the area, such police officers 
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main task, whereas nowadays the priorities have shifted to the maintenance of 
security. Damien, another native-born Grignois, still remembers that there would be an 
annual soccer match between the police and the youth from the neighborhood when 
he was in secondary school. These kinds of activities are nowadays unthinkable in 
Grigny.  
 
Neighborhoods like Grigny are known for the continuous presence of large police 
patrols which use identity checks and the occasional lock-up to keep the pressure on 
young residents who are suspected of displaying regular criminal behavior (Mucchielli 
2004). Such arbitrary stop and searches, assaults and arrests are experienced as very 
grave injustices, and strongly enforce the perceived opposition of “us” versus “them” 
(Moran 2011a, 306). Some of the boys of the focus group told us that it is not unusual 
for them to be checked three times a day on the way from soccer or school to home. 
Identity checks take place regularly at the Grigny RER-station or at the central round-
about in Grigny II and are always carried out by heavily armed policemen of the CRS 
(French riot police). Some of the youngsters specifically complained about the uncivil 
way in which they are spoken to by the police. They feel that this treatment gives 
them the right to be uncivil in return. This leads to a certain culture of confrontation 
that is difficult to change. Sociologist Laurent Mucchielli has done extensive research 
into the relationship between youngsters and the police in French banlieues and speaks 
of a game in which both parties don’t want to lose face to each other (Mohammed & 
Muchielli 2006, 109). Moussa associates the police foremost with a display of power, 
with which the police wish to prove their superior position. His comparison of the 
police with the dog makes it clear that he does not necessarily perceive the police as 
placed in a higher position than the youngsters. Accordingly, the confrontations 
between youth and police become more of a showdown between two parties which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
could work on the prediction and prevention of crime, instead of interventions after an offence had taken 
place. This idea differs largely from the present status of the police force in the banlieues, which consists of 
mainly young and unexperienced officers, who are only placed in particular areas for a short period of 
time (Kokoreff 2008, 220). In addition to this, there is considerable political pressure to book quick 
results in bringing down the crime numbers. Time to invest in a “slow” approach by maintaining 
neighborhood relations has run out (Roché 2005). 
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could both potentially win the game. This reasoning hints at the tendency to challenge 
the monopoly of violence that is in the hands of the police as representative of the 
state. Moussa pleas explicitly for the right of the youngsters to defend themselves 
against any unfair abuse of power on the part of the police.  
 
When someone hits you, you want to defend yourself, that’s normal. That’s how it 
always works in the neighborhood. The actions of the police don’t have any 
legitimacy for us. But what can we do against the police? (Moussa, 22 years old) 
 
At the same time, the youngsters are well aware that the police benefit from a stronger 
force than they could ever apply themselves. The problem is that the police do not use 
their powers in the right way or at the appropriate times. The police are never to be 
trusted, not even in times of need, according to the youngsters. The participants of 
the focus group could not name any situation in which the police had come in time to 
help someone in need. It is exactly this idea that worries Nabil the most. He thinks 
that the constant presence of the police will not make the atmosphere in the banlieues 
any better because the people are not used to trusting their willingness or ability to 
enforce the law in a rightful way.  
 
In all the towns, including Grigny, the relations are tense. Respect for the police does 
not exist. From a very young age, the youngsters depend on themselves. They won’t 
count on the police when there are any social problems, it is not the police that will 
put an end to the social problems. It’s not the police that will put an end to the 
economic problems. In fact, there are too many actors related to security. And too 
little actors related to the economic and social domain who are really dedicated to the 
youngsters from the quartier. When this work will be there one day, I think there will 
be a lot less police. (Nabil, 34 years old)  
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Kemal, another ancien66 from the neighborhood, echoes this thought when he says that 
Grigny needs more doctors instead of policemen on the streets to advise the 
youngsters.  
 
3.7. Imaging and stereotyping in the media 
One factor that puts more oil on the fire when it comes to the tensions between the 
youngsters and the police is media coverage. All media coverage of the banlieues is seen 
as highly manipulative (Lapeyronnie 2008, 151-164). The TV only shows images of 
the banlieues that fit the known stereotypes, and the media base their coverage on the 
stirring up of public sentiments. By doing so, they depict those people in a negative 
way who are already perceived negatively by the general public. They thus broadcast 
images which are already expected, according to the youngsters. This kind of 
stigmatization shapes the opinion people have of the banlieues and produces the 
associations with criminality, violence and uncivil behavior people usually relate to 
young banlieusards. The general opinion of the youngsters is that the media just show 
what they want to show. Some stigmas about certain groups of people are constantly 
repeated, while other groups of people are never negatively depicted in the news. In 
one of the focus group meetings, we discussed the news about the war in Palestine 
and the following interreligious tensions in the banlieues that caused a lot of debate in 
France at that time. Ali was agitated about the fact that many newspapers and TV 
stations paid extensive attention to the two Molotov cocktails that had been thrown at 
a synagoge, while fairly little attention was paid to the Arab-looking boys who were 
attacked by pro-Israeli activists at a school ground. 67  This kind of one-sided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The word ancien is often used to describe “older young” residents in the neighborhood who are 
between thirty and fourty years old and still have a connection to the lifestyle and interests of the 
youngsters, but who are no longer completely involved in their activities on the streets. They are often 
respected individuals, who try to be role models with a good influence on the boys who spend their days 
hanging around on the streets, either in their function as a volunteer or youth worker in one of the youth 
centers or sports facilities, or as an involved older brother or neighbor. In much of the literature on daily 
life in the banlieues, such “older youngsters” with mentoring potential are named grandes frères. 
67 See for example “Frankrijk importeert emoties Midden-Oosten,” De Volkskrant, January 20, 2009. 
http://www.volkskrant.nl/archief_gratis/article926160.ece/Frankrijk_importeert_emoties_Midden-
Oosten 
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information is able to divide people, while they should be standing together, according 
to Ali. 
 
But also in more day-to-day coverage, the media sustain prejudices that can be 
harmful to the youngsters from the banlieues. Since the news from the banlieues is 
always about negative excesses and never about the good side of the story, young 
people from the banlieues have a hard time finding positive examples. This was a 
reason for Hector to start his own magazine, together with some friends from Grigny. 
 
We published articles that should actually be in the newspapers, but they are not 
because the people don’t pay attention to them. For example, we would talk about a 
successful sportsman... They prefer to talk about a guy that has been arrested in 
possession of drugs or things like that. Voila, it’s about showing the good news. We 
wanted to give a certain value, to show the richness, that things are lively and 
happening, that there are people who despite the difficult social context get things 
going, and that they try to get out of it in fact. (Hector, 26 years old) 
 
Sebastian, an advisor at the center for youth employment also lamented the fact that 
the media draw an image of society in which the people from the banlieues don’t have 
any place in a positive sense. He says that he has it relatively easy because he is white, 
of Portuguese descent, but many other immigrant children suffer from all kinds of 
discrimination because immigrants of a different skin color are never depicted in a 
positive light. When watching TV, you only see white people in the commercials, he 
says, because blacks and maghrebins are not considered to be representative. The 
television sells a favorable image and a presenter of the news or a quiz show with an 
immigrant background cannot have a place in this image, according to him. The 
talents of people in the banlieues remain largely unseen due to this tendency, while 
there are so many talents to discover. He points to all the rappers, break dancers, 
singers, soccer players and Thai boxers who come from Grigny. Nourredine takes this 
thought even further. He does not understand that all those who are struggling to 
keep their head up in his neighborhood are not shown as examples of successful living 
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in the media. A boy who helps out his family with an illegal job is not considered to 
be a good example for instance, but amongst his friends in the neighborhood he 
might be seen as a hero. 
 
The participants in the focus group seem to have the feeling that the media create a 
sort of “spectacle society” in which nothing has really happened if the media did not 
cover it. They believe that it is not very useful to plead for a different vision of reality 
by protesting against injustices, for instance, because if the media does not highlight 
the story, these kinds of protests will not have any effects. They lose the appetite to be 
engaged because they feel like they cannot change the story anyway. The “spectacle 
society” also has an effect the other way around, according to some. Young people 
from the banlieues sometimes deliberately sustain the negative image of their 
neighborhood because they think it is cool when people are afraid of them. Malik says 
that a certain business is thus created between the media wishing to show sensational 
images of the banlieues and youngsters who are willing to provide these images because 
they think it is the only way they can earn a place in the spotlights and draw public 
attention to their achievements.  
 
3.8. Don’t we need everyone to make a world? 
We have seen thus far that boys from Grigny experience injustice in a confrontation 
with the law, the police and the media. In relation to all these domains, the youngsters 
feel that they occupy an inferior position and that they are excluded from being able 
to express an agency with decisive power. This general feeling of powerlessness was 
described by Kemal as a form of suffering that is constantly present in the 
background of daily life.  
 
Injustice is something that you can see on the streets immediately, it’s an everyday 
experience. It’s like a background noise, it is something that hurts, but you don’t 
notice it. It is only when you want to stop that noise that you will say, “Oh, where 
was I? I have suffered all that time and I have accepted that suffering.” It is when the 
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background noise stops that you can say it has been tough nevertheless. (Kemal, 30 
years old) 
 
The feeling of being continuously subjected to forms of injustice causes a negative 
sense of resignation and victimization, as well as frustration and aggression. In another 
conversation, Kemal noted that young people from Grigny seem to grow up in a 
culture of failure, which affects the formation of their identity in a negative way. Low 
self-esteem and a lack of expectations for the future is the result. Since their image of 
the future is very dark, they feel like they have nothing to lose. In such a situation, 
violence becomes permitted to express one’s frustration. This sense of victimization is 
also recognized by Mucchielli (Muchielli & Aït-Omar 2006. Mohammed & Muchielli 
2006) and Kokoreff (2003, 103). In this context, French philosopher Étienne Balibar 
speaks of a “void of belonging” that is caused by feelings of exclusion at the level of 
national citizenship (2007, 60).  
 
3.8.1. No respect for the contribution of immigrants 
The feeling of being a “citizen of the second zone,” who cannot be recognized as a 
member of French society, is closely related to the immigrant background of banlieue 
inhabitants, and can be traced back to the indigenization of the population from the 
banlieues (Khiari 2006, 9). People from the banlieues are treated like indigenous people 
who still must be civilized before they can be accepted as normal citizens. This runs in 
parallel to the civilization campaigns which took place in former French colonial 
politics, according to many. The way young people from Grigny experience national 
identity and belonging depends on this process of indigenization. It is as if the state 
perceives their living environment as a barbarian territory which still needs to be 
claimed by means of national force. The hostile relationship between young 
banlieusards and the police, who behave like a military division in search of conquest 
and occupation in the eyes of many, can be understood in this perspective. 
 
There is still a colonial mentality present today. The parents of the youngsters have 
gone through a status of being indigenous at the time of colonization and a status of 
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immigrant in France. ... When you see the police station in the neighborhood, they 
take the French flag, they put up the flag real high, always higher, higher, to show the 
people that the republic will be installed in the neighborhoods – it is completely 
ridiculous. ... The colonial past is a very important moment in history, it is a very 
important fact that you have to remember to be able to talk about the banlieues – what 
have their parents lived through, what have their parents passed on, how do they live 
now, that’s essential in understanding what is happening today. The people are not 
asking if France is guilty, the people are not asking that France recognizes the 
massacres. No, the people are asking that they recognize the fact that those people 
are French nevertheless, they have an immigrant background but they are French. 
That they will stop treating the young people from the neighborhood here like they 
are still in the Algerian war. The Algerian war is over.68 The colonies are over. Today 
those young people there are French. (Nabil, 34 years old) 
 
This colonial legacy makes it all the more painful that the merits of immigrants in 
France are not sufficiently recognized. Becoming accepted as French is only possible 
if you become extraordinary successful, like Zinedine Zidane, who scored two goals in 
the World Cup final in 1998 and helped France become world champions, as the 
participants of the focus group noted. The efforts ordinary immigrant workers have 
made to make France the country it is today – working hard under often harsh 
circumstances, performing necessary but unpopular industrial labor – are not 
recognized. Nourredine says that he finds the French public opinion hypocritical 
when it comes to the acceptance of French with an immigrant background, precisely 
because they are only accepted when they can make a contribution that is seen as 
extraordinary beneficial. 
 
France is a cosmopolitan France, one needs everyone – blanc, beur, black – to make up 
one country. We need everyone to make a world. But when it is not in their own 
interests, we don’t need everyone to make a world. Do you see what I want to say? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Nabil is referring here to the governmental measure, during the riots in 2005, of enacting an emergency 
decree in France that had not been used since the Algerian war. See: “France declares state of emergency 
to curb crisis,” New York Times, November 8, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/international/europe/08cnd-france.html 
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That’s fucked up bullshit. They take things as they are when it interests them, and 
when it doesn’t interest them anymore, they don’t need much, they need only blancs. 
(Nourredine, 26 years old) 
 
This same realization makes anthropologist Alain Bertho conclude that the problem 
of indigenization is not only the problem of minority groups in France, but more a 
general figure of the tendency that equal rights and recognition are not equally 
accessible to everyone. Especially in an urban setting, where tensions and dividing 
lines of exclusion between inhabitants are apparent in a relatively small surface area, 
this problem is urgent. That is why Bertho urges adopting a slogan that has been used 
in various contexts of protest against discrimination and racism: Nous sommes tous des 
indigènes urbains (We are all urban indigenous) (2006, 42).   
 
I will return to Nourredine’s idea, that we need everyone to make up one world, 
despite the obvious differences between people, with more emphasis in the last part 
of my thesis. There, I will address the idea of “world making” on a radically inclusive 
basis, with the retention of an acknowledgement of existing differences in identity, 
world view and convictions as a possible starting point for a shared political agency. 
This shared political agency could contest exactly those experiences of injustice, as 
they are described here in relation to the words of my interlocutors from Grigny. 
 
3.8.2. Caught between two nationalities 
However, the sense of solidarity described by Bertho which could nourish a shared 
practice of “world making” remains wishful thinking in the eyes of my respondents, 
and the young inhabitants of Grigny continue to struggle with their own search for 
belonging. They often feel caught between two national identities, unable to become 
fully part of either one. 
 
In France they don’t consider us to be French, and when we go to our countries, they 
consider us to be French. It’s like you don’t have an identity. (Mustafa, 16 years old)  
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The feeling of not being fully at home in any national context is a source of insecurity. 
It leads to a crisis of identity, on the one hand, and makes it more important to look 
for certainties, on the other. The need to look for alternative structures of belonging 
increases with the lack of a positive feeling of national identity. According to Nabil, 
alternative modes of belonging are either found in the world of gangs or in religion. 
He is, however, the only one who named religion as an important part of identity 
formation for the youngsters.  
 
When they say you are Algerian, you say no. When they say you are French, you say 
no. We are like mutants, no country, no fatherland, no flag. They don’t even know 
the national anthem of their country of origin, they don’t even know the national 
anthem of France, destructuring people like that is dangerous. That leaves room for 
all kinds of extremism. .... The fact that the youngsters don’t feel represented, the fact 
that they are not considered to be French, they are considered to be citizens of the 
second zone, that climate causes you not to feel at home anywhere. The bigger the 
fracture is, the bigger the danger. The people feel the need to hold on to something. 
Either they hold on to their neighborhood, and it becomes a phenomenon of gangs, 
or they hold on to religion. There are very few people here that have a French flag at 
home. The only time they feel French is at the soccer game. (Nabil, 34 years old) 
 
Nabil is talking in this fragment about “destructuring” people in the sense of taking 
away a feeling of national belonging. He thinks that “they,” the representatives of the 
state who make decisions over the lives of the people in the banlieues are not willing to 
give the youngsters the chance to become part of the structure that the French 
national identity could offer. This feeling of being deliberately kept outside of an 
inclusive structure was expressed by others as well.  
 
They play mind-games with us, they make us believe that we are not French. The 
state, they are big communicators, they make us believe that we are not really French. 
(Momo, 20 years old) 
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3.8.3. A need for positive identification 
Just as much as the youngsters feel that the state is not giving them a place in the 
structure of a French national community, their lack of identification with France is 
mainly expressed in opposition to discrimination and exclusion. When it comes to 
their own feelings, they consider themselves to be French. Abdel explains this in a 
very simple way. He says that he does everything that other French people do; he was 
born in France, he speaks the language and has the nationality, he goes to school and 
his parents work and pay taxes. He considers himself as not much different than any 
other French citizen. Most of the youngsters agree with him. They all feel French 
because French is their mother tongue and they were born in France. Due to the 
negative reactions to immigrants in France, they feel forced to see themselves as 
different, but when they go on holidays to another country they present themselves as 
French. In their own sense of belonging69, there is room to be French as part of their 
identity, but when they compare themselves to the representation that the outside 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 In his analysis of feelings of home sociologist Jan Willem Duyvendak notes that familiarity is the self-
evident element of a sense of belonging (2011, 30). People tend to look for ways to familiarize their direct 
environment in order to feel at home. Duyvendak emphasizes the worries of ‘native’ populations in 
Western Europe, who see their home feeling jeopardized by the arrival of increasing numbers of 
unfamiliar immigrants, who change the face of until then familiar neighborhoods. “When people feel 
marginalized or threatened, they begin to view their own place in relation to other groups and their 
places, emphasizing its exclusive identity” (ibid.). Similar mechanisms account for youth of immigrant 
descend, who also feel marginalized and tend to compensate for said marginalization by emphasizing the 
special feel to their own neighborhood. Despite the fact that these youth are seen as “newcomers” by 
many, they are usually born and raised in the same neighborhood and claim their right to be and feel at 
home in that neighborhood by emphasizing a strong territorial sense of belonging, centered around the 
neighborhood. However, Duyvendak also rightly emphasizes that feelings of home or belonging are not 
only depending on a place, but also on the activities that makes one feel at home (ibid. 37). We feel that 
we belong to a certain place once we have made it feel like home, often together with others with whom 
we identify. People’s sense of belonging is further developed if they can also be publicly at home in a 
certain place, if they can freely express their lifestyle in public space, and gather with familiar and like-
minded others (ibid. 38-39). Here a sense of belonging is both defined by a feeling of home and a sense 
of community. For young urban troublemakers, their own neighborhood is often the only place where 
they feel free to publicly be at home, since their image and attitude is easily stigmatized in other areas. 
Hence, their sense of belonging is not only made up by a strong territorial bond, but also by a community 
feel related to the neighborhood, that comes with a specific lifestyle, values and codes of conduct. This 
sense of belonging will be further described in the next section of this chapter. Such a sense of belonging 
is not easily achieved. Belonging does not only refer to a certain state of being, but also to a ‘longing to 
be’ (Prins 2006, 288). The longing to be fully belonging to French society of young urban troublemakers 
is often frustrated by the perception of them as strange, deviant, unwanted, dangerous and/or not yet 
integrated. 
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world has of them, this part of their identity seems to be pushed into a corner. This 
contradiction leads to confusion and frustration, and can become a source of hostility.  
 
Saïd expresses a real voyou reaction to his feelings of exclusion. He thinks that the 
youngsters from the banlieues should not sit back and wait to be victimized by 
discrimination. They should let themselves be known and claim their own acceptance 
as Frenchmen – if this does not go the nice way, it should be done the hard way. He 
sums up this vision with a quote from the French rap scene: 
 
I will humiliate France until it loves me. Let the quartiers be known very, very well. 
(Saïd, 25 years old) 
 
In Saïd’s reaction, the issue of the negative reputation of neighborhoods like Grigny 
returns as an opportunity to develop an alternative structure of belonging based on a 
voyou lifestyle. Youth workers Malik and Kemal agree with Nabil that an involvement 
in the bizness and other criminal activities can offer youngsters the self-esteem and a 
sense of community they cannot find elsewhere. According to Malik, young people 
from the neighborhood are often frustrated and lack a sense of self-confidence. They 
are looking for role models to imitate and express an over-drive to prove themselves 
to the outside world. This leads to a constant search for instant success. If they do 
sports, they want to win the first competition immediately, if they make music, they 
want to perform on a stage immediately, and so forth. A quick route to success and 
recognition is offered in the domain of the bizness, where youngsters can also find role 
models to look up to. Young dealers Nourredine and Saïd both say that the tough 
reputation, which offers an alternative sense of self-worth, has always been attached to 
myths going around in the neighborhood about heroic deeds when facing other tough 
guys from other neighborhoods or the police. These myths have had value in the 
identity formation of youngsters as long as they know and both agree that this is a 
good thing to give some confidence to the youngsters. They think that these myths 
should stay intact and that it can be of benefit of the youngsters that the media do not 
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always give a correct impression of the way things work in the neighborhood. The 
media can thus help the youngsters keep the myths about their neighborhood alive.  
 
Others, like Dayo, make an explicit effort to unmask these myths. He also recognizes 
the urge to look for role models, and he expresses the wish to be one himself to the 
young kids with whom he works. However, he tries to show the youngsters how they 
can search for a healthy connection with society outside of the neighborhood, where 
you cannot behave like a thug and be respected. Despite his time in jail and his 
previous experiences with gangs, Dayo stresses the importance of moral behavior that 
is generally acceptable. He presents himself as a self-made man who has overcome 
hard times, doubts and distractions to become a righteous person who looks for 
success in a legal job, a hard work ethic and helpfulness to others.   
 
We are all examples, either in the right way or wrong way, you see. If it works by 
charisma, if a young man expresses a certain respect towards others in the 
neighborhood, he will have a good influence in the neighborhood. But it works often 
like I respect you either because you are strong or because you have money. And I 
don’t want to be an example for them in that wrong way. I started out with nothing at 
all, but tomorrow I might have a lot of things. Because I have persisted, I have 
worked for it, I have done a lot of things to arrive where I am. It is to show them that 
everything is possible. ... If they say to themselves Dayo is from the neighborhood 
and he started out just like us, he was vandalizing everything, he was hanging around 
(galerer) all day, every day, because everything they do I have done it as well. So I 
understand it a bit. Today I work, I have thought about it, I have said voila, my life is 
worth going somewhere. I have to advance, I have to do something concrete, 
important and I have to show to my parents and my brothers that I am capable of 
achieving big things. I have done certain things. The young ones, they know a bit 
about it in the neighborhood. I come from people with a certain reputation in the 
neighborhood. So despite myself, I am an example. But I have hit bottom and I have 
risen to my feet again, to become someone good. Because I was not someone really 
good before. (Dayo, 25 years old)  
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3.9. “Us”: The community of experience 
The examples of Saïd and Dayo clarify how different alternative structures of 
belonging are developed in reaction to the injustices young inhabitants of Grigny 
experience in relation to the domain of “them”, such as offences by the police, 
discrimination and difficulties in finding a job. The youngsters compensate for such 
negative experiences with the solidarity, the shared values and the joyful moments that 
life in their neighborhood signifies to them. If one goes through the same difficulties, 
one is eager to find a shared way to cope with the differences that are produced in 
relation to the world outside of the neighborhood and to support one another. The 
more the youngsters of the banlieues share the same kind of experiences, the more they 
describe themselves as being part of a certain community. The feelings of exclusion 
and discrimination associated to the domain of “them,” state institutions and the 
French bourgeoisie, and the values and the sense of belonging related to the domain 
of “us,” the neighborhood, are at odds with each other and also reinforce each other. 
The more youngsters feel that they are excluded and discriminated outside of their 
neighborhood, the more they become proud of, and identify themselves with, the 
values and norms of behavior that count inside of the neighborhood. The reputation 
they wish to uphold becomes stronger as a result, but also leads to reinforced negative 
reactions from the world outside.  
 
In this section, I will first provide a more general sketch of how a certain community 
of experience is developed in opposition to the unjust impact which “they” have in 
the neighborhood. In sections 3.10. and 3.11., I will describe the different dimensions 
in which this community of experience is expressed. The role of the family and the 
values and rules of the neighborhood play an important part in the stories of my 
interlocutors about their own lived world in the neighborhood. In section 3.12., I will 
briefly indicate the problematic aspects of the sense of belonging that is offered by the 
community of experience of “us.” In relation to the “outside” world, this sense of 
belonging can also reinforce prejudices and stigmatization.  
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3.9.1. “Us” as a relational expression without fixed identity 
In general, the distance between “us” and “them” is perceived as very large by my 
interlocutors. This results in a vision of society that is almost split into two totally 
separated realities: the reality of “us” and the reality of “them.” These different 
realities are strongly associated with the place where they are lived. The neighborhood 
where the youngsters live is a world in itself, where reality is very different than 
outside of “our” world. At the same time, the awareness of the influence that “they” 
have on “us” is also extremely present. The identity, attitude and agency of the 
youngsters I talked to is not only shaped in the domain of “us,” but for a large part 
precisely in the tense power relation between “us” and “them.” Kokoreff has 
described this development by focusing on the construction of a “community of 
experience.” 
 
But there again, these fine distinctions [between the different actors in the world of 
the banlieues] do not impede a “community of experience or a shared subjectivity.” 
The effects of stigmatization, the pollution of identities, like they are constructed by 
the media, have a part in this experience. In similar vein, the tense relation with the 
police tends to crystallize a collective “we” in relation to a “them” (police, ministers, 
powers). In both cases, these elements are reversed and become supportive of a 
positive identity through the identification with the neighborhood or the display of 
group bravery. (Kokoreff 2008, 193)70 
 
As this quotation makes clear, there is a “community of experience” that goes 
together with the word “us”, even though this “us” cannot be seen as a homogeneous 
community with a fixed identity. This community is constructed in a tense relation to 
a “constitutive outside,” which is made up by the domain of citizens and state powers, 
which are not only clearly distinguished from the domain of “us,” but also represent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 My own translation of: Mais là encore, ces distinctions fines n’empêchent pas qu’il y ait une “communauté 
d’expérience ou une subjectivité partagée”. Les effets de stigmatisation, de pollution de l’identité, tels qu’ils sont fabriqués par 
les médias, participent de cette expérience. De même, le rapport tendu avec la police tend à cristalliser un “nous” collectif par 
rapport à un “eux” (policiers, ministres, pouvoirs). Dans les deux cas, ces éléments s’inversent et deviennent les supports 
d’une identité positive à travers l’identification au quartier ou la mise en scène de la bravoure du groupe. 
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societal privilege, which is lacking on the part of “us.” The experiences that bind this 
community together should therefore not primarily be seen as intrinsic experiences, 
but as experiences of a tense societal relational field which are translated into a 
positive, locally expressed sense of belonging, solidarity and social structure or 
cohesion, in compensation for the negative confrontation with the domain of “them.” 
The “us” is bound by shared experiences and actions that take place in a shared 
physical space, rather than by an abstract vision of the world, theoretical ideas or 
ideals. A verbal explanation of shared values within the world of “us,” for example, is 
always deduced from a previously experienced practice. It is experienced practices, set 
in a perspective of power dynamics, which define the community of “us,” rather than 
a pre-constitutive identity, nationality, ethnicity or belief system. 
 
According to the youngsters, “us” refers to those who are bound by the same life 
experiences and living space, speak the same language (les mots sont vecus: All words are 
lived) and share the same principles or values (valeurs) and code of conduct or norms 
(les règles du quartier). In addition to these general characteristics of “us,” the word 
describes different groups of people. Sometimes, the youngsters use “us” to refer to 
family and friends, while other times they use it to refer to the people from their 
neighborhood and yet other times it stands for youngsters from the banlieues in 
general, or, in some cases, other people who are in the same socio-economic position. 
In a meaning closest to the personal life of the youngsters, “us” is the family. While 
the family is the collective of natural family members, close friends also count as part 
of the family. Family are the ones who can be trusted, who have lived through the 
same experiences and for whom one is willing to take risks.  
 
It should be noted here straightaway that the youngsters did not always speak in 
collective terms when the domain of “us” was addressed. As much as the distinction 
between “us” and “them” was apparent in our conversations, the youngsters were 
often speaking from an “I” perspective. My interlocutors often made it clear that they 
were speaking for themselves and that their opinions should not be taken as 
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representative for “the rest.” The “us” with which they identify is not a collective in 
the classical sense, a homogeneous entity with a shared identity. “They,” as distinct 
from “us,” are often described in much more general terms. “They” are easily lumped 
together as the wrongdoers in any case. The “us” should rather be seen as a way to 
position the youngsters in comparison to “them.” It is therefore more of a relational 
expression than an expression of a community with a distinct own identity. This 
development can be well explained by looking at the value that the youngsters give to 
words such as “family,” “values” and “rules of the neighborhood.”  
 
3.10. “Family is life” 
Already in our first conversation with the focus group, the word “family” emerged as 
a very important word for the youngsters.  
 
Family is important. Without family, you cannot build up anything. You have your 
real family and then you have your friends. They are also family. (Abdel, 14 years old) 
 
The family is everything. It’s your whole life. It’s life. (Mustafa, 16 years old) 
 
“Family” are the ones with whom you share your life, who you respect and who you 
care for. Solidarity and trust, other words that are important to the youngsters, are in 
the first place experienced in relation to the family.  
 
3.10.1. Respect for the parents 
The parents play a central role in the family, since they are the ones whom the 
youngsters respect the most. This is not necessarily because the youngsters share most 
of their thoughts and experiences with their parents or feel completely understood by 
their parents, but because they feel greatly indebted to their parents for the efforts 
they have made to provide a good life for their children. The family history of 
immigration is crucial in understanding the respect the youngsters have for their 
parents. They feel that their parents have suffered a lot in order to finally get to the 
point where they are now, having gone through leaving their own country and family 
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behind, working hard under difficult circumstances in the French industry and 
sometimes coping with an extremely deprived housing situation in the bidonvilles. In 
addition to this, there is the discrimination that the parents have suffered and the 
insecurity about their legal status in France. They had to gain an official citizenship 
status, which is often a natural given for their children, despite the fact that the 
younger generation still feels discriminated against. In a sense, the youngsters still feel 
they have to struggle to be accepted in France, but their parents already won the first 
battle in the fight for them. They can build upon a legitimate citizenship status that 
their parents have secured for them. The next stage would be to win equal treatment 
as citizens. 
 
Our parents have come to France to get out of the misery. They came to France to 
improve their daily lives. Otherwise, they would have stayed in their country, to grow 
potatoes and that would have been enough. They did not want us to experience the 
same difficulties as them. They have worked like crazy. We did not come here by 
ourselves, we just woke up here. Our parents have won their place here for us. What 
they have done is very honorable! Our parents had something to prove, they had to 
win their place and we claim the same rights as the other French, we are at the same 
level as the other French, but our parents don’t have the same level. (Ali, 20 years old) 
 
The circumstances under which some of the parents came to France were far from 
pleasant. Many Algerians came to France during and after the Algerian war in the 
1950s, for example. All difficulties are not over today. Most of the parents have many 
children whom they have to take care of. They work for a low salary and live in small 
houses. Discrimination is still a common experience not only for young banlieusards, 
but also for their parents. The youngsters feel that they have to defend their parents, 
as their history and efforts do not receive the respect they deserve in the collective 
French memory. This makes it unacceptable when their parents are offended or 
belittled by people associated to French institutions. The reason the youngsters often 
cite for riots is when policemen have offended a respectable older person in the 
neighborhood, who is known to be someone’s parent. Such an offence requires an 
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immediate counter-reaction and cannot be left unavenged. Eric Marlière remarks in 
this same context that many young men from the banlieues have the feeling that they 
need to avenge the humiliations that have been inflicted upon their parents in the past 
(2006 b). 
 
To attack the family, that’s serious. To hit my father, that’s a riot. (Moussa, 22 years 
 old) 
 
Despite this unconditional support, the youngsters also state that they often think 
differently about things than their parents. Their parents often have a stronger, natural 
respect for authorities, whereas the youngsters have their doubts about authorities.  
 
At my place, authority is authority. Our parents have more respect for the law than 
we do. For them, the police is the state and one does not want to get into trouble 
with the state. We think differently about that. (Arvid, 19 years old) 
 
My father says: go to work, so you won’t get into trouble. But for my mother it is 
different: she worries more. She is always saying take care of yourself when you go 
out. For my father it is more..., it touches a bit upon his pride if I get into trouble. 
(Moussa, 22 years old) 
 
3.10.2. Friends as family 
In addition to the parents, close friends are also an essential part of one’s family. 
Friends considered to be family have the same perception of the world; they 
understand things in the same way as you do. With your friends, you share most of 
your life experiences, they go through the same development as you do and share the 
same thoughts. “They have your back” when you are in trouble without asking 
questions, it goes without saying that they defend you if necessary, and the same holds 
true the other way around. There are no limits when it comes to protecting one’s 
friends, as many of my interlocutors believe. They would do anything to help their 
friends, even things that could get them into serious trouble.  
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The friends-family can also be experienced in the context of a gang,71 with which risks 
are taken, upon which one depends to share daily activities, and with which one 
identifies. Large groups of young men hang around street corners, forming their own 
temporary communities of experiences in public space. Loyalty towards one’s friends 
is essential, and I heard stories about severe treatment of people who have broken the 
trust of their gang. When this happens, the individual is expelled from his literally 
familiar environment. The impostor is taken out into the woods, far from the 
neighborhood, and stripped of his clothes. He then has to find his way back home 
naked. After this punishment, his friends don’t speak to him for a long period. This 
punishment is quite symbolic, since the feeling of being naked, stripped bare, without 
one’s closest friends, is a good way of describing how much a shared life in friendship 
means to the boys.  
 
What I really love about Grigny is also the family-side of it: you know everybody, 
everybody knows you, in the good and in the bad moments... One knows to count a 
bit on the neighbours. A bit, not a lot, you know, it depends on the person, but no, in 
general one can count on friends. That’s important as well. (Hector, 26 years old) 
 
3.10.3. The family blazon of the neighborhood 
The family feeling touches upon a sense of belonging that exceeds the people in the 
direct circle of family members and friends. This sense of belonging is closely related 
to the neighborhood (cité or quartier). In the quartier, everyone knows one another and 
lives together through the good times and the bad times, as Hector told me. He is the 
only one with whom I spoke who had finished a university degree. Together with 
some of the youth workers, he stands the best chance of moving away from Grigny 
and building up a life in another, better neighborhood. But he also most explicitly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 When talking about gangs, I apply the meaning to the word as used by the young people with whom I 
have spoken. For them, the gang is not a criminal organization with a specific identity and a strict 
hierarchical structure, like the maffia. It is more a group of friends who hang out together and sometimes 
get involved in criminal activities. Hierarchy and codes with which they identify can be important to 
them, but they are not fixed in strict roles of leaders and followers and fixed rites of entrance. For more 
insight into this concept of gangs, see De Jong (2007). 
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emphasized that the sense of belonging he experiences in Grigny had become a part 
of his identity, something which he could never leave completely behind.  
 
There are lots of them who have left, some of them think that Grigny is a curse. You 
might say that the people who have left Grigny are exactly the ones who made it. And 
the ones who stay in Grigny will not make it. I am convinced that it is not at all like 
that, it’s a curse that works the other way around. It’s an area with enormous richness, 
there is a lot to be build up, and one never forgets. It is true that there are some who 
you don’t see anymore, but when they come back..., one doesn’t forget Grigny. After 
all, it is in your blood, Grigny. It’s a small city full of surprises. And there is a lot 
going on. It’s the family, the friends, the good moments, the bad moments, one does 
not forget all that. One cannot leave and then everything is simple. The ones who 
don’t come back have their reasons. I am convinced that I will not forget Grigny. If I 
leave Grigny one day, I will do everything to polish the blazon. (Hector, 26 years old) 
 
Experiencing the same difficulties because one is living in a similar deprived socio-
economic situation produces not only recognition, but also solidarity. This solidarity is 
expressed in the story the youngsters told during one of the focus group meetings 
about the habit of “canteening.” When one of the youngsters has to go to jail, his or 
her friends from the quartier collect some money to buy cigarettes and other small 
things in the prison canteen. But the habit of “canteening” goes further than this 
literal meaning. It also means that close friends sustain the family of the person in 
prison by paying the lawyer, the rent of the apartment and other necessary expenses. 
In even graver cases, like the death of a youngster, the whole neighborhood joins 
forces to support the family of the deceased.  
 
The sense of belonging and solidarity offered by the family feeling in different 
contexts can be seen as a concretization of the community of “us,” as it is experienced 
within a local context, but also as it defines one’s general attitude within society. By 
defining with whom one can associate as family, one can simultaneously clarify one’s 
social position and one’s affiliations in society at large. The word family is used not 
 165 
only to refer to those with whom one has a personal bond, but also to refer to more 
general identification with those who share the same life circumstances within society. 
 
3.11. “There is correct and then there is correct” 
The family feeling or sense of belonging is thus defined by a lived practice. Together 
with this lived practice come shared habits that intensify the sense of belonging. It is 
through a variety of standardized interactions that a sense of belonging to the 
community of the neighborhood is enforced and transmitted. These codes of conduct 
help position a community of “us” in public space, and thus claim a sense of 
belonging, or territory, which is both socially and spatially defined. The sense of 
belonging to a family is expressed here in more general signs of familiarity on the 
streets for example. 
 
3.11.1. Codes of salutation 
In a general sense, the community feeling is upheld by small and clearly visible ritual 
gestures, such as recurring salutations on the streets. News travels fast in the 
neighborhood and everyone pays each other common respect on the streets. When 
walking around on the streets of Grigny on a sunny day, one can see people stopping 
to greet each other in the middle of a crosswalk, shaking hands and taking time to 
exchange news and best wishes for the rest of the family. General rules of courtesy are 
taught to the children because this is the way things work “chez nous.” Les anciens, the 
older and respected young guys, or literally the old people from the neighborhood, set 
the right example and correct the young ones if necessary. Christian, one of the youth 
workers who acts as a supervisor at a center for youngsters between 12 and 16 years 
old, takes this task very serious in his job. He grew up in Grigny himself.  
 
I don’t know why the young ones here are so respectful. Maybe because we are the 
anciens du quartier, so they know that with us they can..., they are obliged to behave 
themselves, because they know very well..., if not we are not going to hit them, but 
we know how to talk to them, the language that they will understand, they will know 
 166 
that the words coming from our mouths will be tough, then they will understand. It’s 
just the way of talking. 
............ 
We have learnt it precisely from the anciens, when we would pass one of the grands, we 
had to shake hands to say hello, because one comes from the same neighborhood, 
that means that everyone has to know each other. And automatically, when we grew 
older, with the younger ones when they saw us and they said hello to us, we would 
offer our hand and we would look them right in the eyes and give them a firm 
handshake. That means that you respect the other person, simple as that. (Christian, 
34 years old) 
 
David Lepoutre places this “code of salutations” in a historical context of popular 
encounters by which the working class used to distinguish itself in from the bourgeoisie. 
The working class based social relations on the sharing of an environment in which 
one physically meets instead of on family ties and reputations. Lepoutre describes 
how, still today, youngsters in popular neighborhoods maintain basic levels of 
acquaintance by greeting each other regularly on the streets, even without knowing 
each other’s name or whereabouts (Lepoutre, 1997:113).  
 
3.11.2. Upholding your dignity 
Along similar lines, social interactions in a banlieue like Grigny are still influenced by an 
interpretation of norms and values that is distinct from the way of life of the bourgeoisie 
and that is highly dependent on a shared living space and a shared socio-economic 
status (or lack of status). This interpretation of norms and values matches the specific 
social world of the area in which banlieue inhabitants live; a social world which is 
organized along different affiliations and achievements than the lived world of the 
bourgeoisie. Besides reflecting a different social reality, such norms and values also 
reflect a certain social defense mechanism. If inhabitants of the banlieues were to 
measure their lives according to the standards that are generally applied in society, 
they would fail on all scales of material and social success. In order not to lose their 
self-worth, people in the banlieues tend to treasure and uphold a specific lifestyle, 
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reflecting a specific interpretation of values which lies within their reach. Respect and 
dignity are not only reflected in basic rules of courtesy, but are an essential part of 
people’s attitude in life. The stories that people treasure within the neighborhood 
often speak about how special it is to live in Grigny, where people support each other, 
despite a wide variety of cultural and ethnic differences, and where people are strong, 
have fun together and make something good out of a harsh life. These stories are 
characterized by Garbin and Millington as counter-narratives, serving to oppose the 
unjust denigration of the neighborhood and signaling local forms of resistance against 
stigmatization by explicitly displaying a pride of the neighborhood (2011, 2074-2076).  
Despite the difficulties experienced in a deprived neighborhood like Grigny, people 
are proud to never lose their dignity. People strive to uphold their personal dignity in 
order not to be reduced to their deprived social status. To uphold one’s dignity means 
living up to certain moral values which count more in life than the classification of 
being poor (Lapeyronnie 2008, 92,92). The more the image of the banlieues becomes 
negative, and the more neighborhoods like Grigny are seen as a place for “barbaric” 
people, the more inhabitants find it important to “jamais baisser les bras” (Never give 
up), as Nabil told me. 
 
The good side of life in the banlieues is the solidarity, the true fraternity, the team 
spirit, the respect, the dignity. Lots of dignity in the quartiers. Even when one has 
nothing, one keeps dignity, an honor, that is really important. Those are the values 
that are really important in the quartiers, but one does not talk much about it. When 
you see how Fadela Amara is destroying the image of the young people from the 
banlieues, one is treated like scum, as animals who rape girls, who are violent. All of 
that is terrible all that.72 (Nabil, 34 years old) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Nabil is referring here to the work Fadela Amara did for the feminist organization Ni Putes, Ni Soumises. 
Like him, many men from the banlieues interpreted the standpoints of Ni Putes, Ni Soumises as an offence. 
They felt that the organization was enforcing a negative image of Islamic men, in particular, who allegedly 
fail to respect and protect the women in their surroundings. In reaction to a demonstration held by Ni 
Putes, Ni Soumises in 2003, a male protest group named Ni Proxo, Ni Macho was established to defend the 
honorable reputation of men from the banlieues.  
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My partners in conversation all agreed that it takes courage to face the problems that 
people deal with in Grigny and keep one’s dignity. In one of the focus group 
discussions, we talked about courage in relation to the family. One of the boys said 
that for him the most courageous thing to do is to take good care of your children, 
despite the fact that you are maybe a single mother without a job. He associates 
courage with the power to take difficult decisions without being worried about the 
limits that your agency might have in a harsh situation. He sees courage as taking 
responsibility because you choose to do so, contrary to feeling obliged from the 
outside world to assume this responsibility. One of the other boys added that it is 
courageous to always keep one’s self-confidence, even in difficult situations. This kind 
of courageous securing of one’s personal dignity and that of the family is placed 
morally above one’s social position with respect to society at large. Where people do 
not have the material means to secure a respected position, they can prove their self-
worth by focusing on values such a dignity, courage and pride. 
 
3.11.3. The rules of the neighborhood 
For the young inhabitants in particular, there is a code of conduct, or “rules of the 
neighborhood,” which expresses their own contextualized translation of important 
values into norms, which guide social interactions between peers in the neighborhood. 
The expression “rules of the neighborhood” was familiar to all the youngsters with 
whom we spoke, though these rules are not a set of explicitly formulated guidelines 
for behavior, but more implicit norms for supporting an interpersonal “climate” 
which is appreciated in the neighborhood. Especially those young people who spend 
most of their time on the streets distinguish themselves from other inhabitants of the 
neighborhood with this code of conduct. A young man who deals hashish has his own 
contextualized interpretation of what it means to keep one’s dignity. This 
interpretation can differ greatly from the opinion that his neighbor, a single mother of 
eight children, has about dignity. The youngsters are well aware that other norms and 
guidelines of behavior count, not only for other inhabitants of the neighborhood, but 
especially in the world outside of the neighborhood. They associate these norms, 
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which are more generally accepted by society, with the world of “them,” as part of a 
reality that is far removed from their own reality. Away from the general norms of 
society, the rules of the neighborhood are designed within the specific social structure 
of the quartier, in which other talents are valued and other measures are taken to 
become successful and appreciated. Since the youngsters feel unjustly treated in the 
context of that other reality because of their marginalized position, they feel that it is 
acceptable to sustain their own set of norms. The rules of the neighborhood thus 
serve as a certain alternative to the norms that are part of a society in which the 
youngsters do not feel accepted. They are closely related to, and also sustain, the drugs 
economy, another alternative which has developed because the youngsters lack, in 
their view, the opportunities to take part in the generally accepted structure of society. 
This led Moussa to tell us that for the youngsters “there is correct and then there is 
correct.”  
 
The rules of the neighborhood are not correct, but for us they are correct. (Moussa, 
22 years old) 
 
Some things are not correct under the circumstances of people’s lives in bourgeois parts 
of society, but they can be correct under the circumstances of young people’s lives in 
the banlieues, according to Moussa. A similar mechanism of justification is recognized 
by Eric Marlière. Young men from the banlieues experience French society as unjust 
because they feel excluded from the regular economic system. This experience of 
injustice justifies the legitimation of an “underground” economy of drug business and 
behavior that is connected with upholding this economy (Marlière 2006a, 2006b).   
 
3.11.4. Self-sufficiency 
The dignity to never give up (jamais baisser les bras) is particularly important for young 
men, who are very keen on preventing any kind of feeling of subordination. The 
argument of keeping one’s dignity and jamais baisser les bras is often applied to justify a 
choice of becoming active in the illegal economy of the neighborhood. Young people 
wish to participate in the normal economy like everyone else, but feel that they lack 
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the opportunity to get a proper job that satisfies their expectations. In order to be able 
to pay for their needs, they enter the drug business rather than remaining in a position 
which makes them feel humiliated and dependent on the judgment of others, either in 
a job in which they have to obey a boss while earning little pay or in a situation in 
which they depend on social welfare. Nabil explains this line of thought after I ask 
him to give an example of dignity in the neighborhood. 
 
There are a lot of young people who come back from the social system, who refuse to 
take part in the social system. Even if one perceives this as criminal, it is nevertheless 
people who decide to live by their proper means. That proves well that young people 
don’t want to be dependent, don’t want to be dependent of a system, don’t want to 
be sheep – they want to support themselves. They want to take part in consumer 
society just as they see it on television. You should not be surprised to see young 
people selling drugs if the only example TV gives them is flashy sneakers and flashy 
cars. 
.................. 
When people die, when there are fights between cités, it’s sad, but that’s how they 
express their solidarity. And there are some that go really, really far. Because it is 
everything they have left, it’s the word one gives, it’s the honor one has, it’s the 
dignity one has. And sometimes some of them are ready to die for that. There are lots 
of people who get involved in really serious forms of crime, really dangerous because 
they have made a choice and the choice they have made becomes really fast to only 
depend on themselves. But life goes on. It’s not the end of the world. (Nabil, 34 years 
old) 
 
Nourredine, who is known to deal, agrees with Nabil and says that drug dealing is 
actually an honorable job because you are not working for a boss and your success in 
the bizness completely depends on the values that you honor. If you don’t keep your 
word, you lose your position, so you have to keep your standards high in relation to 
others. 
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When you are working in the bizness, you don’t have a contract with special 
conditions, you have a contract based on principles. The contract, that’s the person in 
the bizness. It’s the respect. It’s the reputation. You can hurt someone with words – 
with words you can even kill in this business. (Nourredine, 26 years old) 
 
An attitude of self-reliance and self-sufficiency is promoted in order to sustain the 
underground economy. Part of this attitude is to mind one’s own business and to help 
those who are in need. It seems like these two guidelines might contradict each other, 
but they are actually meant to complement each other, as Sisco told us. To mind one’s 
own business means that you don’t mingle in someone else’s activities. When you 
know that someone is undertaking certain illegal activities, for instance, you prefer to 
keep silent since you should not interfere in someone else’s affairs. The rule of pas 
balancer (no snitching) also facilitates an accepting attitude with respect to the telling of 
lies. Whereas the telling of lies is despised in other environments, it is often accepted 
to be dishonest in the banlieues if it serves the goal of keeping personal or illegal 
activities undisclosed (Lepoutre 1997, 229). Silence serves as a means of keeping that 
which happens in the neighborhood in the neighborhood, as someone else explained 
it in the focus group. If a certain problem arises in the neighborhood, people prefer to 
solve it themselves rather than look for help on the outside, especially when this 
involves institutions, whether it pertains to the police or social work. The rule of 
silence can thus only be upheld if people are also willing to help each other in times of 
need. The one rule cannot exist without the other, and the solidarity of the 
neighborhood is thus also meant to keep any unwanted interference outside. Part of 
keeping one’s dignity is to remain independent from those people and institutions 
who fail to give inhabitants of the neighborhood the basic recognition of being 
respected citizens. 
 
3.11.5. Pride 
For many of the youngsters, “pride” is closely related to “dignity.” Pride means not 
losing one’s dignity. In relation to the family this means being decisive in the care of 
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your loved ones and honoring the ‘blazon’ of your neighborhood. Pride means being 
convinced of the worth of the things you are doing. 
 
Even when things are going bad, you should be convinced that what you are doing is 
good, you have to always be proud of what you do. It’s also being proud of your 
neighborhood, of your roots. Being proud whether you live in good circumstances or 
bad ones. (Sisco, 16 years old) 
 
The feeling that one should maintain one’s pride at all times, and that there is “correct 
and then there is correct,” can become a justification to explain away certain actions 
and behavior that are unacceptable according to general moral standards, or which 
could harm others who are less close than “family.” The urge to uphold one’s pride 
no matter what becomes extra strong in a context in which young people feel that 
recognition and self-worth are scarce commodities. They feel the need to immediately 
defend themselves and secure their position, even when they do things that are 
generally condemned as wrong, in a certain over-reaction to recurring experiences 
with stigmatization, humiliation and exclusion. In the context of their relation to other 
youngsters, “pride” means for the boys that you never admit that you are wrong. 
Being convinced of your behavior takes the meaning of not allowing yourself to lose 
face. This value plays an important part in the regular occurrence of violent conflicts 
between boys in neighborhoods like Grigny. From a young age, these boys learn to 
prove their self-worth and courage by attacking immediately – physically if necessary – 
in case one feels insulted. Not only physical violence, but also verbal violence in the 
form of cursing and personal insults and harassment are a result of the wish not to 
lose face (Lepoutre 1997). This particular “macho” meaning of pride also plays an 
important role in the relationship between the youngsters and the police. If the police 
offend you, you have to strike back in order not to lose face. You would be a coward 
if you would let something like that pass without a reaction. This can result in riots 
after someone has been treated disrespectfully during an identity check, for example. 
The same principle of pride also counts in the world of gangs, and can be the reason 
for many fights. It would be shameful to not be recognized and you would therefore 
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have to ask others to show you respect. If they do not show you the respect you 
deserve, your pride will be hurt.  
 
3.11.6. Respect 
This brings me to another important value in the neighborhood with a special 
meaning in the relationship between young people: respect. Respect can be paid in 
daily interaction by greeting each other on the street and it is also an important value 
in relation to the parents. For the youngsters, respect always has to be reciprocal. If I 
pay you respect, you also have to pay me respect in return. Showing each other 
respect is a means of creating a sense of moral unity and solidarity in the 
neighborhood in reaction to the negative image of the neighborhood that is created 
from “outside” (Lapeyronnie 2008, 171). 
 
In the world of gangs, and between young people in daily interaction on the street, 
respect is valued in a tough, macho way. The principle of “survival of the fittest” plays 
an important role in this regard. Nourredine explained to me that respect depends a 
lot on your display of strength on the street.  
 
I used to fight a lot before, when I was younger. I was even broader than I am now, 
because I was training all the time: Thai boxing, jiu-jitsu and rugby. I had to earn my 
place and now people respect me a lot. I am one of the most respected, so I don’t 
have to fight so much anymore. People do as I tell them in the quartier. (Nourredine, 
26 years old)   
 
This attitude leads to a social hierarchy in which those who are the strongest are the 
most respected and have the most influence on how interactions amongst young 
inhabitants develop within the neighborhood.  
  
It’s the law of the jungle here. Here, it’s the strongest who is the boss. When you are 
the strongest you can do whatever you want. Because it’s violence here. There has 
always been violence. The only way to settle problems is by means of violence. So we 
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say for ourselves, we are not going to bother him, because if we do he will fuck us up. 
... So automatically he becomes kind of the head of the quartier or the head of the 
group, because here we don’t discuss with each other. Outside people would discuss, 
one will join in a dialogue, here we don’t do dialogue. If you have a problem, you fix 
it by means of violence, it’s just like that. They don’t take the time anymore to 
discuss, they don’t want any more dialogue. They say it is easier to hit someone than 
to start a dialogue. It’s like that, you make people understand you. (Dayo, 25 years 
old) 
 
Others in the neighborhood show respect to the strong guys. Especially the younger 
ones are well aware of the position of these anciens, the big guys. Mustafa and Abdel, 
who are both a bit younger, told us that they find it important to respect the anciens by 
running an errand for them when asked to, for example.  
 
This macho attitude of showing respect is criticized by Malik, who makes a distinction 
between being respected, and being loved. He says that respect, based on fear, is easy 
to lose, and less honest than the respect that you earn because people love you for the 
“real” values that you represent. Here, Malik seems to question the sincerity of the 
ways in which youngsters, in particular, translate the values which they pretend to 
uphold into action. Like many others, Malik is skeptical about the claim of solidarity, 
fraternity and respect as it is presented in the neighborhood. When it comes to actual 
daily interactions and relations, people are often less inclined to take care of one 
another than they are to secure their own position. He says that respect is often 
enforced in a violent way and is therefore one-sided. While most of the youngsters say 
that respect is always reciprocal, Malik is critical about the degree of reciprocity in a 
relationship in which one pays another respect out of fear. Seni, another youth 
worker, agrees with him. He is worried about the tendency of youngsters to respect 
others because of the money they have and not because of their good behavior. They 
respect someone because of the “bling-bling” he is carrying, without really knowing 
the person. Dayo, who has spent several years in jail for an armed robbery, and who 
now works as a youth worker, therefore focuses strongly on respect in combination 
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with other values. He emphasizes the wish to be respected, precisely because he is 
living up to the values of dignity, in the sense of sharing solidarity with others, and 
courage, in the sense of being decisive and self-conscious.  
 
After all, I love respect because I am also someone who is correct and 
straightforward, even if I do certain things, I am straightforward in everything I do, if 
I can help someone tomorrow I will do it, I will do it without a doubt, and without 
thinking why I am helping that person, what I will get in return if I do it. (Dayo, 25 
years old) 
 
He presented this kind of respect as an “ideal” respect that forms a standard that 
cannot always be achieved in practice. 
 
3.12. “If life does not come as a present, you make your own rules” 
I have shown that the young people with whom I spoke tended to give a non-
mainstream meaning to certain values in the context of their relation to one another in 
the neighborhood. Their contextualized interpretation of values goes hand in hand 
with a contextualized interpretation of norms of behavior. The feeling that the French 
law is not applied justly and equally serves as an argument for the rules of the 
neighborhood as a more valid and just guide in social interactions. By ascribing more 
value to the rules of the neighborhood than to national laws, youngsters take the 
rights which are kept away from them by the outside world into their own hands.  
 
Life does not come to us as a present, we experience a lot of injustices. After that, you 
make your own rules. (Najib, 20 years old) 
 
Since the rules of the neighborhood are developed as an alternative to other rules, 
which are the cause of injustices, the boys from Grigny prefer to be punished 
according to the rules of the neighborhood than according to the French law. Entrer en 
preson est dur, mais la sortie est sûre (To enter the prison is harsh, but you get out for sure) 
is an expression which was mentioned in this context in the focus group. When you 
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have to go to prison, in most cases you know it will be temporary. After serving your 
sentence, you can go home and you will be welcomed again by your family. But to be 
punished according to the rules of the neighborhood can be much harsher, since such 
a punishment might mean the loss of your family, which is one of the worst things 
that could happen. For most of the young people with whom I spoke, the rules of the 
neighborhood count as much more persuasive than national laws and norms of 
behavior. Sometimes, the choice between the two sets of rules – those of the state and 
those of the neighborhood – is made very clearly, as the following story of Saïd 
illustrates. Saïd had just come out of jail when I met him. He had spent nine months 
in prison because he was accused of shooting at a police officer with a hunting rifle 
during a riot in Grigny. Saïd claimed that he was innocent. He knew who had actually 
been the one who took the shot at the officer. However, he chose not to tell on that 
other person and thus had to serve time in prison, because the rules of the 
neighborhood counted more to him than the obligations before the French law. 
Denouncing someone from his own neighborhood seemed much worse to him than 
spending time in prison for a crime he did not commit. 
 
3.12.1. Too included and too excluded 
David Lepoutre addresses the code of conduct, which my conversational partners in 
Grigny called “the rules of the neighborhood,” as a product of a particular “street 
culture” that defines social interactions in the banlieues. This “street culture” is not a 
closed system. Youngsters who are influenced by street culture also take part in more 
mainstream social interactions. They go to school, wish to buy the things they see on 
television and are fans of the same popular national sports as others. Nevertheless, the 
street culture can be described as a way of distinguishing oneself from the dominant 
culture (Lepoutre 1997, 32-33). Kokoreff and Lapeyronnie, on the other hand, 
hesitate to speak of a specific culture, or even sous-culture, in relation to the code of 
conduct that is habitual in the quartiers, since such a designation could double the 
stigmatization which banlieue inhabitants already suffer (Kokoreff 2003, 75; 
Lapeyronnie 2008, 48). For this moral reason, they refuse to name the distinctive 
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behavior of young banlieusards as a culture in itself, which is hierarchically placed below 
the “higher” culture of “normal” citizens. Besides this moral point, the 
characterization of the behavior of young banlieusards as a distinctive subculture is too 
narrow, according to them. The social relations between different social groups are 
very complex. The position of young banlieusards in society can be very confusing 
because they are too excluded and too included at the same time; too excluded 
because they cannot find a regular job and suffer from discrimination, but also too 
included because they wish to copy the lifestyle they see in commercials and make use 
of the same modern communication technology as the more fortunate parts of the 
French population. This contradictory position is difficult to explain and deal with 
(Kokoreff 2008, 146). To live according to the rules of the neighborhood can create 
clarity in such a confusing situation. 
 
Even when the youngsters are confronted with the world outside of their 
neighborhood, they still tend to judge their own behavior and that of others according 
to the rules of the neighborhood, because the rules of the neighborhood serve as a 
moral compass in their entire perception of the world. Their thoughts about other 
people and other places are shaped by the logic of the rules of the neighborhood. 
Young banlieusards tend to adopt an entire lifestyle structured around this logic. 
 
One applies the rules of the neighborhood everywhere, for us the young people. 
(Moussa, 22 years old) 
One internalizes the rules. (Nourredine, 26 years old) 
 
The pride the young people take in the neighborhood they belong to is expressed in 
rap songs, dress codes (with caps and hoodies displaying the neighborhood’s area 
code (91 in the case of Grigny)), inside jokes and heroic stories, which are endlessly 
retold. At the same time, these expressions of pride, which emphasize a sense of 
belonging to the neighborhood, are often seen by the outside world as misplaced signs 
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of a ghetto or gangster culture.73 Outside of the neighborhood, the behavior of young 
inhabitants and the meaning they give to the values that are important to them are not 
accepted, and are often experienced as rude and offensive. An identity that expresses a 
clear belonging to a certain neighborhood in the banlieues is seen as threatening 
because it is associated with young, tough guys who are involved in crime, accost girls 
on the street and are keen on fighting. The rap music, the caps, hoodies and the verbal 
expressions, which are the pride of the youngsters, become signs that make others feel 
uncomfortable and enforces exclusion from the domain of neat and accepted citizens. 
 
3.12.2. A vicious circle 
Many of the youth workers whom I interviewed are worried about the confrontation 
between the way in which the youngsters are used to dealing with things and accepted 
conduct outside of the neighborhood. They see that the habit of adhering to the rules 
of the neighborhood contributes to the marginalized position of the youngsters, 
because they don’t know how to behave correctly in circumstances that are new to 
them. The youngsters should therefore learn to see their own norms in perspective 
and learn to be aware that it can be useful to adapt to other norms in certain 
situations.  
 
Prevention is very important. Prevention in many areas; once they have reached a 
certain age at which they pick up things really fast. So they think they know 
everything. Because here you don’t really have rules in the neighborhood, it’s not the 
rules like on the outside, the rules of the institutions. Here, it’s really the rules of the 
neighborhood. When you go out, it is not the same. They permit themselves to do 
things, they say to themselves that it’s normal. On top of that, everybody does it, but 
in fact it is not normal, that’s why the police come at times to tap them a bit on the 
fingers. And voila, they start the repression after that. I am here to show them a bit, 
in the neighborhood you can see one behavior, but that’s not necessarily the right 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Various examples of the trouble that youngsters can get themselves into because of this clash of norms 
are beautifully depicted in the movie La Haine (1995). Especially the scene in which three friends from 
one of the banlieues end up at a party in an art gallery in one of the poshy neighborhoods of Paris and 
immediately engage in an argument gives some insight into this issue. 
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behavior. So we try out all kinds of prevention, about safety on the road, about 
alcohol and drug abuse, things like that. So they realize that there is another 
neighborhood or another world outside of the neighborhood. They are too much 
neighborhood, it’s like that, it is necessarily like that, but that’s not true. It’s 
afterwards..., sometimes they are outside, they find themselves in other towns, they 
are confronted with other problems, because before they would say to themselves to 
do things like that is normal, all the things they had in the neighborhood, so outside 
we can do it as well. But that’s not possible, so afterwards they get in trouble, a fight 
or things like that. (Dayo, 25 years old) 
 
The stories of youth workers like Dayo show that the sense of belonging which is 
attached to the neighborhood is two-sided. The two sides reinforce each other in a 
complicated vicious circle. On the one hand, the sense of belonging to the 
neighborhood gives the youngsters a family to feel appreciated and protected by, and 
an identification to be proud of, because elements that are necessary for feeling good 
about oneself, like respect, dignity, self esteem and solidarity, are difficult to find for 
them outside of the neighborhood, where they are looked at with suspicion. Because 
of this marginalized position, they feel all the more the need to distinguish themselves 
in a way that is positive to them. On the other hand, they are often met with 
disapproval exactly because of their image and attitude. 
 
This leads to a situation in which it is difficult to distinguish what came first: the 
marginalized position of the youngsters, or the pride they take from a clearly and 
visibly belonging to their neighborhood. It seems hard to find a way out of the vicious 
circle of a marginalized position that facilitates the enforcement of a specific culture of 
the neighborhood, and the neighborhood culture that facilitates marginalization. The 
youngsters often seem to prefer their sense of belonging to the neighborhood to the 
chance to prove themselves in a hostile outside world. Moussa made this clear in one 
of our conversations. I had heard that he had once been a very talented soccer player 
who had been offered a professional contract a few years ago. The story surprised me, 
because I knew Moussa as one of the guys who spent most of his time outside on the 
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streets, while he was half-heartedly looking for an internship, without success. I asked 
him what had happened. Moussa told me that he had indeed been invited to play for a 
professional club somewhere far away from Grigny. The club had offered him a very 
lucrative contract, which would have provided him with enough money to sustain his 
whole family. However, Moussa chose to decline the contract, because the club did 
not agree on the terms which were most important for him; Moussa did not want to 
move to the new club without his friends from his home team. He requested that his 
friends would join him in the “transfer” to the new club. However, since Moussa was 
scouted for his individual talent, the club only wished to offer him a contract. Moussa 
could not accept this chance that was offered to him because he stood out from the 
rest. He was afraid to make the move to the new club by himself, having to leave his 
family, his friends behind. He decided to stay at his old club. Now, six years later, 
Moussa is still playing every week with his friends, but he is not training to become a 
professional any more. He has never regretted his decision. 
 
3.13. A division into two camps: power and the underdog 
In the last section of this chapter, I will take a closer look at the political implications 
of the opposition between “us” and “them,” as it is experienced by my respondents in 
Grigny. 
 
The antagonistic vision that young inhabitants of Grigny have of society as divided 
into two oppositional domains, the world of “us” and the world of “them,” is in 
accord with the observation that young banlieusards are trapped in a position of 
exclusion from the domain of accepted, French citizens. Their position in society is 
that of the dangerous, subversive and/or aloof outsider. I have shown that my young 
interlocutors do not see opportunities to actively make a change in their situation and 
take a part in the political organization of society. According to Robert Castel, this is a 
logical consequence of both discrimination on ethnic grounds, and a lack of equally 
shared and distributed social security, which could permit stigmatized and 
discriminated parts of the population to take part in civil life. If one cannot participate 
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in social citizenship, one is equally excluded from political citizenship (Castel 2007). 
Consequently, young banlieusards understand politics exclusively as an insincere and 
strategic institutional political game that benefits the bourgeoisie, but does not represent 
people from the banlieues. To take charge of an emancipatory political agency, which 
could enforce recognition and influence within the domain of politics, is not a realistic 
option, in their opinion. Lapeyronnie points out the same reluctance, and states that 
residents of volatile areas like Grigny often reject any involvement in a political system 
which excludes and racializes them, and which they hold responsible for their 
complicated situation (2009, 39). Instead of fighting for a place in the national political 
and civic community, my respondents rather seem to withdraw into their own 
alternative community structures. The community of experience attached to the 
neighborhood functions as an alternative for society at large. Young banlieusards tend 
to foster a sense of belonging and self-worth in the context of that community, away 
from the deceptions, humiliations and stigmas associated with the world “outside.” In 
this sense, they appear to be children of a post-political time in which the practice of 
politics is completely dominated by institutional state politics and in which 
possibilities to change the political power plays for the benefits of the marginalized 
seem to be closed. The dimension of “the political,” as a radical emancipatory force 
for reconfiguring positions and privileges within society, is lost in the perception of a 
society in which an asymmetrical hierarchy between the power and the people has 
long been defined in favor of the first. In a political sense, the division of the lived 
world into “us” and “them,” seems to alienate my young interlocutors even further 
from the practice of politics, either in an institutional sense or an emancipatory sense. 
 
However, the lack of political perspectives, which can be observed in the words of the 
young inhabitants of Grigny cannot only be clarified by their antagonistic perception 
of society. A recognition of antagonisms, and even a symbolic enforcement of 
antagonisms, has often served political movements in search of the emancipation of 
those groups in society which suffer from economic casualization, social 
marginalization and injustices inflicted upon them by state institutions. The history of 
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populism shows that an acknowledgement of the opposition of “us” versus “them” 
has served the popular classes in many different national contexts in becoming aware 
of their subordinate position in relation to the state and striving for recognition within 
the domain of institutional politics (Uitermark et al. 2012). In populist politics, it has 
always been the belief that it should be those who stand outside of the centers of 
power who should take matters into their own hands in order to re-establish the bond 
between institutes of governance and the demands of the people. Those who are 
treated as outsiders should claim their rightful place in the center of the political 
community. The question is why the antagonistic perspective of society of young 
banlieusards like the inhabitants of Grigny does not offer incentives to imagine 
possibilities of enforcing emancipation from an outside position in relation to 
institutional politics. Within the context of the banlieues, no link has been established 
between the recognition of antagonisms and the formation of a general, collective 
subject which puts shared political demands on the agenda, as is often seen in popular 
political movements. As we have seen, a distinct and strong sense of solidarity exists 
in the banlieues, based on a community of experience. However, this sense of “we,” 
this solidarity, is in general not politically instrumentalized in relation to state 
institutions. The traditional working class trust in popular politics has largely 
disappeared from the banlieues. The question is why no strong, contemporary, popular 
political subject has been established in the banlieues which is able to draw 
emancipatory benefits from the antagonistic dimension between “us” and “them.” A 
follow-up question is whether another political sense can be found in the community 
of experience of young banlieusards, and if so, in what other way we should understand 
this political sense. 
 
3.13.1 A fruitful distinction between friends and enemies 
In order to understand why no popular political subject has emerged in the 
community of experience of young banlieusards, I will first investigate how a popular 
political subject could be established in such a divided society as the one described by 
my respondents. As soon as we understand the formation of a popular subject in an 
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antagonistic society, we can see where the actions and experiences of my young 
interlocutors differ from this process. The work of frequently collaborating authors 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe can help explain how an antagonistic division of 
society into two camps can be the breeding ground of an emancipatory political 
agency. The more theoretical reflections, which will follow here, serve to place the 
previous, more anthropological description of the division between the world of “us” 
and “them,” as it is seen by my young interlocutors in Grigny, in a political 
perspective.  
 
The understanding of politics, as described in the work of Mouffe and Laclau, is based 
on the notion that society does not consist of a constituent whole, but is always, and 
necessarily, divided. Any emancipatory political practice should therefore not depend 
on a need for consensus formation, but rather on the instrumentalization of 
oppositions, in favor of those who are marginalized. Since both thinkers rely on a 
conception of the social as inherently differentiated, their work can be characterized as 
post-foundational. Chantal Mouffe explicitly focuses on the difference between 
“politics” and “the political” in order to explain how social relations are differentiated, 
and how this differentiation is ordered at the same time. She investigates the influence 
of the political, as the inevitable confrontation between different positions, on a 
seemingly consensual organization of the social in politics. Inspired by the thought of 
Carl Schmitt, Mouffe emphasizes that the taking of political decisions cannot be seen 
apart from fundamental antagonisms. Any consensus is based on acts of exclusion, 
since a certain division between “friends” and “enemies,” “us” and “them,” cannot be 
separated from the political process. Each society is always in a certain way divided by 
“internal frontiers” between friends and enemies (Mouffe 2005). A political process 
therefore always has an agonistic character. The internal frontiers do not threaten a 
healthy political process, but rather make the political process possible. The friend-
enemy relationship is actually a productive force, which produces “vibrant clashes of 
political positions and open conflicts of interests” (Mouffe 2005, 6). A political 
process cannot be seen as a naturally objective means of allowing all people equal 
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access to a procedure of decision-making. Political processes are always shaped by 
power relations, which reflect the tension between friends and enemies, and are 
therefore always contested. Both Laclau and Mouffe pose the question of how social 
actors, who are excluded from the dominant position within the political process, can 
organize themselves for the sake of emancipation. This emancipation cannot be 
established by eliminating the antagonistic tension between friends and enemies, but 
should rather take place by creating new, fruitful antagonisms that make the balance 
of power shift in favor of those who are marginalized. If those who are marginalized 
are able to construct a “we,” this “we” is necessarily distinguished from a “them,” 
which is defined as an enemy. The question is how this “we” can be constructed and 
which “them” should be opposed.  
 
3.13.2. Emancipations on contingent grounds 
In the perception of Laclau, the construction of a “we,” an emancipatory political 
subject, is rooted in contingent grounds. Like Mouffe, Laclau emphasizes the radical 
differentiation of social relations, and looks for possibilities of emancipatory political 
agency in the disruption of a political system, which tries to bring definite order in 
such relations. Laclau notes that the act of emancipation is not a clear-cut, one-
dimensional affair. He speaks of emancipations in the plural, because the hope of 
finding a singular form of emancipation that could bring a singular form of struggle – 
like the traditional concept of the class struggle – to an end has disappeared from the 
contemporary world. According to Laclau, there is “a lack at the root of any identity” 
(1994, 3). Since social relations are radically differentiated, and there is no such thing 
as a unitary society, social positions and identities are not naturally determined, but are 
constantly in development. The subject does not have a prescribed position within 
social interactions, but is constantly looking for something with which to identify. 
Laclau therefore speaks of identification, rather than identity (2000, 58). The 
differentiation between identity and identification points at a radical ambiguity. 
Because there is a lack of a grounded identity, an act of identification cannot be 
founded on any grounds exterior to itself. Nevertheless, in an act of identification, one 
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looks for something substantive with which to identify. From this ambiguity, Laclau 
draws the conclusion that the act of identification aims at structuring people’s agency, 
but that the very content of the identity itself, around which this structuring takes 
place, is contingent. The act of identification is separated from the identity, with 
which it aims to identify (Laclau 1994, 3). This same split returns in the formation of 
political subjects. “The political” is aimed at the radical emancipation of the people 
from the existing social order, and the institution of a new, and better social order. 
Emancipation therefore navigates between two dimensions: a dichotomic dimension 
and a holistic dimension (Laclau 2007b, 1). On the one hand, there is a dichotomy 
between “the emancipatory moment and the social order which has preceded it” 
(ibid.). In the moment of emancipation, one aims to do away with the preceding social 
order, which is experienced as repressive. “[T]he dichotomic dimension requires the 
radical otherness of a past which has to be thrown away” (Laclau 2007b, 4). At the 
same time, one aims to impose a new social order, which cannot be grounded in 
anything other than itself, since the previous one has just been negated. No initial 
grounds are taken from any pre-existing social order in an act of radical emancipation 
(Laclau 1994, 4). However, the new social order should “affect all areas of social life,” 
and it has this all-encompassing tendency in common with the previous social order 
(Laclau 2007b, 1). Such a complete, emancipated organization of the social can never 
be built on solid ground, since its foundations are not external to it. The dimensions 
of dichotomy and holism are therefore inherently incompatible with each other, and 
leave the act of emancipation just as much with an internal lack, like the act of 
identification. 
 
Emancipatory political agency has to deal with its contingent grounds and its internal 
lack. It can only legitimize itself by recognizing its own contingency, and this 
contingency can only be fully grasped if one compares one political position with 
other possible political alternatives from which one’s own position differs. It is 
therefore only in an antagonistic relationship that a political subject can become aware 
of itself. Laclau makes it clear that the formation of a “we” cannot be traced back to a 
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pre-constituted origin, like an individual with specific interests. The development of a 
“we” cannot be reduced to one single entity which exists on its own, and which serves 
as an initial building block for the collective. “Individuals are not coherent totalities 
but merely referential identities which have to be split up into a series of localised 
subject positions.” (Laclau 2004, 3) A “we” is not a collective of people with a similar 
identity or similar interests, but rather a linkage of social needs, which are articulated 
in a common demand. In his book “On Populist Reason” (2007a), which explains the 
logics of emerging emancipatory political agency and awareness of collective identities, 
Ernesto Laclau primarily situates the formation of any kind of “people” in an 
irreducible interplay of differences. Totalities are not composed on the basis of a 
positive, shared identity, but rather on the basis of something negative: the opposition 
to a common enemy (Laclau 2007b, 40-41). A people can only emerge if a totality is 
made up of a variety of differences by opposing this totality to something outside of 
it, something excluded from it. Only in relation to this outside does it become 
possible to declare the internal differences of the totality as irrelevant and can the 
totality be experienced as if it were one, and exactly what it declares to be: a totality. 
The irreducible differences that make up the totality only become equivalential in 
relation to the outside, which is excluded from it. Laclau therefore concludes that any 
identity-formation is characterized by a complex interplay of a differential and an 
equivalential logics (2007a, 70).  
 
[T]he only possibility of having a true outside would be that the outside is not simply 
one more, neutral element but an excluded one, something that the totality expels from 
itself in order to constitute itself (to give a political example: it is through the 
demonization of a section of the population that a society reaches a sense of its own 
cohesion). (Laclau 2007a, 70) 
 
The excluded element that becomes the outside of a totality of equivalential elements 
gains a new status, according to this logic. From being one difference amongst other 
differences, it becomes the element from which a totality needs to distinguish itself 
and without which that totality cannot become a coherent subject. The excluded 
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element is no longer seen as having a significance in itself, but rather as having a 
significance in relation to the coherence of the totality which it helps to define. This 
operation, in which totalities with a clear subject position are formed from an 
irreducible interplay of differences by relegating certain elements to a position in 
which their significance is reduced to the demarcation of that totality, is called a 
“process of hegemony” in the vocabulary of Laclau and Mouffe (Laclau & Mouffe 
1989). In a process of hegemony, certain collective identities can gain a dominant 
status over other identities since they are instrumental to their identity formation as a 
“constitutive outside” (Mouffe 2005, 2). A certain hierarchy emerges in the variety of 
social elements. From this situation, different political antagonisms can arise between 
social actors who either feel excluded by others or have the tendency to exclude 
others. These antagonisms are characteristic for each political process.  
 
3.13.3. The construction of a people around a common demand 
Laclau stresses that the interplay of differential and equivalential logics does not only 
play a part in the constitution of a dominant, consensual majority, which must exclude 
a minority in order to define its unity, but also in the mobilization of such excluded 
minorities for emancipation. The formation of a “we,” composed of people in a 
subordinated position, develops along similar lines and starts with the formulation of 
common demands for justice and equal treatment. Different people with different 
identities and interests can come to the conclusion that they share the same social 
need, such as a lack of proper housing in an impoverished neighborhood. They can 
formulate a common demand that is directed at the city’s administration. If the city’s 
administration can change the housing situation in the neighborhood, the demand is 
satisfied. In this case, Laclau speaks of a simple request directed towards those who 
have the power to decide, without doubting the authority of this institution. However, 
other, more complicated cases are imaginable in which various social needs 
accumulate without a proper response of the administration to improve the situation. 
In this case, the accumulation of unfulfilled demands can create “a widening chasm 
separating the institutional system from the people.” (Laclau 2007a, 74) The various 
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unfulfilled demands that are accumulating receive an equivalential status, which has 
the power to gather a variety of social differences in the same totality under the name 
of a “we,” or a “people.” Out of different positions of particularity, a claim with a 
universal significance can arise. An internal frontier can be distinguished within 
society between a “we,” the people, who are unified by a chain of unfulfilled demands 
and “them,” the administration, which is unable to satisfy the needs of the people and 
has therefore lost its legitimacy. This situation can be distinguished from a situation in 
which various demands can be met separately by an adequate response on the part of 
the institutions. An equivalential chain of unfulfilled demands has a much greater 
power in bringing people together in a process of political antagonism.  
 
If the equivalential chain is strong enough, a shared political agency can be performed 
under a common name. This is the emergence of a popular subjectivity that opposes 
the institutions with decisive power at the other side of the internal frontier in society, 
according to Laclau. “Equivalential popular discourses divide, in this way, the social 
into two camps: power and the underdog.” (Laclau 2004, 5) This statement calls 
Cristian’s expression into mind that France is split into two camps: “us,” the people, 
and “them,” the state. The labeling of such a division as “popular” does not mean that 
Laclau wishes to defend existing examples of populist politics. For Laclau, populism is 
about a specific structure of emancipatory political agency, and not about the 
ideological content of this form of politics. Laclau is well aware of the existence of a 
wide variety of instances of popular politics which ideologically identify with both the 
left side and the right side. Laclau’s theory should not be seen as a judgment of such 
political examples, but as an explanation of how political antagonism is build up in 
general, as an essential logical structure in all political processes. In each political 
process, internal frontiers are created which enable friends to perform a collective 
political agency in opposition to their enemies. In Laclau’s opinion, politics is always 
populist to a certain extent.  
 
If populism consists in postulating a radical alternative within the communitarian 
space, a choice in the crossroads on which the future of a given society hinges, does 
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not populism become synonymous with politics? The answer can only be affirmative. 
Populism means putting into question the institutional order by constructing an 
underdog as an historical agent – i.e. an agent which is an other in relation to the way 
things stand. But this is the same as politics. We only have politics through the 
gesture which embraces the existing state of affairs as a system and presents an 
alternative to it (or, conversely, when we defend that system against existing potential 
alternatives). (Laclau 2004, 13) 
 
Populist politics takes place when people come together to give a name to the lack 
they experience in the social order. This lack can have different causes and can be 
experienced differently, but within the friend-enemy opposition antagonistic names 
emerge which “condense in themselves the signification of a whole antagonistic 
camp” (Laclau 2007a, 87). The “dominant elite” can then be placed opposite to the 
“silent majority” or the “regime” can be placed opposite to “the people.” If this 
assembling under a name does not take place, the political agency of the popular 
subject cannot be expressed properly. A popular subject can act effectively if it is able 
to bring together different struggles under one banner. A rhetorical displacement of 
different struggles into the agency of one concrete social agent which expresses a 
unified collective will has to take place. Laclau explains this movement with the 
example of a trade union, which is active in a neighborhood where racist violence 
takes place (2007a, 109). The trade union organizes an anti-racist campaign. This is, 
strictly taken, not the task of the trade union, but in a rhetorical move of metonymy the 
union links the anti-racist struggle to the struggle for better labor circumstances as 
parts of the same social lack, which is experienced in the neighborhood. If the union 
continues to combine both struggles, the union becomes a metaphor for previously, 
separately experienced social struggles, and thus becomes the “nodal point in 
constitution of a people” (ibid.). From this example, we can draw the general 
conclusion that emancipatory political agency can most effectively be developed if 
different social demands are brought together under a name which reflects a certain 
shared organization of political struggles, representing a certain unifying claim. In such 
a way, the people can claim a hegemonic position. In a hegemonic relation, the 
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dominant collective identity can have political aims which exceed the sum of all 
particular demands out of which it is composed. Such an aim could be the 
emancipation of all who are repressed by the existing political system (Laclau 2007b, 
43). If the alternative for the existing system is strong enough, populist politics 
becomes radically democratic. In that case, the people acquire hegemony with one 
equivalential claim over the existing system of administration, which up until that 
moment was only willing and able to address the particular demands of the people 
separately, in order to keep them in a manageable position. What is essential about 
populist politics is the seizure of hegemonic power by the people from a system of 
administration which had not recognized the full scale of their equivalential claim. It is 
this dominance of the people, who are able to organize themselves under one name 
and take power, which makes populist politics radically democratic. 
 
3.13.4. The impossibility of putting shared demands into practice 
The construction of a collective political subject, which could claim hegemony for the 
underclass and radically change the existing system of political administration, is far 
removed from the community of experience of the young banlieusards whom I met in 
Grigny. The youngsters are aware of structural antagonisms that shape society and its 
political organization, but do not see possibilities of shifting dominance in hegemony. 
The opposition between the poor who have no political influence and the richer part 
of the population with the power to decide seems to be a logical structure. Since this 
structure is not likely to change, general political claims aiming at the emancipation of 
the entire French underclass seem utopic to most of my respondents. 
 
The more there are people who become rich and have something to say, the more 
there also have to be other people who become poor. These poor people are 
necessarily far away from politics, that’s logical. (Adil, 25 years old) 
 
The youngsters do see the posing of certain demands as an essential starting point for 
the development of a political agency of those in the “underdog” position. In 
resonance with Laclau’s theory, the youngsters associate the division between “us” 
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and “them” with a division between the people who have certain social demands and 
the state, which cannot satisfy these demands and therefore loses its legitimacy. My 
respondents described a situation of deep social frustration, in which a variety of 
problems and needs are accumulated in the neighborhood without an adequate 
response from the local or national administration. Sisco, Najib and Dayo said that in 
such a situation it is better to speak of “demands” (revendications in French) instead of 
“politics,” when describing the necessary ingredient of an agency which aims to 
improve the interaction between the people and the state administration. The word 
“politics” is associated too much with electoral strategies, which benefit the personal 
position of politicians; therefore this word can no longer be applied to speak of a 
strategy of tackling social problems or organizing things differently in order to 
improve the lives of people in their neighborhood. The word “politics” seems to have 
exhausted all positive meaning and is only associated with the failures of the state 
administration, while the word “demand” seems to imply a certain hope for possible 
emancipation. It points to a specific formulation of a social need of the people, and 
the appeal to the administration to take the relief of this need as the core business of 
their policies. The word “demand” is therefore better used to reflect on a possible 
fruitful relationship between the people and the state as the word “politics,” in the 
opinion of my respondents.  
  
However, my partners in conversation saw it as impossible to bring different, specific 
demands together under one name of a unified political subject. In one of the focus 
group meetings, we discussed the possibilities of solidarity between the high school 
students who were organizing strikes all over France against Sarkozy’s educational 
reforms in 2008. The participants in the conversation did not see a joining of forces 
happening between the striking students and the young people from the banlieues, 
since in their opinion the demands of one group cannot be easily shared by another, 
even though there are similarities between both groups. In this case, both the striking 
students and the youngsters from Grigny are of about the same age and participate – 
or at least are supposed to participate – in the educational system, but since they come 
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from different backgrounds (the striking students were mostly from ethnically French, 
middle-class families) and live in different circumstances and places, the youngsters 
from Grigny did not envision a shared political agency. 
 
The strikes do not interest me at all. Everyone is on their own side. There is no “us.” 
If the strikes will change something, it will change for them, but not for us. (Mor, 18 
years old) 
 
Since the young residents of Grigny already feel that they do not have a chance to 
equally participate in the French education system, a reform of this system feels far 
removed from their own lived reality. Experiences of racism, discrimination and 
exclusion, which are a daily concern for the young Grignois, are not addressed by the 
student movement. Mor did not see sufficient grounds for sharing general demands 
with the protesting students, since to him they seem to live in a different world. To 
place himself and his friends from Grigny under the same name, which would 
represent a shared political subjectivity, did not come to Mor’s mind, since he thinks 
that the problems of the striking students are radically different in nature to his own. 
This example shows how the different social demands that could be addressed to the 
state are perceived as separate by the youngsters. The demands that are important to 
them are bound to the specific context of their own community of experience. The 
development of a collective will, performed by a shared political subject, would ask 
for a further organization of these separate demands under a shared name. Such a step 
is not considered as a possibility by the youngsters. The idea of transcending the 
contextuality of their demands with a claim of universal significance seems too utopic 
to them.  
 
According to Laclau and Mouffe, demands of the underdog can only be successfully 
expressed in the institutional political domain if the ones expressing these demands 
are recognized as a political subject. The construction of a collective political subject 
presupposes a certain shared recognition of each other as antagonistic parties in a 
shared, but internally divided social order. To gain this recognition, a political subject 
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has to take power into its own hands and make itself visible in the social and political 
field by claiming a name and a chain of equivalential demands. This requires a fair 
amount of collective organization, as well as a collective political consciousness. 
However, the youngsters do not see such a widely recognized democratic struggle as a 
possibility, because they do not see themselves to be recognized as taking part in a 
shared field of political relations at all. In addition, they see it as impossible to 
transcend the embeddedness of their demands within their own local context. As a 
consequence, young banlieusards like my interlocutors from Grigny, do not display a 
collectively organized political agency in the name of a general political claim, 
exceeding its impact beyond their own life circumstances. Their interactions with the 
existing state administration are limited to highly localized, temporary and 
unorganized interventions, inspired by particular demands. 
 
As Dayo explained to me once, with a naughty grin on his face, the political 
participation of the young people from his neighborhood was restricted to a violent 
clash with the police in front of the town hall every now and then. Such a 
confrontation was the only way of expressing a particular demand, like a new space 
for youth activities, in his opinion, since the youngsters would not even be allowed 
entrance to the town hall. This was not only due to police repression, but also because 
the youngsters would not know how to arrange a meeting with the mayor or town 
representatives. And even if they were able to meet the mayor or the representatives, 
they would not know how to speak to them or what to tell them. The violent clashes 
in front of the town hall had had a certain local effect sometimes, but could never be 
compared to an organized popular uprising with a clearly formulated program or more 
generally shared claim, in Dayo’s opinion. He did not wish to describe such events as 
political uprisings, but rather as an expression of discontent. We can conclude from 
this example that the young banlieusards from neighborhoods like Grigny do not only 
suffer from a lack of political representation in state institutions, but first and 
foremost suffer from a lack of recognition as a group with legitimate political 
demands. The relationship between these youngsters and institutional politics is 
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severely distorted. In this chapter, I have shown how the distance between “us” and 
“them,” between the community of experience in the neighborhood and the outside 
world, which is allied to state institutions, lies at the core of this distortion. I have 
shown how young people perceive this distance and develop their own alternative 
social structures for organizing their daily life in the neighborhood. 
 
3.13.5. Complicating the antagonism between “us” and “them” 
Despite the fact that the youngster’s antagonistic vision of society does not lead to the 
formation of a popular political subject, their perception of their position in society, 
the alternative sense of community which they develop and their occasional clashes 
with state representatives are not devoid of political sense. However, this political 
sense cannot be sufficiently understood only in reference to an antagonistic 
framework as described by Mouffe and Laclau. The political sense of the agency of 
“young urban troublemakers” does not lie in the deliberate instrumentalization of an 
antagonistic tension between “us” and “them,” in favor of the emancipation of the 
underdog, nor in a certain revolutionary denunciation of the power of the enemy. This 
political sense lies in the disruptive, or sabotaging effect which the public 
interventions of young urban troublemakers have on institutionalized politics, while 
the powerful influence of this domain is not denounced, but confronted. The 
antagonism between “us” and “them” still forms a frame of reference here, without it 
leading to a carefully constructed political organization. The political sense of such 
agency is found in the messy and confusing space in between “us” and “them,” where 
a confrontation between the two takes place, rather than on the side of a structured 
and operationalized “us,” which deliberately opposes itself to “them”, and hence 
manages to transcend the existing political status quo. 
 
The reactions and interactions which these young people develop between the context 
of their community of experiences and the world “outside” make political sense in an 
unruly way. These unruly politics have a deregulating, or de-structuring, impact on 
existing notions of the system of politics. It is precisely in expressions of discontent 
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and a disruption of the accepted practice of politics that such unruly politics emerge, 
as I will further explicate in chapter 5. The analysis of unruly politics in relation to 
young urban troublemakers implies a different interpretation of the political difference 
between “politics” and “the political” than the one which can be read in the work of 
Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau. It shares certain elements with their theoretical 
insights, such as a basis for solidarity which is found in the opposition to a shared 
enemy, its denunciation of a unitary and homogeneous political community and the 
opening of a perspective on another, better world. However, it differs in other aspect, 
such as in its lack of strongly formulated universalist claims, a strongly positioned 
subject formation and organization. The notion of unruly politics enables me to speak 
of the political significance to agency which is not consciously directed at a self-
proclaimed and well-organized populist revolution, but which is nevertheless 
concerned with experienced injustices and inequalities. The character and expressions 
of this unorganized, vulnerable, subversive, situated and unruly political agency will be 
described in further detail in the third and fourth part of my dissertation.  
 
Before I get to this description, I will focus in the next chapter on the impact state-
induced policies have on the community of experience of young inhabitants of 
deprived neighborhoods and how these youngsters tend to avoid or sabotage these 
policies in order to maintain their own version of independence and dignity. I will 
make use of different theoretical aspects from the work of Michel Foucault to further 
investigate the complex interplay between state-led expectations about the right kind 
of civic participation and the unruly counteractions and uncivil, civic participation of 
youngsters from Kanaleneiland, a “problem neighborhood” in the Netherlands. 
Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau explicitly focus on the productive and conscious 
force of the people to counter or overthrow a state administration, which is perceived 
as “the enemy.” They thereby tend to pay less attention to the productive force of 
existing policies of state governance in the lives of people, in favor of a new scenario 
of political alternatives which is yet to come. Since my interlocutors do not 
consciously work on the radical popular transformation, which Laclau describes in 
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detail, I need to take a closer look at their relation to existing governmental 
institutions and representatives in order to understand their social position and civic 
interventions. The work of Michel Foucault is useful in gaining insight into the 
governmental mechanisms of surveillance and control that have a substantial impact 
on the lives of a young generation, which does not attract the spotlights in a general 
popular uprising, but tries to escape in their own particular community structures, in 
the shadows of society at large. The feelings of animosity which are attached to an 
antagonistic image of the division between “we,” the people, and “they,” the state, 
have not disappeared from this situation. In the following chapter, I aim to focus 
more on their origin in existing relations between troublesome youth and institutions 
of governance and less on their possible employability for radical, political alternatives. 
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Interlude 
 
 
 
Today, I spent another entire day dealing with the “light bulb problem.” It all started 
yesterday morning with a text message from the general manager at the women’s 
association. She had understood from the security manager of the district department 
(wijkbureau) that “certain things were vandalized inside” during our meeting in the 
youth center on Sunday evening. I could only think of the lemonade jug, which 
accidentally fell on the floor while the boys were playing table football, but could not 
imagine that the security manager would be warned about a lemonade jug.... It took 
me the whole afternoon to find out what was going on. Neither the security manager 
nor the manager of the youth center got in touch with me directly, so I had no idea 
what kind of vandalism was involved. This morning, I was finally able to sit down 
with the manager and the caretaker of the youth center to find out what happened.  
 
The caretaker told me that the boys had stormed in before we arrived on Sunday and 
had been very rude and noisy. I immediately remembered the chaos upon our arrival, 
when we found the caretaker cursing aggressively at Samir, who was in a rebellious 
mood and had obviously been drinking. The caretaker left us with the boys without 
an explanation and I was not sorry for it, because I felt a bit threatened by his 
aggression. After a reprimand, Samir calmed down and we were able to start our 
meeting. Of course the boys refused to tell us what had happened before our 
entrance. We allowed Samir to stay for the meeting and, despite some unrest, we had 
a good discussion. Now, the caretaker told me that he had wished to send Samir 
home because of his cheek. Things had gotten only worse after he had studied the 
images of the surveillance cameras on Monday. The boys had tried to open the 
closets in the game corner while they were alone in the room, and had violently 
pushed the table football table across the floor. The images also showed that Samir 
had deliberately taken a light bulb from a lamp and thrown it on the floor. 
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Like us, the caretaker knows Samir as a quiet boy who usually doesn’t cause any 
trouble, but he still wishes to press charges for the broken light bulb. The general 
policy as agreed between the district department and the youth service prescribes that 
every act of deliberate vandalism has to be reported to the police, no matter how 
small the damage is. This general policy has proven itself to be very fruitful, according 
to the manager and the caretaker. The caretaker recognized a few of our more quiet 
boys as troublemakers from the past. “They were sitting down quietly, because they 
know they cannot cause any disturbances inside here. What they did in the past was 
also reported to the police and they were punished for it. Now the boys clearly know 
what is not allowed and what the consequences are. Maybe Samir didn’t know about 
all of this yet.” I mentioned that I was also not aware of the general policy, nor of the 
presence of the surveillance cameras inside, which I find both quite strong measures, 
worthy of a clear notification. I have not seen any signs announcing camera 
surveillance, for example.  
 
We all agreed that we should have had a conversation about the rules of use in the 
building earlier. The manager and caretaker regret they did not know what kind of 
group they were dealing with. The manager would have been more clear about several 
things if she would have known which boys were in the group. She blames me for 
not telling her that I am working with a group of notorious troublemakers. I did not 
dare to say that I deliberately left that out, because I did not want to be confronted 
with more suspicious looks or a denial of access, like we already experienced at other 
locations.  
 
I proposed that the manager and the caretaker first have a conversation with Samir 
before reporting anything to the police. I was hoping we could come to an alternative 
punishment, since we had not been aware of the conditions attached to our presence 
in the youth center and had therefore also not been able to stress these conditions to 
all the boys. Because of all the miscommunication, this seemed fair to all of us. The 
manager wished to explain the rules to Samir and let him know that he is still 
welcome in the youth center if he behaves. She found it very important to make clear 
to Samir that the negative image of the boys in the neighborhood is not simply 
confirmed and reproduced by the management of the youth center.  
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When I told this whole story to Zuhair and Mo, they exploded with anger. “You see, 
that’s how you make criminals out of these boys!,” Zuhair said. “For every little 
display of cheeky behavior, reports are made to the police. No wonder they don’t 
catch the big fish in this neighborhood, since all the cops are busy filing reports about 
broken light bulbs…” In the afternoon, I found Samir and convinced him to come 
with me and Mo to the youth center to talk to the manager and caretaker about the 
events of Sunday. The manager came straight to the point by saying that an act of 
vandalism had taken place which was caught on tape and which she will report to the 
police. She continued by saying that she understands this is unpleasant for Samir, but 
that this is according to the general policy, and that she wanted to explain herself to 
Samir, to be straight and clear. She did not ask Samir any questions and did not 
address him personally. Samir was not encouraged to account for his behavior, nor 
was any alternative punishment proposed. In the meantime, Samir stared at the table 
and finally muttered that he wanted to see the camera footage. When the manager 
and the caretaker left the room to get the footage, he drew it out for us on the table. 
“Here is the youth center and here are the police, then a line, and over there on the 
other side are the boys. On that side, they are all connected to each other and they do 
nothing for us. That’s how it goes in this neighborhood. Now I really don’t feel like 
going to the youth center anymore.”  
 
We all watched the camera footage and it was clearly Samir who tossed the light bulb 
on the floor. He left the room without saying another word. We continued to discuss 
his punishment with the manager and the caretaker. Only after Mo insinuated that the 
aggressive attitude of the caretaker on Sunday could also be worth a police report did 
the course of the conversation change. We eventually agreed that the incident will not 
be reported to the police if Samir comes help the caretaker in the youth center for 
one afternoon and if he pays the cost for a new light bulb. Samir was waiting outside 
for Mo and me. He told me that he is afraid he will be now arrested by the police and 
will not be able to go to Grigny with us. I told him that we agreed on an alternative 
punishment, which did not involve the police, but he was not reassured. He kept 
repeating that he will surely be arrested. 
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Now I feel completely exhausted. I have spent two entire days negotiating with 
different parties over a broken light bulb. These events have made quite clear how 
the maze of security measures does not help bring different positions in the 
neighborhood closer together. Volunteers like Mo and Zuhair who work with the 
boys are very suspicious towards the district department, and believe that anyone in a 
management position plays the people of the neighborhood against each other and 
the police. Those managers, in turn, do not seem to communicate directly with the 
volunteers, but only with their fellow managers. They seem to stick to the general 
policy at all costs. The boys misbehave at the same time that they play the victim and 
try to get around rules and punishment. Obviously, the only one who came out of the 
negotiations without directly accounting for his behavior was Samir. So what lesson 
has he exactly learned from all of this? It seems that his impulse to run from the 
police is the only thing which has been enforced, and not exactly his trust in the 
straight and just approach of the youth center, or his ability to behave civilized and 
according to the rules. 
 
I keep stumbling over the mismatch between all the different versions of the same 
events presented by different actors in the neighborhood. Mistrust, 
miscommunication and misunderstanding seem to characterize the way in which the 
youngsters, self-organizations (zelforganisaties), the youth service, the police and the 
local municipality relate to one another. And I am right in the middle of it all...... At 
least I am getting to know the neighborhood better and better.  (Field note, 
December 16, 2010) 
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Chapter 4 
          
A penal panopticon in Kanaleneiland: Escaping and 
sabotaging institutional efforts at “normalization” 
 
 
 
Our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance; under the surface of images, 
one invests bodies in depth; behind the great abstraction of exchange, there continues 
the meticulous, concrete training of useful forces; the circuits of communication are 
the supports of an accumulation and a centralization of knowledge; the play of signs 
defines the anchorages of power; it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is 
amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is 
carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies.  
    (Foucalt 1991, 217) 
 
 
In this chapter, I will describe how “at-risk boys” from Kanaleneiland, the 
Netherlands, and local governing policies regarding security and participation are 
involved in a complex relationship with each other. Those who are designated as at-
risk boys in the neighborhood are adolescents with a criminal record and deviant 
social behavior. Several institutions in the neighborhood make efforts to integrate 
these boys into the body of normal, civil citizens, without much success. The boys’ 
habit of causing public disturbance, expressing themselves in uncivil ways, telling lies 
and sabotaging any interaction with authorities makes them seen as discredited 
outcasts within the neighborhood. This reputation, in combination with their own 
“gangster attitude,” creates an image of the boys as non-participative outlaws, without 
a social or political conscience. The all-encompassing approach to youth and security 
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in the neighborhood is effective in monitoring the whereabouts of the boys, but it is 
less effective in its efforts to discipline them. Consequently, the distance between the 
lived world of young urban troublemakers and the domain of “good citizens” remains 
large, despite policy efforts at “integration.”  
 
During my fieldwork in Kanaleneiland, I quickly discovered that a large part of the 
narratives about the experiences of my respondents in Kanaleneiland were very similar 
to those that my respondents in Grigny had told me. I will therefore speak in this 
chapter in a similar way about the development of a community of experience in 
relation to the way in which the boys socially structure their lives in the neighborhood. 
As in Grigny, this community of experience is constructed in a complex relation to 
privileged, native citizens and state representatives, who are seen as hostile others, 
from whom the boys distinguish themselves, but who are also seen as influential 
imposters with a large and mainly negative impact on the life circumstances of the 
boys. In opposition to this dominant, hostile societal structure, a community structure 
is developed which offers another sense of belonging. The importance of keeping 
one’s dignity in one’s own frame of reference that is opposed to the larger society 
from which the boys feel excluded was emphasized in the conversations I had in both 
neighborhoods. The framework of values and codes of conduct which shapes the 
thoughts and behavior of the boys was very similar in both neighborhoods as well, as 
my respondents themselves also discovered in the conversations they had during the 
exchange trip to Paris and Grigny. Also, the justification of an underground economy 
and the sense of belonging provided by friends and family played a similarly 
significant role in the stories of my respondents in both neighborhoods. Another 
shared aspect of the conversations in both neighborhoods was the strong feelings of 
discrimination and exclusion from the body of accepted citizens and the national 
community, as well as the hatred towards state representatives and authorities, in 
particular the police.  
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In this chapter, I will not only concentrate on presenting and analyzing the lines of 
thought of my respondents in Kanaleneiland regarding their community of experience 
in the neighborhood, with its associated values and codes of behavior, as I did in the 
previous chapter. During the analysis of my fieldwork in Kanaleneiland, my attention 
was drawn in particular to the influence of policies around the surveillance and 
management of at-risk youth in the neighborhood, and the way my respondents 
perceived their own position in the neighborhood and in society at large. Therefore, in 
this chapter I will focus more extensively on the policies aim at regulating the boys’ 
behavior in the neighborhood, and the reaction of both my adolescent respondents 
and the professionals working with youth to these policies. Other than in Grigny, the 
boys in Kanaleneiland did not feel as free to develop their own lifestyle and arrange 
their own affairs in a world of “us,” which functions relatively autonomous from, and 
in opposition to, the organization and morality of the rest of society. The different cités 
within the banlieues around Paris each form a stronger, autonomous community with 
its own identifications and social structures, compared to deprived neighborhoods in 
the Netherlands (Duijndam 2011, 62, 73). While the segregation between the “inside” 
of the neighborhood and the world “outside” is less pronounced in Kanaleneiland 
than in Grigny, the influence of different authorities on the lives of the boys and 
dominant discourses defining accepted civic participation are more present in 
Kanaleneiland. The boys react in their own distinctive and rebellious way to this 
influence.  
 
In this chapter, I choose to focus in more detail on the difficult relationship between 
the boys, who can be described as young urban troublemakers, and local authorities, 
since this relationship forms an important backdrop against which the youngsters’ 
view of politics can be understood. My findings in Kanaleneiland illustrate the 
relationship between institutional politics and the disruptive public presence of a 
group of deviant citizens, who express their civic participation in uncivil ways and 
show their political awareness in expressions of discontent. This relationship forms a 
crucial part of the context in which young urban troublemakers express their own 
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forms of unruly politics. Before I look into the unruly political aspect of the public 
interventions of these youngsters in the third part of my thesis, I will first engage with 
the governmental policies of surveillance and control which shape the daily 
experiences of the boys in a neighborhood like Kanaleneiland. 
 
I will start this chapter by describing the historical, social and political context of the 
neighborhood of Kanaleneiland as a place for youngsters to grow up. I will then 
proceed by describing the lived experiences of my young interlocutors in the 
neighborhood. Their deviant lifestyle makes them the object of the specifically 
designed policy for youth and security. I will describe the aims and reasoning behind 
this policy, as well as reactions of professionals working with “at-risk boys” on the 
neighborhood policies regarding this target group. In the second half of this chapter I 
will analyze the relation between at-risk boys and local authorities in reference to a 
body of theory around the notion of “governmentality,” which is dominated by the 
work of Michel Foucault. Set against the background of neoliberal governance, the 
approach to at-risk boys in Kanaleneiland can be understood as a penal panopticon, 
which is intended to both contain the behavior of deviant citizens and encourage 
these citizens to assume their own responsibility in participating in society in a 
productive and accepted way. I will conclude this chapter by arguing that such a 
governmental approach enlarges the distance between the practice of politics and the 
community of experience of young urban troublemakers. However, the agency of 
deviant citizens has its own political meaning, even if it operates at a distance from, or 
in opposition to, the practice of institutionally endorsed politics. In relation to the 
work of Partha Chatterjee, I will shed light on a political interpretation of the deviant 
agency of alien or uncivil “others.” This political interpretation will be more 
extensively developed in the following parts of my dissertation. 
 
4.1. Welcome to Kanaleneiland 
Kanaleneiland lies in the southwest part of Utrecht, one of the four major cities of 
Amsterdam, only a few tram stops away from the city center. On the west, the 
 205 
neighborhood is bordered by the Amsterdam-Rhine Canal, from which the 
neighborhood derives its name (Kanaleneiland means “Canal Island”). On the east, the 
neighborhood is bordered by one of Utrecht’s larger thoroughfares. Between these 
borders, one can find a grid of several blocks of low-rise buildings and higher, four- to 
five-story apartment buildings. There is also one large shopping mall, two smaller 
shopping areas, several neighborhood shops which sell vegetables, fish, bread and 
other daily necessities, some barbers, a large library, a police station, various 
neighborhood centers for women, youth and elderly people and some Turkish coffee 
houses. In between the apartment blocks there are courtyards, gardens and small city 
parks. Some of the larger squares in the neighborhood contain children’s playgrounds 
and soccer fields. The neighborhood’s many green areas earned it the nickname of 
“Rose island,” before the neighborhood gained the negative reputation it has today. If 
one were to take a stroll around Kanaleneiland on an average afternoon, one would 
not imagine this to be one of the most hotly debated and notorious “problem 
neighborhoods” of the Netherlands74 (Ouwehand et al., 2008, 71, 74). One would 
probably see young students biking around, children playing in the courtyards in one 
of the several primary schools, men drinking coffee at the lunchroom in the shopping 
mall, women carrying grocery bags home and some adolescent boys smoking a 
cigarette on a bench on one of the squares. At first sight, one does not see graffiti on 
the walls (except for the murals which have been created by artists to give the 
neighborhood some color), homeless people on the streets or piles of garbage on 
street corners. Front yards are neatly trimmed. The neighborhood hardly looks like a 
ghetto. Nevertheless, the reputation of the neighborhood has become synonymous 
with crime, urban degradation, youth nuisance and failed integration.75 The name of 
the neighborhood has gained a bitter symbolic connotation, as many of its inhabitants 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 See this newspaper article for an overview of incidents between 1996 and 2007 that have contributed 
to his reputation: “Al tien jaar probleemwijk.” AD, September 24, 2007. 
http://www.ad.nl/ad/nl/1039/Utrecht/article/detail/2206148/2007/09/24/Al-tien-jaar-
probleemwijk.dhtml 
75 In 2007 Kanaleneiland was placed on the ranking list of the 40 “problem” neighborhoods of the 
Netherlands by the Ministry of Housing and Integration. These neighborhoods were euphemistically 
dubbed “power neighborhoods” (krachtwijken) to express the necessity of em“power”ment for these 
urban areas and their inhabitants. See: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/aandachtswijken 
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indeed feel like they live on an island that is separated from the rest of the city, and 
even from the rest of Dutch society. 
 
4.1.1. Island life 
Kanaleneiland is a Dutch “post-war” neighborhood, constructed at the end of the 
1950s and beginning of the 1960s in order to solve the severe housing shortage that 
arose after the war and intensified with the baby boom of the 1950s (Kuypers 2002). 
The city of Utrecht lacked housing for young families and designed an extensive city 
development plan. The construction of three new neighborhoods – Hoograven, 
Overvecht and Kanaleneiland – was part of this plan. The design of Kanaleneiland 
was characterized by a strong focus on the functionality of the lay-out, a separation of 
living and entrepreneurship and a lot of space for both green areas and car traffic 
(Meurs et al. 2006). A pattern was repeated of square-shaped blocks of both 
apartment buildings and single-family dwellings with a playground and parking areas 
in the middle and surrounded by strips of green and straight boulevard-like streets. 
Pre-fab materials were used for the construction of the houses in order to ensure an 
efficient and quick building process.76 The neighborhood was intended as a prestige 
project, an example of the new style of Dutch architecture (Het Nieuwe Bouwen), which 
aimed to provide for a spacious, comfortable and efficient living environment 
(Argiolu et al. 2008). However, Kanaleneiland quickly became less desirable to the 
autochthonous, middle-class population of Utrecht due to its monotonous character, 
the distance to the city center, the lack of possibilities to “move up” to more suitable 
housing in the same neighborhood over the years and the lack of maintenance 
performed in the neighborhood (Eikelenboom and Pas 2009). More and more low-
income families, mostly of an immigrant background, moved to Kanaleneiland. In 
2010 and 2011, at the time of research, almost 78 percent of the population was of 
non-native Dutch descent. In 2013, 75 percent of the population is of non-native 
Dutch descent, with the largest part of the population having its roots in Morocco, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Source: KEI, Knowledge Institute for Urban Renewal; http://www.kei-
centrum.nl/view.cfm?page_id=1897&item_type=project&item_id=248 
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and the second largest part having its roots in Turkey.77 Today, Kanaleneiland is home 
to more than 40 nationalities.  
 
The current population of Kanaleneiland has to deal with a variety of problems. 
Unemployment numbers are high: In 2010, almost 10 percent of the adult population 
in Kanaleneiland was unemployed, compared with 4 percent in Utrecht as a whole. 
Almost 20 percent of the population was on social welfare at the time of research 
compared with 11,5 percent for Utrecht as a whole.78 Many large families live in small 
apartments and have to make ends meet with a minimal income. Problems that occur 
“behind the front door,” like domestic violence and neglect, are common. A high 
number of “multi-problem families,” 79  which struggle with poverty, parenting 
problems, criminality and drug abuse at the same time, live in Kanaleneiland80. Many 
children of the neighborhood are placed under custody of the state and have trouble 
completing their education. Crime rates, dominated by burglaries and car heists, are 
also high. While there are 63,1 registered reports of criminal offenses per 1,000 
inhabitants for the whole city of Utrecht, the number for Kanaleneiland was 81,5 per 
1,000 inhabitants in 2010.81 In a comparative study of all neighborhoods in Utrecht in 
2009, Kanaleneiland was ranked as the least safe area of the city.82 This reputation 
improved slightly over the past few years, with Overvecht seen as the least safe area of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Almost 39% of the population is of Moroccan descent, while 17% is of Turkish descent. Source: 
Buurtmonitor Utrecht, Utrecht.buurtmonitor.nl 
78 Data from 2010. Source: www.utrecht.buurtmonitor.nl 
79 The Dutch Institute for Youth describes “multi-problem families” as families which deal with a 
combination of socio-economic and socio-psychological problems, while at the same time having 
problems in relation to institutional assistance. Family members often try to avoid institutional assistance, 
display a lack of motivation or actively resist assistance. This attitude justifies various so-called “behind 
the front door” approaches in which professionals conduct intensive outreach work and focus on 
interventions in the family home. “Family coaches” or “intervention teams” visit the families regularly at 
home and function as central coordinators for the various institutions and professionals who are involved 
in the assistance of the family. Such “behind the front door” approaches are controversial, as they can 
compromise the privacy and autonomy of the families. Extensive questionnaires about family members’ 
citizenship status, financial administration, religious affiliations and personal relations are often perceived 
as intrusive and the coupling of information services as coercive (Berg-Le Clercq & Kalsbeek 2011; 
Tabibian 2006; Van den Berg 2008). See also the Nicis Institute report “Eerste hulp bij sociale stijging: 
Literatuuronderzoek naar achter de voordeur aanpakken” (in Dutch). 
80 Source: Neighborhood Action Plan “Kanaleneiland Leert!” 2009. 
81 Source: Source: www.utrecht.buurtmonitor.nl 
82 Data from 2009. Source: Wijkenmonitor, Gemeente Utrecht, www.onderzoek.utrecht.nl 
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the city in 2012, and Kanaleneiland and its surroundings moving up to the 
penultimate position 83 . At the same time, community feeling is strong in the 
neighborhood and there are several neighborhood associations and other non-
governmental organizations which provide for social activities and the assistance of 
those in need. Amongst the most active organizations in the neighborhood are two 
mosques, a Moroccan-Dutch women’s association, a Moroccan elderly association, an 
organization of “neighborhood fathers,” several youth associations, several tenant 
associations and several sports associations.84 
 
4.1.2. Redevelopment plans 
Kanaleneiland is split into two parts by the road, which leads up to the Prince Claus 
bridge spanning the canal. Next to this road, one can find the main shopping mall and 
the police station, strategically located in the middle of the neighborhood. The 
northern part of Kanaleneiland, known of as “Kanaleneiland Noord,” has a more 
negative reputation than the southern part. This area is predominantly characterized 
by social housing, which is more deteriorated than the resident-owned houses in the 
southern part. Kanaleneiland Noord is also more known for high crime numbers and 
youth nuisance on the streets. In 2007, an extensive re-development plan was 
launched for this part of Kanaleneiland.85 This plan envisions a structural solution for 
both the physical and social problems in the neighborhood. The idea is for the 
neighborhood to be re-established as an attractive and popular place to live: crime and 
nuisance should disappear, the social cohesion should increase and a mixture of 
residents of various backgrounds and incomes should be encouraged. The physical 
appearance of the area should also be drastically changed. The “heart of 
Kanaleneiland Noord” has already been renewed with a building which houses several 
schools, social and sports facilities, next to around 100 new apartments and single-
family dwellings. Many of the semi-high-rise buildings in this part of Kanaleneiland 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Source: Wijkenmonitor, Gemeente Utrecht, www.onderzoek.utrecht.nl 
84 A listing of several neighborhood organizations can be found on the website of the Utrecht South 
West district. Source: http://www.utrecht.nl/smartsite.dws?id=278358 
85 See: Neighborhood Action Plan “Kanaleneiland Leert!” 2009. 
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will be demolished in order to make space for the restructuring of the 
neighborhood86. The three housing corporations that are active in the neighborhood 
are key partners of the municipality in these renewal plans.  
 
The housing corporations traditionally also assume social responsibilities in the 
neighborhood, in addition to taking care of the housing stock. Since the privatization 
of many housing corporations, the balance between private and public tasks, on the 
one hand, and social and economic interests, on the other, has been difficult to define 
(Van den Brant 2009). The housing corporations are also held financially responsible 
by the government for the upgrading of deprived urban areas like Kanaleneiland, 
which the corporations see as both an opportunity and a burden (Eikelenboom & Pas 
2009). The ambiguous role of the housing corporations in the neighborhood often 
leads to distrust on the part of neighborhood residents. The renewal plans are met 
with a lot of resistance. Many residents feel that the redevelopment of the 
neighborhood is part of tactics of the municipality and housing corporations to push 
low income families out of the area to make room for more profitable middle-class 
inhabitants. Nostalgic feelings about the changing appearance of the neighborhood 
also play a part in the negative reactions of neighborhood residents. This is in addition 
to the accusation voiced in my conversations with the focus group that the renewal 
plans are racially motivated and intended to reduce the number of families of Turkish 
and Moroccan descent. In anticipation of the demolition of the apartment blocks, no 
new maintenance of the buildings is being carried out and more and more apartments 
are left vacant. Artists and entrepreneurs in the creative sector are invited to make use 
of these vacant spaces for a period of three to five years in exchange for a low rent. In 
addition, the influx of student residents in the neighborhood has been actively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 In 2012 asbestos was found in one of the apartment blocks. One hundred and seventy five homes were 
temporarily evicted in order to remove the material. The procedure around the eviction was judged very 
negatively by a municipal committee at the end of the year. The responsible housing corporation had not 
informed the inhabitants sufficiently about the procedures around the restructuring of their homes, nor 
about the health risks attached to the asbestos. In addition, the eviction took place too sudden. The lack 
of information and impersonal attitude of the housing corporation and municipality caused much panic 
and insecurity amongst inhabitants. See: “Maatregelen asbest Kanaleneiland buiten property.” December 
4 2012. NOS. http://nos.nl/audio/447678-maatregelen-asbest-kanaleneiland-buiten-proportie.html 
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stimulated. The aim of the housing corporations behind this is to get a head-start on 
diversifying the neighborhood population. However, some of the artists in residence 
are skeptical about the value they could add to the neighborhood, as an actual 
exchange between “old” and “new” inhabitants appears difficult to establish.87    
 
4.2. “Major Cities Policy” and the neighborhood as a “malleable” community 
The redevelopment plans for Kanaleneiland have to be understood in the perspective 
of an evolving national neighborhood and urban development policy in the 
Netherlands. In 1994, a national “Major Cities Policy” (GSB, Grotestedenbeleid) was 
launched in order to tackle urban problems like the flight of middle- and upper-class 
inhabitants, the lack of employment possibilities for the lower educated and the 
increase of crime, poverty and insecurity.88 Many of these problems were seen as 
related to the increasing percentage of the city population coming from immigrant 
descent. A covenant was signed between the national government and the 31 major 
cities in the Netherlands (initially this included only the four major cities of 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht, but later other cities were added). 
The aim of the covenant was to let municipalities develop their own plan of action 
within a framework of national policy. At the same time, the “Major Cities Policy” 
aimed to offer an integrated approach which was geared to the economic, the social 
and the physical development of the city (Musterd & Ostendorf 2008). In 1998, the 
first minister of Urban Development and Integration was appointed. The name of this 
new department illustrates that the influx of immigrants, and their integration, was 
perceived as one of the major areas of city-related problems. The issue of urban 
development became highly ethnicized over the years. The changing political climate 
in the Netherlands, which had become less tolerant towards newcomers and more 
suspicious towards Muslims under the weight of two political murders, 89  the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 See, for example, the blog of young artists taking part in the residency project “Expodium.” Source: 
www.expodium.nl  
88 See policy report “Steden op stroom: Tussenstand Grotestedenbeleid 1994-2002,” April 2002, The 
Dutch Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
89 In 2002, Pim Fortuyn, leader of a populist party and critic of multiculturalism and Islam, was 
assassinated. In 2004, Theo van Gogh, filmmaker and also critic of multiculturalism and Islam, was 
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denunciation of multiculturalism and a new nationalist movement formed the 
background of a “new realist” approach to the integration of newcomers in an urban 
setting (Prins 2004). Immigrants were not only expected to learn the language and find 
a job, but they were also expected to show active participation in their direct 
environment and subscribe to a shared Dutch culture and set of values. The 
government can provide assistance to accelerate integration, but immigrants should be 
encouraged to assume their own responsibility in playing an active role in their urban 
living environment. 
 
4.2.1. Liveability 
Alongside integration, the encouragement of “social cohesion” in the neighborhood, 
which is seen as the first and direct environment in which citizens relate to one 
another, became a focal point of urban policies. 90 The creation of a feeling of 
community, if necessary with the help of governmental policies, was seen as 
indispensible in improving the “liveability” (leefbaarheid) in deprived neighborhoods 
(Blokland 2003). Urban policies shifted from a city-wide approach to a neighborhood-
oriented approach.91 The term “liveability” gained special attention and became a 
heavily loaded term (Veenhoven, 2000). In the first place, the term “liveability” is used 
to designate the degree of attractiveness of a certain area for its inhabitants. The better 
the liveability of the neighborhood, the more willing people are to invest in the area. 
The “liveability” of the neighborhood became a matter of concern for housing 
corporations, house owners, city planners and policymakers because of its key impact 
on the popularity and economic success of the neighborhood. Despite the highly 
subjective nature of liveability, it became a tested indicator in citywide surveys 
amongst inhabitants, and an important factor in comparing neighborhoods. The 
emotional perception of life in the neighborhood thus became a quantifiable tool of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
assassinated by a radical Muslim. Although Van Gogh was not a politician and Fortuyn was killed by a 
radical environmentalist, both murders are often perceived as political murders which signaled the failure 
of a peaceful and consensus-built multicultural society in the Netherlands. See Scheffer 2007. 
90 See WRR report “Vertrouwen in de buurt,” 2005. (Scientific Council for Governmental Policies) 
91 See RMO report “De wijk nemen,” 2009. (Council for Social Development) 
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measurement.92 Questions about the perceived safety, comfort, “hominess” and social 
cohesion in the neighborhood are now generally used to indicate people’s feelings 
about their area of residence and facilitate distinctions between “good” and “bad” 
neighborhoods.  
 
Along with the concern about liveability, urban segregation in deprived 
neighborhoods became another important focus of urban development policies. A 
mixed environment in which people of different ethnic descent cohabit benefits a 
neighborhood’s liveability because it accelerates the integration of immigrants, is the 
dominant presumption (Gijsberts and Dagevos, 2005). It is seen as a problem that 
“allochthonous” inhabitants have less contact with “autochthonous” inhabitants in 
neighborhoods with a high concentration of people with an immigrant background 
(Gijsberts et al. 2010). A lack of socio-cultural integration is coupled with limited 
progress at a socio-economic level (Blok et al. 2004). Those neighborhoods which do 
not score well in terms of liveability are often associated with a higher numbers of 
residents with an immigrant background, a lower level of social cohesion and a higher 
level of poverty and degradation. As a consequence, the discourse on “liveability” 
often focuses on the negative aspects of the presence of immigrants in the 
Netherlands. This relationship is illustrated by Leefbaar Rotterdam (“Liveable 
Rotterdam”), a political party that is active in the municipality of Rotterdam. Leefbaar 
Rotterdam pleads for stronger measures on safety, limited immigration and the 
assimilation of immigrants to Dutch norms and values in order to improve the 
liveability in the city of Rotterdam.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 The so-called leefbaarometer, or “well-being meter,” was commissioned by the Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Integration in 2008. This provides citizens and policymakers with information about 
the level of liveability in every postcode area of the Netherlands. Information is gathered for around 50 
indicators, divided into seven themes, ranging from the diversity of the housing stock and the 
composition of the population to the level of safety. The information is provided per neighborhood, and 
each area is assigned to one of seven levels of liveability, ranging from very negative to extremely positive. 
On a colored map of the Netherlands, one can see at a glance which areas are ranked highest and which 
are worst off. Source: www.leefbaarometer.nl 
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4.2.2. Ethnic and social mixture in the neighborhood 
In 2007, Minister Vogelaar of the new Ministry of Housing, Communities and 
Integration made a shortlist of 40 “problem neighborhoods,” which became the 
object of extra policy attention (see Musterd & Ostendorf 2009). In cooperation with 
the municipalities and social partners like housing corporations, new action plans were 
made to improve the livelihood in these neighborhoods and to fight persistent 
problems like youth unemployment, limited social participation of immigrant women 
and criminality. The aim of such restructuring policies is to reduce the concentration 
of social housing, low-income families and immigrants, assuming that mixed 
neighborhoods will accelerate integration and reduce poverty. Indirect policies aimed 
at improving the distribution of low-income immigrant inhabitants include the 
construction of more resident-owned apartments in deprived neighborhoods and 
more social housing in newly constructed suburbs and housing estates (Uitermark & 
Duyvendak 2004). However, these tactics of distribution have been criticized for not 
addressing the social problems which are related to the integration of immigrants (Van 
Kempen et al. 2000). Also, contact between neighbors with a different background in 
a mixed neighborhood often remains limited to obligatory greetings on the streets and 
do not lead to the development of an actual shared neighborhood community. 
Feelings of community and mutual assistance between neighbors are often stronger in 
an ethnically homogeneous neighborhood. At the same time, this form of social 
cohesion does not always lead to a better socio-economic position of the inhabitants 
of such neighborhoods. Strong neighborhood bonding can also distance inhabitants 
from the rest of society (Van Kempen & Bolt 2009).  
 
Despite doubts about the effectivity of related policies93, we see that ethnic and social 
mixture in the neighborhood has become a goal in itself. This goal seems to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 In 2013 a critical report of the Dutch Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau came out, indicating that the approach 
related to the 40 neighborhoods on the Vogelaar-list had not had a positive effect. The report indicated 
that the 40 neighborhoods which received extra support had not developed more than other 
neighborhoods with a similar problematic status, which had not received support. The neighborhoods on 
the Vogelaar-list did not become safer, the liveability did not increase, and the socio-economic position 
of inhabitants did not improve. The researchers did find that social cohesion and satisfaction with the 
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inspired by the wish of establishing a well-balanced neighborhood community which 
reflects dominant Dutch cultural habits and values. The ideal image of civic 
participation seems to depend on the way in which Dutch “autochthonous” people 
are used to interacting with one another and their urban living environment. 
Immigrants are expected to adapt to these dominant habits and values, not only to 
become accepted as good neighbors, but also to increase their own level of prosperity 
by opening social and economic opportunities for themselves in their living 
environment. These presumptions pertain not only to newly arrived immigrants, but 
also to second- and third-generation immigrant families, who have often grown up 
with Dutch as their mother tongue, but who still display civic behavior in the 
neighborhood that does not correspond with factors that score high on the scales of 
liveability and social cohesion. 
 
4.3. Growing up in Kanaleneiland 
Kanaleneiland is a young neighborhood. Thirty-nine percent of the population is 
under 24 years old,94 with the largest part of the young inhabitants between 20 and 24 
years old, constituting 14 percent of the total population of the neighborhood.95 The 
neighborhood is dominated by so called “black schools,” with 98 percent of the 
primary and secondary school population of non-native Dutch descent96. Eighty-nine 
percent of the school population suffers from learning disabilities and cases of school 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
neighbourhood environment increased, however they doubt whether the Vogelaar approach contributed 
to this increase, since numbers decreased slightly after 2009, during the last few years of the implemented 
policies. See Permentier et al. 2013. 
94 In the whole city of Utrecht, 35 percent of the population is under 24 years old. Data from 2011. 
Source: www.utrecht.buurtmonitor.nl 
95 Data from 2011. Source: www.utrecht.buurtmonitor.nl 
96 The term “black school” (zwarte school) refers to a school with a high number of students of immigrant 
descent (officially over 70% of “allochthonous” students). The explicit racial reference in this term is 
quite remarkable, since the use of the term “black” to refer to Dutch inhabitants of color is not common 
in the public debate or policy discourse. Here, the term “allochthonous” is preferred, as I have already 
explained in chapter 1. In addition, students who attend “‘black schools” are often not all black, but from 
various non-Dutch ethnic backgrounds. Black schools are usually located in deprived neighborhoods and 
suffer from poor test results. See: Arts and Nabha, 2001. However, the problems associated with the 
segregation in Dutch education that is symbolized by black schools is more of a problem of segregation 
along socio-economic class lines than a problem of segregation along race lines, according to Bowen 
Paulle (2007). 
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drop-out are very common.97 Especially in Kanaleneiland Noord, young residents are 
seen as both the cause and the victim of a variety of problems. Sixty-four percent of 
residents who took part in the annual citywide resident survey in 2009 indicated that 
they are regularly confronted with youth nuisance.98  
 
Kanaleneiland Noord is known as the home of a larger group young “hard core” 
(harde kern) criminals who are intensively monitored by the police.99 Car burglaries, in 
particular, are a frequent occurrence in the neighborhood. Many young residents of 
Kanaleneiland Noord find themselves in a difficult socio-economic situation and also 
suffer from psychological problems. They have difficulty finding a job or internship 
and struggle with debt. They are susceptible to different kinds of addictions, including 
alcohol and soft drug abuse and gambling. The respondents who took part in my 
research come from this part of Kanaleneiland. The participants of the focus group I 
worked with are representative for the young residents of Kanaleneiland Noord, who 
are perceived as the worst problem cases. They can be seen as part of the “hard core” 
troublemakers of Kanaleneiland, judging by the reactions of professionals, police 
officers and neighbors with whom I spoke. One of the professionals I interviewed 
said, “You are really dealing with the gutter of Kanaleneiland. All these boys are lost; 
there is no hope for improvement in their case.” Such remarks were very common in 
relation to the boys from the focus group. In Kanaleneiland, the police work with a 
list of about 150 boys who are part of groups which are a nuisance to the 
neighborhood’s other residents.100 About thirty to forty of these boys are criminal and 
cause severe forms of nuisance. The chief of police told me that he suspected that all 
participants of the focus group were among this last list of thirty to forty “severe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Source: Neighborhood Action Plan “Kanaleneiland Leert!” 2009.  
98 Source: Neighborhood Action Plan “Kanaleneiland Leert!” 2009. 
99 Source: Neighborhood Action Plan “Kanaleneiland Leert!” 2008-2009, p. 17. 
100 See this article from 2003 for the origins of the police approach to delinquent youth in Kanaleneiland: 
“Heldere aanpak harde kern,” April 1, 2003, http://www.websitevoordepolitie.nl/archief/heldere-
aanpak-harde-kern-84.html. This approach has been further developed into the “shortlist method.” See: 
“Notitie aanpak overlastgevende en criminele jeugd” policy report (in Dutch) on disruptive and criminal 
youth of the municipality of Utrecht, May 1, 2005, 
http://www.utrecht.nl/CoRa/Griffie/Commissie%20Bestuur%20en%20Veiligheid/Openbaar/2007/N
otitie%20aanpak%20overlastgevende%20en%20criminele%20jongeren.pdf 
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problematic cases.”101However, this could not be confirmed since I did not share the 
names of my focus group participants with the police.  
 
The boys’ behavior is generally seen as immoral and unacceptable by others, and has 
given them their bad reputation in the neighborhood. At the same time, the boys 
often feel excluded and stigmatized. They are convinced that their Moroccan descent 
prevents them from having equal opportunities in Dutch society. Dreams of 
becoming a “self-made” professional with the help of the criminal circuit and 
“gangster” skills seems to be their only perspective on a successful future. The 
youngsters constantly oscillate between feelings of powerlessness and insecurity due to 
their position as unwanted troublemakers and the pride and strength they try to prove 
to one another in their shared community of experience. 
 
4.4. Tough guys on the streets of Kanaleneiland Noord 
In this section, I will take a closer look at the lived experiences in the neighborhood of 
the participants of my focus group and the perception they have of their own position 
in Dutch society. It will become clear that their behavior is strongly influenced by a 
“gangster attitude,” which is expressed in various forms of deviant and disruptive 
behavior, such as the habit of provoking others in public space and telling lies. The 
feeling of being stigmatized and excluded according to the norms of general society 
leads to the boys dreaming of a fast track to success and prestige in the criminal 
circuit. The fact that most of them have dropped out of school and have difficulty 
finding and keeping a job contributes to the idea that they can only make money and 
achieve success by means of criminal activities. The boys attribute their failures in the 
desired areas of civic participation to a lack of equal opportunities for youth of 
Moroccan descent and recurring confrontations with discrimination. The feeling of 
not being accepted and, in a certain sense, “homeless” is reinforced by the fact that 
the boys feel caught between two nationalities, that of their family’s homeland and the 
Netherlands, and two different cultures, one which is dominant in in their life on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 He could not confirm this because I refused to provide him the names of the focus group participants 
out of privacy concerns. 
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streets and one which is dominant at home. The thoughts and experiences of the boys 
demonstrate the distance that exists between them and the domain of the “good 
citizen,” and justify a specific policy approach of state authorities and other 
institutions to “normalize” their behavior. 
  
4.4.1. “Making chaos” and “talking mia” 
Two expressions often used by the boys play an important role in observing their 
behavior. These are “making chaos” and “talking mia,” which means something to the 
effect of telling stories in the street slang of the neighborhood. Redouan told me that 
he suspected the word “mia” to be derived from the Moroccan Arabic word for 
“hundred,” but he had no idea how this word acquired its meaning within the street 
slang of the neighborhood. Like many other words used on the streets, nobody knows 
where they originally came from, and they are easily replaced with new expressions 
that come into fashion. When I asked Redouan about this word again in 2012, he told 
me that it already lost its appeal and was less used amongst his friends. Both the habits 
of making chaos and talking mia give an impression of the way in which the boys’ 
specific lifestyle creates distance in their social relations and of their reputation of 
having a disruptive impact in the neighborhood. Both phenomena cause a constant 
lack of trust and sense of vigilance, not only in relation to “outsiders” but also within 
the boys’ circle of friends.  
 
“Making chaos” is a regular habit of the boys and can be understood as creating 
disorder in their direct environment. This can be done by getting into a fight with 
friends or strangers, exhibiting rowdy behavior, screaming or making other kinds of 
noise, scolding one another or passers-by and vandalizing things in their environment. 
During our meetings, the boys would often refer to various situations in which 
someone “made chaos” and therefore got himself and/or his friends in trouble. This 
kind of chaos can be understood both as naughty teenage behavior of boys with a 
large dose of energy and testosterone and as a habit of challenging the rules and 
authorities with which they find themselves confronted. The boys know what 
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accepted behavior in certain situations is and often deliberately deviate from this 
behavior as a joke or to impress their friends. Dutch anthropologist Jan Dirk de Jong 
recognizes this kind of provocative behavior as part of the specific group culture of 
delinquent youth groups (De Jong 2007, 150). Sometimes, the chaos is expressed 
verbally. Osman told me that he and his friends like to call out dirty words just to 
have fun and shock others in their environment: “They’re like filler words, we do not 
mean them seriously. For example, we say “go suck dick” all the time after every 
sentence. My favorite at the moment is ‘ass moisture.’” At times, the verbal chaos of 
the boys is offensive or threatening to others, especially when addressed to girls. 
During our trip to Grigny, I observed various situations in which the boys practiced 
expressions like “I like your ass” and “Come home with me” in broken French in 
order to attract the attention of girls. Without exception, the girls would react 
frightened or offended and distance themselves as soon as possible from the boys. At 
other times, the chaos of the boys becomes more physical. At home in the youth 
center, fights and acts of vandalism often caused problematic situations which resulted 
in restriction orders and the occasional closing of the center for a certain period of 
time. 
 
The chaos of the boys can be offensive, frightening, irritating or funny to their 
environment, but in all cases it distances the boys from those around them. In many 
cases, it is a direct impetus for others to give them the dirty looks or rejections they 
experience as discriminating or stigmatizing. These dirty look are often caused by their 
loud speech, horseplay and coarse remarks regarding sex, drugs and gangster ideals. I 
witnessed many such situations during our trip to Grigny. During the trip, we left the 
closed environment of the meeting place for our focus group discussions, and I could 
observe the reactions of others to the behavior of the boys. The first confrontation 
took place immediately upon arrival in Grigny. When we checked into the hotel, the 
welcome was all but hospitable. The boys were eager to see where we were going to 
stay and stormed into the lobby. They started to explain to the receptionist in their 
best French that they were the group of Dutch youngsters who were expected to 
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arrive that day. When I came in and made some room between the boys to speak to 
the woman, I saw an expression somewhere between shock and disgust on her face. 
She had obviously experienced the loud explanations of the boys as intrusive. “This is 
not at all the group I expected,” the woman told me. “You did not tell me to expect 
this kind of youngsters.” She did not tell me what kind of youngsters she had in mind, 
but apparently she had had a different idea about the nine Dutch teenagers I had 
written to her about. She then proceeded to warn me several times that we would all 
be expelled from the hotel if the boys would make any noise during the night. A 
similar situation occurred when we went to the swimming pool in Paris. As soon as 
we came in, we were ushered into a special room by the security guards. One of the 
security managers initially told the boys that they were not allowed to enter the 
swimming pool because they were too loud and there were too many of them. “Large 
groups like you boys, wearing caps and exhibiting rowdy behavior, are not welcome 
here,” was the message. After some persuasion, the boys were eventually allowed to 
enter, but only after the security manager gave them a serious speech on the rules and 
regulations which they had to respect. Also, while travelling around the city in the 
metro, we were met with disapproving looks by fellow travelers who happened to be 
in the same carriage. They would hold on to their handbags and stare out of the 
window with a sturdy face, in an attempt to ignore the rowdy group of boys in their 
vicinity.  
 
“Talking mia,” the other expression which regularly occurred in our conversations, 
helps describe the way in which the boys relate to one another and position 
themselves. Complicated dynamics between sincerity, deliberately created “cool” 
postures and lies play an important role in their social interactions. “Mia,” which 
means “stories” or “excuses” is opposed to “life,” which means “for real” or 
“seriously” in their slang speech. The boys constantly doubt the honesty of their 
partners in conversation, regardless of whether they are friends or strangers. At the 
same time, they feel the need to convince others of their sincerity or of the reality of 
the story they are telling. This game can also take a material form. In a recurring play 
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of deceit, the boys challenge their friends by taking things from them, while at the 
same time blaming someone else as the thief. Such small power struggles are also 
directed at those who are in a position of authority in relation to the boys. The boys 
often challenged me and supervisors in the youth center by blaming others for having 
done something against the rules, or by inventing silly and provocative stories just to 
test our reaction. Amongst friends, they often pass the time by telling each other 
trumped-up stories. In all of these cases, “life” is the expression used to convince the 
other of the story’s truth and “mia” is the expression to blame the other for just 
making something up.  
 
It is very common for the boys to twist stories in order to hide their own share in 
certain illegal or unethical activities. Even between friends, it is common to hide 
things. This can be the case because the boys tease each other or because they play 
each other out against each other in order to secure their own reputation as a “tough” 
guy. It is normal for the boys to constantly be involved in a certain comparison of 
power with their friends (Faassen 1998, 53). If the boys can protect themselves by 
telling little lies, even at the cost of others they know well, they will do it. If the boys 
can make someone else look weak by telling little lies, they will do it as well. They 
therefore engage in relations that are always marked by a certain distrust. Relations 
amongst friends are characterized by a certain survival of the fittest mentality in which 
one thinks of one's own well-being, first and foremost, before caring for others. 
However, this distrust is not seen as a serious obstacle in friendships, since they know 
all that they are doing the same thing.  
 
Nevertheless, friendships are quite haphazard and noncommittal in the eyes of the 
boys. When talking about the rest of the focus group, Yousef once said: “Friends you 
have in your pocket. These guys are just acquaintances.” He continued to explain that 
he does not always trust his friends, despite the fact that he has spent almost all of his 
life with them. In another discussion, the good qualities of Murad were discussed. 
One of the boys said: “He is a good friend. When you meet him on the streets, he 
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stays with you the rest of the time.” In this conversation, it became clear that 
friendship largely depends on whom you meet on the streets when you step out of 
your house. The boys do not often make deliberate appointments with specific friends 
just because they like to see each other. Deliberate appointments are usually only 
made when “business” is involved. The dependency of friendship on coincidence also 
implies that the boys often join one another in dubious activities just because the 
opportunity arises when they happen to meet. In the same conversation, we also 
discussed the good and bad qualities of Farouk. Regarding his own bad qualities, he 
said:  
 
I find it difficult to say no. For example, I promise my mom to come home on time 
to help her with something. Then I go out on the streets and meet a friend, who is 
just about to go into the city to do some “business.” Then I join my friend and return 
home really late. Then my mom is yelling at me again, of course. (Farouk, 19 years 
old)  
 
The practice of telling little lies, excuses and stories is also used to challenge 
authorities and escape mechanisms of structure and discipline. The boys are used to 
getting around rules and regulations by not telling the full story.  
 
Lying seems to be a certain mechanism of defense in case the youngsters do not trust 
someone. I have seen really young kids lying about their name to adults they do not 
know very well. For example, if someone comes up to a little boy or girl in the youth 
center and asks “What is your name?,” it would be normal just to answer, but no, 
even when they are really young, boys and girls here just say some other name. 
Because they do not know the person who asks. It happens almost automatically. 
(Bilal, youth worker) 
 
The fact that the boys are not keen on taking responsibility for their own actions is 
related to these little lies and excuses. I have heard a whole variety of “yes, but” 
answers when I tried to confront the boys with their own bad behavior. The boys do 
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not like to admit mistakes and always wish to have the last word in order to make a 
tough impression. Tariq, who is a master when it comes to winning discussions and 
making up excuses, made this clear when we were in Grigny. One morning, after I 
had given the boys a speech about our rules of engagement during the trip, Tariq 
burst out in anger: “We are no part of your experiment or something like that. We just 
want freedom. Are you going to discipline us, or something like that?” I reminded him 
that we had put the rules of behavior together in the last meeting before the trip, and 
that since he had also agreed on these rules, he would know what behavior would be 
crossing the line. “If I would be smart enough for that, I would not be here to look 
around in some other ghetto neighborhood,” he replied. “Then I would have become 
president or something like that. And you also selected us because of that. If we 
would not have been problematic cases, you would not have taken us.” This 
conversation with Tariq is a good example of the boys’ tendency to place the 
responsibility for their behavior in the hands of others, or at least outside of their own 
influence. Dutch anthropologist Frank van Gemert and Mark Fleischer have noted 
the same externalization of the responsibility for bad behavior, and for the negative 
reputation of at risk boys (2002, 57, 59). The feeling of being subjected to any 
disciplining efforts by those who already presume the boys to be keen on crossing the 
rules, since they are perceived as troublemakers, causes immediate irritated reactions. 
Tariq’s reaction speaks of a certain self-fulfilling prophecy; i.e. you think we are 
troublemakers, well, we will show you what trouble is, but only because this is what 
you expect from us. Later, when Tariq calmed down he explained himself to me.  
 
I just always need to have the last word in a discussion. I have always been like that, 
even at school and in youth prison. I cannot handle any kind of authority. (Tariq, 18 
years old) 
 
4.4.2. Live like a gangster 
The boys’ behavior is structured by the circumstances in which they spend their days. 
The use of drugs, criminal activities and a “ghetto-inspired lifestyle” frame their world 
of experiences. “Making chaos” and “talking mia” are both influenced by these three 
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factors. The excessive consumption of drugs makes the boys distracted and jumpy, 
sometimes even slightly paranoid. This state of mind facilitates their susceptibility to 
aggressive behavior and makes them forget the limits of accepted social behavior. 
“Making chaos” is certainly stimulated when the boys are under influence. At the 
same time, the regular consumption of drugs like hashish helps the boys who tend 
towards ADHD calm down and relax. Some of the boys told me they were not able to 
sleep if they did not smoke marijuana or hashish at night. When the boys are unable 
to smoke for a while, they become restless and rowdy. 
  
The regular telling of lies and excuses is both influenced by the criminal activities of 
the boys and their self-proclaimed “ghetto style.” Right away, during the first focus 
group meeting, the boys told me that they respect their own set of rules in the 
neighborhood. One of the most important rules is “No talk,” as Rachid expressed it. 
“You keep your mouth shut about what you saw someone else do.”  
 
It is not like someone frames the rules, it is more natural how you act. It just 
developed like that. (Rachid, 16 years old) 
 
In order to be able to develop various illegal activities, it is important that the boys 
mind their own business in the neighborhood. Talking to youth service professionals, 
for example, is suspicious and talking to the police is simply not done (Van Gemert & 
Fleischer, 2002, 60). However, the telling of lies and excuses is completely permitted 
in order to protect one’s own activities or those of others against nosy outsiders.  
 
The rules of the neighborhood also prescribe how the territory of the boys should be 
defended. They see their neighborhood as their own domain and can react aggressive 
to other boys from other neighborhoods who do not respect the local inhabitants.  
 
If there is trouble with boys from other neighborhoods we get the blame, so this has 
to be prevented. (Latif, 18 years old) 
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Strange boys who give disrespectful looks, behave too loudly or harass girls in the 
neighborhood are sent outside. This protection of the territory also implies the 
protection of girls from the neighborhood. Despite the fact that the boys themselves 
are not always polite to strange girls, the girls of Moroccan descent they know from 
the neighborhood fall under their protection since their brothers, fathers and nephews 
are familiar and live around the corner, as they like to put it. What the girls think of 
this offered protection is not important to the boys, since the code of conduct is 
primarily something they share amongst themselves. These rules and codes of conduct 
are similar to the way of the streets in other deprived neighborhoods (Decker and 
Weerman 2005). De Jong describes such behavior as part of a ‘street culture’ (2007), 
which is not typically Moroccan, but can be found in deprived neighborhoods in 
different national contexts. The boys like to model themselves after the gangster 
lifestyle in what they know as “really bad neighborhoods” in the United States, for 
example, as portrayed in video clips, movies and TV series. They like to think of 
themselves as gangsters and look for examples in the same kind of environment.  
 
During our visit to Grigny, we met a well-known French-Moroccan rapper from a 
neighboring banlieue. The boys were really excited to meet him because they knew his 
video clips, which were really “difficult” (slang for tough) and “crazy” in their 
opinion. However, the rapper turned out to be a responsible young man who warned 
the boys not to be seduced by a career in crime. He told them he was afraid of only 
two things in life: death and prison. He warned the boys not to think too rosy about 
gangster life, because in the criminal world people cannot be trusted. “Before you 
know it, you have a knife in your back.” The boys responded by saying that they did 
not need to trust anyone, because money was much more important to them than 
friendship. Friends are an unstable factor in life in their opinion, and too much 
personal attachment can also be a threat to business. They made it clear that they were 
willing to take large risks in order to make big money as a gangster, since they did not 
believe society had any other professional possibilities to offer to them. The rapper 
was shocked by so much negativity. “When I hear you speak, it is like you come from 
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a war zone, from Palestine. But you all have sweet faces, you do not look like the 
hardcore criminals you’d like to be.” After the meeting, the boys were disappointed 
because the rapper was not a “real gangster.” He was not at all like he looked in the 
video clips and had not told the boys the exciting stories they had hoped to hear.  
 
4.4.3. Money is everything  
As became clear from the aforementioned meeting with the French rapper, the boys 
see their own opportunities, capacities and ambitions in the field of work and 
education as very limited. In their opinion, their limited opportunities are caused by 
discrimination and a hostile political climate towards those of Moroccan descent.  
 
We wish to make black money because we do not get any opportunities. Since 
September 11th, it’s just all become worse. Everywhere we are looked at askance. 
Nobody wants us Moroccans – we get even less opportunities. (Hamid, 20 years old) 
 
Also when it comes to education, the boys see their opportunities as very limited. 
Most of them are on the level of basic vocational education, but do not find this 
level’s career perspective appealing. When asked why they stopped going to school, 
many of the boys said they felt they did not learn anything useful. Besides their low 
motivation, the boys often get into trouble at school because of their deviant 
behavior. Working towards a long-term goal, which does not immediately show its 
benefits, is difficult for the boys. They have a short attention span and do not like to 
spend a lot of time and effort learning something new. The boys live from hour to 
hour and event to event, without planning or making appointments. Naturally, this 
attitude does not fit well with a working environment or school environment. All of 
the boys had had trouble finding internships when they were still in school because 
they would show up late or not at all or because they had conflicts with authority. 
 
We are not the type of guys for time. If you want to do something with us, you need 
to do it right away – otherwise we forget. And we have to see what it brings us 
immediately. (Nouredine, 18 years old) 
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Since their attitude does not help them make use of the few opportunities they have 
with respect to work or education, the boys focus on other ways of making money 
and developing their skills. The opportunities they find in the criminal domain offer 
immediate results. Once they find out how exciting and easy it is to make money by 
“popping” cars and handling stolen goods, it becomes difficult for them to focus on 
other, more regular future perspectives. A criminal career looks the most appealing 
because it has the most to offer in the boys’ opinion. In addition to money, it offers 
them the independence, excitement, status and self-esteem which they cannot find 
elsewhere (De Jong 2007, 164). Once they have made the decision to engage in 
criminal activities, the boys start working on their gangster image and start 
denouncing all things associated with “goody-goody” school boys. “You are only 
smart at school,” as Yousef expressed it. The positive valuation of this gangster image 
becomes a way of bestowing respect upon themselves and their peers in spite of their 
activities, which are seen as unethical by others.  
 
When you are a criminal, you are used to money. So much has gone through our 
hands and so much has been going on. (Nouredine, 18 years old) 
 
It is all or nothing. We do not want to work for a boss. We want to make good 
money immediately, with something fun to do. Not some kind of shitty job in the 
supermarket. When you are used to “popping,” it just goes really fast. When you 
stock shelves at the supermarket, it takes really long and you make so little per hour. 
(Yousef, 18 years old) 
 
The best would be to make money out of your hobby. Like rappers and soccer 
players. If that would be possible for us, we would also do it. Then you are doing 
something because you like it and not because someone tells you to. (Ghalid, 17 years 
old) 
 
The boys are convinced that money is the most important thing in the world. “Money 
is everything,” Husain once said during a meeting and the whole group agreed with 
him. “Money opens doors. That is why it is so important,” Osman explained. The 
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world of experiences of the boys therefore revolves largely around ways of making 
money and buying and consuming things which show that they possess it. The first 
thing the boys wanted to know of their peers in Grigny was how they made money 
and how they spent it. On the last day of our trip, the boys were mostly looking 
forward to buying souvenirs like watches, necklaces and clothes that would show their 
expensive taste. For the boys, the possession of money is a measurement of success, 
since they cannot imagine other things which would bring them prestige. The boys 
admitted several times that they are influenced by the continuous confrontation with 
commercials and other public displays that promote a wealthy lifestyle and 
consumerist ideals. They are very aware of their marginalized position in society but 
nevertheless wish to enjoy the same benefits it has to offer to those who are in a more 
fortunate position. This wish to share in the richness that the world around them has 
to offer distinguishes the boys from the generation of their parents, in their opinion.  
 
Our parents had to work really hard and had a really difficult life. They always say 
hamdoulla: “I am blessed with what I have.” When something bad happens, like 
someone gets sick, they say that. But also when good things happen. They say it all 
the time actually. But we have seen what else is possible. We do not want to work 
hard for little like they did. We are kind of spoiled actually, we have seen so many 
possibilities. (Farouk, 19 years old) 
 
4.4.4. Equal opportunities are nowhere to be found 
The fact that it is difficult for the boys to fully enjoy the possibilities they see around 
them is frustrating. As under-educated Moroccan-Dutch boys from a deprived 
neighborhood, they know that they cannot make of life what others in better 
circumstances can (Faassen 1998, 58). The negative public opinion of Moroccan-
Dutch boys and their own experiences of discrimination and failures in the area of 
work and school are the source of great disappointment (Hermans 2006). The boys do 
not receive equal opportunities in their experience and therefore have a very negative 
image of their own future. Their defense of criminal activities, a gangster lifestyle and 
troublesome behavior in the neighborhood could be seen as an example of coping 
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with “meta-stereotyping”, by exactly legitimizing those activities that contribute to the 
negative image that others have of Dutch-Moroccan youth as a group (Kamans et al. 
2009). Since they feel that their equal chances are limited by discrimination, they adopt 
a group image which reciprocates that negativity, in order to “pay back” for this 
discrimination, but also to legitimize the search for means to make a living and gain 
respect outside of the opportunities which they experience to be cut off to them. To 
affirm a “tough” reputation, which has a stigmatizing effect when emphasized by 
others, becomes an act of resistance against a lack of equal opportunities (De Jong 
2007, 227). Despite their glorification of gangster life, they are aware of the risks and 
the small chances of really making it in the criminal domain. All admit that they would 
love to live a normal and quiet life with a standard income, if they would have the 
possibility. They just do not see how this could really become possible in their case. 
“We have a black picture of the future,” Rachid said. “For us, there is nothing to be 
earned in the Netherlands.” In addition to the wish for a “normal” life, the boys do 
not have clear hopes or ambitions that extend beyond spending the day in a pleasant 
way, without getting in trouble. When I asked the boys about their regular activities 
during the first meeting, Yousef answered: “We lean against the wall and we search 
for hope. Just to keep ourselves together and so when we go to sleep at night we have 
good memories of what happened that day.” Greater ambitions than these simple, 
short-term ones are hard to imagine for the boys. 
 
The lack of equal opportunities to develop themselves is largely caused by feelings of 
discrimination, in the opinion of the boys. These sentiments are in accord with the 
observation that inequalities on the labor market are influenced by a migrant-hostile 
discourse (Siebers 2010). An emphasis on their ethnic descent was repeated frequently 
in the boys’ accounts regarding discrimination. Their Moroccan appearance and 
Moroccan name was often a reason to treat them differently, in their experience. They 
recounted stories of discrimination at school, in trying to find a job, in nightlife and 
on the streets. Experiences of discrimination have become such a regular part of their 
lives that the boys find it hard to imagine what could be changed about it.  
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Discrimination is normal, it’s always been like that. Moroccans have got a bad 
reputation. (Rachid, 16 years old) 
 
We are really often denied entrance to bars and clubs because of our clothes and 
haircuts. Or when they see our names on our ID, they say it is full. And also, just 
now, before the meeting, we came from Nieuwegein [a neighboring town] with the 
tram. This Dutch man put his things on the chair next to him so I could not sit 
down. They do this on purpose when they see you. Those people who come from 
Nieuwegein are more tidy. They are Dutch and they don’t want allochthonous youths 
in their neighborhood. (Farouk, 19 years old) 
 
When talking in more depth about their experiences of discrimination, it became 
apparent that not only their Moroccan descent, but also their behavior is a reason that 
people treat the boys differently. Their appearance of being “teens from the streets” 
often cause them trouble. When discussing their experiences in finding a job, the boys 
first stressed that they have no chance of finding a job or an internship because they 
are Moroccan. A bit later in the conversation, however, the boys agreed that it is also 
difficult for them to keep a job because they are not used to displaying an accepted 
“working attitude.” Husain said that he once worked for three months in a 
supermarket but had to leave because he came into conflict with the manager. “He 
wanted to play the boss. I know that he’s the boss, but I don’t like it when people tell 
me what to do.” Rachid agreed with him: “When you are not used to working from 
when you were thirteen years old, it becomes difficult to find a job when you are a bit 
older.” Their behavior when they go out at night can also cause the dirty looks the 
boys receive.  
 
If allochthonous youth would behave more calmly, they could also make a better 
impression. If there are no fights and annoyances and stuff like that. (Farouk, 19 
years old) 
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Despite such an occasional reflection on their own behavior, the boys are very eager 
to stress that their bad reputation is undeserved. When I asked the boys during the 
first focus group meeting which words they would use to describe themselves, they 
unanimously presented themselves as “good guys,” naming words such as “helpful” 
and “calm” to describe themselves. The urge to present newcomers a positive image 
of themselves, in contrast to an undeserved negative reputation, resurfaced in various 
conversations. Nouredine emphasized their “teamwork” when cleaning up after the 
first meeting, and the boys came up with classic examples of their helpfulness, such as 
“we help elderly people carry their groceries and cross the street.” Ghalid was eager to 
present their nightly presence on the streets as a good thing for the neighborhood: 
“We are like night guards, we patrol the streets. When we see someone breaking in, 
we catch the guy.” Farouk proposed that the boys would do “something good” for 
other people in the neighborhood to earn our trip to France, since he was afraid that 
people would think that the boys were given a vacation without having done anything 
for it. He proposed to clean up gardens or do small jobs, such as bringing away empty 
bottles to improve their reputation in the neighborhood. Later, after the trip, when we 
were talking about a possible name for the group of boys in case they would continue 
with a follow-up project with another organization, Murad proposed “Heroes from 
the Heart” as a name for the group.  
 
In this case, the boys explored the possibility of presenting themselves as a group, but 
in general they disliked this idea. The boys only present themselves as a group when 
they either feel threatened by, or wish to make an impression on certain outsiders, as 
Van Gemert and Fleischer also notes (2002, 32/33). When the boys are amongst each 
other, their relations are more characterized by rivalry. When I asked them in one of 
the focus group meetings if they would consider themselves as a fixed group of 
friends, Rachid said: “We do not call ourselves a group, we are not in school.” His 
reaction indicated that the labeling of the boys as part of a fixed collective reminded 
him of certain regulated systems, like the school system. Reactions from others made 
it clear that the boys associate the naming of them as a group with their “bad name” 
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in the neighborhood for being a “group of troublemakers” or a “group of loitering 
teens.” The feeling of being the object of negative stereotyping became more clear in 
a conversation I had with Yousef during our trip to Grigny. I asked him why the boys 
often reacted offended when “we,” the supervisors, addressed them collectively for 
behaving in a certain way. Yousef said: 
 
You are always saying “you this” and “you that.” We see “you” as a term of abuse. 
The boys hear it often, they react kind of touchy to it. It is a kind of trauma. When 
people look at you, they say “you, you” all the time. And then they look dirty at us as 
a group (Yousef, 18 years old, participant focus group) 
 
4.4.5. Homeless between the Netherlands and Morocco 
The boys feel that they are depicted as one homogeneous group which poses a threat 
to the safety of the neighborhood. Policymakers, the police and the media all 
contribute to this bad reputation, which causes the boys’ feelings of discrimination 
and prejudices. The police are suspected by the boys of deliberately marking them as 
criminals. Many stories were told during the focus group meetings about arrests and 
identity checks by the police without any clear suspicion. At the same time, the boys 
are involved in criminal activities and admit the temptations of making easy money 
with little effort in the criminal domain. Yet they blame the police for first 
encouraging these temptations in order to later punish them. These tactics reinforce 
the boys’ bad reputation, in their opinion. 
 
They place “bait cars” in the neighborhood with something valuable inside, like a 
laptop or something like that. Then, a young boy walks by and sees the laptop. Of 
course, he is tempted to steal it because it looks so easy. These young boys like to do 
things to be tough and show the older ones that they can also make money for 
themselves, but they do not know about the risks yet. So they “pop” the car, but 
everything is put on tape by the police, and later they go to his house to arrest the 
boy. They put cameras on the bait cars. That is dirty and unfair. It is how the police 
work here. (Nouredine, 18 years old) 
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The “dirty tricks” of the police legitimize a perception of the police as the boys’ worst 
enemy, as De Jong also notes (2007, 67). Not only the police enforces their negative 
reputation, in the eyes of the boys. The media encourages this deliberately created 
image of criminalized youth by biased reports on events in Kanaleneiland. 
 
All the negative stuff makes the news, but not the positive stuff. It is not like that in 
other neighborhoods. (Tariq, 18 years old)  
 
The negative image as it is presented in the media is not only related to the 
neighborhood in which they live; it is also related to their Moroccan descent, in the 
eyes of the boys. In general, the boys directly associate a negative perception of their 
behavior and experienced discrimination with an emphasis on their ethnic descent. 
They are well aware of general assumptions about the causal relation between 
Moroccan ethnicity, criminality and disruptive behaviour (Jennissen 2009). 
 
When a Moroccan does something criminal, like stealing something, the newspaper 
writes: Moroccan criminal arrested. But when a Moroccan scores in a soccer game, 
they say that a Dutch player scored. When things go badly you are called to account 
as Moroccan, but when things go well you are suddenly Dutch. (Hamid, 20 years old) 
 
This kind of negative stigmatization reinforces the boys’ feeling that there is no place 
for them in the Netherlands. As a consequence, they idealize the image they have of 
Morocco and dream about escaping the situation in which they find themselves in 
Kanaleneiland. Despite the boy’s lack of ambitions and dreams, we did speak of some 
dreams the boys have for the future. All of them said they would like to go to 
Morocco after making some good money elsewhere. They have the idea that life in 
Morocco is much better than in the Netherlands. The air is healthier and the food is 
better. People are not “spoiled by modern Western idea’s there” and life is more 
simple since “you do not get letters from the tax services every day.” “There you can 
live without a mailbox.” Life is also cheaper in Morocco, so you can do much more 
with your money than in the Netherlands. This positive image of life in Morocco is 
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largely based on their own holiday experiences. On summer trips to Morocco, the 
boys attract attention as teens who know about life in the promised lands of Europe 
and have much more money to spend than their peers in the small villages where their 
family members live. The boys also say that they feel more related to the culture in 
Morocco. “There, you just know how everything goes.” The boys first want to make 
money before they go to Morocco, because they know that it is even more difficult to 
find a job there and wages are lower. Various boys have the dream of first making a 
lot of money and then starting their own business in Morocco, preferably a café or a 
club somewhere on the coast in a touristic area. They dream of being the owner of the 
kind of places they like to visit themselves when they are on holidays. 
 
We see that even their dreams transport the boys away from the place where they 
spend their days. The daily experiences of the boys take place in Kanaleneiland, but 
are at the same time miles removed from the experiences of other inhabitants of the 
neighborhood. Willem, a former police officer in the neighborhood, emphasized a 
certain feeling of “homelessness” and alienation of the boys in relation to their 
difficult behavior.  
 
These boys are nowhere at home really. Here, they are given the cold shoulder, but 
also in Morocco they are mistrusted because of their bad morals. There, they are seen 
as the spoiled brats who show off and misbehave with the girls. So the boys have 
nothing to lose really. And when you have nothing to lose, everything is permitted. 
Then it’s easy to do criminal things. (Willem, former police officer)   
 
The words of Willem resonate with a remark made by Latif during one of the focus 
group meetings. He said “outside you are Dutch and inside you are Moroccan,” when 
we were talking about the fact that most of the parents have no idea how their sons 
really behave outside of the house. Pegagogist Trees Pels has noted that the 
community-structures, which troublesome boys find on the streets, offer a level of 
mutual respect, which is often missing in interactions with others, also within the 
family (2003). The boys experience respect as something which is, in their case, usually 
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not offered on a mutual basis. They are expected to show respect in interactions with 
institutions and “accepted” citizens, but receive suspicious looks and disciplining 
reactions in return. Their own community of experience on the streets offers as an 
alternative structure in which they can nevertheless find respect and polish their self-
esteem. 
 
In order to establish a relation of trust with her clients, Juliette, a coordinator of a re-
integration project for delinquent teenagers, said that she first of all wants to give the 
boys a feeling of home. “They need a lot of love, despite the fact that they are a pain 
in the ass. They are not used to feeling at home somewhere, so I see that they really 
get attached to a place where it is warm and cozy and where an adult listens to them.” 
She also finds it important to give the boys a sense of what is going on in 
autochthonous Dutch families, since they normally do not interact with Dutch people 
much. She therefore likes to tell small things about her own family life and the 
activities of her own children. This telling of personal stories also helps the boys to 
relate to her on a less formal level, in her experience. The lack of experience with 
Dutch people also played a part in one of the meetings of an empowerment course in 
which most of the boys from the focus group participated, and which I attended. 
When asked what they wanted to learn from the course, Farouk answered that he 
would like to learn “how to communicate with Dutch people, because we never speak 
to them.”  
 
4.5. The containment of young delinquents 
In the previous section, I have given insight into the thoughts of my young 
interlocutors regarding their own social position and certain characteristics of their 
social behavior. I will now continue by examining the policies that have been 
developed in order to contain the deviant behavior of these “at-risk boys.” This will 
accordingly give insight into the approach taken by authorities towards young urban 
troublemakers within the context of Kanaleneiland. The discussion of this approach 
serves as an example to demonstrate the distance which exists between the 
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community of experience of young urban troublemakers and the domain of 
institutional politics. This distance contributes to a politically charged and encouraged 
distinction between good, civil citizens and delinquent troublemakers. Due to the 
delinquent nature of their activities and their rowdy behavior, these boys are not seen 
as “good” citizens, but as an at-risk group which needs to be directed towards 
desirable civil participation. Policies that are developed for this task are set within a 
framework of security issues and measurements. After having discussed the 
characteristic aims of responsibilization and participation within the approach to 
youth and security in the neighborhood, as well as its disciplining and monitoring 
effects, I will discuss the reactions to this approach by professionals from the area in 
section 6. These professionals are critical because they are confronted on a daily basis 
with the negative effects of the approach which, in their eyes, is characterized by a 
lack of attention to social guidance and an over-emphasis on market logics. In section 
7, I will discuss the reactions of the boys themselves to the policy approach. They 
most of all wish to gain a certain autonomy from the institutions which, in their 
experience, tend to control their lives. 
 
4.5.1. How to talk about politics with thieves 
In a meeting with the local women’s association, I had talked about my research 
interests and the work I was doing with the focus group of boys in the neighborhood. 
One of the advisory board members, an ethnic Dutch consultant in his forties, said to 
me after the meeting, while shaking his head as if he pitied my naivety: “How can you 
speak with such boys about politics and civic participation, if they are not even able to 
keep their hands off of other people’s belongings?” His question, which was clearly 
meant to be rhetorical, insinuated that youngsters who display criminal behavior are 
not likely to have an opinion on social or political matters, precisely because of their 
criminality. This reasoning seemed to imply that criminal youngsters cannot be seen as 
political or social agents because criminality is morally opposed to an interest or active 
involvement in social and political matters. The words of the consultant placed 
criminal youngsters at a distance from civic and political participation. This line of 
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thought recurred in many of the conversations I had in Kanaleneiland with 
professionals who dealt with Moroccan-Dutch at-risk youth, as well as with the boys 
themselves. My interlocutors would all associate politics with political institutions 
where “professional” politicians debate and policies are developed. This domain of 
politics is far removed from the boys’ own community of experiences. 
 
There is a tension between the boys’ community of experience and the institutional 
domain, which strives to make the boys participate in society in a constructive and 
accepted way. At the same time, young crime offenders stand at the center of a highly 
politicized process. It is not as agents, but as objects of a specific political discourse 
and practice of policy making, that such youth gain political attention. 
 
The development of a discourse in which minority groups are increasingly seen and 
addressed as “dangerous others,” comparable to criminals, is part of a broader 
process of crimmigration – the merging of migration policy and crime control – in 
the Netherlands (Van der Leun & Van der Woude 2011, 445).  
 
Especially for youth with an immigrant background, specific policies are developed 
which simultaneously consider crime prevention and integration102. Hence, these boys 
are not only addressed as criminals, but also as “alien” others – something which has 
an effect on the perceived value of their citizenship. The reputation of immigrant 
youth from deprived neighborhood as a dangerous category of potential criminals is 
used by various political parties as “a kind of electoral glue. On the one hand, fear of 
youth crime can bind together an otherwise disparate band of electors into a new 
‘post-industrial’ political constituency which transcends traditional class affiliations. 
On the other, it may be used to repair rifts within political parties, generating an 
impression of unity and common purpose” (Pitts 2001, 2). Consequently, we can see 
that delinquent youth with an immigrant background become the center of political 
debates and policy formation, precisely because of their reputation as deviant and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 See the Nicis Report from 2011: “Effectieve aanpak van risicojongeren.” 
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non-participative to the social and political domain. As much as these boys are 
perceived as a threat to the body of “good” and “active” citizens, this perception 
simultaneously offers political opportunities for the unification and enforcement of 
civil society. Debates about, and the development of, crime control regarding youth 
with an immigrant background from deprived neighborhoods play an important 
rhetorical role for governing bodies in showing their capacity to safeguard the well-
being and security of the civic community.  
 
This same mechanism can be noticed in Kanaleneiland. Local authorities emphasize a 
necessary containment of the behavior of possibly delinquent boys in the 
neighborhood in order to protect the “liveability” and community feel of the area for 
other residents. The presence of a high number of “Moroccan-Dutch at-risk youth,” 
as they are classified in the policy domain, is a general worry to the neighborhood. 
These youngsters are widely associated with the negative reputation of the 
neighborhood, since crime rates are high and perceived nuisances caused by 
youngsters are frequent. A rhetoric of risk management and policies of crime control 
and prevention characterize the responses from the institutional political domain to 
their presence in the neighborhood103. In my analysis of the relationship between 
these boys and local political institutions, the image of Moroccan-Dutch at-risk boys 
as young criminals – as well as the mechanisms of crime control developed around 
this image – occupies a central role.  
 
4.5.2. The Security House 
The municipality of Utrecht manages a broad network of public services and 
community-based organizations, intended to provide for the “liveability” in 
neighborhoods like Kanaleneiland. The containment of deviant behavior of at-risk 
youth is a primary focus of their objectives. A general policy is developed by the 
municipality and a network of various partners in the neighborhood, brought together 
in the so-called “Security House” (Veiligheidshuis). The Security House is responsible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 See “Handboek voor aanpak problematische jeugdgroepen Regio Utrecht” and “Gemeentelijk beleid 
voor Marokkaans-Nederlandse jongeren”, Verweij Jonker Institute 2008. 
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for the execution of this policy, under guidance of the “security manager” of the 
district department of the municipality. Just like one can speak of “total theater” or 
“total soccer,” one speaks in Kanaleneiland of the “total approach” (totaalaanpak) with 
respect to youth and youth activities in the neighborhood. Shared agreements are set 
down in the “Youth and Security” covenant, whose title immediately discloses the 
general aim of the total approach. Security in the neighborhood will be improved if 
the impact of deviant youth on the neighborhood is contained. The reasoning behind 
the covenant is that this aim will benefit from a general policy which provides clarity, 
unity and stability. The main players who develop this integrated approach are 
managers and policy advisors at the district department of the municipality, the local 
police and the justice department. For the implementation of the policies, they 
cooperate with the local youth service, the Youth Care Agency, the Child Welfare 
Council, resettlement associations, the Area Health Authority, organizations for the 
treatment of addictions and various surveillance organizations which focus on youth, 
such as the Youth On The Streets team, Streetcornerwork and Youth Advice Team. 
So-called “self-help organizations”104 (zelf-organisaties) are sometimes involved in the 
implementation of the general approach, but do not form a permanent part of the 
Security House and often hold a critical stance towards it.  
 
Policies regarding “youth and security” are characterized by a discourse of 
responsibilization and participation, on the one hand, and techniques of discipline and 
punishment, on the other hand105. The general approach prescribes what kind of 
activities for youngsters are endorsed by the municipality and the police, where these 
activities take place, what kind of working method regarding youngsters is preferred 
and what kind of information is shared by the different organizations involved in the 
general approach. However, the general approach, which is created to enforce 
cooperation and solidarity in the neighborhood, is not effective in all its aims. It leads 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Community-based organizations at a local level, like the Moroccan elderly committee, the women’s 
association and private youth associations. 
105 See RMO report “Tussen flaneren en schofferen: een constructieve aanpak van het fenomeen 
hangjongeren” 2008. 
 239 
to a variety of miscommunications, frustrations and feelings of injustice. In fact, the 
general approach neglects to effectively address – let alone include – the experiences 
and environment of the very youngsters it wishes to transform into good and active 
citizens. To understand how this discrepancy emerges, a closer investigation of the 
reasoning behind the general approach is needed, consisting of an analysis of the 
strategies of governance that underlie these policies as well as the instruments of 
governance that are included in these policies.  
 
4.5.3. “We will be monitoring you” 
The general approach and the covenant originate from a period in which youth 
criminality and public nuisance were very high. Drastic measures were taken by the 
police and the municipality to re-establish peace in the neighborhood in 2007. Fences 
were placed between flats at certain places in the neighborhood to prevent boys from 
fleeing the police on their scooters.106 Mosquitos107 and surveillance cameras were 
installed and a prohibition on assembling was enacted.108 With respect to this period, 
the former chief of police commented: 
 
It was really a war zone when I first got to know the neighborhood. The inhabitants and 
the police were diametrically opposed to each other. In one occurrence, a police officer 
broke his jaw in a confrontation with a group of youngsters on the streets. Such bad 
experiences also built up the tension inside the police office and there was no more 
personal contact between officers and the people outside. And it was not only youth who 
were involved. I also witnessed 80-year-old senior citizens spitting at the police. Even the 
seniors easily chose the side of the youngsters. (Ben, former chief of police) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 See: Wim Boevink, “Wilders en zijn hek,” Trouw, June 9, 2009. 
http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4492/Nederland/article/detail/1141398/2009/06/09/Wilders-en-zijn-
hek.dhtml 
107 The Mosquito is a device which is used in public space to combat youth nuisance. The device sends 
out a very high tone which is annoying to young people under a certain age, but cannot be heard by an 
older generation. 
108 See: “Samenscholingsverbod Kanaleneiland verlengd,” De Volkskrant, May 25, 2009. 
http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/333181/2009/05/25/Samenscholings
verbod-Kanaleneiland-verlengd.dhtml 
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The police started to work on a better relationship with inhabitants by initiating a 
dialogue with various self-help organizations, such as the mosque, but also with boys 
from the area. A new youth service organization was attracted to specifically deal with 
boys causing trouble.109 This organization was given the specific order to bring the 
boys from the streets into the youth center in order to reduce the complaints about 
public nuisance. They were supported in their task by various instruments of 
surveillance, such as cameras outside on squares, fields, at the entrance of flat 
buildings and inside the youth center, the presence of street coaches outside and the 
attendance of police officers at certain youth activities. A stricter and more 
coordinated policy was developed to bring unity in the approach to youngsters by 
professionals in the neighborhood. This resulted in the Youth and Security Covenant. 
Regular meetings between the local municipality, police and professionals working 
with youngsters were also initiated.  
 
Since those days, all youngsters who cause trouble in the neighborhood are personally 
evaluated by these parties in a monthly “security consultation” which takes place 
under the wing of the Security House. Regular meetings are held at the district 
department to discuss special security-related situations, such as New Year’s Eve, 
when many cars are burned. The measures taken led to a decline in the 
neighborhood’s crime and nuisance rates, as experienced by the inhabitants, the police 
and the district department.110 According to an annual questionnaire, the “citizens’ 
monitor,” the inhabitants of the neighborhood feel safer than a few years ago.111 The 
centralized policy approach has also led to more intensive consultations between the 
institutional domain and self-help organizations in the neighborhood, and a more 
uniform policy regarding the prevention of escalations in the neighborhood.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 See: “Je moet hier vaak je hoofd laten zien,” AD, July 7, 2007. 
http://www.ad.nl/ad/nl/1039/Utrecht/article/detail/2326438/2006/07/07/Je-moet-hier-vaak-je-
hoofd-laten-zien.dhtml 
110 See: “‘Definitief einde samenscholingsverbod Kanaleneiland,” NU.nl, December 1, 2009, 
http://www.nu.nl/binnenland/2134738/definitief-einde-samenscholingsverbod-kanaleneiland.html 
111 Compared with 2006, specifically experienced nuisances instigated by youth diminished by 25% in 
2009. Source: Wijkenmonitor 2009,  
http://www.utrecht.nl/images/Secretarie/Bestuursinformatie/Publicaties2009/pdf/wijkenmonitor2009.
pdf 
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In addition to the focus on security, I have heard representatives of the district 
department and the police express two other aims of the general approach which are 
more directed at the benefits of the youngsters and less at the benefits of the co-
inhabitants of the neighborhood. These two aims both point in different directions, 
though at the same time they complement each other in the eyes of the police and the 
district department. First of all, those boys who cause public nuisance have to be 
punished for their deviant behavior. A local police officer said to me about certain 
boys from the neighborhood who have repeated run-ins with the law: “It doesn’t 
work to try to improve the personality of these boys. The only thing you can do is 
punish them. Punish them hard.” According to the general approach, these boys have 
to be taken from the streets and isolated from their habitual environment, in which 
they are tempted to do bad things and are a burden to their surroundings.  
 
That same police officer also told me that he wished to show another side of his 
approach as well: “At all times, you should embrace the boys again after they are 
punished and tell them you wish to help.” This help is expressed in the other aim of 
the general approach, which I encountered in conversations; the boys should learn 
how to participate. What kind of participation is meant here did not become very clear 
in most conversations, but statements such as “the boys should take part in society 
like everybody else,” and “they should have a constructive daily occupation” suggest 
that the meaning of participation should be sought in the direction of good or active 
citizenship, work and education. This aim is not only practically translated into leisure 
activities which take place at the youth center, the sports center or in the open air 
during summer, but also in individual support to find internships, mental counseling 
or educational workshops. An important aspect of the view behind this aim of 
participation is that the boys should assume their own responsibility with respect to 
participating in an accepted way. The help offered by professionals in the 
neighborhood is limited, and the boys themselves are primarily responsible for finding 
a constructive way to spend their time and interact with their surroundings. “We are 
not going to take them by the hand all the time” was a sentiment I often heard. This 
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focus on the individual responsibility of the boys was often related to an explanation 
of rules and regulations, which are oriented less to the aim of participation and more 
to the aims of security and punishment. 
 
The point of view is it is your own responsibility how you spend your day. We wish 
to help you in this regard, we wish to offer you education, we wish to direct you to 
specialized assistance, but it is first and foremost your own responsibility and 
initiative. We know that that is easy to say with this target group, because these are 
youngsters with severe problems. Some are mentally handicapped or psychologically 
impaired. But the emphasis remains that you are yourself responsible for your own 
future. We wish to help you, but if you destroy something inside, smoke marijuana on 
a bench or drink beer, then you’ve come to the wrong address – then you have to be 
out on the streets. This means that you will not be alone, as youth outreach is also 
provided. We will be monitoring you. (Representative of district department) 
 
The motto “we will be monitoring you” sometimes takes drastic proportions. The 
wish to provide for security can lead to situations in which the formal procedures of 
the covenant overshadow less formal and more personal interactions between various 
parties in the neighborhood. Over-regulation and suppression of “street-level” 
interaction and cooperation in favor of “management-level” interaction and 
cooperation can be an effect. An example of such a situation can be found in the case 
of the light-bulb problem, which I mentioned in the interlude preceding this chapter. 
When the manager of the youth center found out that she was dealing with a group of 
notorious at-risk boys from the neighborhood who were supervised by new faces, 
who themselves were unaware of the covenant, she felt that this was a matter to 
discuss with the security manager of the district department in the first place. The case 
of the broken light bulb was hence first of all dealt with at the management level. The 
management of the police and the district department likes to keep “control strictly in 
their own hands” when it comes to the implementation of the total approach, as some 
professionals from the neighborhood expressed it. Sometimes, this control has to take 
a quite bureaucratic route before it reaches the actual place where the interaction with 
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the youth in question takes place. In the case of the broken light bulb, the first 
judgment about the situation was made by managers who had neither been present at 
the actual event itself nor ever had contact with the boy in question. Before Samir, the 
perpetrator, was confronted with his actions, a lot of discussions on the matter had 
already been conducted, and at the moment when he was confronted, no actual 
interaction with him took place. He was not asked, nor did he get a chance, to account 
for his behavior; rather, he was merely informed in a general way of the standard 
measures which would have to be taken in situations like these. 
 
In addition to these lines of communication, which are focalized in the supervision of 
the police and the district department, one can also distinguish a tendency to 
centralize the activities and support for at-risk boys in the neighborhood at the 
expense of a diversity of grassroots initiatives. Activities should only take place at 
official locations, which are managed and controlled by partners of the convenant. 
This issue can also be illustrated by the description of the light-bulb case. Since our 
focus group meeting had taken place in a facility run by a partner in the covenant, we 
had to abide by its rules. These rules had proven to be effective, as the caretaker told 
me, and set a clear standard of behavior for the boys. When we as newcomers tried to 
find our way around the covenant with an alternative punishment for Samir, this led 
to a reproach by a local police officer: “I am not happy at all with this course of 
events. You are deviating from the policy we have. That means undermining the total 
approach. But clarity is very nice for these boys.” The security manager of the district 
department also made it clear that non-partners of the covenant who organize 
alternative activities at alternative locations were not appreciated, out of fear that 
troublemakers would go “shopping at other locations” if they were denied access at 
the local youth center.  
 
We only have one place to offer to the youngsters, that is the youth center. That is 
the place where we support youth who are looking for a place to go. That is where 
the youth service is. That is where we get together. We are not going to offer 
something to do seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day, because that is not our 
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point of view. Of course, there are other organizations, but I am much more often 
sitting at the table with them, and they stick to our agreements. (Security manager, 
district department) 
 
Part of the general approach is that official institutions like the police and the district 
department have eyes everywhere to monitor what is happening in the neighborhood, 
and to work on containing the behavior of young troublemakers. Those eyes are 
literally present in the form of surveillance cameras, both inside and outside. Those 
eyes are also symbolically present in the encouragement of youth workers to transmit 
personal information about clients to the institutional domain, and a strict control on 
the working methods of self-help organizations dealing with at-risk youth in the 
neighborhood. What is proposed as transparency can therefore also be experienced as 
surveillance, and what is proposed as cooperation can also be experienced as 
discipline, to use concepts coined by Michel Foucault, as I will discuss in more detail 
in the last sections of this chapter. 
 
4.6. Frustrations of professionals regarding the general approach 
The “total approach” has been developed to restore tighter connections between the 
institutional domain and the inhabitants of the neighborhood, but also has its counter-
effects. Those professionals who are closest to the youngsters often react critically to 
the general approach, since they feel that their own, more personal, association to the 
boys is undervalued, while managerialism flourishes. It is the experience of various 
professionals I interviewed that the general approach does not leave room to build up 
a personal relation of trust with the boys. Professionals in the field fear that the 
policies of youth and security are effective on a short-term and superficial level, but 
do not contribute to a solution for problems which lie at a deeper socio-economic or 
psychological level. Such choices are made because the players who have the most 
power to decide in the neighborhood are not those with a direct connection to the 
young inhabitants and their hopes, worries and problems. The general approach 
therefore implies a power dynamics in which various forms of domination can be 
identified. The installation of security, discipline and punishment are favored over 
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personal guidance for the boys and the search for structural solutions for structural 
social problems (Moerings 2003). Management skills and knowledge of policies in the 
bureaucratic system are favored over practical skills and knowledge of the dynamics 
on the streets and in the family homes of the neighborhood.  
 
4.6.1. “What about the future of our children?” 
At the district department’s consultation of local self-help organizations dealing with 
youngsters in December 2010, two topics stood on the agenda: the regulations with 
respect to New Year’s Eve and the plans and activities for youngsters scheduled in the 
new year. By the time the security measures for New Year’s Eve were discussed with 
the police, the street coaches and the fire brigade, there was no time left to discuss the 
second topic on the agenda. The older president of a Moroccan association 
complained that the discussion about security measures had taken all the time of the 
meeting. Now there was no time left to discuss “the future and well-being of our 
children,” he said. Several other people present agreed with him and muttered that 
this did not happen for the first time. The topic of security often prevails over other 
concerns, such as education and work, which local organizations have in relation to 
youngsters from the neighborhood. Many of the professionals I interviewed agreed 
that the security focus of the total approach is not going to solve the problems that 
underlie the criminal behavior of boys in Kanaleneiland, but nevertheless takes up 
most attention. More personal attention and guidance will have a better effect in the 
longer term than a surveillance- and containment-based approach, in their opinion.  
 
I don’t really know what the view behind the policy is. I know the rules, but I do not 
know what they wish to establish in a longer term. Sometimes, I feel that the policy is 
literally and figuratively meant to keep the trouble outside of the door. The boys are 
sometimes called “care escapists,” but the caregivers seem to escape the boys as well, 
because they seem to be too difficult to handle. It is all about monitoring and 
punishment, but not about structural guidance. (Bachir, youth activity volunteer) 
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Many of the professionals I interviewed believe that the dominant emphasis on the 
youngsters taking their own responsibility to participate masks a lack of institutional 
support for individual guidance to new perspectives. The focus on security and 
punishment makes it easy to monitor the youngsters, and yet difficult to find the 
means and time to work on personal development. Particularly those boys who 
display the most difficult behavior are in need of intensive support for their personal 
development, according to many of the professionals. These boys cannot take their 
own responsibility if they are not structurally supported. 
 
Repression also rewards a negative attention to the boys’ behavior in the 
neighborhood, while you should reinforce the positive power in the boys themselves 
and their families. For this, you need to hold out long. Your patience has to be three 
times more than that of other people. The boys are used to receiving the 
consequences if they do not show for two, three times, but they actually need 
someone who will be there. Then you should not say, “Why were you not there last 
time?” No, you say, “Great that you are here this time.” You should never give up, 
just continue. Sometimes, I spend the first weeks just eating kebab with a boy, just to 
give him good food and some confidence. Only then we can start to work on other 
things, like going back to school or first going to soccer practice on time every week. 
(Saïd, 28-year-old youth worker) 
 
The rewarding of negative attention to bad behavior of at-risk boys is not only noticed 
by Saïd, but also by Zakaria, who grew up in Kanaleneiland himself and who runs an 
organization for cultural and sports activities with youngsters in the neighborhood. He 
believes that the policy focus on punishment and security does not have a lasting and 
constructive effect.  
 
We only offer services but no support in the Netherlands. The politicians and 
policymakers don’t want the problems to be solved, they only need to be manageable. 
Some years ago, the mayor of Utrecht called out and said that the situation in 
Kanaleneiland was untenable, and there you go, ten million was made available by the 
government. Then I thought: This is how it works, I have to remember that very well. (...) 
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Real support would be to put other ideas in the heads of those boys, so they will not get 
into the same situations again. But they are put in jail for some months and after that there 
is no follow-up care. That does not put other ideas in their head. (Zakaria, self-
organization for youth activities) 
 
The dominant framing of policies in terms of security also impacts funding and 
resources, according to some of my interlocutors. It is Zakaria’s feeling that money is 
only made available for new youth facilities when criminality and nuisance rise in the 
neighborhood, since this is what the political logic of supply and the demand 
prescribes. If there is enough media and political attention to certain security risks, the 
means are made available to deal with these risks in order to reassure the public. 
Zakaria told me a story about a group of youngsters he met in another neighborhood 
in Utrecht. They had been lobbying for funds for a new youth center in their area for 
a long time without any results. They told Zakaria they were thinking about starting to 
destroy things in the neighborhood, like windows, to attract attention. “We will start 
doing shit like those boys in Kanaleneiland, and then we will see how soon the new 
youth center will be there,” they threatened. “If those boys just remain calm, nothing 
will be fixed for them,” Zakaria concluded. A similar analysis resurfaced in many of 
the conversations I had, even with representatives of the district department.  
 
4.6.2. “The neighborhood is not a company” 
Most of the professionals I interviewed were critical of the dominance of the 
economic rationality characterizing the general approach, as well as of the strict 
application of regulations which are developed in the management domain. These 
regulations do not leave enough room for the experiences and skills of professionals 
“in the field.” The “managing” of security-related problems, which seems to be more 
profitable than a search for enduring social solutions, caused a volunteer in the 
neighborhood to sigh that “the neighborhood is not a company.” With this 
exclamation, he directly criticized the economic approach to what many of the 
professionals in the neighborhood perceive as social issues. The professionals who 
work with youngsters directly feel this shift in rationality in their work routine. A cost-
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efficient approach to the category of “at-risk youth,” leads to statistic indexes which 
have to be calculated and questionnaires which have to be completed, in hours which 
cannot be used for personal counseling of the boys or visits to the family. 
Bureaucratic processes and rigid policies sometimes make the professionals in the 
neighborhood feel that they have no space to develop their own working methods. A 
certain autonomy to take personal and situated decisions, which might vary from boy 
to boy, is not stimulated in the light of centralized policies. The professionals feel that 
they cannot leave such policies aside, since most of the organizations in the 
neighborhood depend on institutional support.  
 
“When you are subsidized, you get stuck to certain connections,” as Kadir, a volunteer 
from the neighborhood, expressed it. Many professionals feel that they need to 
perform according to the standards set by the general approach in order to be granted 
financial and political support by the district department. Mohamed, one of the youth 
workers I interviewed, criticized this tendency of local organizations to follow the 
wishes of the district department, just to be sure of institutional support, without 
making any independent, professional choices with respect to the interests of their 
clients. He also noticed the tendency of small organizations working with youngsters 
to see one another as rivals instead of as partners in the neighborhood. He laments 
the lack of cooperation out of own initiative, without interference of the consultations 
of the district department. The logic of the market does not always stimulate the 
desired cooperation between various organizations, but rather leads to competition 
without a clear goal. The competition for gaining institutional support, making enough 
promotion and demonstrating an effective basis for activities causes frustration, 
jealousy and distrust.  
 
The system of calling for tenders is a good example in this context. Every four years, 
the municipality writes out an invitation to tender with respect to the youth service in 
the neighborhood. Various large welfare organizations compete to receive the tender 
by showing their most SMART-proof business proposal, with the most attractive 
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tactics to meet the targets set by the municipality. If targets are not met as planned on 
short notice, a new tender is put out. This system results in a regular change of 
organizations in the field of youth work, with larger parties never staying longer than a 
few years in the neighborhood. Regular shifts of management and quickly changing 
expectations for the youth workers in the field are the result. Such changes lead to 
unrest in the neighborhood, and projects that have been recently launched often have 
to be abandoned. This lack of continuity is lamented by most of the professionals I 
interviewed112.  
 
Another effect of these free market processes is that management and marketing skills 
pay off more than social skills in the field of youth work. Those organizations that 
know how to fill out fund applications, network during meetings at the municipality 
and create flashy websites and posters stand a better chance of receiving approval 
from the institutional domain than those that spend most of the time on the streets 
and at family homes and do not know their way around the office. I have also noticed 
that the advantages of bureaucratic, management and corporate skills are often 
divided along ethnic and cultural lines, with highly educated, ethnically Dutch 
managers maintaining a dominant edge over practically trained Moroccan-Dutch 
grassroots professionals. In a neighborhood where a large majority of the inhabitants 
are of Moroccan descent, I was surprised to see that most of the people in higher 
positions are not originally from the neighborhood, are of ethnically Dutch descent 
and often verbally overrule those who do grassroots work in the area. This is 
illustrated by the fact that a self-organization set up by a group of Moroccan women 
from the neighborhood to support other women has an advisory board in which only 
ethnically Dutch professionals take part, and two managers who deal with the finances 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Not only professionals from Kanaleneiland are critical about the system of tender calls. See for 
example: “Aanbesteden van welzijnswerk zaait verdeeldheid onder professionals: ‘Reserves ontbreken 
voor het meedingen naar opdrachten.’” Zorg Welzijn. October 27, 2004. 
http://www.zorgwelzijn.nl/Welzijnswerk/Nieuws/2004/10/Aanbesteden-van-welzijnswerk-zaait-
verdeeldheid-onder-professionals-Reserves-ontbreken-voor-het-meedingen-naar-opdrachten-
ZWZ013283W/, and “Vluchten in aanbesteden.” Binnenlands Bestuur. May 22, 2009. 
http://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/sociaal/achtergrond/achtergrond/vluchten-in-
aanbesteden.116652.lynkx 
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who are also both ethnically Dutch. Furthermore, one of the members of the advisory 
board is also one of the local commanders of police. This indicates a close 
cooperation between the institutional domain and grassroots organizations, but also a 
high level of top-down control. The area of decision-making therefore does not reflect 
the composition of the neighborhood, but rather the dominance of a governing 
“autochthonous” elite. 
 
4.7. Lost boys escaping control 
Many professionals feel that over-classification is an important reason for the lack of 
personal attention to clients in their profession. The need to fit people into general 
categories makes it more difficult to search for someone’s individual ambitions and 
capacities in a qualitative way, according to resettlement worker Tim. The boys 
themselves also notice this. When we discussed the youth work in the neighborhood 
during the focus group meetings, the boys’ reactions were always negative. “What 
have they done for us?” and “What have we seen from them?” were frequent remarks. 
Tariq once said: “There are agencies on top of us we don’t even know about.” His 
words make clear that the boys are well aware that they are subject to extensive 
monitoring but do not feel personally involved in this process. Most of the boys feel 
explicitly offended by this approach. Tim understands why: 
 
Our job becomes more and more technical. It is like a moral classification. Based on your 
lifestyle, your risk profile is calculated and the necessary guidance is also calculated. In 
society, we want to be able to measure everything. The boys wish to escape that because 
they seriously distrust these systems. It is about classifying and drilling. But not everyone 
is willing to be drilled. (Tim, former resettlement organization employee) 
 
The distrust which youngsters have towards the approach of the youth service, the 
police and the district department was often discussed during our focus group 
meetings. The goals set by the general approach do not connect with the experiences 
of the boys. The aim to get the boys off the streets and reduce the inconvenience 
experienced by other inhabitants of the neighborhood is seen by the boys as a threat 
 251 
to their privacy. The presence of surveillance cameras and regular police checks give 
the boys the feeling that they are constantly followed and observed and cannot move 
about freely in public space. Since the streets are the boys’ main base, they feel overly 
controlled and even routed by the police.  
 
The police are like ants. They’re crawling around everywhere. It is an infestation. 
(Nouredine, 18 years old) 
 
The boys withdraw themselves from the regulative efforts of those with a managing 
influence in the neighborhood. They try to escape all disciplining mechanisms and 
find refuge in their own domain with its own code of conduct. In this regard, it is 
quite symbolic that the greatest wish of the boys with respect to the neighborhood is 
to have a place for themselves. After our trip to Grigny, we discussed in the focus 
group meetings what the boys would like to report to the district department and the 
youth work service about their experiences. I asked them what their wishes and 
recommendations were regarding the neighborhood. The most important thing the 
boys expressed was a wish for their own place to get together. Their idea was to have 
something like a portable shipping container on the side of the canal, away from the 
apartment buildings, where no neighbors would complain about noise, where they 
could listen to music, play games and just hang out together. They would prefer to 
have the control of the place in their own hands. They were already thinking about 
having a rotating pool of “caretakers,” each for a short period of time. Opening hours 
should also be flexible, the boys thought.  
 
Like many other thoughts of the boys, this idea is diametrically opposed to the point 
of view taken by the district department and the youth service, who stress that there 
should be one place where all youths of the neighborhood come to spend their free 
time: the youth center. This boys, however, do not feel welcome in the youth center 
and display behavior which often cannot be handled in the youth center. The fact that 
they do not conform to normal behavior makes it impossible to work with them in 
the settings of the youth services offered, while they are at the same time exactly the 
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population which the youth services should reach. The boys are seen as the lost boys 
of the neighborhood and often also find themselves lost on the streets. 
 
4.8. Risk management as central concern of governance 
After the previous sections in which I discussed the relationship between the 
community of experience of at-risk boys from Kanaleneiland and the local policy 
sphere, I will now place these dynamics in a broader political perspective. The focus 
of the “Youth and Security” approach on responsibilization and participation on the 
one hand, and measures of discipline, surveillance and control on the other hand, can 
be seen as embedded in a more general governmental trend. This trend is framed by 
neoliberalism and characterized by risk management, a market-led approach to social 
issues, the coupling of securization and responsibilization and the extensive 
monitoring of deviant groups within society. In the following sections, I will discuss 
the general framework of “governmentality,” a specific modern approach to 
conducting the population, within which the general policy approach to at-risk youth 
in Kanaleneiland should be understood. My analysis of the notion of governmentality 
has primarily been derived from the work of Michel Foucault, and complemented by 
the work of others active in the field of “governmentality studies” and criminology.  
 
In this section, I will first discuss the notion of risk prevention as an important 
characteristic of the kind of society in which governmentality dominates state politics. 
The preoccupation with risks and the desired protection against risks both lie at the 
basis of policies regarding the containment of youth’s delinquent behavior and guide 
the discourse around such policies, including the choice to speak of “at-risk boys.” In 
Section 9, I will discuss the underlying rationality and intentions of a model of 
governmentality, continuing in Section 10 with a description of the techniques of 
governance which can be associated with governmentality. In Section 11, I will focus 
on the coupling of these techniques with techniques of discipline and punishment. 
This combination leads to an all-encompassing normative view of at-risk groups, such 
as young urban troublemakers, which has exclusionary and stigmatizing consequences. 
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The last section of this chapter will be dedicated to a first exploration of possible 
forms of agency that could confront the depoliticizing effect of the neoliberal model 
of governance discussed here and its increase of the distance between politics and the 
community of experience of deviant groups of citizens. 
 
4.8.1 Preventing the worst through risk management 
The need for developing a policy regarding youth and security is closely related to the 
designation of boys who display troublesome behavior as “at-risk youth.” As Ulrich 
Beck has pointed out, Western neoliberal and capitalist societies are strongly 
preoccupied with risk management (Beck 1992). Beck defines risk as “a systematic 
way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization 
itself.” (ibid., 21) A preoccupation with the accumulation of wealth characterizes 
neoliberal and capitalist societies and, with modernization, endless possibilities of 
doing so have emerged, according to Beck. More natural resources are exploited, new 
production technologies are invented and the territory of the market is ever 
expanding, as well as the needs and wishes of consumers. However, efforts to increase 
our wealth come with unintended consequences. Modern societies are faced with a 
wide variety of risks: epidemics, natural disasters, stock exchange crashes, terrorist 
attacks and crime and riots are but a few examples of possible events that can heavily 
influence human efforts to accumulate wealth.  
 
The need to calculate and prevent all these risks is directly connected to the aims of 
modern society itself. The relationship between capitalist development and risk 
management is therefore completely self-referential, according to Beck. The self-
referential circle within capitalist development, which produces risks that have to be 
calculated and managed in order to let capitalism continue its development, has lead 
to the point at which risk management itself has become the primary aim of 
governance in late-modern societies. This leads to a speculative and negative 
orientation of governance, which is directed towards preventing the worst that the 
future might bring. The just and equal distribution of what was already gained in the 
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past becomes a lesser concern, and this has consequences for our social and political 
awareness. “Whereas the utopia of equality contains a wealth of substantial and positive 
goals of social change, the utopia of the risk society remains peculiarly negative and 
defensive. Basically, one is no longer concerned with attaining something ‘good,’ but 
rather with preventing the worst” (Beck 1992, 49). In the risk society, “solidarity from 
anxiety arises and becomes a political force” (ibid.). 
 
The fact that fear becomes a source for policy development is particularly seen in the 
domain of crime control. The monitoring of feelings of (in)security has become a 
crucial factor in institutional approaches to crime, often inspiring policies more than 
impacting actual crime rates (Elffers and De Jong 2004, Oppelaar and Wittebrood 
2006). Stereotypical images of dangerous perpetrators, ranging from perverted child 
molesters to bearded Islamic terrorists, inspire debates on crime regulation and 
punishment.  
 
Accompanying these projected images, and in rhetorical response to them, the new 
discourse of crime policy consistently invokes an angry public, tired of living in fear, 
demanding strong measures of punishment and protection. The background affect of 
policy is now more frequently a collective anger and a righteous demand for 
retribution rather than a commitment to a just, socially engineered solution. (Garland 
2001, 10-11) 
 
Against this backdrop, one can understand the emergence of the classification of “at-
risk youth.” Adolescent boys with an immigrant background who populate public 
space in neighborhoods like Kanaleneiland represent many fears of inhabitants 
(Bovenkerk 2003). The risk of these boys disturbing the “liveability” of the 
neighborhood is perceived as extremely high and justifies a tailor-made institutional 
approach for this group. However, the benefits to the surrounding neighborhood are 
not the only things considered in this approach. The general development of the boys 
themselves as rightly participating citizens is equally concerned. Policies regarding at-
risk youth are oriented towards crime prevention, job opportunities, family relations 
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and education. This broad approach is justified from a defensive perspective of 
prevention. All possible areas in which problems might occur have to be taken into 
account.  
 
4.8.2. Coalitions of state institutions and civil society working on prevention 
Like other forms of risk management, policies regarding at-risk youth are primarily 
oriented towards the future. The Utrecht program for grants in support of at-risk 
youth, appropriately named “Our Future,” explicitly states that it is aimed at the 
prevention of problems and the offering of opportunities.113 A broad approach in 
which the boys’ participation in the family, at school, in the neighborhood and on the 
job market are all monitored to be able to intervene as soon as trouble emerges fits 
these aims. Such an approach is characteristic for a contemporary shift in thinking 
about crime, as David Garland notes. Policies related to crime regulation used to be 
led by a “correctionalist rationale,” which means that crime was seen as an exception, 
as a display of deviant behavior, which could be corrected by the right kind of 
punishment and guidance (Garland 2001, 40). Crime regulation policies were mainly 
aimed at intervening in case and after the crime has taken place in order to restore 
order. Imprisonment and probation were focused on the re-socialization and re-
integration of convicts into normal, civilized interactions. Nowadays, crime is no 
longer seen as an exception, but rather as one of the inevitable risks which our late-
modern society has to deal with. In a capitalist system in which the opportunities to 
accumulate wealth flourish, the opportunities to commit crimes also flourish. Crime is 
therefore calculated as an aspect of everyday interactions.  
 
From this new rationale, crime is viewed “prospectively and in aggregate terms, for the 
purpose of calculating risks and shaping preventative measures.” (Garland 2001, 128) 
Crime prevention takes place no longer only in the domain of institutional law 
enforcement, but also in the field of civil organizations and social professionals. The 
general approach to at-risk youth therefore stretches from family life to education and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 See: “Stand van zaken Onze Toekomst,” 2011, 
http://www.utrecht.nl/images/BCD/Bestuursinformatie/publicaties/2011/OnzeToekomst2011.pdf 
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counts on the support of a wide variety of partners, from the municipality, police and 
justice department to civil partners like neighborhood social services and the 
community itself, as the “Our Future” brochure states (Feeley and Simon, 1992). The 
control of everyday life is thus expanding to cover potential situations which might 
give rise to criminal acts. With this reasoning in mind, surveillance cameras on squares 
and in youth centers, house visits of municipal intervention teams and street coaches 
all become desirable. “Where an older criminology concerned itself with disciplining 
delinquent individuals or punishing legal subjects, the new approach identifies 
recurring criminal opportunities and seek to govern them by developing situational 
controls that will make them less tempting or less vulnerable” (ibid., 129). 
 
The need for an integrated approach in which various partners develop an extensive 
“supply chain” of security methods owes itself to an increase in crime numbers since 
the 1970s, as well as the rapid development of new forms of criminality and a 
perceived intensification of the complexity of criminal behavior, which relates to 
various domains in society, such as family life, education and city planning (Garland 
2001). The authorities are no longer able to ensure the security of the citizens on their 
own, since the issue of crime and security has grown beyond their exclusive control. 
These developments have led to a sharing of responsibility for security measures and 
crime control between state institutions and civil society. In an integrated approach to 
security, the state is one of the partners in the chain alongside schools, private security 
companies, social work, recruitment offices, neighborhood committees, housing 
corporations, mosques and cultural centers. Citizens are encouraged to actively get 
involved in reducing situations which could offer opportunities for criminal behavior. 
Examples like neighborhood policing, but also survival holidays which are jointly 
organized by youth work and the police, parenting courses and detection gates in 
schools can all be understood in this light. When it comes to security mechanisms, it is 
no longer possible to speak of one “Big Brother” watching over the population, but 
rather of several little sisters who share the task of policing, monitoring and indicating 
(Schuilenberg 2008). Authorities are still steering, but not rowing (Van Steden 2011, 
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11). State institutions are still supervising and initiating programs and policies 
regarding security and crime, but this is done by means of “governing at a distance” 
and the implementation is largely left to partners in civil society (Rose and Miller 
1992). 
 
4.9. The governance of free circulation 
The widening scope of crime regulation has been extensively analyzed by Michel 
Foucault in the light of the emergence of modern governance and governmentality 
(Foucault 2007, 2008). Like Garland, Foucault also signals a type of crime regulation 
that is no longer restricted to the discipline and punishment of those who have already 
deviated from the norm, but has moved on to permeate all aspects of the daily life of 
possible offenders and their surroundings. This extensive technique of regulation is 
embedded within a broader approach to governance, which I will discuss in the 
following sections. Governmentality is a specific form of organizing power relations. I 
focus on Foucault’s notion of governmentality as the principal mode of managing the 
population within the present system of institutional politics in Western European 
societies. This approach to political management is characterized by an economic 
rationality. A more structural analysis of the underlying intentions and mode of 
thinking of contemporary governance will contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
functionality of practices of risk management and crime regulation within its 
governing context. The relationship between deviant groups, such as young urban 
troublemakers, and institutional politics is embedded within this state-induced 
approach to the management of the population. After having studied Foucault’s 
structural approach to the organization of power on an institutional level here, in the 
last part of my thesis I will turn to the possibility for people to influence and 
transform power configurations in a critical and even subversive way. In this last part 
of my dissertation Foucault will return as interlocutor. 
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4.9.1. Governing in the interest of the population 
Foucault closely relates the emergence of governmentality to a distinct model of 
knowledge and power production, in which an intensified development of security 
mechanisms is embedded.  
 
First, by “governmentality” I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, 
procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of 
this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, 
political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its 
essential technical instrument. (Foucault 2007, 108) 
 
The notion of governmentality originates in questions about the governing or 
conducting of oneself and others (Foucault 2007, 121-122). To conduct or to govern 
may mean to morally and spiritually guide one’s own soul or someone else’s, or to 
impose a certain control over someone’s physical or mental behavior. It may imply a 
coercive relation of command and control, but it can also imply the open exchange of 
words, knowledge and even sexual affection. Both elements of control and exchange 
that form a part of governance play a role in different matters of the governance of 
people, ranging from the education of children to the managing of a household and 
the government of the state. “The art of governance” in a more political context first 
emerged in the late sixteenth century, and was further developed in the eighteenth 
century into a mechanism of political power which still dominates the domain of 
institutional politics today, according to Foucault. Two historical shifts in matters of 
governance which took place in the sixteenth century heralded the development of 
political governmentality, as it was set in motion in the eighteenth century (Foucault 
2007, 89). Under influence of the emergence of modern, centralized states with a 
larger and – in the case of colonial states – distant territory, state administrations 
changed their exercise of power. At the same time, spiritual guidance changed shape 
and became less centralized under the influence of “religious dispersion and 
dissidence,” caused by the Reformation and the Counter Reformation. It is from these 
two movements of national centralization and religious decentralization of large 
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amounts of people that political governmentality in Western Europe originated. 
Tracing the historical roots of this governmentality helps explain practices of 
regulation and surveillance that are dominant within current institutional politics. 
 
The political governance, which takes shape in the period of governmentality, 
operates on another level, and it is expressed through techniques other than the 
absolute power of the sovereign, modeled after the Machiavellian Prince, according to 
Foucault (ibid., 93). It is no longer the singular position of the sovereign that needs to 
be protected by the act of governing, but rather the free and secure existence of all 
those who are governed by the state. The well-being of the entire population, in its 
diversity, is the main objective of modern governance. The rationality behind the 
sovereign governance of the Prince has therefore been turned upside down. Within 
the framework of governmentality, institutions of modern governance no longer have 
their own continued existence as their main objective, but become instrumental to the 
collective interests of the population. In the era of modern governance, which spans 
the whole modern period from the eighteenth century to today for Foucault, the 
population has become both the object and subject of political governance. 
Governing institutions intend to “improve the condition of the population, to 
increase its wealth, its longevity, and its health” (ibid., 105). The population is both 
“the subject of needs and aspirations,” which guide the course of governing 
institutions and “the object of government manipulation” (ibid, 105). It is therefore 
no longer the strictly vertical relation between the sovereign and his/her subjects that 
is important within modern day governance, but rather a networked pattern of 
circulating desires and transactions between the people, state institutions and the 
market. Paradoxically enough, these desires and interactions are carefully controlled 
and managed in order to create a free exchange of everything that the population 
needs to optimally develop itself. Under the influence of governmentality, people are 
no longer molded into obedient citizens according to a pre-shaped framework 
designed by the state; instead, state institutions should be shaped so as to fit civil 
associations. However, this does not signify that coercive, state-led practices that 
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interfere in the lives of citizens have entirely disappeared. It merely signifies that the 
techniques of state-led control over the life of the population have evolved from clear 
cut top-down coercion into more complex processes of internal self-management 
within the population, and silently, externally imposed manipulation.  
 
4.9.2. Biopolitics 
The technology of power management and production, which is applied within a 
structure of governmentality, can be named biopolitics, according to Foucault. Within 
biopolitics, biological processes become the subject of management and control in 
order to regulate the conditions of human life (Foucault 2003, 242-243). This 
technology of power is distinct from, but does not exclude, the technologies of power, 
which Foucault associates with sovereign power. Sovereign power is characterized by 
disciplinary techniques, in which the individual is constructed and monitored by 
focusing on the personal body of each member of the population, and surveilling, 
training and punishing this individual body if necessary. Techniques of biopolitics also 
shape the subjectivity of people, but operate on the level of the entire population. Not 
the individual body, but the body of society is its subject. This body is treated as a 
multiplicity which in its variety can nevertheless be governed as a “global mass” (ibid., 
242), since it is affected by the same general processes of human life. Various new 
techniques are developed to understand, predict and control these processes in order 
to secure the well-being of the population. Since this population consists of a 
differentiated multiplicity, the effects of processes like sickness, crime, poverty and 
other risks have to be carefully calculated (Foucault 2007, 61). Biopolitics is 
characterized by regulatory mechanisms, rather than disciplinary mechanisms 
(Foucault 2003, 249). Statistics predicting fertility, birth and mortality rates, and mass 
security measures dealing with possible risks yet to occur, like vaccinations and 
insurances, were all developed in the era of modern governance. Control over the 
calculation of these “statistics” is in the hands of state institutions, and statistics are 
therefore one of the crucial state instruments for the management of the population. 
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4.9.3. A new political economy 
The management of the population became a complex enterprise, requiring new 
instruments such as statistics, as soon as Western states had to deal with growing 
territories and growing numbers of inhabitants. The development of governmentality 
is directly related to the shift in scale from feudal, rural societies to industrialized and 
urbanized societies. With this expansion, a new economic rationality is developed. 
Traditional technologies of knowledge and power no longer suffice to regulate the 
expanding production of goods and the expanding population, which has to benefit 
from them. In order to prevent scarcity and the risk of civil unrest that accompanies 
it, free and effective circulation of money, goods and people has to be safeguarded by 
the state. Foucault states that the governance of such free circulation of goods and 
consumers becomes the objective of a new form of political economy. Rather than 
being preoccupied with the question of its own legitimation, like in the days of strictly 
sovereign power, the governmental practice is now characterized by a calculation of 
the effect it has on the prosperity of the market and the population. The relationship 
between state institutions and civil society is not only prescribed by the law, but also 
by the logic of the market, and the population is not only seen as subject to the law, 
but also as homo economicus. Governing institutions should enhance the freedom of the 
population by facilitating the free circulation of people and things (Foucault 2007, 49). 
The homo economicus is a manageable human being, in as far as the market can be 
modified. As a consequence, the rule of costs and benefits becomes more influential 
than the rule of law within the rationality of governmentality. If governmental 
measures work, they can be approved, regardless of their legitimacy. “In other words, 
there will be either success or failure; success or failure, rather than legitimacy or 
illegitimacy, now become the criteria of governmental action.” (Foucault 2008, 16) 
This rationality of political economy leads to a “self-limitation of governmental 
reason,” according to Foucault. Whereas the sovereign could never govern enough, 
the question of modern governance, which is informed by political economy, is how 
not to govern too much. The raison d’Etat of governmentality is therefore essentially 
liberal (Foucault 2008, 20-22).  
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At the same time, this political-economic reasoning leads to a paradox that is typically 
liberal according to Foucault: in order to create space and freedom for the market to 
take its natural course, and for the people to make autonomous decisions about their 
lives, the government needs to keep a distance. But in order to guarantee a maximum 
of freedom, social and economic interactions have to be regulated. Therefore, 
freedom has to be created (Foucault 2008, 65). Foucault states that freedom is not just 
the effect of a laissez faire attitude, as a certain classical understanding of liberalism 
prescribes. Paradoxically enough, to create a maximum of freedom for the population, 
certain specific freedoms have to be restricted. Risks, which could potentially curtail 
the freedom of the population, have to be managed in such a way that the population 
does not feel overly restricted or directed. The natural course of events should 
therefore be the standard to impose regulations which latently cover the whole scope 
of daily life, but only become apparent when things actually get out of hand. 
 
Natural phenomena will have to be framed in such a way that they do not veer off 
course, or in such a way that clumsy, arbitrary, and blind intervention does not make 
them veer off course. That is to say, it will be necessary to set up mechanisms of 
security. The fundamental objective of governmentality will be mechanisms of 
security, or, let’s say, it will be state intervention with the essential function of 
ensuring the security of the natural phenomena of economic processes or processes 
intrinsic to population. (Foucault 2007, 353) 
 
4.10. Techniques relating to security and crime 
After having discussed the general characteristics of modern governmentality as 
sketched out by Foucault, I will now turn to the more specific techniques of 
governance which can be associated with this rationale of managing society. A 
discussion of these techniques becomes relevant in analyzing the approach to youth 
and security in a neighborhood such as Kanaleneiland. Security measures are needed 
in order to protect the collective interests and needs of the population against the 
divergent needs and interests of certain deviant individuals (Foucault 2008, 65). At the 
same time, the collective interests of the population should not be used to overly 
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curtail individual freedom. The liberal paradox of imposed restrictions in order to 
maximize freedom leads to dreams of a security utopia: a society in which both 
security and freedom are maximized (Boutellier 2005). A political-economic balance 
needs to be found in the dynamics between these two extremes. It is within security 
strategies that this balance is at stake.  
 
4.10.1. Targeting everyone as a potential offender  
The central role that security measures play within a system of governmentality 
becomes explicitly apparent in the dealing with the risk of crime. 
 
The general question basically will be how to keep a type of criminality, theft for 
instance, within socially and economically acceptable limits and around an average 
that will be considered as optimal for a given social functioning. (Foucault 2008, 5) 
 
This question of the containment of risks of criminality is an economic question for 
Foucault, since it questions “the relation between the cost of repression and the cost 
of delinquency” (ibid., 9). Mechanisms of security, which can serve to deal with this 
issue, are further enhanced in neoliberal governance, the contemporary strategy of 
institutional governmentality. Typical for neoliberal governance is the valuation of 
non-market phenomena with an economic mind-set (Foucault 2008, 240). Social 
relations are analyzed in a perspective of supply and demand, costs and benefits, 
success and failure. A vocabulary which matches this rationality has been introduced 
into the social field, as well as a whole set of security mechanisms which can be used 
for risk management. It has become common practice to speak of “consumers,” 
“supply chains” “market value” and “creation of capital” in relation to education, 
health care and crime control. In the field of crime control, one speaks of “a balance 
between the curves of the supply of crime and negative demand” (ibid., 256). 
 
Under the influence of neoliberal governmentality, crime is perceived as an 
inextricable part of society which cannot be completely eradicated, but which should 
be managed in the most effective way. Extensive monitoring systems are developed to 
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calculate the susceptibility of groups and individuals to engage in crime. These systems 
are used in institutions that are traditionally responsible for crime control, such as the 
police and probation offices, but also in institutions that are traditionally associated 
with the social domain, such as health care, education and youth work. Such 
monitoring systems consist of questionnaires and statistic indexes, which are time- 
and cost-effective, and aimed at the production of generally applicable knowledge 
about at-risk groups and risk behavior. Individual counseling and re-socialization form 
a part of the approach, but are not its primary aim.  
 
This neoliberal approach to crime can be recognized in contemporary policy practices, 
such as the ones which I discussed in Section 5. An example is the “shortlist method,” 
which is used in the Netherlands to map out youth groups that dwell in public space 
(Ferwerda & Kloosterman 2004). This method is also used in Kanaleneiland, as I 
mentioned before. Neighborhood police use a questionnaire to make an inventory of 
different groups of youngsters who can be found regularly in public places in the area. 
Information collected by means of the questionnaire includes the ethnic composition 
of the group, the locations where the group tends to gather, the daily occupation of 
the group members, “risky habits” like use of drugs and alcohol and the criminal 
records of group members. Each group is categorized on a scale ranging from 
annoying, to disturbing, to criminal. The information gathered by the shortlist method 
per neighborhood is shared citywide with the so-called “triangle” of the city mayor, 
the police and the Prosecution Council. In order to work as cost-effective as possible, 
“the triangle” makes a priority list of the groups per neighborhood which are most 
likely to cause trouble. These groups become the subject of the kind of “integrated 
approach,” which I have discussed in relation to Kanaleneiland, and which is 
coordinated by the security manager of the district department of the municipality, 
together with the police, youth work, probation, the Youth Care Agency (Bureau 
Jeugdzorg) and social organizations from the neighborhood. The integrated approach 
can range from the removal of benches from squares, to parenting courses and 
individual debt restructuring. Penal measures are included, but the approach reaches 
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further. The integral approach to youth and security tends to be further specialized in 
integrated approaches for specific target groups, like Moroccan-Dutch at-risk youth 
(Vandenbroucke et al. 2008). 
 
Characteristic for the approach based on the shortlist method is that, in principle, all 
youngsters who pass their time on squares and street corners are targeted as potential 
offenders. It is not a sketch of deviant behavior of drop-outs and criminals, which is 
the approach’s point of departure, but rather a broad sketch of each neighborhood 
situation in which criminality might occur. All young people who take part in such 
situations become an interesting object of study. The next step is to effectively single 
out the most likely problematic cases in order to deal in an economic way with the 
resources and information at hand. We can see that this approach fits Garland’s 
description of the “criminology of everyday life” (2001, 127-131) and is inscribed in 
the political economic rationality which has been described by Foucault in relation to 
neoliberal governmentality.  
 
4.10.2. The changing role of civil society 
In the general approach to potential young delinquents, we see that a close 
cooperation between state institutions and organizations of civil society, or between 
the public and the private sector, is very common. Tasks like policing, which were 
traditionally carried out by state institutions, are now shared with other partners in 
society and with members of the community themselves (O’Malley and Palmer 1996). 
Foucault notes that the meaning of the notion of civil society is changing in the period 
of governmentality (2008, 296). Traditionally, the term civil society denoted a juridical 
and political bond within a certain community. Under influence of the political-
economic rationality of governmentality, civil society is also understood as an 
association of economic subjects, with economic interests. Within the notion of civil 
society, the population is both addressed as a homogeneous subject of rights and a 
collective of economic actors. The integration of the juridical and the economic 
domain is completed within civil society, according to Foucault, and we can see that 
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both more classical dimensions of sovereign power, as well as a political economic 
rationality, are combined in the relationship between civil society and the state. This 
leads to a situation in which the government of the population balances between 
legislative measures that the state imposes on citizens as legal subjects and an appeal 
to active participation in the market sphere of citizens as economic subjects. The 
cooperation between governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations 
to reduce crime risks must be understood in this light.  
 
In earlier periods of European modern governance, in which neoliberalism was less 
influential, the state was seen as responsible for providing for the basic needs of the 
population, since citizens are entitled to the right of basic social security precisely 
because of their citizenship status. In the context of the traditional welfare state, the 
citizen was primarily addressed as the bearer of social rights (Marshall 1963), but in 
“advanced liberal democracies” (Rose 1996) citizens are expected to merit social rights 
by means of their creation of social and economic capital. The focus on 
responsibilization and participation within the general approach to at-risk youth in 
Kanaleneiland can be understood within this context. Basic social security is no longer 
granted without active civic participation in return.  
 
 “[T]he rationality of the governed must serve as the regulating principle for the 
rationality of government” (Foucault 2008, 312). In return, it is expected that the 
governed actively clarify and sustain the rationality which underlies their interests. It is 
therefore logical that the neoliberal understanding of civil society is related to a 
technique of “responsibilization” (Garland 1996, 2001; Burchell 1993; Muncie 2006). 
Since the population is governed in its own interests, it is evident that the population 
also has to take responsibility for its own governance. Civil society has to take the 
responsibility to co-shape “good governance” together with state institutions, since it 
is in its own interest to do so. This becomes the main argument for encouraging the 
active participation of partners from civil society regarding general security measures. 
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Efforts to discipline and normalize at-risk boys in order for them to take on the role 
of “good citizens” stem from the same approach to the building of a healthy society. 
 
At the same time, the idea of responsibilization stands at the heart of the paradox of 
neoliberal governmentality. The belief that state-imposed measures are needed to 
guarantee a maximum of free circulation within the population leads not only to 
techniques of general risk management, but also goes together with techniques of 
individual discipline and punishment. Therefore, a tension exists between a rhetoric 
about the responsibilization of civil society, combined with governance at a distance 
in the interests of the population itself, and a close state-controlled monitoring of the 
right kind of civic participation, also in the interests of the population itself. In the 
same line, we see that efforts to shape at-risk boys into good citizens are supported by 
methods of discipline and punishment that enforce certain dominant frames of 
civilized behavior under the pretext of benefitting those who are in need of being 
normalized. 
 
4.11. A penal panopticism in the neighborhood 
Foucault repeatedly stresses that the focus within neoliberal governance on the 
population’s own interests, the free circulation of goods and people, and the 
responsibility of civil society to bring good governance into practice does not signify a 
complete break from state-induced mechanisms of surveillance, discipline and 
punishment that are imposed on people who deviate from the norm.  
 
[W]e can say that there is one element that will circulate between the disciplinary and 
the regulatory, which will also be applied to body and population alike, which will 
make it possible to control both the disciplinary order of the body and the aleatory 
events that occur in the biological multiplicity. The element that circulates between 
the two is the norm. The norm is something that can be applied to both a body one 
wishes to discipline and a population one wishes to regularize. (Foucault 2003, 
252,253) 
 
 268 
The normalization of deviant people was initially described by Foucault in relation to 
state mechanisms preceding the age of governmentality, in which techniques of 
discipline and punishment were inscribed in the individual body. For the general 
management of the population in neoliberal governance, power mechanisms are 
operated on both the individual level and the collective level. This means that 
techniques of regulation at the individual level, such as panoptic structures of 
surveillance, are combined with more generally applied mechanisms of normalization 
which seem to stem from the internal dynamics of civil society itself. In this section, I 
will discuss how the relation of techniques of discipline and punishment are entwined 
with efforts towards normalization. This description will clarify how strong normative 
judgments and an authoritarian containment of at-risk boys appear under the veneer 
of an appeal to the “own benefits” of the boys in question. The stigmatization and 
exclusion of at-risk boys is therefore not solved in a neoliberal model of governance 
which claims to operate in the interests of the population in its entirety. 
 
4.11.1. The normative nature of citizenship expectations 
The influence of coercive expectations about desired citizenship on regulative 
measures pertaining to “at-risk groups,” such as young urban troublemakers from 
Kanaleneiland, is embedded within a process of normalization. Within purely 
disciplinary power mechanisms, the norm has a prescriptive function. Within 
neoliberal governance, the norm seems to emerge from real data about the average 
behavior of the population, as it is gathered through statistic instruments, according to 
Foucault. No immediate separation between the normal and abnormal is envisioned, 
but the expected impact of abnormal behavior on the total of the population is 
predicted. Measures are then taken to manage this risk, which in principle account for 
the population at large, and not only for the problem cases. Here, the norm seems to 
have a stronger matter-of-fact reliability. The norm is not pre-given and prescriptive, 
but is deduced from the behavior of the average part of the population (Foucault 
2007, 63). The way in which mechanisms of security that are related to neoliberal 
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governance work on the normalization of people therefore seems to be less 
“normative,” i.e. less inspired by moral judgment.  
 
However, this appearance is just as paradoxical as other elements of the neoliberal 
rationality. State authorities do make use of disciplinary and penal mechanisms in 
order to normalize those who tend to deviate from the path of the average citizen. 
The protection of the part of the population indicated by the statistics as average 
justifies measures against those who could be seen as at-risk groups. The paradoxical 
character of coercive measures, which are introduced by the state in order to meet the 
general interests of the population, and security technologies, which are meant to 
guarantee the freedom of the majority by restricting the space of movement of a 
divergent minority, returns on the local level, in neighborhoods like Kanaleneiland. 
We are constantly reminded that such paradoxical measures are taken for the own 
good of civil society, and can only be endorsed by the collective responsibility of 
active citizens, while governing institutions are not only closely watching every step of, 
but are also deliberately interfering in, the lives of those who do not display a certain 
generally desired civic participation. 
 
4.11.2. Security provided for the privileged 
The development of an apparatus of security mechanisms is not opposed to, but goes 
hand in hand with a demand for severe punishment, public shaming, isolation from 
the community and re-education in special camps or institutions for at-risk boys114. It 
becomes clear that governmentality does not always lead to a well-appreciated and 
effective mode of governance that is non-centralized, horizontal and inspired by the 
demands and needs of the population. Experiences of injustice, discrimination and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 See: “Criminoloog: Hijs Bijlmertuig in roze tutu.” Spits. November 19, 2010. 
http://www.spitsnieuws.nl/archives/binnenland/2010/11/criminoloog_hijs_bijlmertuig_i.html; “Het 
Marokkanen-probleem ettert voort: Het is tijd voor repressie van Marokkaans tuig” The Post Online. April 
9, 2013. http://politiek.thepostonline.nl/column/het-marokkanenprobleem-ettert-voort/; “Antilliaanse 
criminelen heropvoeden op tuchtscholen” Nu.nl. November 19, 2005. 
http://www.nu.nl/algemeen/628644/antilliaanse-criminelen-heropvoeden-op-tuchtscholen.html; 
“Concentratiekampen voor Marokkanen?” Joop.nl. July 3, 2013. 
http://www.joop.nl/opinies/detail/artikel/21822_concentratiekampen_voor_marokkanen/ 
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repression have not gone away in these times of neoliberal governance, but have often 
been intensified. The omnipresence of security mechanisms favor certain groups in 
society, while others become increasingly vulnerable, and the rationality of political 
economy leads to a neglect of various social problems. 
 
Also, the moral classification of at-risk groups has not disappeared with 
governmentality and, as such, still leads to various experiences of exclusion and 
discrimination. Youth crime control and prevention is characterized by a network of 
social relations in which class domination is expressed over youngsters from a 
working class and low educated background (Gray 2009, 448). This social dynamics 
often leads to a moral judgment of young offenders, which is not only influenced by 
class distinctions, but also by ethnic and racial distinctions. Xenophobic feelings play a 
part in the formulation of arguments for a strict, punitive attitude towards “at-risk 
boys” with an immigrant background115. Apart from such moral judgements, research 
also shows that youth with a migrant background are often punished more severely 
for a similar crime than youth of “autochtonous” origins (Komen & Van Schooten 
2006). It is mostly the privileged who benefit from security mechanisms, since they are 
able to secure their interests, while the deprived are either left to their own devices, or 
met with suspicion, and are therefore subjected to techniques of discipline and 
surveillance. The state does not guarantee security for all. Security has become another 
commodity which is not equally distributed amongst the population, but which can 
only be afforded by those who have the right position in the market (Garland 1996, 
463).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 An argument for a more severe punishment of youth with a migrant background is that 
“allochtonous” people have other, culturally determined, norms and values, and therefore also other ideas 
about punishment. They feel guilty less easily and see time in prison as a vacation. Hence, they are less 
likely to learn from standard punishments, and are in need of a special treatment. This line of thought 
was both expressed by a high ranked police official and the former minister of justice in the Netherlands. 
See: “Allochtoon strenger straffen.” Trouw. June 30, 2003. 
http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/archief/article/detail/1779534/2003/06/30/Allochtoon-
strenger-straffen.dhtml; “Wat werkt bij Nederlandse jongetjes werkt bij anderen averechts”. Amnesty 
International. December 2003. http://www.amnesty.nl/wat-werkt-bij-nederlandse-jongetjes-werkt-bij-
anderen-averechts 
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4.11.3. The penalization of precariousness 
Risk profiles often reflect social and ethnic divisions and justify strong punitive 
measures in relation to marginalized groups (Bovenkerk 1993, Unnever and Cullen 
2010). Those who are less likely to realize economic success are more often related to 
crime and become the objective of strict institutional control and containment, as well 
as moral stigmatization. It is often youngsters who live in deprived urban areas and 
have to deal with unemployment or early school leaving who are placed in risk 
categories. Loïc Wacquant speaks in this regard of the “penalization of 
precariousness” (2009, 35). He notes that a neoliberal security discourse has the 
criminalization of poverty as one of its effects. The political economic rationality of 
neoliberal societies prescribes accepted social participation through economic 
participation. The necessity to work, pay taxes and hence contribute to the economic 
prosperity of the nation becomes a coercive social norm and overshadows measures 
of social assistance. Together with a strong focus on the individual responsibility to 
achieve economic success, this line of thought leads to a move from the right to 
welfare to an obligation of work fare. Since it has become the responsibility of the 
individual to meet the standards of economic participation, agency is prioritized over 
structure in neoliberal governance and crime regulations (Gray 2009, 452). Those who 
could not benefit from the expansion of the market economy, and are confined to low 
wage work, or the shadow economy of the streets, are looked down upon and blamed 
for their lack of persistence. Those who cannot or will not meet economic obligations 
are easily criminalized and are not seen as deprived, but rather as deviant.  
 
Wacquant characterizes neoliberal states as “centaur states,” with a liberal head and an 
authoritarian body (2009, 43). Ideals of the equal maximization of the freedom of 
personal choice and development are carried by a paternalistic and punitive attitude 
towards those who suffer from the hidden social inequalities that are attached to a free 
market model. Social services are instrumentalized for surveillance and security 
purposes, and the tasks of social workers change. Whereas resettlement workers were 
occupied with the re-socialization and coaching of clients during the height of the 
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welfare state, they now spend most of their time calculating and reporting the risk of 
recidivist behavior. Social problems are calculated in the light of their economic 
expenses, but no longer directly treated as issues of equal worth and just redistribution 
of chances and goods. Measures of crime control and punishments emphasize ethnic, 
racial and class differences, while these differences are at the same time no longer 
directly addressed in the institutional domain.   
 
Hence penalization serves as a technique for the invisibilization of the social “problems” that 
the state, as the bureaucratic lever of collective will, no longer can or cares to treat as 
its roots, and the prison operates as a juridical garbage disposal into which the human 
refuse of the market society are thrown. (Wacquant 2009, xxii)  
 
This statement reminds of the various forms of waste created as a counterpart to the 
constant desire to produce and consume in our modern times (Bauman 2004). Global 
technological and economic progress has led to a situation in which no human being 
and no piece of land escapes the doctrine of economic purpose and utility. Those 
people or places that do not measure up to the economic standards of efficiency and 
market value are reduced to a disposable status. This accounts for both goods and 
people, with the creation of “human waste” as a result. The “industry of security” has 
quickly become one of the largest producers of human waste (ibid, 21). This “human 
waste” is usually placed out of sight of the average, economically sane citizen, as we 
see in the case of illegal immigrants, who are locked up in foreign detention centers, 
or youngsters who receive long prison sentences for stealing commodity goods during 
riots, like we saw in the case of the London riots in 2011. 
 
The imprisonment of marginalized groups does not only take place in actual prisons, 
but also in urban space, as illustrated by the phenomenon of ghettoization (Wilson 
2012). In order to allay the fears of broader society, at-risk groups are separated and 
enclosed in a space which is characterized by intensified surveillance. This 
demonstrates that it is not only class dynamics that shape mechanisms of security and 
crime control, but also ethnic and racial distinctions. Wacquant analyzes the 
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emergence of the American ghettos, in which predominantly black Americans are 
confined in an “ethnoracial prison” (2009, 205). Many structural elements of his 
analysis can also be recognized in the Dutch context. The at-risk boys from 
neighborhoods like Kanaleneiland also live in an ethnically homogeneous 
environment, characterized by a lack of social and physical mobility. In order to 
obtain generally accepted material status symbols, they turn towards illegal means. As 
unskilled youth with a negative reputation that is related to their ethnic and cultural 
background, they look for means to earn respect and a living in the underground 
economy. As a result, “incarceration, like chronic joblessness and poverty, becomes a 
banal event and a modal pathway through adulthood” (Wacquant 2009, 207). I will 
return to the impact of these mechanisms of ghettoization in the next chapter. 
 
“At-risk boys” who live in a ghettoized context are not only the object of penalization, 
but are also perceived as “moral trash.” Punitive measures are inscribed in what 
Garland describes as a “criminology of the other” (1996, 461). Garland distinguishes 
this criminology from the “criminology of everyday life,” in which crime is portrayed 
as a risk that could emerge equally in everybody’s life. In the “criminology of the 
other,” criminals are depicted as an essentialized other, who poses a threat to 
normality because they have an identity that is radically distinct from the average 
citizen. “Normal” citizens could never empathize with criminals, because they are a 
completely different kind of human being. Ethnic, racial, cultural and social 
distinctions are emphasized as characteristics related to criminal behavior (Russel-
Brown 2008, Walker, Spohn and DeLone 2012). This movement of demonization and 
alienation of criminals plays on popular fears and xenophobic sentiments. Criminals 
are seen as dangerous, uninhibited and violent creatures who should be kept separate 
from the body of normal citizens, for example by imprisonment. This reasoning 
seems to be a retreat from the rationality of modern governance, as we have seen in 
Foucault’s description. Garland therefore associates the “criminology of the other” 
with neo-conservative tendencies within contemporary institutional politics. These 
neo-conservative tendencies have an influence on neoliberal governance, and make 
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seemingly pre-modern ideas about exclusionary and punitive measures gain strength 
within the political arena. Such measures sometimes accompany, and sometimes 
contradict, strategies of security management. According to Muncie, these dynamics 
between a neoliberal and a neo-conservative view of crime lead to a lack of 
consistency in the reasoning behind approaches to youth delinquency (Muncie 2006, 
771). A wide variety of quickly alternating measures characterizes the working field of 
organizations dealing with young delinquents. This working field is shaped by the 
dynamics between the responsibilization and punishment of deviant youngsters. It is 
Muncie’s conviction that no coherent political-economic rationality underlies this 
quickly changing landscape of strategies of crime prevention, control and retribution. 
According to Wacquant, however, these seemingly divergent strategies have the same 
origin. He sees both punitive tendencies and rhetorics of responsibilization as 
products of the crisis of the welfare state and neoliberal reforms (Wacquant 2009, xiii). 
It is precisely the paradoxical nature of neoliberal governance which becomes 
apparent in the approach of crime with different techniques. Wacquant recognizes a 
“double regulation” of especially the poorer, working class parts of the population in 
both social policies and penal policies (ibid., xviii). This combination characterizes the 
“centaur states” of neoliberalism. 
 
Next to measures of penalization, techniques of normalization also imply a certain 
moral education of irresponsible outcasts, who are stigmatized. Migrants, or children 
of migrants, are the primary target of this moral education. The governing of migrants 
is closely related to crime control, since migrants are often perceived as not yet fully 
grown citizens, who might have a formal citizenship status, but do not yet live up to 
the moral standards of “good” and “active” citizens (Schinkel & Van Houdt 2010). It 
is these citizens manqués who are at most risk of displaying non-accepted and 
irresponsible behavior. Such groups become the objective of “repressive 
responsibilization,” which is supported by various state-initiated measures aimed at 
the reformation of deviant behavior (ibid., 708). While “facilitative responsibilization” 
is applied to the part of the ethnic majority which already live up to “society’s norms 
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and values,” “repressive responsibilization” is applied to migrants and their children, 
who are presumed to be backwards and unaware of the enlightened values of Western 
neoliberal democracies. The integrated approach to youth crime, community policing 
and family intervention teams are all measures designed to enforce responsibilization 
on those who do not already express the desired active citizenship themselves. The 
extent to which coercive policies are applied to improve responsibilization is 
differentiated along ethnic and class divisions.  
 
In effect, this means that a division is produced between migrant youth in specific 
urban areas, which are deemed lacking in cultural adjustment and responsibility, and 
much of the rest of the population, which is called upon to express its cultural 
adjustment by the enactment of responsibility through preventive forms of 
community formation. (…) It is crucial that both immigrants and non-immigrants are 
responsibilized and moralized, albeit in juxtaposed ways: the first are to be 
repressively responsibilized and culturally and morally adjusted; the second are 
facilitatively responsibilized and called upon to enact their already existing powers of 
responsibility, cultural integration and moral adjustment. (Schinkel & Van Houdt 
2010, 710) 
 
These tendencies are not supported by an actual link between the ethnic affiliations of 
young crime offenders, their lack of integration and their criminal behaviour (Junger-
Tas 2001). Research shows that Dutch-Moroccan youth who strongly identify with 
Moroccan culture and who have a social network with strong ties to Islamic norms 
and values are less likely to become criminal, and that criminal Dutch-Moroccan 
youth are often more oriented to Dutch society than non-criminal Dutch-Moroccan 
youth (Driessen et al. 2002, Stevens, Veen & Vollebergh 2009). In addition, criminal 
youth of Moroccan descent often display a less serious risk profile than ethnically 
Dutch criminal youth, because they are involved in less distorted family relations and 
are often caught for property crimes, where ethnically Dutch youth are sentenced for 
violence and vandalism (Stevens, Veen & Vollebergh 2009). Nevertheless, expressions 
of what is perceived as “antisocial” or “disorderly” behavior are more easily 
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criminalized in the case of youth with an immigrant background who dwell in urban 
public space (Muncie 2006). Repressive responsibilization can be understood in a 
disciplinary light as one of the instruments by which troubling “outsiders,” such as at-
risk youth with an immigrant background, are encouraged to internalize the moral 
standards and expectations of active participation in society under control of various 
disciplinary institutions.  
 
4.11.4. The normalizing gaze 
Another complementary instrument in this endeavor is extensive surveillance. In 
order to discipline and control, the behavior of at-risk groups has to be constantly 
visible. In order to qualify, classify and punish, the population - particularly its risky 
elements – has to be exposed to a normalizing gaze (Foucault 1991, 184). In the case 
of the at-risk boys in Kanaleneiland, we can see that they are indeed placed under a 
“microscope of conduct” (ibid., 173), which consists of camera surveillance at a 
variety of locations, as well as the meetings held at the Security House and the indexes 
of annoyances which are kept up-to-date by the police.  
 
The perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a single gaze to see 
everything constantly. A central point would be both the source of light illuminating 
everything, and a locus of convergence for everything that must be known: a perfect 
eye that nothing would escape and a center towards all gazes would be turned. (ibid., 
173)  
 
This perfect disciplinary apparatus is the panopticon.116 Even though Foucault situates 
the panopticon in a time of strictly disciplinary and sovereign power, prior to the 
emergence of political governmentality, its structure fits the rationality of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 The panopticon is an architectural model for a prison which was designed by Jeremy Bentham in 
1791. It was meant to serve as a cost-effective structure for supervising large numbers of inmates. The 
prison model consisted of a round building, with one watchtower in the middle, from which all the cells 
could be observed in one gaze. Because of a system of backlighting, the prisoners would be aware of the 
watchtower’s presence, without actually being able to see it. Therefore, they would never know for sure 
if, and when, they were being observed. Foucault took the structure of the panopticon as a model for any 
advanced system of surveillance in which the behavior of individuals can be monitored and contained 
(Foucault 1991). 
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governmentality, since it is not dependent on an actually present sovereign power. 
Whereas the sovereign used to be the one who placed himself in the spotlight while 
his subjects remained an indistinct crowd, the population itself is now spotlighted 
while the disciplinary power is de-personified and able to be wielded by anyone. The 
panopticon is not managed by a single observer, but rather internalized by all subjects, 
who know they can be observed and measured at any time in their individual 
endeavors. Foucault has studied various expressions of panoptic techniques of 
discipline and punishment. He observes that, since the eighteenth century, the police 
have adopted this panoptic structure and operate as a “faceless” gaze which is 
constantly on the lookout for abnormalities, ready to correct in coextension with the 
entire social body (ibid. 213-214). Not surprisingly, Wacquant characterizes the 
contemporary status of crime control as a “penal panopticism” (2009, 209).  
 
The individual and his/her neoliberal freedoms are produced within a constellation of 
power relations which is both disciplinary and normalizing at the same time. The free 
individual, who has his/her place in a capitalist society, is carefully monitored and 
modeled – or monitors and models him/herself – to ensure that he/she behaves as a 
producer and consumer who stimulates economic growth. (Sub)cultural expressions, 
beliefs and deviant or criminal behavior that pose a threat to such productive, 
individual freedom are placed under a disciplinary gaze. Abnormalities can be 
controlled because they are singled out, dragged from the shadows and made 
accountable. In this light, the approach to “at-risk boys” in Kanaleneiland can also be 
characterized as a penal panopticism. Continuing efforts to “normalize” the behavior 
of the boys are undertaken with the “total approach” serving as a guideline. The boys 
are constantly placed under surveillance. If they cross the lines which are drawn by the 
general approach they are punished immediately. However, there is not one particular 
person or authority who takes the general lead in the total approach. It is rather a 
constellation of various actors, organizations and institutions that implements this 
general approach in the neighborhood. Nevertheless, every move of the boys is 
carefully monitored, and initiatives that would take the boys out of reach of the gaze 
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of the general approach are prevented as much as possible. The boys are well aware of 
this continuing scrutiny of their whereabouts and try to “hide” as much as possible, or 
sabotage any disciplining efforts.  
 
4.12. Heterogeneous struggles against depoliticizing governance 
Despite the promise of governance in the interests of the entire population, I have 
explained that neoliberal governmentality leads to selective benefits for certain groups 
of citizens, while other groups are excluded or stigmatized. Groups that do not display 
the right economic participation and productivity are often subjected to extensive 
mechanisms of surveillance, control and discipline so that they will not develop risky 
behavior which could affect the security of the average citizen. Those who are already 
labeled as at-risk groups do not have a voice in the political domain and are easily 
stigmatized as citizens manqués for their failure to display of the right kind of civic 
participation and their lack of economic success. These groups of citizens manqués have 
little opportunity to plead for their demands within neoliberal institutional politics, 
since the paradoxical nature of this type of governance does not leave space to justify 
the position of those who are not obviously represented by the average interests of 
civil society. Since the state pretends to base its policies on the interests of the total 
national body of citizens, particular needs and interests that differ from the norm are 
not easily recognized as legitimate within an institutional setting. State-induced policies 
claim to be based on a rational scrutiny of scientific, statistic information and a direct 
consultation of organizations from the civil, non-governmental domain. Those who 
are not represented by organizations in the sphere of civil society, and who score high 
on different risk indexes, are not easily recognized as serious agents within the domain 
of politics. We see that the access to a position of influence within neoliberal, 
institutional politics is not equally open to all. Those who find themselves at the 
periphery of a flourishing economic market often find it difficult to make their voices 
heard. In this last section, I will first focus on the depoliticizing effect of neoliberal 
governmentality in reference to French sociologist Jacques Donzelot, before shedding 
light on the perspective of a possible political agency which offers a disruptive critique 
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on neoliberal governance. In reference to Partha Chatterjee, I look for this political 
agency in the domain of marginalized groups that are not organized like traditional 
syndicalist political subjects, but nevertheless have a part in the messy political reality.  
 
4.12.1. The disappearance of collective political struggles 
Political procedures in times of neoliberal governmentality are selective and certainly 
not developed in the interests of all members of the population. Jacques Donzelot 
recognizes this problem of inequality, and states that strategies of security at the core 
of neoliberal governance have a depoliticizing effect (1994 [1984]). This 
depoliticization could already be noticed when the welfare state was the dominant 
form of governance, and basic social security, also for underprivileged groups, still 
seemed to be high on the agenda. Even though the logics of governmentality 
presumes a horizontal mode of governance, its institutional implementation in the 
governance of the welfare state enabled privileged groups to speak out in the political 
domain, while the interests of those who do not adhere to the neoliberal standards of 
success are not sufficiently represented. Existing social inequalities are not sufficiently 
recognized in a system of governance which pretends to secure the freedom of all at a 
basic level, while an economic subjugation of a large part of the population is 
obscured, according to Donzelot. State-induced security measures actively help to 
both enforce and disguise such inequalities. The fact that some are convicted to 
depend on social welfare, while others will never have to depend on it, is disguised by 
a rhetoric of equal exposure to risk. This rethoric is, for example, translated into the 
coupling of the tax system to social insurances, for which we all equally have to pay. 
The palliation of socio-economic inequalities is paradoxically enough facilitated by a 
preoccupation with the social, at the expense of the political.  
 
With the emergence of the welfare state, a focus on social rights was established to 
correct social inequalities, without threatening the existing political organization of 
society. Social injustices became seen as reparable flaws, and not as structural 
inequalities. Within the welfare state, political oppositions between grand ideologies 
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like socialism and liberalism are reduced to issues of redistribution, since the social 
and the economic have become interchangeable (ibid., 184). This effacing of 
antagonistic struggles from the practice of politics is also noted by those who 
characterize societies modeled to a neoliberalism as post-political, as I mentioned in 
chapter 1. The generic theme of equal rights for all was thus fractured into a lobby for 
various specific social rights (Donzelot 1991, 170-171). Traditionally, it had always 
been the underprivileged classes who fought for a dignified means of existence by 
stressing the need for equal rights for all. This generic claim disappeared with the 
negotiation of management issues, to which political struggles are reduced in 
neoliberal governance. The revolutionary threat historically associated with the 
working class population could thus be pacified. At the same time, this led to a 
disappearance of the political agency and collective struggles of the popular classes, 
demanding a structural transformation of social inequalities. For Donzelot, the 
disappearance of the laborers’ struggle is inextricably connected with the rise of 
neoliberal governance. Workers no longer went out onto the streets to demand 
general rights, but were incorporated into an administrative apparatus of insurances.  
 
The crisis of the welfare state has not solved, but rather intensified this political lack. 
The crisis of the welfare state points at an impasse of government, for Donzelot. On 
the one hand, leftists and libertarians complain that the state has become a too 
dominant power in society, under the pretext of promoting progress for all. On the 
other hand, reformists argue that the technocratic direction of the welfare state has 
hollowed out the representative bodies of democracy. As a remedy to these problems, 
the responsibility for the progress of society has to be given back to the people 
themselves (Donzelot 1994, 226-227). In order to prevent state authorities from 
becoming too dominant, the crisis of the welfare state leads to an autonomization of 
the social sphere, or civil society (ibid., 183). A multiplicity of social partners is 
mobilized to co-govern social and economic life (ibid., 232-233). This process of 
decentralization displaces traditional confrontations between state representatives and 
organizations of the people, like syndicates, to the local level, and thereby makes it 
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increasingly difficult to establish real social justice on a more general scale. As an 
effect, a political imagination of a radically different organization of the state is again 
replaced by smaller adjustments within the framework of the state, as it already exists. 
Social rights are established to maximize solidarity within the given political situation, 
but do not offer opportunities for, or a vision of, a more radical reformulation of the 
organization of society (ibid., 124). Radical democratic ideals which originated in the 
times of the French revolution have been “cast away to the warehouse of illusions” 
(ibid., 18-19). 
 
Donzelot’s analysis of the depoliticizing effect of neoliberal governance and its 
strategies of securization clarifies why no traditional, strong political subject, striving 
for the emancipation of underprivileged groups, has emerged within the context of a 
neighborhood like Kanaleneiland. In this sense, Donzelot’s analysis indeed leads to 
conclusions similar to the analysis of thinkers who define our times of neoliberal 
governance as a post-political situation. The managerial approach to political 
governance disables our imagination of radically different political alternatives, just as 
much as the all-encompassing presence of security measures and panoptic techniques 
of surveillance and discipline prevent people from collectively organizing dissonant 
interventions in the institutional political sphere. The necessary antagonistic dynamics 
of the political practice for the establishment of an emancipatory political subject, as 
Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau have described it, seem to be stifled in a grip of 
suffocating risk management, without sustainable political vision in the name of the 
marginalized. From this point of view, it becomes understandable how the 
organization of institutional governance prevents a collective political agency in the 
light of a common popular demand from arising. The antagonism between the 
privileged and underprivileged part of the population cannot be instrumentalized for 
an emancipatory political agency, because each member of the population is 
encouraged to develop the right kind of civic and economic participation only on the 
individual level. We can see that, under the pretext of the protection of the interests of 
the average citizen, deviant or underprivileged citizens are politically paralyzed. 
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4.12.2. “Politics is theater” 
In this light, it is not surprising that the perception of politics of the boys in 
Kanaleneiland is just as negative as that of their peers in Grigny. Just like their peers in 
Grigny, the boys associate politics with politicians from governmental institutions 
who are not really interested in the lives of normal people and who speak in an 
unintelligible language. They see politicians as treacherous and discriminatory towards 
people with a migrant background like themselves, in particular towards those of 
Moroccan descent. Politics is not for them, as Hamid expressed it. 
 
 Politics is theater. (Osman, 19 years old) 
 
Politics is just politics. It is already in the word itself, it is a game. (Rachid, 16 years 
old) 
  
As Rachid said, the boys associate the word itself with an insincere activity, a game of 
power, or, more specifically, the deliberate influencing of people to gain personal 
power. They do not believe that politics could bring positive change to their personal 
lives and the circumstances in which they grow up. Some of the boys, who are 
eighteen, voted in the municipality elections in 2010, but none of them believe that 
their vote will make a difference. The boys did not make an effort to form their own 
opinion about the platform of the various parties. “We voted for the best party for us 
Moroccans – for the party that older people from the neighborhood advised us to 
vote.” But Rachid also wondered “what difference one vote will make among sixteen 
million people,” and his skepticism was shared by others. If an Islamic party were to 
join the elections, the boys would be slightly more enthusiastic, but their vote would 
depend on the party’s platform. Less discrimination, more equal opportunities for 
Moroccan-Dutch and more freedom to practice the Islamic religion would be 
important standpoints for them, while in daily life they are not explicitly occupied with 
religion. This could be explained by the wish to see a recognition in the political 
domain for the lives and background of their families, who ascribe to the Muslim 
faith. 
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The boys feel that politics has only a negative impact on their lives and deprives them 
of equal opportunities. They name political debates and municipal policies as an 
important instigator of discrimination and exclusion. Institutional politics therefore 
also influences the view they have on their own position in society. The boys see 
themselves as a marginalized and unwanted group in Dutch society, but also as a 
tough and actively present group in their own neighborhood. The involvement that 
they express in their own neighborhood is largely based on their own code of 
conduct, which is derived from a ghetto lifestyle. They mostly focus on their own 
group of youth in the neighborhood and their families, and little on other inhabitants 
of the area. They do not have clear ideas about their own contribution to society at 
large, nor do they feel like they belong to a community larger than their own 
environment of boys from the streets. Well-known community places in the 
neighborhood, like the youth center and the mosque, are not places where they feel 
they belong. The streets are their domain and also the domain in which they actively 
try to get away from, or challenge, the norms which are propagated from an 
institutional perspective. In this sense, the boys are used to feeling “untouchable” and 
hidden in the shadows, while at the same time they would like to be given recognition 
by others outside of their direct environment.  
 
The dynamics between the panoptic gaze of the institutional political domain and the 
escapist and sabotaging behavior of the boys is quite static, with little space for 
unexpected interventions. This situation can be experienced as quite suffocating, 
especially in the case of those who have limited power to decide over their own 
situation. It objectifies the boys as passive actors in a general social perspective. 
Besides disruptive social behavior, the boys therefore also show a certain “learned 
helplessness,” as Tim expressed it.  
 
We should not only roll the ball in the direction of making people become what we 
like them to become. People are constantly pathologized. We always need to see what 
made people miss the boat, while these are usually very human moments or very 
political moments. Then people develop a certain learned helplessness. They don’t 
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move from their place anymore. They are beaten into a pulp by life. They have 
discovered that nothing you do works. If you wait long enough, this makes people 
really passive. Of course, then you can work with them really well in an institutional 
setting. They only cost a lot of money. (Tim, former resettlement organization 
employee) 
 
The boys of Kanaleneiland seem to either withdraw in their own community of 
experience, which shows a certain indifference to the rest of the world, or upset the 
outside world with erratic, disorderly interventions. Between these two options, there 
seems to be little space for political events to emerge. No collective conscience about 
general societal issues is developed, which leads to a shared organization around 
generic political claims, as more traditional leftist perspective on political 
emancipation seem to prescribe. The question still remains if, and if so, how, a 
political significance can be ascribed to the public disorder caused by young urban 
troublemakers, who predominantly seem to be interested in their own, local, 
community of experience. 
 
4.12.3. The messy parts of political reality 
Indian post-colonial scholar Partha Chatterjee has emphasized that the deregulating 
agency of deviant people, who are not collectively organized along the lines of 
traditional Western syndicalist movements, is not a priori without political 
significance. He gives insight into the critical potential of marginalized parts of civil 
society which are not seen as influential on the political stage, but which can 
nevertheless have a substantive impact on institutional politics. The struggle for 
political change of these marginalized people often explicitly takes place within their 
own, local, communities. Political agency that is able to criticize the existing neoliberal 
governance does not need to be expressed in generic claims, like a traditional take on 
emancipatory politics seems to imply, according to Chatterjee. Other than Donzelot, 
Chatterjee does not argue that the revolutionary threat of grand ideologies is needed 
in order to challenge the world dominance of neoliberal governance. Chatterjee even 
notes that generic politics is derived from a utopic vision which prevents us from 
 285 
recognizing real, heterogeneous political struggles in which existing governance is 
defied and modified, even if it is not in the name of a general civic ideal (Chatterjee 
2004).  
 
Chatterjee speaks from a post-colonial context and draws his examples from the 
Indian situation, where he sees various occasions in which the structures of 
governmentality do not lead to the political sidelining of the urban poor and 
marginalized, but actually offer them the opportunity to develop political strategies 
which are embedded within a specific context. In these situations, a political agency is 
developed which is firmly rooted in the awareness of a specific identity to which 
specific political demands are related. This recognition of the particular embeddedness 
of political agency implies a critique of the Rawlsian idea that one should leave one’s 
personal background at home upon entering the political arena. In Chatterjee’s 
writings, political agency is not reserved for a universalist ideal citizen who bases 
his/her agency upon the uniform exercise of equal citizen’s rights, detached from a 
particular identity and affiliations to specific communities.  
 
Chatterjee emphasizes that the structure of governmentality is directed at diverse 
groups within the population, each of which merit a specific policy approach. Hence, 
a diversified interplay is noticeable between populations in the plural, various 
governmental agencies and multiple policies of security and welfare management. 
Chatterjee presents the organization of political governance in this sense as a porous 
structure in which the decisions of the state and the agency of deprived citizens are 
not strictly separated from each other. Governmentality offers subordinated classes 
the opportunity to act politically, without conforming to a static blueprint of the good 
and legally recognized citizen, as long as they are able to negotiate their particular 
demands with state representatives. Chatterjee makes a distinction between formal 
and real citizenship. He associates formal citizenship with the realm of civil society, 
which is not a body in which the collective interests of the population are expressed, 
but rather “the closed association of modern elite groups,” which make use of utopic 
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ideas of civic freedom and rational law in order to keep a government in place which 
will secure their particular, privileged interests (ibid., 5). When we look at politics from 
the perspective of civil society, it is not a politics that is actively created by the people, 
but rather a politics of the passively governed. However, politics does not always 
manifest itself in this form. Besides civil society, a political society exists which 
consists of all those people who are not regarded as proper members of civil society 
by state institutions and who are only ambiguously perceived as the bearers of equal 
rights (ibid., 38). These people do not live outside of societal reality and the reach of 
the state; they rather express “real” citizenship. They stand in the middle of the 
political process, even though they are often not recognized as such. Their struggles 
aim at the real participation of citizens in state affairs, and not merely at the subjection 
of citizens to policies meant to secure their passive well-being. Their involvement in 
the political process does not take the form of proper civic and political participation, 
as it is envisioned by state authorities, but it can nevertheless be seen as a dissonant 
form of civic and political participation.  
 
Chatterjee’s distinction between civil and political society originates from the division 
in the political domain between organized elites and unorganized subalterns, as it is 
presented in the area of subaltern studies.117 This idea of a division in the political 
domain clarifies how citizens who are often perceived as the dangerous, alien and 
deficient “other” are politically related to institutional politics. In times of neoliberal 
governance the large and unifying popular struggles have lost their persuasion and 
appeal, but this does not mean that the subaltern classes no longer have opportunities 
to act politically. The alternative for such large popular struggles is not necessarily 
sought in a form of civil participation which enforces state politics, because it is 
embedded within an accepted civil society. The structure of civil society may appeal to 
well organized privileged groups, but subalterns often choose their own subversive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Subaltern studies emerged in India and Southeast Asia as a scientific discipline in the 1980s in order to 
give a historical and social account of the experiences of colonialism and post-colonialism from the 
perspective of those who make up the subaltern classes, and whose voices are often appropriated by the 
rhetoric of elite groups within society. Subaltern studies pay explicit attention to the role of marginalized 
groups as important agents within events of social and political change. See: Chaturvedi 2012. 
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ways to make their demands heard. Unorganized popular or subaltern classes are not 
apolitical just because they do not organize themselves in the same way as elites, who 
easily influence the practice of institutional politics. The struggles of subaltern classes 
to find shelter, make a dignified living and build community structures can take illegal 
forms, but are nevertheless political. A similar point is made by Asef Bayat in his book 
“Street Politics” (1997), which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7 . People 
who squat abandoned houses and plots of land, work in the underground economy, 
practice religious and cultural practices which contradict national norms and make 
illegal use of public services can all form political communities, even though they are 
not treated as accepted citizens by state authorities. State authorities maintain a 
different relationship towards such groups than to legally accepted organizations of 
civil society. However, authorities interfere with these groups, sometimes by 
negotiating local and particular demands and creating temporary alliances, sometimes 
by tolerating their self-sufficiency, even if it violates certain laws, and sometimes by 
trying to contain their presence in the public sphere and attempting to integrate them 
in the body of accepted citizens. Chatterjee speaks in this regard of the “emergence of 
an entire substructure of paralegal arrangements” in which the subaltern classes and 
state institutions interact with each other (2004, 137). Such messy, controversial, illegal 
and sometimes violent processes form part of political reality in societies which 
pretend to be neatly regulated by a homogeneous process of governance. Those who 
instigate such processes are just as much part of the population as those with an 
indisputably recognized citizenship status. Their political interventions bring us to the 
margins of managed and institutionalized political life, where existing political power 
plays can be toppled, rules can be bent and conventional practices can be blurred or 
stretched. Their struggles are necessarily contextual and temporary, and are necessarily 
characterized by heterogeneous claims and multiple strategies. They often seem 
unorganized and inarticulate because of the lack of a uniform program and body of 
supporters. Nevertheless, their political significance needs to be further specified.  
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Chatterjee’s analysis helps me envision the political significance of contextual and 
temporary agency of people who do not represent the right kind of civic behavior and 
who have a tense relationship with state authorities. Those who are often stigmatized 
as citizens manqués can play a political role in nations which are dominated by neoliberal 
governance, but not only when they manage to entirely overcome this governance. 
The agency of citizens manqués is not clearly organized and does not have general 
revolutionary aspirations which transcend the contextualized position and particular 
struggles of the actors involved. Such agency therefore does not propose the 
overthrow of an entire political system, to make room for a new political order, as 
Laclau defines the goals of proper emancipatory politics. Power, in the context of this 
agency, is not directly instrumentalized to overthrow the state, but more perceived 
from the Foucaultian perspective: as a dimension of all social and political relations, 
shaping a dynamics between state institutions and citizens from which one cannot 
fully escape. Political change is in this context rather derived from a confrontation 
with state authorities and institutions, rather than from an elimination of such 
authorities and institutions. In this confrontation power relations with the state are 
not dissolved, but bent and negotiated. Nevertheless, this thinly organized agency, 
which is located in between institutional politics and unruly disruptions indicates an 
ongoing political struggle. 
 
Rather than speaking of an essential antagonism, it would be better to speak of an 
“agonism” – of a relationship that is at the same time mutual incitement and struggle; 
less of a face-to-face confrontation that paralyzes both sides than a permanent 
provocation. (Foucault 2000, 342) 
 
Chatterjee bases his theory on a post-colonial reality, but his noted division in the 
political domain between organized elites and unorganized subalterns is also present 
within the Western European context. This distinction is helpful in beginning to 
imagine a possible political agency of deviant citizens who express certain demands 
that do not transcend their particular community of experience. However, Chatterjee 
also emphasizes the importance of negotiations with state representatives in order for 
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political society to successfully ameliorate the position of underprivileged groups and 
make particular demands heard. Political society needs to maintain an active 
relationship with state authorities and display at least a certain level of strategic 
organization. “To play the game of strategic political negotiations with the authorities, 
population groups too must organize themselves” (ibid., 138). The question remains 
whether we can speak of any political significance in the case of agency that is not 
organized, but rather consists of unplanned, disruptive interventions. Young urban 
troublemakers not only lack this strategic level of organization, but are also not 
recognized as a group which could make legitimate demands in relation to state 
authorities. These youngsters are overlooked in the domain of political negotiations 
and do not express their demands in such a way, that they are even up for 
consideration by authorities. Chatterjee’s framework becomes less useful when 
exploring the political significance of agency which is not at all recognized as 
expressing demands by state authorities. I will have to turn to other sources in order 
to analyse the political significance of agency which is not organized beyond a 
disruption of existing structures of governance. 
 
In the following chapters, I will investigate whether we can ascribe a political sense to 
Western “subaltern” agency which sabotages the relationship with state authorities, as 
we see in the case of young urban troublemakers. This agency is not seen as rational 
and utilitarian from an institutional perspective, but rather as an expression of public 
vandalism and violence. I will investigate whether a disruption of governing strategies 
by these troublemakers can be seen as a critique of the way in which citizens are 
governed in present Western European societies. I will focus on agency that is 
explicitly developed in unorganized settings, on the streets, and within communities of 
particular experiences and lifestyle. An investigation in these areas enables me to 
explore whether the tendency of young urban troublemakers to sabotage strategies of 
disciplinary governance and security policies, and escape into their own realm of 
urban street culture, can make political sense in an “unruly” way. 
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Part 3 
          
 
The political sense of disruptive 
interventions 
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Prelude 
 
 
 
While we wait for the others to come in, I chat with Murad, Yousef, Hamid, Khalid 
and Osman. They are very excited about our plans for the trip to Paris and ask me a 
lot of questions about Grigny. “What is it like there?,” Yousef asks me. “What are the 
guys like there?” I take out my laptop and search for “Grigny” on YouTube in the 
hope that I will find some images of the area to give an impression. One of the first 
hits is a rap video shot in the neighborhood. We see the flats of La Grande Borne and 
Grigny II, the concrete spiral with graffiti in the middle of the central field and a lot 
of motocross bikes. There are also images of the Grigny area code and the holes in 
the walls of the flats in La Grande Borne. The boys who star in the clip are clearly 
aiming to represent the “gangsta” lifestyle. Two are showing off a gun, one is stealing 
a bag of crisps from a store, a group engages in a romp and kick a companion in the 
stomach. I ask the boys what they think of the video. “Crazy” is the first comment, 
and I hear the impressed tone in their voice. Yousef tells me that they have seen 
videos from France before. Hamid asks him to show “the one with the 21 crimes in 7 
minutes.” The boys look it up and it appears to be the music video for the song 
“Stress” by the French electro duo “Justice.” I have seen this video before.  
 
The video is shot in a very realistic and fast-cut documentary style.118 The images are 
gripping, and communicated in such a direct way that the viewer is roughly 
confronted with the events. A group of young boys, all North African or Sub-Saharan 
African in appearance, and all wearing caps, hoodies and the same black leather jacket 
with the logo of the band on its back, roam around Paris, leaving violence and 
destruction in their wake. Their raid starts in a degraded flat area where a neighbor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 The video was directed by Romain Gavras, a young French director, and the son of political 
filmmaker Costa Gavras, who gained a reputation for shooting controversial music videos, but who also 
co-founded “Kourtrajmé,”” a production collective for film, music and street art which aims to translate 
the urban lifestyle of the banlieues into artistic products. Gavras was surprised by the heated debates which 
his “Stress” video caused on the internet and made the following comments about it in an interview: “I 
didn’t try to do something controversial, otherwise I would have put whores and Nazis in it.” See: 
http://www.interviewmagazine.com/film/romain-gavras#_ 
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watches them from his balcony and puts his middle finger up. The gang takes the 
metro to the center of Paris, and on the way they spray graffiti, harass a woman and 
beat up a man who comes to her rescue. In the city, they damage cars, destroy a street 
musician’s instruments, steal an elderly lady’s bag and smash up the interior of a bar, 
amongst other acts of violence and vandalism. The clip continues with a 
confrontation between the gang and a police squad in a metro station. The boys beat 
up one of the officers and steal a car in their attempt to escape. The video ends with 
the boys setting the car on fire and attacking the cameraman who has been filming 
the whole trip.  
 
This video caused a lot of debate on the internet when it was released in 2008. It was 
banned from mainstream media channels because of its violent content, not to the 
regret of the creators, who later stated that it was their purpose to instigate a media 
hype through informal channels. In their opinion, this approach fit their music best, 
since it was not meant to please a mainstream commercial audience anyway. The 
video was viewed over a million times on YouTube and Dailymotion in the first 
week, and reactions to the video ranged from accusations of spreading a racist 
message and enforcing the negative stigmatization of banlieue youth to disgust over 
the celebration of nihilistic violence and criminality.119 Many commentators were 
confused by the presentation of the violence and vandalism in the clip as a given fact 
in itself, without any context or moral commentary. “What’s the point of showing 
pointless violence?,” was one of the illustrative comments.120 However, Justice’s 
street-style marketing paid off, and the jackets with the band’s logo became 
immensely popular, despite the fact that they were not put on sale, except for an 
exclusive model for the price of 700 euros apiece.121  
 
The fame of the video has even reached Kanaleneiland, as I can see now. The boys 
ask me what neighborhood the video was shot in and if we will visit this area as well. 
They are curious about the boys from the video and express their astonishment that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 See: “Justice stresse a toile,” Libération, May 12, 2008, http://www.liberation.fr/jour/010180564-
justice-stresse-la-toile 
120 See: “Uproar over French music video,” Time, May 19, 2008, 
http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1807724,00.html 
121 See: “Succès sur Internet et mise en vente de blousons,” Le Monde, May 11, 2008, 
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/recherche_breve/1,13-0,37-1035518,0.html 
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kids in France are so violent and fearless. “We have seen this clip so many times 
already,” Yousef says. “You know, we were counting how many criminal acts they 
commit in the video. Here, it’s really not like that. Over there, it’s all a lot worse and 
they’re a lot crazier than we are.” I am a bit surprised that the boys apparently look at 
this clip as if it were a real-life documentary. I tell them that this video is staged and 
that the boys’ extreme behavior in the clip is not common practice in the banlieues. 
Yousef looks at me like he does not really believe me. He leaves me to wonder how a 
hype created by a hipster duo from the chique and fashionable French electronic 
music scene, without any direct connection to the community of experience of boys 
from areas like Grigny and Kanaleneiland, can make such a realistic impression and 
cause so many strong reactions, precisely because of this perceived realism (Field 
note, November 29, 2010) 
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Chapter 5 
          
 “Their politics is criminal, our criminality is political122” 
Young urban troublemakers as “rebels with/out a cause” 
 
 
 
 
The devil has to be given a particular shape to know what virtues are being 
asserted. Thus, the senseless and meaningless image which is the dominant 
one attributed to vandalism, affirms the value of utilitarian, rational action. 
People in our society do things for certain accredited motives; behaviour 
such as vandalism which appears not to be motivated in this way, cannot be 
tolerated and is nihilated by describing it as senseless. The only way to make 
sense of vandalism is to assume that it does not make sense; any other 
definition would be threatening. (Cohen 2011, 77) 
 
 
An increasing popularity of violent and uncivil behavior in urban youth culture is a 
recurrent topic of debate in Western European democracies like France and the 
Netherlands123 (Decker and Weerman 2005; Mohammed 2011; De Jong 2007). The 
habit of “making chaos” and recurrent violent clashes with the police in 
neighborhoods like Grigny and Kanaleneiland are understood as central to this 
development. Male adolescents with an immigrant background from such urban areas 
have gained a reputation of being antisocial and having an attitude which turns them 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Quote found on a toilet door in Paris. 
123 See: “European experiences with street violence: Not gangs but troublesome youth groups,” 
November 29, 2011, http://efus.eu/en/topics/risks-forms-of-crime/collective-violence/efus/2567/, 
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away from society (Van den Brink 2002, 179-194)124. For no apparent reason, these 
boys harass fellow inhabitants, destroy public property, cause a nuisance and clash 
with the police – or so it seems, if we follow reports on such seemingly senseless 
incidents of violence and incivility which dominate the media when youth with an 
immigrant background from “problem neighborhoods” are concerned (Corrado et al. 
2002, v; Body-Gendrot 2005, 7). In the reception of such reports, the actions of small 
groups of youngsters gain a representative status for the image of larger groups of 
youngsters, who at first sight look and behave similar to the initial troublemakers. 
Soon, all non-white urban youth with a certain fashion style are perceived as the 
products of a “street culture,” which is opposed to the “civil culture” (Van Strijen 
2009). This street culture is seen as the cause of an antagonistic tension between the 
community of experience of boys from neighborhoods like Kanaleneiland and Grigny 
and the desired participation of well-behaving citizens in society. A gang mentality, 
macho and egocentric attitude and eagerness to seek physical or verbal confrontation 
characterize the image of urban youth culture, which is seen as counterproductive to 
good and accepted citizenship and devoid of any socio-political awareness.  
 
In this chapter, I will explore the possible political meaning or sense of such seemingly 
“senseless” subversive behavior by looking at the image of young urban 
troublemakers as contemporary “rebels without a cause,” who might actually be 
“rebels who are denied a cause.” The “chaos” that is instigated by troublemakers is 
usually understood within a framework of criminality and behavioral deviancy, while a 
political cause that might be implicit in their actions is overlooked or explicitly denied. 
I choose to focus on the relationship between the negative collective perception of the 
rebel without a cause and the positive appropriation of images of the rebel without a 
cause within youth subculture, as the actual experiences of young urban troublemakers 
and their own perception of their position in society are co-shaped by narratives 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 See also: “The power of the hoodie.” The Guardian. August 9, 2011. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/09/power-of-the-hoodie; “Lettre ouverte aux “P’tites 
Racailles des cités” qui font peur à la France!” The Huffington Post. October 10, 2010. http://archives-
lepost.huffingtonpost.fr/article/2010/10/18/2271825_lettre-ouverte-aux-p-tites-racailles-des-cites-qui-
font-peur-a-la-france.html;  
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which are transmitted through popular culture and the broader reception of these 
narratives. Youngsters like my respondents in Grigny and Kanaleneiland recognize 
their own lived experiences in such narratives, but also adapt their lifestyle and 
attitude to such narratives. In a certain circular movement, the actual lived experiences 
of those who are often seen as rebels without a cause are influenced by the 
representations of rebels without a cause that are transmitted through mass media and 
subculture.  
 
In Chapter 1, I already stated that young urban troublemakers can be seen as the 
agents of unruly politics. The unruly political character of civil disturbances caused by 
young urban troublemakers with an immigrant background, and the fear they instigate 
in society at large, can be understood in greater depth by examining them in the 
context of the articulation of subcultural expressions and attitudes that are associated 
with marginalized youth, as well as the reception of these expressions and attitudes. 
Within this context, we can see that not only deliberately organized agency, but also 
everyday expressions of lifestyle and attitude, and everyday social interaction, can have 
a political meaning, precisely because they are perceived as disruptive in relation to 
dominant notions of “good citizenship” in a certain desired “civic culture.” 
 
I will start by historically tracing the construction of the figure of the “rebel without a 
cause” in urban youth culture, or “street culture,” as the deviant outsider, who causes 
moral panic, precisely because of his seemingly senseless behavior. Since the 1980s, 
this role has particularly been ascribed to non-white adolescents with an immigrant 
background in Western societies. Many young males of immigrant families who live in 
stigmatized neighborhoods are not only seen as the notorious bad guys; they also 
identify with this image. The troublesome behavior and rebellious attitude associated 
with this image seem to be dissociated from the social structure of society. However, 
when we look at the interventions and expressions of the rebel without a cause as 
disruptions of a certain hegemonic culture and power plays, they gain a political sense 
that is often denied or overlooked. By examining the disruptive character of the 
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agency of the “rebel without a cause,” in light of Jacques Rancière’s theories on 
politics as dissensus, we can see that the tendencies of young urban troublemakers to 
“make chaos,” and disturb or sabotage dominant strategies of governance can make 
political sense, without being deliberately organized in the light of certain pre-
formulated, explicit political claims (2010). By acknowledging the political sense in 
certain acts of disagreement, we can also acknowledge that certain seemingly senseless 
disruptions of the civic order are instigated by an underlying, yet unarticulated demand 
for equal recognition and treatment within society. Seen in this light, the “rebel 
without a cause” could actually have something to fight for. 
 
5.1. From “making chaos” to starring in an urban legend 
Before I focus on this possible unruly political significance of disagreement, I shall 
first investigate what role the reception of urban youth culture plays in the creation of 
an image of young “rebels without a cause.” The controversy surrounding a video like 
“Stress” by Justice shows how boys from “problem neighborhoods” are generally 
perceived as delinquent, antisocial, amoral and apolitical adolescents. A continuous 
emphasis on the “pointless violence” in their actions places them outside of the body 
of “normal” citizens and into a frame of deviant exponents of street culture. This 
“counter”-culture is perceived as a social context in which youngsters develop a 
dangerously rebellious identity which conflicts with standard expectations of a 
teenager’s personal development (Roszak 1995 [1969]). At the same time, such a 
counter-culture can also generate a framework of belonging for youth who feel 
stigmatized. I understand urban youth culture here as a broad social phenomenon and 
not only as a distinctive expression of popular culture that is translated into fashion 
style, music taste and the use of slang. In my interpretation of urban youth culture, I 
connect to the tradition of subcultural studies that was developed by members of the 
Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham, amongst others (e.g. Hall 
and Jefferson 1975; Hebdige 1979). Seen from this perspective, youth culture is not 
only a matter of esthetic lifestyle, but also an expression of the role which socio-
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economic class affiliations and the sense of belonging to a certain community play in 
the lives of adolescents. 
 
The “culture” of a group or class is the peculiar and distinctive “way of life” of the 
group or class, the meanings, values and ideas embodied in institutions, in social 
relations, in systems of beliefs, in mores and customs, in the uses of objects and 
material life. Culture is the distinctive shapes in which this material and social 
organization of life expresses itself. (Hall & Jefferson 1975, 10) 
 
Youth culture as a way of life is not only deliberately expressed by those who identify 
with a specific culture. It is also shaped by its reception by the surrounding social 
environment. These two factors of influence on the development of youth culture 
cannot be strictly separated. Representations in popular culture125 play an important 
part in the creation of an image of urban youth as senseless troublemakers, as well as 
in a process of self-identification with this image. A habit such as “making chaos,” as 
it was described by my respondents in Kanaleneiland, contributes to this image of 
urban youth as senseless troublemakers. Not only are the adolescents presented as 
troublemakers in media reports and policy debates, but they also identify with this 
typecasting. A provocative distancing from accepted social behavior becomes “cool,” 
and an identification with a rebellious image is further encouraged by various 
expressions of popular culture, as the video clip of Justice exemplifies. Those who 
“make chaos” on the streets do not wish to only hide in the shadows, but often hope 
for a popular cultural platform for their actions in order to reach a wider audience. All 
of this is not a new phenomenon, even though frenzied media reports on derailed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 With popular culture, or simply “pop” culture, I am referring to cultural products that are widely 
transmitted through mass media, like television and internet, and easily accessible to a broad audience. 
Youth culture and popular culture are often closely related, because young people can freely and easily 
inform themselves through popular culture, as well as create products of popular culture themselves, such 
as blogs and YouTube videos. At the same time, professional producers of popular culture often tune 
into the interests of a young audience by highlighting new trends which were discovered in youth culture 
“on the streets.” Other social groups, including those which have a negative stance towards urban youth 
culture, have a similar symbiotic relation with popular culture. Under influence of a variety of voices, 
both negative and positive stereotypes about youth are transmitted through popular culture. 
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teenagers or lost generations have a tendency to present such youth problems as a 
sign of the decay of our time.  
 
5.1.1 Youth culture as a cause for moral panic 
Deviant youth groups have been the catalysts of many “periods of moral panic,” as 
Stanley Cohen expresses it. In his book “Folk Devils and Moral Panics,” he analyzes 
the clashes between groups of young “mods” and “rockers” who challenged each 
other in the otherwise quiet coast towns of England in the 1960s. In these times, these 
were still groups of “native” youngsters with a distinctive class background and 
subcultural affiliations who confronted one another. The disturbances of public life 
caused by these rival youth groups were hotly debated in the media and in the sphere 
of institutional politics. The elements of violence and delinquency in their 
disturbances were perceived as a threat to the general morality and coherence of 
society. Similar moral panics still characterize our society today. Delinquent youth 
who are influenced by a violent urban youth culture are still an important instigator of 
contemporary moral panics. The intense preoccupation with social insecurity and risk 
and the dangers which are expected from criminals and uncivil groups or individuals 
are a natural source for generally lived anxieties and fears (Cohen 2011, xxxi). As I 
emphasized in Chapter 4., fear becomes a principal ingredient in a political discourse 
which is highly focused on risk management. “[I]n populist and electoral rhetoric 
about such issues as fear of crime, urban insecurity and victimization, the concepts of 
risk and panic are naturally connected” (ibid.).  
 
The emergence and effects of such panics are difficult to analyze in an objective or 
systematic way. Some social phenomena cause general panic, while others are ignored 
or trivialized. It is often in cases in which no clear motivation, sensible within a social 
context, can be detected for civil disturbances, so that there seems to be reason to 
panic. The greater the unpredictability of the events and the strangeness of the actors 
involved, the more chance there is that concerns about a certain social problem will 
evolve into moral panic. Hence, moral panic is influenced by collective, subjective 
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tendencies, but is nevertheless not an illusion that can be easily disregarded. Moral 
panic can have a real impact on social relations and the position of groups in society. 
 
5.1.2. The role of urban legends in community building 
In the case of civil disturbances caused by adolescents with an immigrant background, 
both the factors of unpredictability and the strangeness of the actors involved are 
present. In the previous chapter, I explained that policy measures developed in order 
to contain the behavior of “risk youth” are largely based on perceived feelings of 
insecurity, not only on actual numbers of youth delinquency. In the Netherlands for 
example, certain cases of nuisance and delinquency caused by Dutch- Moroccan 
adolescents lead to the discussion of a general “Moroccan problem” or “Moroccan 
disaster” in both the public and the political debate126. In the wake of this discussion 
Dutch-Moroccan youth in general are seen as part of a dangerous underclass, which 
should be both seriously investigated and contained with a specific policy approach 
(Jurgens 2007). Here we see that the emergence of moral panic relies first of all on a 
generally shared belief in the seriousness of a certain social threat, regardless of an 
objective or scientific verification of this perceived threat. Certain narratives grow in 
the collective imagination to be true, despite the fact that their origin cannot be traced 
and their status cannot be verified as an objective truth. In this sense, the 
development of moral panic can be compared to the construction of urban legends 
(Meder 2009).  
 
Folklorists have characterized urban legends as contemporary narratives which serve 
to interpret the significance of social change in post-industrial societies (Brunvand 
1981; Fine 1980).127 Developments such as new labor divisions, the scaling-up of 
community life, emerging bureaucratic systems, changing values and rapid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 See registration of the debate in parliament about the “Moroccan problem.” April 4, 2013: 
http://debatgemist.tweedekamer.nl/debatten/het-debat-over-het-marokkanenprobleem; and, 
“Marokkaan die het goed doet is een uitzondering.” Volkskrant. April 11, 2013: 
http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/3184/opinie/article/detail/3423709/2013/04/11/Marokkaan-die-het-
goed-doet-is-een-uitzondering.dhtml 
127 Some researchers prefer to speak of “contemporary” or “modern” legends, since said legends are not 
only located in urban areas. See for example Mullen, 1972. 
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urbanization are translated into symbolic stories which represent the perceived risks 
and innovations in a changing, modern society. Like more traditional legends, urban 
legends often contain a moral message that is symbolized in a story about everyday 
events, which derail into unexpected disasters through an ironic twist (Brunvand 
1981). Other than traditional legends about the world of gods and fairy tale creatures, 
urban legends are usually localized around the corner, in the real-life setting of those 
who tell such stories. This proximity causes people to strongly identify with the events 
told in the story; it could happen to all of us. Urban legends are often transmitted 
through informal channels and have a strong emotional component. They sometimes 
refer back to previous social events which caused strong emotions, but they can also 
generate new emotions. The creation of such new emotions is often set in the context 
of a need to consume emotions collectively and a need to establish social bonding, in 
the light of a sense of belonging to a certain community. The more such emotions are 
consistently shared by a majority of people, the more likely the story is believed to be 
true (Heath, Bell & Sternberg 2001).  
 
The widespread knowledge of, and belief in, urban legends distinguishes them from 
simple rumors. We can speak here of stories which express a certain collective 
emotion and therefore serve as a binding factor in a social sense, even when the story 
is associated with fear, danger and annoyances. Hostility towards threatening outsiders 
who are a source of fears can enforce the solidarity between those who see themselves 
as part of the same community. Urban legends often involve unexpected and 
irrational attacks on innocent people, performed by deviant or insane perpetrators. 
Such stories serve to explain or justify otherwise intangible feelings of social anxiety 
and offer a personified imagination of the cause of these anxieties (Best & Horiuchi 
1985). They could therefore be seen as minor “confictions” (Schinkel 2007), as 
discussed in Chapter 1., because they serve to create a certain solidarity amongst 
dominant social groups in society, while they serve to “convict” others as threatening 
and deviant outsiders. Urban legends demonstrate the role of both binding and 
dividing narratives in a shared understanding of society. Myths and legends have 
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always played a role in community building and urban legends are a contemporary 
expression of this phenomenon. The moralistic message, as well as the creation of a 
common threat and the shared horror attached to this threat, makes it easy for people 
to identify with one another as the “good” ones through the practice of narrating 
legends. A strong symbolism characterizes these legends, in which certain figures, 
places or events represent societal elements which should either be encouraged or 
prevented. In the construction of moral panics, a similar symbolism can be 
recognized.  
 
5.1.3. Folk devils threatening society 
In the case of moral panic, the narratives forming the source of panic are not only 
transmitted through informal channels, but also through mainstream media, public 
and political debates. The symbolic power of exaggerated media reports in which 
certain social events are described as natural disasters, which can have an impact on all 
citizens were they to be repeated, plays a crucial role in the emergence of moral panic. 
Certain narratives about dangers and annoyances are continuously stressed in the 
media and intensify feelings of moral panic. Incidents which share elements with 
certain previous events that caused moral panic are easily symbolized in the same way. 
For example, following the extensive urban riots in France in 2005, Dutch media 
repeatedly warned of “Paris-like situations” in the case of relatively minor 
disturbances caused by youngsters in Dutch deprived neighborhoods.128 The symbolic 
impact of such media reports is also reflected in the policy sphere, and mechanisms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 In 2010, de Spits daily newspaper referred to “Paris-like situations” in a report on three burned cars in 
Vught, a relatively small town in the south of the Netherlands. Source: 
http://www.spitsnieuws.nl/archives/provinciaal/2010/10/parijse_toestanden_in_vught.html. It is not 
only in the media that these terms are used. In 2007, some riots broke out in Slootervaart, a Western 
neighborhood of Amsterdam, after a male inhabitant who had attacked two police officers with a knife 
was shot to death inside of the police station. The Chief of Police of Amsterdam was one of the first to 
publicly speak of “Paris-like situations” in relation to the events in the area. See: 
http://www.elsevier.nl/web/10142996/Nieuws/Nederland/Welten-Rekening-houden-met-Parijse-
toestanden.htm. In December 2007, an account on the website of the National Committee of Mayors 
referred to “Paris-like situations” in the header, in relation to the presentation of a report on social unrest 
in the city of Utrecht. Source: http://www.burgemeesters.nl/wei-ji 
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control are extended under the influence of such reports.129 Local incidents which 
resonate with moral panics can become a reason to tighten certain national policies 
regarding the containment of deviant behavior. Measures can be taken by authorities 
that not only extend beyond the place where the initial incident took place, but also 
increase the perceived intensity of the initial events. Only the physical features of 
those who could be recognized as instigators of moral panic can become a reason to 
place certain people under intensified state control. As I have stated in the previous 
two chapters, the risk of criminal behavior is especially associated with young people 
of immigrant descent – those who differ ethnically and racially from the standardized 
image of the average citizen. Ethnic profiling by the police is a result of such 
associations (Van der Leun & Van der Woude 2011; Cankaya 2012; Human Rights 
Watch 2012). 
 
Cohen describes those who are designated as the instigators of such fears and 
anxieties as “folk devils,” or social fairy tale figures, who are enlarged in the collective 
imagination as a general, evil threat. These folk devils are outsiders to the general 
consensus on what is accepted moral behavior. In this sense, they lose their human 
recognizability and gain monstrous, or devilish, proportions. It is especially the 
apparent senselessness of the actions of these folk devils that encourages their labeling 
as inhuman or barbarous, since the motivation of their actions cannot be recognized 
as valid. According to Cohen, this social typecasting works as a certain self-
affirmation. The negative evaluation of deviant behavior is influenced by the fact that 
our understanding of this behavior is framed by the denominator of deviancy. The 
behavior of the groups that are labeled as folk devils is valued in the light of this label 
and, in return, often affirms the image of deviancy that is already attached to this label. 
Several societal elements, such as media reports and political debates, play a role in the 
labeling of certain groups as deviant. In this light, it is of importance to take into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 In 2007, the Chief of Police in Amsterdam spoke of the heightened sense of vigilance in relation to 
the riots in Slootervaart, and said that he was constantly aware that “some conscienceless pesterers could 
come crawling out of the gutter.” The Liberal Party in Amsterdam proposed to take extra measures such 
as a restraining order and extra preventive stop-and-search surveillance in the area. Source: 
http://www.nu.nl/algemeen/1278026/welten-alert-op-parijse-toestanden-in-slotervaart-video.html 
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account that deviance not only leads to social control, but also “social control leads to 
deviance” (Cohen 2011, 8). 130 Certain labels of deviance can influence the self-
identification of groups in society, as I mentioned in Chapter 4. in relation to the 
coping with meta-stereotyping. It is not only that youth groups are labeled as folk 
devils; they often also start to intentionally play the role which is assigned to them. 
Cohen describes how the boys who were designated as Mods and Rockers would pose 
for media photographers while kicking in a telephone boot, screaming slogans or 
making signs which were associated with their folk devil status (Cohen 2011, 188). 
Similar images can be recognized in the context of more contemporary cases of urban 
riots in which youngsters who are labeled as deviant were involved, such as the riots in 
Paris in 2005 and in London in 2011. 
 
5.2. From folk devil to commercial icon of pop culture 
Cohen’s analysis of moral panic makes it clear how youth culture of delinquent and 
rebellious teenagers is perceived as a frightening product of abnormality. Their 
expressions are discredited as irrational, and certainly not recognized as a form of 
worthy or legitimate civil participation. Moral panic therefore feeds certain 
mechanisms of exclusion from society. However, this does not mean that youth who 
are labeled as folk devils are completely overlooked. They often occupy the center of 
public attention. This attention does not always imply a rejection, but can also take the 
shape of an embrace. The exciting attraction of the tough and non-conformist thug 
and his unpredictable lifestyle has inspired many references in popular culture. Hence, 
deviancy can also be exploited in a commercial sense (Cohen 2011, 157). As much as 
disturbances which are ascribed to “folk devils” are used to legitimize certain political 
decisions or moral campaigns in favor of the containment of deviancy, the deviant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Cohen is here clearly influenced by labeling theory. Within labeling theory it is explicitly emphasized 
how the behavior of groups and individuals can be influenced by the “labels,” which are attached to them 
by the larger society. It is not only the individual agency of those who are abnormal, which causes their 
condemnation. The fact that they are seen as not-normal, makes it easy to express negative judgments 
and enforce stereotypes. The reception of deviant behavior co-creates the very notion of deviancy, and 
shapes one, negatively valued, container category to designate those who avert from the dominant norm. 
Those who are placed in this category are not only identified with deviancy, but can also begin to identify 
themselves with this label. See Becker, 1991. 
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status of the folk devil can also be explicitly played out and celebrated in the light of 
commercial interests. Youngsters who do not identify themselves with the image of 
the average neat and law-abiding citizen often feel attracted to those figures in popular 
culture who represent the opposite: the uncivil troublemaker. The image of the 
rebellious outsider not only frightens, but also attracts, and therefore sells. The folk 
devil can thus become a hero, and his status cannot only gain notorious proportions, 
but also iconic proportions. 
 
Features of urban youth culture which are initially associated with a small, unadjusted 
and rebellious group can rapidly gain popularity amongst youngsters who do not 
completely fit the label of the “real” folk devil. When elements like fashion style, street 
language and code of conduct become detached from the socio-economic background 
and living environment of those who were initially associated with these elements, the 
youth culture becomes diffused. Then, the initial representation of actual social 
deviance becomes lost in popular culture, and those without a deviant identity also 
begin to identify with the commercialized representations of counter-culture 131 . 
Commercial exploitation of negative stereotypes from urban youth culture can cause 
both confusion and excitement in the general public, as the Justice video shows. As 
soon as such commercial use of certain youth cultural elements reaches a mainstream 
public, both the moral panic and the excitement about the original, rough and 
maladjusted image it used to represent is lost. “There is, then, a phase of 
commercialization and exploitation, slackening off, resistance or lack of enthusiasm, 
followed by stagnation and the eventual preservation of the style in nostalgic 
memories. (…) What starts as a revolt finishes as style” (Cohen 2011, 229).  
 
Certain countercultural elements can shift in symbolical signification over the course 
of such a process of commercial exploitation. Where a certain physical appearance or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 This phenomenon is described in the Dutch novel “Witte panters” (white panthers), about two white, 
ethnically Dutch, middle class teenagers, who are in search of a new and rebellious identification to 
compensate for their liberal and privileged upbringing. They become attracted by rap culture and the 
“gangsta” street-style of the black and Arab youth they see hanging around the playground near their own 
neighborhood. (Stapele 2012) 
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a certain social attitude is first perceived as a cause for moral panic, it can later become 
a popular part of a new fashionable lifestyle, destined to finally be nostalgically 
remembered as a harmless expression of a teenage struggle for freedom and 
recognition. In such a movement towards a commercial embrace of counter-culture, 
the threatening impact of folk devils, who cause moral panic, can be transformed into 
accepted expressions of civil engagement. When, in later times, the general public 
looks differently, and with some distance, at certain moral conventions, those who 
broke such moral standards can become recognized as part of an avant-garde which 
heralded a change in the dominant mores of society. This shift in reception can also 
imply that a political significance can later be ascribed to deviant behavior which was 
first discredited as senseless. There are various historical examples of figures in 
popular youth culture who were first seen as notorious personifications of dangerous 
and unwanted adolescent behavior, and later became icons of youthful struggles for 
the recognition of changing values and social relations in a changing world. Two of 
the most famous of such icons are Marlon Brando in his role in the movie The Wild 
One (1953)132 and James Dean in his role in the movie Rebel Without a Cause (1955).133 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 In 1953, Marlon Brando played the role of Johnny in The Wild One, the young leader of a motorcycle 
gang that turns a small, neat and sleepy American town upside down, with fatal consequences. Johnny is a 
rough and unconcerned young man, who crushes all good manners under his boot and seems to be 
wasting his time while irritating his environment. The movie is based on a story about alleged riots that 
broke out in the small town of Hollister, California, after a street party for motorcyclists. The story was 
presented in a documentary style in articles which appeared in Harper’s Magazine and Life, but later turned 
out to be largely fictionalized. Nevertheless, the opening message of the movie reads: “This is a shocking 
story. It could never take place in most American towns – but it did in this one. It is a public challenge 
not to let it happen again.” These words suggest that the events depicted in the film were real-life events 
and of general concern to all Americans. This appeal to a lived reality of social concern contributed to the 
status of the movie as highly controversial. Out of fear that the movie would instigate young people to 
stray from the right track, the movie was banned from cinemas in Great Britain for fourteen years, where 
it was screened for the first time in 1968. At the same time, Marlon Brando’s role in the movie gained an 
iconic status. Many young people recognized themselves in the troubled anti-hero. His leather jacket, cap 
and even his haircut were endlessly copied and re-used in other products of popular culture. See also 
Phillips 2005. 
133 James Dean starred in the movie Rebel Without a Cause as the rebellious son of a proper all-American 
family who stands up to the narrow-minded and suffocating morals of his parents. Jim feels 
misunderstood and undervalued in his family home and looks for recognition and companionship 
outside, on the streets. There, he engages in a competition with other recalcitrant teens, which leads to 
various minor and major disasters, amongst which an illegal car race with a dramatic ending. The image 
of Dean, wearing jeans and a red jacket, looking into the camera with a bored, challenging and anguished 
look on his face, became the representation of a generation and the dream of millions of girls around the 
globe.  
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5.2.1. The rebel without a cause 
Long before videos like the one from Justice found their way to viewers by means of 
YouTube and other internet channels, representations of derailed young urban 
troublemakers already caused both scandal and excitement through mass media. 
Brando and Dean became both famous and infamous not long after the feature film 
had become accessible to a larger public. They reached millions of youngsters and 
their parents with their personification of a generation adrift, estranged from their 
families and local communities. They showed how adolescents would rather occupy 
themselves with the creation of a distinct “street culture,” with specific codes and 
habits, than to work on a connection with civil life. In later receptions, both film 
figures became icons of unconventional civil engagement, representing the struggles 
and needs of a large group of young people who felt like they had no place in society. 
In this sense, they could be seen as the predecessors of the present-day rebels without 
a cause who hold a controversial position in Western societies. 
 
The rebellion of Jim in Rebel Without a Cause first of all reflects a clash of generations 
in post-war American white middle-class families, in which parental authority and 
traditional family values were challenged by the younger generation’s newfound 
individuality and urge to experiment. Johnny’s struggle in The Wild One is set in a more 
public societal perspective, and deals with the clash between law-abiding citizens and 
delinquent or deviant groups of youngsters who come from a lower class background 
and tend to disturb the civil peace with gang behavior.  
 
Despite a difference in focus on a respective private and public setting for a 
generational conflict, and a different class perspective, both narratives of rebellion can 
be compared in some crucial respects. Both movies depict the fascination with, and 
repugnance of, senseless violent behavior of socially disengaged adolescents. In both 
cases, delinquent teenagers defy existing authorities and moral frameworks, while their 
motivation remains largely inexplicable to the general public. In this sense, both 
movies bring the “rebel without a cause” to the center of the stage of popular culture, 
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in a rather compelling way. The protagonists of both movies seem to be randomly 
looking for disturbances, without any particular reason or aim. In a scene in The Wild 
One, Johnny and his friends enter a local pub. A girl approaches Johnny, who is 
standing in a corner and gazes indifferently at his dancing pals. She asks him curiously: 
“Hey Johnny, what are you rebelling against?” Johnny answers her in an uninvolved 
tone: “What do you got?” Johnny seems to be completely indifferent towards whom 
or what he is confronting, as long as he can seek some kind of confrontation. His 
rebellion seems to be a goal in itself.  
 
The initial and most obvious reception of both film narratives focuses on a lack of 
social engagement and political awareness. Both boys in both movies are depicted as 
rebels, but their revolt seems to be missing the point. The behavior of the rebel 
without a cause seems to be standing alone, without an embeddedness in a certain 
rational or emotional context which could serve to explain its origin or end. Precisely 
because of its lack of justification, this behavior seems to be difficult to correct. In 
order to correct the rebel without a cause, one needs to envision a certain context in 
which this alienated adolescent could regain his/her natural place as an adjusted 
citizen. It is exactly this impossibility of “fitting in,” which enables the labeling of 
youngsters who act like rebels without a cause as “outlaws,” as barbarous or devilish 
outsiders, who are untouchable in the referential framework of accepted civil 
participation and who therefore place themselves outside of the domain of the law, 
the community and the mores of their time. In contrast to the seemingly senseless 
disturbances incited by the rebel without a cause, a legitimate revolt consists of an 
interaction with a social context which is deliberately criticized in a conscious 
reflection, with the aim of changing it for the better or replacing it with a new social 
structure. Senseless violent disturbances and acts of vandalism, on the other hand, are 
a danger which undermines any project of society building, precisely because they 
seem to lack rational, attainable and recognizable claims for social change. Legitimate 
resistance against dominant power structures or authorities requires a meaningful 
interaction with these structures or authorities, even if they are denounced in this 
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interaction. In the case of rebellion without a cause, such a meaningful interaction 
seems to be absent. This absence forms a clear cause for moral panic; a fear emerges 
with respect to the dissolution of society under the devastating impact of randomly 
striking, violent outlaws. The police officer who grabs Johnny by the collar at the end 
of The Wild One says in despair: “I don’t know if there’s any good in you. I don’t know 
if there’s anything in you.” And this is precisely the problem. How can we see any 
social or political significance in the violent rebellion of derailed teenagers, if this 
rebellion seems to be empty, devoid of any meaning, any understandable motivation 
and any imaginable goal? 
 
At the same time, the presentation of a seemingly senseless youth rebellion in the 
movie Rebel Without a Cause is accompanied by clear psychological and moral 
reflections on the causes of the protagonist’s behavior. Just like the other young 
characters in the movie, Jim is portrayed as the unfortunate product of a generation of 
parents who are unable to deal with their own discontentment and fail to set an 
example for their children. The rebellious tendencies of the teens in the movie seem 
to be rooted in a despair caused by parental neglect and psychological insecurities. Jim 
seeks refuge in a conquest for honor and recognition within the social structure 
offered by his peers on the streets. This presentation of the hidden causes behind the 
seemingly erratic anger of the protagonists seems to be derived from a classical 
pathologization of adolescent, delinquent behavior. In line with classical criminology, 
causes for delinquent youth behavior were, until the 1950s, sought either in the 
individual psyche, moral strength and rational choice of the offender (Reckless 1961; 
Cornish & Clarke 1986) or in deficits in their family lives (Bowlby 1944). Structural 
conditions, like poverty, marginalization and discrimination, were often left out of the 
analysis of causes of juvenile delinquency (Muncie 1999; Goldson & Jamieson 2002). 
Juvenile delinquency was framed as an example of personal abnormality and its causes 
were less analyzed as part of a societal struggle with a political significance. Starting in 
the 1960s, this research focus changed and environmental factors like the socio-
economic background of youngsters and the political power dynamics of society were 
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more closely examined in relation to youth subcultures and delinquency. In this new 
research tradition of subcultural studies, a political significance was sought in 
seemingly senseless rebellious agency, by perceiving it in relation to a social, cultural 
and economic environment in which power plays between dominant and subaltern 
groups determine young people’s position, attitude and identifications. 
 
5.3. Defying dominant culture with a safety pin 
When we look at the disturbing agency of “rebels without a cause” from the 
perspective of subcultural studies, it becomes easier to understand how a seemingly 
senseless rebellion can make political sense. It is precisely the deviant, and even the 
delinquent elements, which make political sense when we perceive them as 
expressions of resistance against coercive doctrines of “good citizenship” that are 
imposed on groups, which are simultaneously excluded from the collective shaping of 
a political order and public morality. Seen from this perspective, expressions of 
subcultures of marginalized youth that are not deliberately linked to a certain form of 
political organization also gain political significance. The relationship between youth 
subcultures and delinquent behavior was already a topic of research before the 1960s, 
especially in the tradition of the Chicago School (Thrasher 1927; Shaw & McKay 
1942; Whyte 1943). In this tradition, research was conducted into the behavior, 
motives and life circumstances of the “real” rebels without a cause, and not only into 
the collective imagination which developed around their reputation.  
 
5.3.1. Subcultures in class perspective 
In 1955, Albert Cohen published “Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang,” a 
book about delinquent boys with a lower-class background and their involvement in 
gang activities in America. According to Cohen, subcultures emerged in inner city 
slums as a framework of norms and values of those who live at a distance from 
mainstream middle-class culture, in the margins of society. The social circumstances in 
which young males from the slums grow up largely determine whether they will 
become corner boys, who try to make the best of their life given the circumstances, or 
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delinquent boys, who seek to resolve their social problems by obtaining status and 
recognition in a criminal milieu. From Cohen’s perspective, criminal activities 
performed in a gang context have a compensatory function for youngsters who have 
little to no other means of boosting their self-esteem. In a way, this behavior can be 
seen as a solution to perceived social problems. In contrast to Walter Miller, another 
influential writer in the field of youth delinquency in that time, Cohen emphasizes the 
norms and values of these slum boys as specific character-traits of a youth subculture. 
Miller, on the other hand, sees these norms and values embedded in a broader context 
of a lower, working class culture (Miller 1958). 
 
On the other side of the Atlantic, researchers from the “Birmingham school” (Centre 
for Contemporary Cultural Studies) continued to work in line with Cohen’s focus on 
the working class culture of predominantly male adolescents from deprived 
neighborhoods and its translation into specific youth subcultures. They shared his 
relational approach, in which subcultures are understood as divergent from dominant 
culture, and his concern for the influence of the social environment on the 
development of the individual. In addition, the scholars of the Birmingham School 
explicitly looked at subcultures from a political perspective. The work of scholars such 
as Dick Hebdige, Stuart Hall, Toni Jefferson and Stanley Cohen is firmly rooted in a 
(neo-)Marxist tradition and focuses on expressions of urban subcultures as a form of 
revolt of subordinated groups against the dominant classes in society. From their 
perspective, the development of cultural characteristics is closely related to socio-
economic class structures. The economic situation of families, access to work and 
education and physical conditions of the neighborhood of residence all influence the 
social and cultural conditioning of young people. It is in the interest of scholars who 
study subcultures in a Marxist tradition to examine which groups in society have 
access to the establishment of a dominant social order and which groups are excluded 
from this order. The position and interests of the dominant classes are leading in the 
development of a framework of socio-cultural meaning, which is presented as the 
obvious, most natural way of living. Other cultural expressions and social relations are 
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discredited as deviant from the normal standard, but can at the same time seek to 
question, negotiate, modify or contest the dominant culture (Hall & Jefferson 1975, 
12). This analysis makes it clear that subcultures should not only be examined as a 
stand-alone social phenomenon, but should always be approached in relation to the 
dominant culture from which they diverge.  
 
In this reading, subcultural practices are “rituals of resistance” enacted by working-
class youth in response to the break-up of traditional communities and an unbridled 
post-war consumerism that was creating a sharply visible, unequal distribution of 
wealth (Nayak 2003, 16). 
 
Subcultures are not only subordinated expressions of lifestyle, but also potentially 
subversive in relation to “mainstream” culture (Nayak 2003). Subcultural expressions 
can thus be seen as contesting hegemonic power structures, as they are expressed in 
both cultural and political dominance. Here, “the term hegemony refers to a situation 
in which a provisional alliance of certain social groups can exert ‘total social authority’ 
over other subordinate groups” (Hebdige 1979, 16). The issue is which habits of 
young people are able to crack open the general consensus upholding this hegemonic 
social order and in what way youth subcultures can be understood as a challenge to 
hegemony. Expressions of subculture can become a way to “win space” in public life 
for young people who are marginalized, sometimes literally by claiming a territory in 
public space to spend their leisure time, sometimes more symbolically by claiming 
cultural space for their taste of music (Hall & Jefferson 1975, 45-46). Style gains a 
political significance in this subcultural context. Everyday elements of style, such as 
the wearing of a leather jacket, can be seen as a political statement, because they are a 
symbol of resistance against hegemonic power (Hebdige 1979). Certain everyday 
objects become the symbol of such a practice of resistance against subordination 
(ibid., 18).  
 
Style in subculture is, then, pregnant with significance. Its transformations go “against 
nature,” interrupting the process of “normalization.” As such, they are gestures, 
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movements towards a speech which offends the “silent majority,” which challenges 
the principle of unity and cohesion, which contradicts the myth of consensus. (ibid., 
18) 
A safety pin has a whole different connotation in the hands of a tailor than when it is 
pinned through a punk’s eyebrow because it is taken out of its “normal” context. In 
an act of bricolage, different everyday objects are appropriated in subcultures and 
combined in a configuration of style which has a meaning in itself, resisting 
normalization (ibid., 104). Such new configurations of style elements are not just 
random snippets of a noncommittal pop culture. They are compatible with the values, 
codes of behavior and social relations which give meaning to the lives of those who 
form part of a subculture in a coherent internal structure (ibid., 113). Translations of 
subculture into commercial pop culture therefore do not always have to lead to a 
gliding scale of mainstream cooptation, as I earlier noted in reference to Cohen. 
Whether they have a political significance or not depends on the embeddedness of 
elements of style within a class context, according to scholars of the Birmingham 
School. 
 
5.3.2 From subculture to counter-culture 
Hall and Jefferson discuss the difference in cultural expressions between youngsters 
with a working-class background and youngsters with a middle-class background in 
“Resistance through Rituals” (1975, 60).  
 
Both working-class sub-cultures and middle-class counter-cultures are seen, by moral 
guardians and the control culture, as marking a “crisis of authority.” The 
“delinquency” of the one and the “disaffiliation” of the other index a weakening of 
the bonds of social attachments and of the formative institutions which manage how 
the former “mature” into hard-working, law-abiding, respectable working-class 
citizens, or the latter into sober, career-minded, “possessively-individual” bourgeois 
citizens. (Hall & Jefferson 1975, 62) 
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The subcultures of lower-class adolescents are characterized by strong collective social 
structures and are focused on an appropriation of their deprived environment. The 
strong affiliations to the community of experience of my respondents in Grigny and 
Kanaleneiland can be understood in this light. In our present time, the strong 
collective social structures in which youngsters with an immigrant background find a 
certain sense of belonging have shifted from working-class identifications to 
identifications with the domain of “the streets.” The need for an appropriation of the 
direct living environment remains unchanged. The cultural framework of middle-class 
youth is more loosely constructed, more individualized and is focused on the 
transformation of their social environment, or on creating “enclaves within the 
interstices of dominant culture” (ibid., 60). Middle-class youth start to negate the 
obviousness of dominant culture from within this very culture. At the same time, their 
cultural expressions are often more deliberately articulated in a political sense, and 
more explicitly positioned in opposition to the dominant culture and morals. While 
lower-class adolescents feel excluded from certain parts of the dominant culture which 
they would like to appropriate without losing their own identity, middle-class youth 
often deliberately reject the dominant culture in which they grew up. This is why Hall 
and Jefferson prefer the term counter-culture for these middle-class cultural 
expressions, instead of subculture.  
 
In addition, they emphasize that it is not only the difference in behavior of the 
youngsters themselves that causes this perceived difference between subculture and 
counter-culture; it is also largely due to the reception of these different youth cultures. 
While middle-class cultural expressions are easily perceived as having a political 
significance, even if no clear political statements are made, working-class culture tends 
to be easily discredited as devoid of any political sense, even if a clear class conscience 
is expressed. Institutional mechanisms of control tend to incorporate lower-class 
youth cultures as acts of plain delinquency and gang behavior, without any social and 
political awareness. Youth cultures from middle-class teenagers are often seen as 
deliberately undermining a familiar moral framework which is rejected as being too 
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narrow-minded. Both varieties of youth culture have become the object of state 
control, but were nevertheless controlled in a different way and because of a different 
reasoning. It is often the better connections of middle-class youth to the institutional 
domain that enables a more political understanding of their subcultural expressions. A 
link between such subcultures and more institutionalized bodies, which are able to 
represent and voice the concerns and demands of those affiliated to it, is often easier 
established in a middle-class milieu. This becomes apparent in the close connection 
between the hippies and the student movement, for example. In the case of lower-
class youngsters, such connections to more institutionally representative bodies are 
often lacking. These differences in political interpretation of middle- and lower-class 
youth subcultures are still present today. Especially the street culture of lower-class 
and marginalized youth is considered to be without any political sense. 
 
5.4. Dreams of “making it” as the notorious bad guy 
Despite this differentiated analysis of lower- and middle-class subcultures, the 
majority of subcultural studies remained focused on boys from one racial and ethnic 
background, namely from “native” white families. However, from the 1980s onwards, 
the “rebels without a cause” who dominated the newspapers were no longer boys who 
looked like Brando or Dean. The image of the rebellious youth who caused moral 
panic shifted from white lower- or middle-class youngsters to black lower-class 
youngsters. The experiences and subcultural expressions of black young people and 
youth with an immigrant background started to receive more attention, often in a 
negative way. The delinquent youth who caused new eruptions of moral panic were 
now perceived as dangerous outsiders for a double reason. They both looked different 
than the average citizen and behaved different than the dominant norms of civil 
participation prescribed. Their rebellious agency was not only rooted in class 
distinctions and generational conflicts, but also in experiences of racism and area-
based discrimination. In the wake of these developments, more and more researchers 
started to critique the dominant focus on masculinity and whiteness in subcultural 
studies. More gender- and race-conscious studies appeared which aimed to shed light 
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on the subcultures that still had remained undervalued in the context of this very 
domain of research (Mac An Ghaill 1988; Mirza 1992; Back 1996; Alexander 1996).  
 
5.4.1 The racialization of the rebel without a cause 
This attention emerged in a time in which an increasing fear of the young black 
criminal living in degraded inner-city neighborhoods, dealing and consuming drugs, 
started to dominate the public and policy debate in both the United States and 
Western Europe. This fear expanded from the end of the 1970s onwards, when both 
the trafficking of hard drugs intensified and an economic crisis put established 
institutional political relations to the test. 
 
The imagery of alien violence and criminality personified in the “mugger” and the 
“illegal” immigrant has become an important card in the hands of politicians and 
police officers whose authority is undermined by the political fluctuations of the crisis 
(Gilroy 1982, 48). 
 
A plea for the containment of deviant behavior and societal threats was more and 
more associated with young people from racial and ethnic minority groups, immigrant 
families and mixed cultural backgrounds, and increasingly coupled with the perceived 
problem of “ghetto-ization.” Lines of racial demarcation not only limited socio-
economic opportunities, but also divided urban space up into territories dominated by 
different racial and ethnic groups (Massey & Denton 1993). Both dominant and 
minority groups increasingly felt restricted in their freedom of movement in certain 
parts of public space, due to expressions of racism and race-inspired assaults. As a 
result, social control was increasingly territorialized, which resulted in a strong 
presence of police in predominantly black and/or immigrant neighborhoods (Gilroy 
1981, 214). Reactions in the form of violent clashes between young people and the 
police formed part of this same development. Race-related riots had already taken 
place in the United States throughout the 1970s, when both the Civil Rights 
movement and the Black Power movement inspired a fight for equal recognition and 
just treatment of black people by the state. Cases like the Brixton Riots in South 
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London in 1981 and the Rodney King Riots in Los Angeles in 1992 continued to 
demonstrate the level of frustration about discrimination, precarious life 
circumstances and state oppression amongst communities of black youth in both the 
United States and Western Europe. 
 
Under influence of these developments, the issue of racism became important in the 
analysis of subcultural dynamics, in addition to class subordination. A realization 
emerged that struggles in which cultural hegemony is contested not only take place 
along class lines, but also along race lines. Not only the class aspect of identity, but 
also the race aspect of identity influences young people’s opportunities in relation to 
work, education and personal development, as well as the cultural practices in which 
they express themselves (Gilroy 1995). Race has to be understood here not as a 
biological identity marker, but as a relation which is constructed within the social and 
political field. The question is therefore what political implications the use of the 
terms “black” and “white” have, and in what way these terms play a role in the 
construction of both dominant and resistant political agency (West 1993). Taking the 
British context as an example, Paul Gilroy emphasizes that class struggles are 
performed in and through race (Gilroy 1981, 210). The composition of classes is 
constantly redefined and, besides a focus on the struggle between different classes, it 
is important to take notice of the various groups with various histories and 
experiences in relation to ethnicity which are involved in a struggle for better life 
circumstances. For example, the active involvement in, and shaping of, the labor 
struggle by immigrant workers became more recognized at the end of the 1970s. 
 
An awareness that the urban poor were also racialized, and that this racialization 
affected not only the lives of young people, but also the way in which they rebel 
against oppression, started to become apparent in subcultural studies. Not only socio-
economic circumstances and policies of law and order stimulated a more race-
conscious approach to subcultures. Also, a different view of the development of 
culture itself played a part in the emergence of the awareness of race. According to 
 321 
Stuart Hall, this new awareness was largely caused by a shift in focus on sources of 
cultural influence from Europe to America. In Europe, the influence of race and 
immigration on cultural development was always largely neglected, since ethnicity did 
not seem to be a category of identity which had to be reckoned with. In America, on 
the other hand, different ethnicities and movements of immigration had always played 
a part in the construction and understanding of American identity and culture. 
“[C]onsequently, the construction of ethnic hierarchies has always defined its cultural 
politics. And, of course, silenced and unacknowledged, the fact of American popular 
culture itself which has always contained within it, whether silenced or not, black 
American popular vernacular traditions” (Hall 1993, 105). Based on this awareness, 
black people claimed their right to shape cultural expressions based on their own 
experiences and used their own cultural representations to contest stereotypical 
images of blacks as victimized and marginalized, or delinquent and deviant (Hall 
1996).  
 
At the same time, a representation of life in a ghettoized neighborhood, where 
encounters with crime and drugs take place on a daily basis, started to take an 
important place in the subcultures of black youngsters, as became explicitly apparent 
in hip-hop culture. Rap music, in particular, emerged as a cultural tool for the 
“voiceless,” to speak out and give accounts of experiences of racism, marginalization 
and the hardships of ghetto life (Best & Kellner 1999). The context of “gangsta” life 
in the ghetto became the background of popular rebellious anti-heroes, who appealed 
to young people living under the stress of a stigmatized life in the “wrong” 
neighborhood, coming from the “wrong” race and background. The stereotypical 
image of the dangerous and lawless black criminal has in fact increased in popularity 
since the 1980s and continues to do so today. In an environment in which all 
opportunities to gain success and recognition according to mainstream expectations 
seem to be lost, young people are attracted to precisely the kind of violent, “outlaw” 
and egocentric behavior of which they are accused by defenders of civility and 
modesty (Anderson 1999). It is in the domain of criminality where these youngsters 
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seem to see their only route to success. Those icons who have inspired youngsters 
since the emergence of gangsta rap seem to lack all of the social and political 
awareness that was still present in the black popular culture of the 1970s and the 
beginning of the 1980s, when the Black Power movement was still flourishing.  
 
Figures like 50 Cent represent an ultraviolent and macho lifestyle, supported by a 
radical individualism, materialism and moral opportunism, which seem to be devoid 
of any engagement. From the perspective of shared societal interests and a political 
order, this attitude appears to be completely senseless. However, when we look at 
such a “gangsta” attitude not from within a framework of good citizenship and civil 
participation, but as an expression of disagreement with certain civic norms of those 
who are positioned as outsiders to the domain of the “good citizen,” this attitude has 
a certain subversive and unruly political significance. When the dominant position of 
the “good citizen” is no longer taken as the norm for social and political participation, 
a subversive distortion of this norm to suit an alternative framework of community 
belonging and societal recognition for the excluded is equally political. This political 
significance can be found in the laying bare of structural inequalities between those 
who are seen as model citizens and those who are seen as threatening the consistency 
and well-being of society. It signals the struggle of those who have another identity, 
and who behave differently than the “autochthonous” majority, in gaining a 
respectable place in society. If that respect cannot be earned by fitting into the 
dominant ethnic and cultural framework, it is earned by explicitly defying that 
dominant framework and replacing it with an alternative social and cultural structure 
in which civic virtues and measures of social success gain a whole different meaning. 
This turn to an alternative structure in which dignity and a sense of belonging can be 
found cannot be seen separately from the political order of society. Both insiders and 
outsiders to the domain of good citizenship are bound by the same political power 
plays. In a collective disapproval of a “gangsta lifestyle,” good citizens recognize one 
another, while young people who identify with this gangsta style simultaneously turn 
against the community of good citizens, of which they feel they could never become a 
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part. Just as much as the flirting with violence and criminality of representative icons 
of a gangsta lifestyle is morally despicable, it tells us something about the social and 
political relations between dominant and “subaltern” groups within society at large. 
 
5.4.2 Tony Montana: Hero from the gutter 
A crucial figure in this respect is Tony Montana, the protagonist of Scarface, an 
American gangster movie which was released in 1983. Although Tony Montana is not 
black, but Hispanic, he became an important inspiration for black urban youth 
culture. Many black youngsters living in degraded inner-city areas, struggling with daily 
expressions of racism, were inspired by Tony’s attitude and achievements. However, 
not only black youngsters started to look up to Tony as a cult hero. His iconic status is 
recognized in a variety of communities of young people who feel excluded from 
society. Tony Montana became an icon of criminal and violent rebellion, serving no 
other cause than his own pursuit of money, power and women, as Tony himself 
expresses it in one of the movie’s famous scenes. The movie follows Tony in his 
endeavor to fulfill his own version of the American Dream, from the moment he 
arrives in the United States as a penniless immigrant of Cuban descent, struggling to 
obtain a green card, to his rise as a self-made, wealthy drug lord in charge of large-
scale, international criminal operations. The film has a somber undertone and ends in 
a fatal, apocalyptic scene, in which Tony is assassinated by a team of hitmen in his 
lush villa, amidst golden statues, crackling machine guns and mountains of cocaine. 
Towards the end of the movie, the viewer sees Tony become more and more lonely, 
getting lost in his own drug abuse and paranoid fears of losing all he has gained over 
the years. He becomes estranged from the few people he loves: his wife, his best 
friend and his younger sister. The only things that keep him going are increasingly 
unrealistic fantasies about his own invincibility and righteousness. Despite this 
negative message, the movie gained immense popularity.  
 
Tony Montana became an example of coolness and success for young people with a 
similar immigrant or ethnic minority background, living in deprived neighborhoods 
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and holding on to the code of the streets. The story of Scarface seems to represent the 
hope of achieving success for those who come, like Tony himself, “from the gutter,” 
through an alternative route which defies both the laws and codes of conduct of the 
dominant classes, and the mainstream cultural mores of the white and “native” 
majority. Those who do not feel represented by white, well-behaved, law-abiding, 
mainstream heroes like James Bond feel represented by the rebellion from the margins 
of Hispanic outsider Tony Montana. Heroes, who are “clearly designed to reinforce 
the ideological status quo of law, order, and justice” do not appeal to an audience 
which recognizes itself in Tony Montana (Rob 2009, 20). Both that ideology and the 
political and legal order which it substantiates are not designed for them to have a part 
in. This is at least their experience. The fact that Tony Montana defies that order and 
nevertheless manages to make it on his own terms makes him a role model and an 
appealing anti-hero at the same time.  
 
Scarface was initially not a big success at the box office, nor amongst movie critics. The 
almost three-hour long movie, a remake of a gangster movie with the same title from 
1932,134 was initially given an X rating because of its extremely violent content and 
explicit language.135 The critics’ reception was mixed, with some judging it to be one 
long trip of excessive and nihilistic crime and violence, and others being impressed by 
the realism of the characters.136 The initial reception of the movie in the Cuban 
community of Miami, where the story is set, was fairly negative, due to its 
confirmation of a stereotypical image of the criminal, opportunistic, misogynistic and 
drug-abusing Cuban immigrant. However, much to the surprise of the makers of the 
movie themselves, within twenty years the movie gained a cult status amongst 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 This movie was based on the career of gangster icon Al Capone, and gained a similar reputation for 
being very violent as the Scarface from the 1980s. Source: 
http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/19831209/REVIEWS/312090301/1023 
135 See: “Director Protests X Rating given to Movie ‘Scarface’,” Sarasota Herald-Tribune, November 5, 
1983. Source: 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=3Z4cAAAAIBAJ&sjid=lWgEAAAAIBAJ&pg=2585,3446095
&dq=scarface+rated+x&hl=en 
136 See for example: “Scarred for life,” Age, October 11, 2003.  
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/10/08/1065601905570.html, and “Scarface,” Sun Times, 
December 9, 1983, 
http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/19831209/REVIEWS/312090301/1023 
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youngsters in the United States and far beyond. Since the Geto Boys used some of 
Tony’s quotes as samples in one of their tracks in 1988, various hip-hop artists, from 
the Notorious B.I.G. and the Wu Tang Clan to Dutch rapper Appa, have referred to 
Scarface as the ultimate story of the notorious bad guy who manages to earn credit and 
respect while he was first ignored as a nobody. Tony’s brute and bold style has 
influenced the entire genre of “gangsta rap” as we know it today (Tucker 2008). But 
the “Scarfacination” went even further, and the image of the movie became exploited 
as a symbol of coolness in mainstream popular culture. 
 
Scarfacination is the transformation process the film undertook, from its initial 
lukewarm cultural insignificance in the mainstream, to its assimilation by Hip-hop 
males as a symbol for gangsta invincibility, to its becoming a national symbol for 
aggressive defiance that has transcended even the Hip-hop national boundaries. Its 
relevance to American culture today appears to be forced upon us by corporate 
marketing, as evidenced by its placement as a product brand and sales commodity, 
the image of Tony Montana adorns t-shirts, video games, posters, and literally every 
other conceivable means to turn a profit. Thus Scarface, which maintains its meaning 
in Hip-hop culture as the representation of a gangsta’s day to day militancy towards 
white patriarchy, has become transformed over time by the marketing plans of those 
capitalists intent on cashing in on that meaning. (Rob 2009, 58) 
 
For boys who recognize such a gangsta lifestyle in their daily environment, the violent 
militancy of Tony Montana remains attractive inside and outside of America to this 
day. I came across the popularity of Scarface on numerous occasions during my 
research. The walls in the youth centers in Grigny were decorated with Scarface posters, 
and the boys from Kanaleneiland named Scarface as the movie they re-watched most 
often. Tony Montana was mentioned in various conversations as an example of both 
the risks and attractions of a gangsta lifestyle, and frequent reference was made to 
him. I heard various invocations like: “Those tough guys from the square all want to 
be like Tony Montana!” This exemplifies the popularity of, and identification with, the 
movie and its leading figure across the borders of the United States, in various 
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national, cultural and subcultural contexts. Whether of black, Hispanic or Moroccan 
descent, a young audience from “problem neighborhoods” feels related to Tony and 
his dreams and struggles. Like him, they experience that their only chance to meet the 
standards of capitalist success and self-fulfillment lies outside of the law but in their 
own hands. Tony comes across the slogan “The World is Yours” 137 at various 
moments during the film, and it is exactly this message and the way in which he is able 
to materialize it, which appeals to a young audience fighting to gain access to the 
advantages of a capitalist and consumerist society. Those adolescents who feel they 
are living in a world which is all but their own are inspired by Tony’s determination to 
get everything he believes he deserves, even if he has to take it by force. The fact that 
Tony has to pay for his criminal ascent to success with his life is not perceived as a 
fatalistic failure, but rather as a realistic risk one needs to take if no other options are 
available.  
 
Tony Montana is not seen as a pathetic victim of criminal megalomania, but rather as 
a tough self-made man, who manages to find bold solutions for his problems of 
poverty, misrecognition and neglect. These solutions he finds within his own frame of 
reference, by staying loyal to the values and codes of conduct which have formed him 
in a tough life on the streets. Tony has no respect for any kind of authority forced 
upon him from the outside, except for the rules which he chooses to follow himself. 
When his loyalty is questioned by a Bolivian business associate, Tony tells him: “All I 
have in this world is my balls and my word and I don’t break ‘em for no one.” Tony’s 
personal courage, dignity and credibility offer the only guidance to which he is willing 
to abide. This readiness to cross any authoritarian force or externally imposed laws in 
case their justice is not internally convincing or genuinely experienced appeals to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 This same slogan is paraphrased in the French movie La Haine, which depicts one day in the lives of 
three friends from a Parisian suburb who are clearly inspired by representations of the gangsta lifestyle. In 
one scene, the boys come across an advertisement billboard which contains the French version of the 
phrase “The World is Yours” (le monde est a vous) and one of the protagonists changes it into “The World 
is Ours” (le monde est a nous) with spray-paint. This scene could be read as a small wink or conversation 
between a younger generation which is still living under challenging life circumstances and still holding a 
marginalized position, but nevertheless continuing to remember the confidence of a subcultural role 
model from decades ago.  
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young audience of immigrant children who feel they have too often been treated 
unjustly under the pretext of general laws and authority. The option to use violence in 
opposition to such given authorities is perceived as both a realistic and justified 
measure by those who can imagine what it feels like to be in Tony’s shoes.  
 
5.4.3 The truth of Tony about those who have no part 
Tony Montana as cult figure, propagating the criminal realization of the capitalist 
dream, is directly associated to the contemporary generation of “rebels without a 
cause,” who instigate an intense moral panic in Western democracies like France and 
the Netherlands. 138  These rebels without a cause are equally associated with an 
egocentric, illegal strive for materialistic success. However, the disruptive public 
interventions, such as urban riots, which are instigated by these rebellious adolescents, 
are speaking of a different cause, which is in a different way related to a strive for 
recognition and success within society. Such disruptions are often seen as one of the 
by-products of a gangster lifestyle, but they are appealing to the public 
acknowledgement of these young peoples’ marginalized position, rather than to their 
personal capacity to make it as a gangster. This public, rather than personal appeal 
represents the political meaning of such disruptions. This political meaning is often 
disregarded because said subversive interventions are judged to be “without a cause” 
in a similar way in which Tony’s endeavors to gain prestige are rejected. The factors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 That such moral panics are not only caused by popular culture alone, but also by direct reflections in 
“real” social interactions and conflicts, becomes clear in the case of the “Scarface gang” which was active 
during 2011 in Belgium and the Netherlands. This gang committed a series of bold armed robberies of 
gasoline stations, jewelry stores, a hotel and several companies for the transport of valuables, and was 
given its name after one of the members was seen on surveillance cameras dressed up like Tony 
Montana. The gang used several stolen, exclusive and fast cars and were equipped with heavy arms. Its 
members did not hesitate to shoot at those who tried to get in their way, including the police. After a 
robbery in Amsterdam, the gang led the police into an ambush on the highway and fired at them with 
automatic machine guns. When one of getaway cars crashed, the gang hijacked the car of a passer-by and 
managed to escape the police. The robbers’ bold style and lack of conscience was seen as particularly 
shocking. Despite a lack of knowledge about the background or motivation of the gang members, several 
news articles reported that the gang was inspired by the gangsta life as represented in the movie Scarface. 
See, for example: “Scarface en Tony Montana inspiratiebron voor criminelen,” De Volkskrant, July 2, 
2011. http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/3376/film/article/detail/2460727/2011/07/02/Scarface-en-
Tony-Montana-inspiratiebron-voor-criminelen.dhtml; “Brute bende spiegelt zich aan Scarface,” Spits, 
June 30, 2011. http://www.spitsnieuws.nl/archives/crime/2011/06/brute-bende-spiegelt-zich-aan-
scarface 
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that drive Tony – capitalistic growth, power in the field of business and a personal 
luxurious lifestyle – would be appreciated if he would have chosen a legal and 
mainstream approach to it. However, his identity, in combination with his unruly 
actions, makes him an unconventional and dangerous “outlaw.” It is the violent and 
lawless “otherness” of behavior like Tony’s which instigates a moral panic that creates 
a widely felt unease. It is illustrative that in one of the few academic articles that 
discusses the movie, Tony’s story is described as one in which no law counts but that 
of “limitless excess,” in which social codes are dissolved in a sensual drug trip, an 
example of “simulacral postmodernity” in which social class has “no real functional 
importance” (Bogue 1993). Just as I find that, despite its morally despicable nature, 
Tony’s behavior is not completely lawless, or without social codes and reference to 
social class distinctions, I find that public disruptions of young urban troublemakers 
are not without political meaning. It is not so much the fact that the subversively 
rebellious behavior of young urban troublemakers with an immigrant background 
seems to be without any cause, but rather that their cause is not recognized as a 
worthy cause within the dominant standards of civil participation. 
 
In Tony’s attitude, we can see an instrumental approach to politics as it can be 
understood within an institutional framework. Tony sees violent crime as his only 
chance of having an equal opportunity to build up a life in America. Both the law and 
the political order are of less value and importance since they are clearly not put in 
place to serve guys like him. I recognize the same attitude of dismissal in relation to 
the law and institutional politics in the stories of my respondents, who equally feel 
that crime is permissible when one feels to be living in a societal and political order in 
which one does not have a rightful and respected place, nor the opportunity to 
influence this order. The political system is not theirs, but that of the white middle 
class, and therefore one can only relate to it in an instrumental way, in their opinion. 
In this light, the habit of “making chaos” can be seen as a provocation directed 
towards the “good citizens,” and an act of sabotage in relation to the laws and 
authorities that are installed to protect these good citizens. However, these disruptions 
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can be seen as signs of an unruly politics which goes beyond an instrumental 
application of the existing political structures for one’s own benefits. While Tony is 
trying to work the dominant framework of civil and political participation to his 
advantage, the political meaning of public disruptions of contemporary young rebels 
lies in the fact that they denounce this framework altogether, because it leaves no 
place for those who do not adapt to the image of the “good citizen.” 
 
The disruptions of rebels without a cause draw attention to a part of society which is 
usually seen as no part at all. Despite the moral abjection of their behavior, or actually 
because of this moral abjection, the collective imagination around “rebels without a 
cause,” not only causes moral panic, but also serves as a binding factor for those who 
make up the body of well-behaving and respected citizens. Tony himself seems to be 
well aware of this fact. In a later part of the movie, Tony engages in a drunken dispute 
with his wife in a restaurant. After she makes a scene and leaves him, he is escorted 
out of the restaurant while he delivering a sermon to the rest of the embarrassed 
guests. 
 
What are you looking at? You are all a bunch of fucking assholes. You know why? 
You don’t have the guts to be what you wanna be. You need people like me. You 
need people like me so you can point your fucking fingers and say that’s the bad guy. 
So, what that make you? Good? You’re not good. You just know how to hide. And 
lie. Me, I don’t have that problem. Me, I always tell the truth, even when I lie. So say 
goodnight to the bad guy. It’s the last time you gonna see a bad guy like this again, let 
me tell you.  
 
Tony seems eager to transmit a message here, which is usually ignored. He alludes to 
the role of “the bad guy” as the constitutive outside of “the good citizen.” Both 
characters make up one social reality, in which they are bound to each other by the 
same boundaries which separate them. Tony refers here to a different experience of 
truth than truth in its “normal,” mainstream connotation. The truth, which Tony 
speaks, is revealing this social and political relatedness, precisely because he is drawing 
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attention to his own moral promiscuity and tendency to tell lies. The general public, 
which makes an effort to stay within the boundaries of societal conventions, needs 
deviant elements to measure its own good conscience. The “outlaw” defines the law, 
as the bad guy defines what we know to be good behavior. However, one’s social 
position, background, identity and (sub)cultural affiliations determine which side of 
the line is defined as good and which as evil. For those rebellious adolescents who feel 
excluded from the dominant societal order, “good” social behavior has another 
meaning than it does for the mainstream citizenry.  
 
Dutch rapper Appa touches upon the same message in his song “De slechterik” (The 
Bad Guy), in which he uses a sample of Tony’s words: “That’s the bad guy.” Appa 
speaks of himself as a “little rat with big balls,” a kutmarokkaan (Moroccan scum) who 
is seen as “terrorist,” but who nevertheless laughs at all the politically correct slaves of 
the system, who point at the bad guy while not noticing that they themselves are just a 
number in a machine. This arrogant attitude can be seen as a social coping mechanism 
for dealing with a subordinate social position and lack of recognition. Besides such a 
socio-psychological analysis, one can look at such an inversion of standard social 
conventions from a political perspective. The staging of rebels without a cause as 
societal scapegoats, and the simultaneous inversion of this reputation as a sobriquet of 
those who at least dare to stick out among the masses, has a political significance that 
often remains underexposed. This political significance simultaneously signals the 
power dynamics between good citizens and unruly troublemakers within one and the 
same social reality, as well as the disagreement of the troublemakers with the way in 
which the balance turns out in favor of the good citizens, who seem to be the only 
ones recognized within these power dynamics. It is related to the possibility – or 
impossibility – of recognizing dissonant voices in the political arena and 
understanding politics in terms of disagreement, instead of merely as a project of 
consensus building.  
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5.5. Demanding equality in an act of disagreement 
In my conversations about politics with respondents in Grigny and Kanaleneiland, a 
feeling was often expressed that young people with an immigrant background cannot 
take part in the construction of a socio-political order in France and the Netherlands. 
My respondents live in the impression that their voices are not heard in the political 
domain, and that acts of “political passivity” (May 2008), like voting, have no 
influence on their life circumstances. However, more active or activist political 
interferences do not seem to be an option either, since the boys’ community of 
experience seems to be completely detached from the place where the political power 
resides. A strong feeling of indifference with regard to the practice of institutional 
politics is a result. Thus far, I have shown that both the attitude and the actions of 
said youngsters are valued as apolitical and antisocial by the general public, since they 
belong to the domain of deviant street culture, which forms a threat to the culture and 
values of “normal” citizens. The gangster lifestyle of rebels without a cause, who look 
at Tony Montana for inspiration, seems to be destructive in relation to any socio-
political order. However, it is precisely the disturbing impact that these rebels without 
a cause can have on their environment which can be seen as making political sense, if 
we understand politics in an “unruly” way. In an act of disturbing disagreement, these 
rebellious youngsters seek to clarify that both unruly troublemakers and good citizens 
equally take part in society, despite the efforts of the accepted citizenry to confine 
deviant troublemakers to the outside of social reality. Politics is not understood here 
as the project of establishing order and consensus amongst those who are already 
respected as citizens, but rather as a disagreement with a supposed political consensus 
which serves as a pretext for excluding those who deviate from the mainstream norms 
and cultural lifestyle.  
 
5.5.1 The problem with the consensus model in democratic politics 
In order to better understand how expressions of disagreement with the current 
political status quo can be considered as unruly politics, I will refer to the work of 
French philosopher Jacques Rancière here. His work on politics, especially as 
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elaborated in his book “Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy” (1999), offers the 
opportunity to consider the political significance of actions which do not directly 
support, but rather disrupt the project of consensus building, as it is intended with 
institutional, democratic politics. According to Rancière, it is precisely the search for 
consensus in mechanisms of institutional politics which has lead to a process of de-
politicization. His critique on the status quo of Western European democracies relates 
to the analysis of our times as post-political that was previously discussed in Chapter 
1. The representative nature of contemporary democratic governments is delusory, 
since the consensus model on which such governments are founded never really 
includes the interests of everyone on an equal basis. Those who take part in the 
consensus are usually only the ones who are already recognized as adequate, capable 
and reasonable partners in the formation of a stable political order. At the same time, 
even such accepted citizens do not have much opportunity to directly influence the 
process of governance. For Rancière, it is not an obvious case that justice and equality 
are reflected in an institutional political structure, even if this structure is chosen in a 
democratic way. Democracy as we know it in its formal, administrative form runs the 
risk of becoming a consumerist model in which passive individuals can choose a 
representative of their liking, based on their specific identity, lifestyle and taste, but 
without really engaging in an active political struggle for equality and justice (Rancière 
2005, 30).  
 
Consensus consists in the attempt to dismiss politics by expelling surplus subjects and 
replacing them with real partners, social and identity groups and so on. The result is 
that conflicts are turned into problems to be resolved by learned expertise and the 
negotiated adjustment of interests. Consensus means closing spaces of dissensus by 
plugging intervals and patching up any possible gaps between appearance and reality, 
law and fact. (Rancière 2010, 71-72) 
 
For Rancière, politics does not imply a negotiation of interests of identity-based 
groups within a neutral sphere of parliamentary debates, nor does it imply the exercise 
of power (ibid., 27). Instead, politics begins where the exercise of power is 
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interrupted, and the orderly organization of society is disturbed, in the name of those 
who are excluded from that organization. Politics should therefore not be sought in 
the domain of ruling institutions, but rather on the level of disruptive interactions 
between people without any status and those ruling institutions. It should be noted 
here that Rancière uses the term “politics” to designate exactly the kind of non-
institutionalized political dimension in human agency and interactions which I called 
“the political” in Chapter 1. Rancière’s notion of politics can be seen as a 
manifestation of what is named “the political” by other thinkers such as Mouffe, 
Laclau and, in a different perspective, Nancy, since it is not mediated or managed in 
an institutional setting. The institutionalized practice of the organization of society 
which was referred to as “politics” in my introductory theoretical reflections is 
referred to by Rancière as “police,” as I shall explain further on in this chapter. 
Rancière does occasionally use the term “the political”, to indicate that which makes 
what he understands as “politics” possible. “He reserves the term `the political' (le 
politique) to designate the place for the defining moment of politics: that is, the 
encounter between the police logic and the logic of equality, between, in other words, 
a process of governing and a process of political subjectivication guided by the logic 
of equality, attempting to verify the equality of anyone with anyone. (Dikeç 2005,184) 
Rancière’s understanding of politics critically questions an institutional system which 
protects the interests of dominant groups more than it cherishes the equal treatment 
of all who are present in society. Rancière takes the expression of dissensus as a point 
of departure for considering his notion of politics, even if it carries us across the 
boundaries of lawful political participation. In the following sections I will clarify how 
a “process of political subjectification guided by the logics of equality”, as Dikeç 
mentions, can make an unruly disruption in a dominant system of governance. 
 
For Rancière, dissensus is not limited to issues of distribution within the territory of 
recognized citizens. In this sense, his interpretation of politics as dissensus is very 
useful in clarifying the political significance of unruly public intervention of young 
urban troublemakers, who are usually seen as “rebels without a cause” by the general 
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public. Rancière’s theory helps us understand that the rebel without a cause actually 
has a political cause, even though this cause does not lead to a further political 
organization or program beyond the expression of a disagreement with a certain 
unjust system of governance. Political causes are usually only understood as valuable if 
they uphold the ultimate cause of democratic consensus within such a system of 
governance. However, the political cause of the contemporary rebellious adolescent 
with an immigrant background is aimed at revealing who is not included within this 
system of governance, but actually stands outside of it. This cause has value in its 
capacity for identifying the flaws and limits of those political causes which are too 
easily designated as the only acceptable ones. Hence, seemingly senseless disruptions 
make political sense because they confront us with the very limits of the majority’s 
dominant understanding of political sense. Rancière’s work explicitly focuses on the 
role that marginalized groups, which are not recognized as taking part in any existing 
political process, can play in the emergence of a new, political evocation of equality. 
Politics, in his opinion, emerges in the moment that people express their disagreement 
with an order of governance which falsely pretends to reflect the equal distribution of 
“social parts and shares” (Rancière 2010, 35,37). Such a moment signals that both 
those who are perceived as “good citizens,” and those who are seen as a threat to 
accepted civic culture, equally take part in society. It is therefore not only the 
dominant political order, but also the dominant civic culture which is contested in a 
political act of disagreement. 
 
5.5.2. Disagreement beyond a commonly shared frame of reference 
Rancière states that the question of democracy revolves around the equal presence of 
all within society, regardless of their institutionally recognized citizenship status. Truly 
democratic politics rarely emerges, since it elicits the presence of the people and not 
merely their representation. Justice and equality should not be given to the people by a 
ruling elite, even if this elite claims to be representative. In real democratic politics, the 
equality of “everyone and anyone” is at stake – not only of those who have the power 
to influence the institutional political process or even of those who are able to claim 
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their political rights. “Democracy is the power of those who have no specific 
qualification for ruling, except the fact of having no qualification” (Rancière 2010, 70). 
Other than in the case of aristocracy, meritocracy or plutocracy, a true democracy is 
characterized by an awareness that it is not only those who are from the best families, 
the best-educated or the richest who can take part in the shaping of a socio-political 
order (Rancière 2005, 54); it is rather a critical stance towards the status quo of the 
ruling powers from which democracy emerges. It is the presence of the people alone, 
expressed in various unruly ways, that can indicate where equality is missing from a 
political “community” which pretends to be complete, but which actually excludes 
people. Equality therefore does not indicate a homogeneous unity which originates in 
a certain shared human nature and a shared natural bond, but rather “the power of an 
inconsistent, disintegrative and ever-replayed division which tears politics away form 
the various figures of animality: the great collective body, the zoology of orders 
justified in terms of cycles of nature and function, the hate-driven rallying of the 
pack” (Rancière 1995, 33). Rancière critiques the same romantic ideas about an 
original, natural community underlying the political order of society, as I mentioned in 
reference to the critique of Nancy in Chapter 1. By pressing for equality, the people 
who have been excluded can indicate that no imagined political community was ever a 
natural given, with certain people destined to rule and others destined to be kept at a 
distance or in a subordinate position. Because the people do not need any entitlement 
or natural authority to perform politics, Rancière’s understanding of politics can be 
characterized as post-foundational. Political structures cannot be legitimized by 
referring back to an ultimate social order or law which determines in what way people 
should be governed.  
 
The foundation of politics is not in fact more a matter of convention than of nature: 
it is the lack of foundation, the sheer contingency of any social order. Politics exists 
simply because no social order is based on nature, no divine law regulates human 
society. (Rancière 1999, 16) 
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This sheer contingency of any social order brings with it a responsibility to critically 
examine its effects on society and advocate changes if the order appears to be unjust.  
 
The disagreement which Rancière sees in politics is more complex and radical than the 
disagreement one can imagine within the setting of a deliberative political model. In 
such a model of governance, disagreement is limited to different opinions which 
originate in different interests, but which nevertheless are expressed in a common 
language. In such a situation, problems are understood in the same terms by all 
parties, and different standpoints about possible solutions are discussed under shared 
conditions of a reasonable discussion. The disagreement that takes place is a 
disagreement of political conviction colored by personal interests, while the political 
arena in which the disagreement takes place is shared by all parties and remains 
uncontested. Rancière speaks of a disagreement in which there is no problem that can 
be formulated in mutually understood terms, because the different parties in the 
disagreement do not understand each other’s expressions. The disagreement is 
fundamental to such an extent that it cannot be solved by aiming at a consensus under 
the same shared terms because the one party does not even recognize that the other 
party is communicating something. Both parties disagree because they not only speak 
a different language, but also because at least one party is not recognized as an equal 
addressee or an equal adversary in the same discussion.  
 
An extreme form of disagreement is where X cannot see the common object Y is 
presenting because X cannot comprehend that the sounds uttered by Y form words 
and chains of words similar to X’s own. This extreme situation – first and foremost – 
concerns politics. (.....) The structures proper to disagreement are those in which 
discussion of an argument comes down to a dispute over the object of the discussion 
and over the capacity of those who are making an object of it. (Rancière 1999, xii) 
 
This kind of radical disagreement involves not only situations in which the language 
used by a party is not recognized as meaningful language, but also – and even more 
often – situations in which the very existence of a group of people is not recognized 
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as the existence of a meaningful part of society. According to Rancière, those who are 
marginalized because they are poor, or because they deviate in other ways from the 
accepted norm, are structurally kept in their subordinate place. This happens not only 
because they are not taken serious as actors in the public domain, but because their 
utterances, whether linguistic or not, are not recognized to have any meaning at all 
(Hewlett 2007, 97). A failure to recognize someone as a “political being” begins by 
“not understanding what he says” (Rancière 2010, 38). This happens, for example, 
when expressions of certain people are not recognized as meaningful in the public 
domain, because they are confined to another domain, like the domestic domain. One 
can imagine what Rancière means by thinking of the difficulties that illegal domestic 
workers have in claiming equal rights with respect to a variety of issues, including 
health insurance and work conditions. Another example would be the situation in 
which young urban troublemakers are confined to the domain of street culture, which 
is seen as detached from the domain of civic culture. In that situation, these young 
“rebels without a cause” are not recognized as “political beings,” since their public 
interventions are seen as senseless vandalism, which does not conform to the political 
rationality of “normal” citizens. Also in this case, the expressions of the people 
involved are not recognized as meaningful in the public domain, but rather as 
disturbing without any reason, and therefore as a cause of moral panic. Yet, if we 
follow Rancière’s understanding of politics, it is precisely those who disturb the 
existing socio-political order who are acting out politically. The act of disruption in 
itself gains political significance, precisely because of its disruptive nature. However, 
such a disruption of politics happens very rarely, according to Rancière. To think and 
act outside of the order of institutional governance, and call the very order itself into 
question in the name of those who do not have a place in that order, is unusual.  
 
When those who live in a world that is normally kept separate from the world in 
which political power is distributed are suddenly able to make their voices heard, it 
becomes clear that it was not all who made up the world as we understood it before 
these particular people stepped out of the shadows. Politics “is the construction of a 
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paradoxical world that puts together two separate worlds” (ibid., 39). Rancière’s 
analysis relates here to the statements of Nourredine, one of my respondents in 
Grigny, who noted that the public opinion in France only seems to recognize that we 
need all to make up one world if it is in the interests of the dominant socio-cultural 
group in society, as noted in Chapter 3. 
 
Politics exists when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution 
of a part of those who have no part. This institution is the whole of politics as a 
specific form of connection. It defines the common of the community as a political 
community. In other words, as divided, as based on a wrong that escapes the 
arithmetic of exchange and reparation. Beyond this set-up there is no politics. There 
is only the order of domination or the disorder of revolt. (Rancière 1999, 11-12) 
 
Here, Rancière makes it explicitly clear that a political community can never be a 
homogeneous unity. Every sense of belonging within a political community can only 
be established in relation to the dynamics of a split between “us” and “them.” This 
split cannot be simply instrumentalized or overcome, but should be acknowledged in 
its full complexity. In a confrontation with the disruptive interventions of young 
rebels “without” a cause, others can become aware of this complexity.  
 
For Rancière, politics cannot be associated with an all inclusive consensus on which 
policy formation is based, nor with a commonly shared battleground for equal 
adversaries to meet. The disruption of those who have no part is therefore not directly 
aimed at a renewed all-inclusive order, or at a perpetual revolutionary disorder. It 
merely makes us conscious of a certain dynamics between order and disorder which 
exists at the core of every community. The commonality in a community, or the 
element which defines the interrelatedness within a community, is always a certain 
extent of internal division. Because this inherent division is characteristic to every 
community, no order of domination should be understood as natural. No order is 
essentially “right” or all-encompassing, even if we believe that we live in a completely 
equal community, according to Rancière. When the part that has no part suddenly 
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manifests itself not as the outside of a community but inside of it, this necessarily 
points to a problem of inequality within society, and therefore interrupts the 
legitimacy of the order that was sustained up until then. Politics cannot completely do 
away with such inequalities, but rather presses for an awareness that such inequalities 
exist within society, and not only in relation to its outside. 
 
5.5.3. How politics interrupts the order of the police 
The situation that is usually described as politics, but which remains within the space 
designed by the reigning order, is called “police” by Rancière.  
 
Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and 
consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of 
places and roles, and the system for legitimizing this distribution. I propose to give 
this system of distribution and legitimization another name. I propose to call it the 
police. (Rancière 1999, 28) 
 
The police, in Rancière’s understanding, are not only the professional men and 
women who enforce the law on the streets. They are the whole system of practices 
and structures that seek to discipline and control people in order for them to take and 
keep their appropriate place in society. Rancière does not primarily associate the 
police with the state because that would imply an over-simplified opposition between 
society and the state. The police comprise not only the state apparatus, but all forces 
and entities in society that seek to maintain the existing configuration of power 
relations and social positions. Education, for example, can also be seen as part of the 
police. The police exist to seek clarity, to illuminate those actions and utterances that 
can be allowed in society. Politics, however, always interrupts the work of the 
police.139  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Rancière’s understanding of “police” is inspired by the description of police found in the work of 
Foucault. In Foucault’s study of “political technologies of the individual,” which have emerged since the 
eighteenth century, Foucault sees an important function of the police as a constitutive force in the 
formation of one social entity, or a population, out of individuals, which is under guidance of the state. 
Foucault sees “police” as a specific set of techniques of government (Foucault 2002, 409). This notion of 
police is broader than its modern significance, as a name for the specific institution which sees to the 
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Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a 
place’s destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes 
heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as 
discourse what was once only heard as noise. (Rancière 1999, 30) 
 
By interrupting the order of the police, people who were previously not counted can 
manage to make their existence known and demand equal participation in political life. 
Hence, a certain claim to equality is present within politics, but this claim is not 
expressed in a standard form of political organization, nor does it aim at the 
recognition of a sameness in identity or social status. One does not need to be 
organized in a recognized interest group in order to claim equality. “The essence of 
politics is thus disagreement (la mésentente) between orderly inequality and disorderly 
equality. It is this disorderly – one is tempted to say anarchic – equality which 
Rancière champions.” (Hewlett 2007, 101-102) Politics as disagreement does not 
appeal to a particular deviant identity that should be respected, but to an equal 
participation in a commonly shaped social site. Many different people can remain 
heterogeneous from one another, be counted on their own merits and still take part in 
the same political disturbance of the police order, in the name of equal participation 
and acknowledgement within society.  
 
5.5.4. Becoming a political subject in an unruly event 
This way of coming into being in the struggle for equality itself, regardless of one’s 
previously ascribed identity, is named a process of subjectification by Rancière (ibid., 
35). Rancière associates subjectification with an agency of disruption and a presence in 
a certain shared situation, rather than with the development, or recognition, of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
maintenance of law and order. For Foucault, the police cannot only indicate an institutional practice, but 
also a utopia of universal government and even an academic discipline (ibid., 410). In the utopic sense, 
the police would see to the public morality and well-being of the population by engaging in the domain of 
education, public health care, infrastructure and manufacturing, and would therefore encompass all 
different institutional domains of the state. An institutional practice of policing that is inspired by this 
utopia would therefore regulate the whole life of individuals. The police should have a positive influence 
on people’s behavior, and should investigate how the population can best be regulated. Foucault refers to 
various French and German historical sources to prove his point, including the work of Louis Turquet de 
Mayerne, De Lamare and Von Justi (Foucault 2002, 409-416). 
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certain identity. He does not deny that identity plays a role in political agency, or can 
even be transformed by it, but detaches identity from a process of subjectification, 
which is instigated by agency rather than by identity. A political subjectivity can be 
made up by people with all kinds of identities and should not be associated with one 
commonly shared class, sex, ethnicity, culture or race. “Politics cannot be defined on 
the basis of any pre-existing subject” (Rancière 2010, 28). When people stand up to 
declare their own equality to others, despite their differences, this is an act of political 
subjectification. In such a case, the division is denied between those categories of 
people who can share in the construction of a community or a political order, and 
those who cannot, and it is recognized that “equality cannot be received, because to 
receive equality is already to be less than equal to the one who bestows it” (May 2008, 
71). Because politics as disagreement causes a sudden awareness of the equal presence 
of certain excluded groups, its emergence is always simultaneously embedded within a 
particular situation, and causes a deregulatory effect within that situation. Rancière’s 
notion of politics as disagreement points to how political agency can be unorganized 
and situated, and can yet emerge in temporary, local events of rupture. It is often on 
the streets, and in neglected corners of the city, where politics as disagreement 
emerges. The act of sabotaging disciplinary and security policies that are seen to have 
an unjust and un-dignifying effect on young people from immigrant families can be 
seen as making political sense in this light. In the last part of my dissertation I will 
engage in a more detailed investigation of a political subjectivity, which is not rooted 
in a pre-existing identity, but which emerges in a situated, unorganized and unruly 
agency, and which can be ascribed to these young urban troublemakers. 
 
We have to be aware here that political subjectivities are not created “ex nihilo” 
(Rancière 1999, 36). In a process of political subjectification, seemingly fixed identities 
are critically transformed by indicating who has the right to define the meaning of 
such an identity and who does not. In this process, certain identifications can be re-
appropriated from a dominant framing. When Dutch rapper Appa uses the term 
kutmarokkaan provocatively as a sobriquet, as a title to be proud of because it 
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expresses force and determination, he re-defines an identity which has been ascribed 
to him by others. By doing so, he puts himself in the spotlight in an unexpected but 
undeniable way and claims the possibility of equally questioning and transforming 
identifications which were previously dominated by the perspective of others. In this 
sense, an act of political subjectification indicates the gap that exists between the 
identifications which are established in the domain of the police and those which are 
appropriated and transformed by the people. It is precisely such a re-appropriation or 
re-definition of certain prescribed identifications, in disagreement with their framing 
in the context of the dominant culture, which is characteristic for subcultures in 
general, and urban street culture in particular. 
 
Any subjectification is a disidentification, removal from the naturalness of a place, the 
opening up of a subject space where anyone can be counted since it is the space 
where those of no account are counted, where a connection is made between having 
a part and having no part. (ibid.) 
 
A public clash between the community of experience of young urban troublemakers 
and the mainstream culture of respected citizens can make political sense even when it 
is violent, even when the laws are broken and even when no alternative political order 
is proposed. This political sense should be merited for its critical impact on the order 
of society, and its ability to address perceived injustices and inequalities, besides the 
obvious moral judgments that can be made. It is not the forms of accepted political 
participation that have been carefully designed as a tool to keep power in its 
designated place within the domain of the police that inform us of the equal presence 
of everyone and anyone within society; it is the “unpredictable subject, which 
momentarily occupies the street” who can show us where radical democracy can be 
found, whether we judge this subject to be a “folk devil” or not, and whether we 
perceive its agency as morally disturbing or not. It is the fleeting, versatile, sporadic, 
open and constantly unexpected and renewed character of political subjectification, 
which can continue to put the existing political order to the test, that claims to be 
complete, democratic and reflecting equality (Rancière 1995, 61).  
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5.5.5. The political value of local expressions of discontent 
Let me return to the frustrations and indifferent attitude my interlocutors in Grigny 
and Kanaleneiland have towards politics. Events like the occasional riots in front of 
the Grigny town hall, as well as the habit of the boys from Kanaleneiland to “make 
chaos” in order to upset and sabotage representatives of the dominant, “civilized” 
culture, seem merely hopeless acts of frustration to both my interlocutors and the 
general public, but can be seen as political acts with Rancière’s insights in mind. The 
expressed indifference or frustration towards institutional politics is political when we 
understand politics in an unruly way. Dayo, one of my respondents in Grigny, told me 
that the youngsters from his neighborhood would not know how to arrange a meeting 
with political representatives to discuss their problems and needs, and that they would 
probably not be welcome at the town hall. A fundamental confusion of tongues seems 
to separate the community of experience of boys from the neighborhood from the 
domain of institutional politics. The only option for these young people to make 
themselves heard was what Dayo already called an “expression of discontent,” in the 
form of a violent clash with the police in front of the town hall. It is precisely such an 
expression of discontent by a people who are not heard within the mechanisms of 
institutional politics which Rancière defines as political. The mere disturbing presence 
of rioting youth in front of a town hall demonstrates the fact that the youngsters are 
there, even before any shared political programs or claims are laid out. They are 
equally present in society, despite the lack of recognition of this equality. The fact that 
their interventions are not understood as political points to the monopoly on political 
expressions and language held by administrative political bodies. Something similar 
can be said about those aspects of “making chaos” meant to instigate a certain 
disorder within mechanisms of governance and civil participation that are seen as 
stigmatizing and unjust in relation to the community of experience of young urban 
troublemakers in Kanaleneiland. Such unorganized, disruptive agency makes political 
sense as far as it questions the legitimacy of existing authorities to prescribe and 
monitor social interactions within the neighborhood.  
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5.6. What comes after disagreement? 
Rancières theory has been of help to clarify how unruly events of disruption caused by 
young urban troublemakers can make political sense. However, his theory does not 
clearly answer the question of how, and in which direction, the existing structures of 
governance could transform or develop after an event of disruption has taken place. 
Fellow philosopher Alain Badiou even criticized Rancière for not directly addressing 
state institutions in his analysis of the police as governing order (Badiou 2005, 119). 
By focusing only on the moment of disruption, Rancière seems to idealize the 
disagreement itself, at the expense of a clear analysis of the relationship it has to the 
system of governance, which is disrupted, as well as a more detailed analysis of the 
nature of the disruption. When I relate this issue to the debate about the difference 
between politics and the political, as I discussed in Chapter 1, Rancière seems to favor 
the political as the true form of politics. He therefore tends to present a very formal 
theory on the nature of this true politics, which fails to give clear answers about the 
effects of the interplay between politics and the political at material sites of conflicts. 
In the last part of my dissertation, I will investigate this interplay in further detail, in 
order to envision how we not only can understand the political sense of disruption 
itself, but also how the recognition of the political sense of disruption could instigate 
change within actual mechanisms of state politics. 
 
In addition, since Rancière’s definition of politics does not extend further than the 
effect it has on the order of the police, it leaves the reader to wonder whether any 
disturbance of the public order is an act of politics. As Rancière says, nothing is 
political in itself (1999, 32). What makes an act political is not its object or its location, 
but its form. It is the inextricable relationship between a disruptive action and an 
underlying assumption of equality that makes an action, which directly intervenes with 
the governing order of society, political. A disturbance of public order which does not 
invoke equality would not be political, according to Rancière. However, should we not 
denounce certain acts of disagreement for being too violent or destructive, and 
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therefore transgressing the political value of a critical indication of an equal presence 
of “good citizens” and “troublemakers” in society? 
 
To answer that question, I will explore whether an invocation of equality can also be 
translated through an act of violence. In the next chapter, I will take a more detailed 
look at those forms of disruptive and unruly agency that are most controversial due to 
their violent nature. The element of violence is the strongest source for moral panic in 
relation to the unruly disturbances of those youngsters who are seen as “rebels 
without a cause.” As soon as a certain element of violent destruction characterizes a 
disruptive event in relation to the governing order of society, its possible political 
significance is most easily contested. This happens in the case of so-called “senseless 
urban violence,” as events of rioting and violent public disorder involving young 
troublemakers with an immigrant background are often categorized. The sense of 
such seemingly senseless urban violence will be further investigated in the following 
chapter. 
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Interlude 
 
 
 
Middle of the summer, enough flies and heat 
Sittin’ in a crowded apartment, about a hundred and ten degrees 
I went outside, in the middle of the night 
All I had was a match in my hand, and I wanted to fight 
So I said I’ll burn, baby, burn 
Burn, baby, burn 
Nowhere to be, and Lord, and no one to see 
And now nowhere to turn 
Burn, baby, burn 
 
I called President Johnson on the phone, the secretary said he wasn’t there 
I tried to get in touch with Mister Humphrey, he couldn’t find him anywhere 
I went into the courtroom with my poor black feet 
Didn’t have no money, didn’t have no lawyer, they wouldn’t plead my case 
So I said I’ll burn, baby, burn 
Burn, baby, burn 
Nowhere to be, and Lord, and no one to see 
And now nowhere to turn 
Burn, baby, burn 
 
I really wanted to be somebody 
I really wanted some scratch 
I really wanted to have a decent job now, but all I had was a match 
Couldn’t get oil from a Rockefeller well, couldn’t get the diamonds from the mine 
If I can’t enjoy the American Dream, there won’t be water, but the fire next time 
So I said I’ll burn, baby, burn 
Burn, baby, burn 
Nowhere to be, and Lord, and no one to see 
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And now nowhere to turn 
Burn, baby, burn 
 
Walking around in Harlem now, looking mean and bad 
Deep down inside my heart feeling sorry and sad 
Got a knife and a razor blade, everybody that I know is tough 
When I try to burn my way out of the ghetto I am burning my own self up 
and I said I’ll burn, baby, burn 
Burn, baby, burn 
Nowhere to be, and Lord, and no one to see 
And now nowhere to turn 
Burn, baby, burn 
 
I really want a decent education 
I really want a decent job now 
I really want a decent opportunity 
I wanna grow like everybody else 
I wanna grow like everybody else 
….. 
Lyrics of “Burn, Baby, Burn” 
Jimmy Collier and Frederick Douglass Kirkpatrick, 1965140 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Jimmy Collier, a community organizer for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, wrote the 
song “Burn, Baby, Burn,” after the Watts riots, which took place in Los Angeles in 1965, as a way of 
understanding the mindset of the rioters and expressing in words what they were trying to say by burning 
down the city. The phrase “Burn, Baby, Burn” became a popular urban slogan, which was re-used in 
other riots associated with the American Civil Rights Movement. The Watts riots are seen as one of the 
most important violent urban uprisings of black people against their subordinated position in America. 
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Chapter 6 
          
“No justice, no peace”141 
The sense of senseless urban violence 
 
 
 
 The disparity between the lived experience of minoritarian Europeans and their (non)  
 perception by the majority creates an obvious alienation, a breakdown of 
 communication. This, however, does not completely succeed in silencing the 
 misinterpellated subjects who intervene in a discourse not meant to include them, 
 creating not a legitimate positionality, discursive or otherwise, but a temporary 
 disruption of a normative order that cannot recognize their existence: in everyday 
 exchanges, through verbal diversions in response to the ritualized questioning of 
 origins, or through spectacular incidents such as the French uprisings. (El Tayeb 
 2011, 170) 
 
 
Riots are some of the most disturbing public interventions caused by adolescents 
from so-called “problem neighborhoods” in which the rift between their world of 
experience and the domain of institutional politics becomes apparent. Contemporary 
urban riots, which predominantly involve young people with an immigrant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 In addition to being a commonly used slogan in street protests since the Rodney King riots in the 
USA in 1992, “No Justice, No Peace” is also the title of a song by French rap group La Rumeur. Hamé, 
one of the members of La Rumeur, was brought to trial by then interior minister Sarkozy for defamation 
of the national police force, after he wrote a critical pamphlet about the difficult situation in the banlieues, 
the neglect of these areas by state authorities and the abuse of power by the police. After a long sequence 
of trials, he was permanently acquitted on the grounds of freedom of speech in 2010. See: “Le rappeur 
Hamé relaxé, fin d’un long combat judiciaire.” Le Monde, June 25, 2010. 
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2010/06/25/le-rappeur-hame-relaxe-fin-d-un-long-combat-
judiciaire_1378991_3224.html 
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background, like the extensive riots around Paris in 2005 and around London in 2011, 
can be placed in a long historical tradition with a global scope. From the “bread riots,” 
which heralded the French Revolution, to the “race riots,” which accompanied the 
American Civil Rights Movement, riots have taken place in different periods of social 
and political change. Despite a wide variety of origins, circumstances, locations and 
expressions, all riots share some general characteristics. In general, riots can be seen as 
an enraged and frustrated reaction to the painful distance between an officially 
recognized political discourse and the complicated social reality in which people living 
in precarious circumstances find themselves (Bertho 2009). According to French 
anthropologist Alain Bertho, riots indicate a profound rupture between the political 
domain of the state and the desire for political recognition of the people. In his 
opinion, riots are no political strategy in themselves, but rather a sign of the absence 
of a political practice that is capable of doing justice to the lives of people in the 
margins. It is therefore no surprise that the political implications of riots are often not 
fully recognized by representatives of the institutional political domain. However, as 
stated in the previous chapter, based on the work of Rancière, a disruption of the 
status quo in politics can have a political meaning even without a deliberately 
developed political strategy, precisely because it calls attention to a lack of 
representation within institutional politics, which is also indicated by Bertho. Dikeç 
identifies the 2005 riots around Paris as “unarticulated justice movements”, also in 
reference to Rancière (2007, 3900 kindle edition). Eric Hobsbawm, as quoted in 
Lapeyronnie, recognizes this pre-organized political meaning contained in the rioters’ 
protest against an unjust organization of society. In previous work, he had already 
stated that riots can be an effective tool for those who are denied access to 
conventional methods of political deliberation to press for their demands (1965).  
 
Rioting is the act of the “primitive rebel” in that it is a political act of protest by 
populations that the institutional system cannot or will not integrate. These primitive 
rebels make an appeal to the values of society against a social order they judge 
immoral and, at the same time, demand to become part of that order, to be 
acknowledged. Rioting is a “primate” political movement lacking ideology and rules, 
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because the populations that engage in it remain on the outside and erect their “us” 
against the institutions, but nevertheless intend to provoke an institutional reaction or 
bring about reform. It is a strategy of exceeding the framework of the institutional 
system – from above by its strong moral dimension and from below by its use of 
violence – and it is used by populations alienated from that system. (Lapeyronnie 
2009, 26-27) 
 
Urban riots, which involve youngsters with an immigrant background, are no 
exception to this description. In this chapter, I will investigate the pre-organized 
political meaning of violence as it emerges in such riots, while simultaneously putting 
the role of violence as a strategic tool in politics up for critical discussion. In 
contemporary cases of riots in neighborhoods like Grigny and Kanaleneiland, we see 
that there is an explicit lack of a political interpretation of the events. Media reports 
and political spokespeople often focus on the delinquency, troubled family 
background and deviant social behavior of young rioters, but do not describe them as 
agents who have a political message to transmit. In contrast to these analyses, I will 
argue that senseless urban violence142 makes political sense, without that violence 
being deployed as a conscious political strategy, such as a militant movement might 
put into practice. Their spontaneity, irrationality, unorganized character and lack of a 
clearly formulated message can be understood as political in an “unruly” way, as far as 
they lay claim on a lack of justice and equality in the lived experiences of the young 
people involved. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 The use of the term “urban violence” is controversial, because it tends to focus on the deviancy of 
rioters’ behavior and therefore facilitates a dismissal of the political character of riots in favor of an 
interpretation of riots as being nonsensical and irrational (Lapeyronnie 2009). The term “urban violence” 
also tends to undervalue racism as a central dimension of the riots in question (Mbembe 2009). I make 
use of the term urban violence here, first of all because the riots do imply violence which takes place in 
an urban setting. I recognize the fact that racism plays an important role in such riots, but this does not 
lead me to use a different term, such as “race riots,” since in major events of urban violence relevant to 
my research, such as the riots around Paris in 2005 and the riots around London in 2011, race was not 
the principal characteristic that distinguished those involved. In addition, I find it important to focus 
precisely on the violent dimension of the riots and analyze the political sense of this violence, in full 
awareness of its irrational and unorganized character. It has to be noted here as well that I agree with 
Sophie Body-Gendrot, who emphasizes that urban violence is a socially constructed phenomenon, 
“because who the accusers are and who the accused are and what is considered as violent varies 
according to specific historical and socio-cultural conditions.” (2005, 5) 
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Despite its setting in different times and circumstances, the lyrics of the song “Burn, 
Baby, Burn” by Jimmy Collier and Frederick Douglas Kirckpatrick still aptly describe 
the various sentiments and incentives which are related to the riots and other cases of 
urban violence, with which my respondents in Grigny and Kanaleneiland identify 
themselves. Still today, similar frustrations about a lack of equal opportunity to 
become a successful and respected citizen, similar frustrations about a lack of 
attention and equal treatment in the domain of justice and politics, combined with a 
desperate attempt to find alternative pride and self-sufficiency in a ghetto-ized 
context, and both literally and figuratively heated circumstances lead to spontaneous 
violent outbursts. As described in the song text, the element of boredom and 
excitement related to a certain inherent attraction to violence itself should not be 
neglected in an evaluation of the incentives for riots. In this chapter, I will further 
clarify these sentiments and incentives, next to my exploration of the political sense of 
seemingly senseless urban violence.  
 
My young respondents, who have been involved in riots or sympathize with rioters, 
describe the emergence of riots either as a direct reaction to and retribution for 
perceived injustices inflicted by the police or a desperate act to make the state and the 
general public aware of the demands of young people in a marginalized position. The 
public depiction of such riots as “senseless” neglects the political aspect of their 
violence, and merely serves as an instigator of moral panic, as I described in reference 
to Cohen in the previous chapter. Following the line of Rancière’s thought as it was 
presented in the previous chapter, I propose that the political aspect of the riots does 
not lie in their instrumental use in the light of the realization of a clearly defined 
revolutionary goal or emancipatory subjectivity, but rather in the negation of a 
political and legal order which does not do justice to everyone. Despite the fact that 
these civil disturbances cannot be seen as a means to a clear political end, the 
“inoperativeness”143 of their violence directly invokes a lack of justice and equality in 
the current political situation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 See Chapter 1. for the introduction of this term, which appears in the work of Jean-Luc Nancy. 
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I will begin this chapter by analyzing the incentives for urban riots as they were 
described in the various conversations I had with young people, especially in Grigny, 
and as they are perceived from an anthropological perspective. Humiliation, retaliation 
and the wish to be noticed and taken serious by state authorities are essential elements 
of these incentives. The political meaning of such urban riots is often ignored because 
the riots seem to be detached from a strategic operationalization in the light of a 
higher political goal. In Section 3, I will discuss how a historical theoretical debate 
about violence as political strategy, involving the work of Hannah Arendt, Franz 
Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre, has defined the possibilities of ascribing political meaning 
to acts of urban violence. In this context, a political subject should consciously work 
towards certain programmatic aims, as Etienne Balibar and Michel Wieviorka also 
emphasize within a more contemporary context. In Section 4, I will explore how the 
political meaning of urban violence can be sought beyond such a strategic application, 
in reference to Slavoj Zizek. The sense of senseless urban violence lies in the 
inoperative denunciation of experienced injustices. In Section 5, I will further discuss 
the disruptive effect on the legal and governing order of such an indictment, because 
it signals a lack of an immediate relation to justice in the law and the domain of 
politics. In a critical discussion of the notion of “divine violence” in the work of 
Walter Benjamin, I will characterize young urban troublemakers as the agents of an 
inoperative violence as a critique of unjust governing structures. 
 
6.1. Inside the rhythm of the riot 
In many of the aforementioned cases of riots, such as the extensive riots around Paris 
in 2005, or the explosive disturbances around London in 2011, a similar pattern can 
be distinguished. Events are sparked by experiences of injustice in relation to state 
authorities, and are further fuelled by feelings of inequality in relation to average, 
merited and successful citizens. In both the riots around Paris and London, a 
confrontation with fatal consequences took place between the police and youth from 
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a stigmatized neighborhood.144 The death of someone from the neighborhood caused 
an intense feeling of frustration amongst fellow inhabitants of the area, and the role of 
the police in the situation was perceived as extremely unjust. Following these events, 
representatives from the institutional domain showed a lack of recognition for the 
grief of those surrounding the victim, and a lack of respect for those expressing their 
frustration and discontent regarding the events. These ingredients sparked off an 
enraged and violent reaction in the form of street riots involving youth from the area 
and the police. 145  The violent clashes later spread to other areas and involved 
thousands of young people who did not necessarily share the specific frustration and 
experiences of injustice that initiated the first emergence of riots. Violence and looting 
spread to other neighborhoods and other cities. This violence seemed to be motivated 
by a variety of incentives, ranging from rage about regular confrontations with racism 
and discrimination, to the pleasure of breaking the power monopoly of the police in 
the public domain, or the personal opportunism of obtaining material goods which 
are completely out of reach under normal circumstances.  
 
Both in Paris in 2005 and in London in 2011, the riots were not inspired by a clear 
political, militant strategy. Riots emerged randomly, with social media bringing 
together masses of young people who had never met before and who did not share a 
particular political ideology. The violence did only occasionally deliberately target 
symbols of the power structures that were perceived as unjust. It often affected 
people living in the same circumstances and from the same community as the rioters 
themselves, with cars being burned and local shops being trashed in deprived areas 
instead of in business districts or the city center. The rioters did not make public 
statements about their motives and were not represented by spokespeople who 
addressed the press. These characteristics made many people condemn the riots as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 In Paris, in the northern banlieue of Clichy-sous-Bois, two boys were electrocuted when they were 
hiding in a power substation after fleeing a police check. In London, a young man from the impoverished 
Broadwater Farm estate in Tottenham, was shot dead by the police in an attempt to arrest him. (See, 
Kokoreff 2008 and Lammy 2011, amongst others) 
145 See for an analysis of this train of events: Naima Bouteldja, “Paris is Burning.” Red Pepper, November 
2005. http://www.redpepper.org.uk/Paris-is-burning/ 
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expressions of senseless urban violence committed by young delinquents lacking any 
moral or social conscience, as I already noted in the introduction to this dissertation. 
Official reactions to the riots stressed the unacceptable deviant behavior of the 
youngsters, which did not show any connection to a possible general interest. In 
France, then minister of internal affairs Nicolas Sarkozy famously promised that he 
would clean the country of those “scumbags” and criminals who took part in the riots, 
and who allegedly all had a previous criminal record or formed part of criminal and 
violent gangs (Mucchielli & Aït-Omar 2006). In England, Prime Minister David 
Cameron analyzed the riots as a sign of the “moral collapse” of a “broken society.”146 
By stating that this moral collapse is expressed in a lack of parenting skills in 
“troubled” families, and that an “all-out war against gangs and gang-culture, 
celebrating violence, opportunism and self-interest” is needed, Cameron also stressed 
the origin of the riots in deviant socio-psychological behavior and youth delinquency. 
He explicitly stressed that the riots were a matter of a deviant culture and not of 
poverty, discrimination or unequal social chances. 
 
Such reactions deny the necessity and possibility of discussing the embeddedness of 
the riots within a larger social and political context. The stories of those young people 
who have been involved in riots, or who sympathize with those who have, contest the 
depiction of riots as mere products of gang culture and often strongly link the riots to 
unequal social opportunities and other experiences of unequal treatment in relation to 
the order of society. In the conversations I had with youngsters in Grigny, many 
referred to riots as acts of frustration and retribution in relation to state authorities or 
the bourgeoisie class, and therefore implicitly stressed the “unruly” and subversive 
political impact of such violent events. Grigny is one of the areas in the Parisian 
banlieues where many riots have taken place over the years, despite the relative calm 
that was maintained during the riots of 2005. In all conversations, my interlocutors 
gave a similar account of the emergence of riots. The first incentive preceding a riot is 
usually a grave injustice committed by the police, which needs to be revenged in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 See: “England riots: Broken society is top priority - Cameron.” BBC, August 15, 2011. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14524834 
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opinion of the youngsters. The injustice is sometimes directed against a respectable 
older person from the neighborhood, and sometimes against an innocent youngster. It 
is often humiliating treatment during a police check or an undeserved arrest which 
sparks a shared feeling of rage and frustration. In several accounts of both larger and 
smaller rioting incidents, the disrespectful searching of mothers was named as an 
incentive for a violent confrontation with the police. These mothers were pushed 
against the wall during a stop and search while they were walking with their children in 
pushcarts, or they were surprised by a police squad, which turned their home upside 
down in a search with unclear purposes. Such intrusive behavior by the police is seen 
by my interlocutors as a grave insult which is not only felt by the direct victim, but by 
all inhabitants of the neighborhood. In these cases, the family’s sense of pride and 
dignity, which are important shared values in the neighborhood, have been violated by 
state representatives. 
 
6.1.1. The expressive and instrumental dimension of riots 
Such acts of humiliation cannot be allowed to pass without a reaction, and therefore 
justify the use of violence on the part of the youngsters, in their frame of reference. 
This frame of reference consists of the rules of the neighborhood that were discussed 
in Chapter 3. In general, the use of violence is seen as a permissible measure for 
avenging the harm inflicted on close ones like family and friends, within the context 
of the community of experience of young banlieusards (Lepoutre 1997). Fighting fire 
with fire in a direct confrontation like a street fight is a completely acceptable way of 
saving one’s own reputation, or the dignity of one’s family. Since the police are seen as 
the enemy, with whom one cannot engage in a rational discussion, insults from them 
have to be countered with violence which matches – at least symbolically – the 
violence which was applied by the police in the first place. For the youngsters, the 
police’s monopoly on violence is not legitimized, because it is not grounded in an 
attitude of responsibility to ensure the just application of the law. As I have also stated 
in Chapter 3., the law in itself is often perceived as unjust, since it is associated by the 
youngsters with racial profiling and an unequal treatment of immigrant families 
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(Goodey 2006). The relationship between young banlieusards and the police is seen as a 
power struggle between two adversaries who claim the right to dominate the order in 
one territory, rather than as a hierarchical relationship between citizens who abide by 
the law and state representatives seeing to the correct implementation of the law.  
 
Hence, it is a profound and shared hatred of the police, which brings young people 
together in an act of rioting. The structural ingredients in the pressure cooker that lead 
to the emergence of riots are feelings of injustice and humiliation, most often inflicted 
by the police (Kokoreff 2008, 19). In addition, riots sometimes gain a more 
instrumental political meaning, in that they are sometimes used as a means of getting 
the local government to take action.  
 
Riots could be useful for certain things, if you burn cars or cause a riot in the 
neighborhood, in relation to the municipality... they will make some funds free. To 
calm the youngsters down, they will offer them a billiards table or some stuff for a 
youth center. ... You tap on the table to say voila, we exist. You don’t want us? Ok, we 
will start burning. They believe it is the only way to be heard. They don’t live in a 
world of council meetings, meetings where the mayor and the electives and all those 
are there. The youngsters are angry, they want that something is done for them – a 
trip or a place to hang out, for example. (Dayo, 25 years old) 
 
According to Kokoreff, the violence of riots has two dimensions: an expressive 
dimension and an instrumental dimension. The expressive dimension reflects the 
feeling that the use of violence is the only way to convey discontent and to be heard 
by those in power, while the instrumental dimension reflects the wish of making the 
state and other public services aware of the basic resources that the adolescents 
involved lack in their lives (Kokoreff 2008, 18). It is both the rage about exclusion and 
the desire for emancipation that inspire riots. In this sense, the youngsters wish to use 
the riots to make a claim for improving their life circumstances; a claim which is 
directed at the state. 
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Besides a direct and enraged response to perceived injustices, riots seem to be an 
effective tool in making the political elite take notice of the grievances of inhabitants 
of the banlieues. Rioters feel both excluded from the political system and highly 
distrustful of the system. Youngsters with an immigrant background from the banlieues 
do not feel represented in the system of party politics and develop a cynical view of 
society and its institutions. This cynical view permits an aggressive and resistant 
attitude towards these institutions that decide on the lives of the banlieusards, but in 
which they themselves have nothing to say (Mucchielli & Le Goaziou 2006). These 
youngsters live in a political void, so to speak, which is only filled by the feeling of 
being colonized by the political agenda of a dominant elite which is far removed from 
their own experiences (Lapeyronnie 2008, 225). The feeling of being the subject of an 
act of colonization forms a painful historical reminder for these children of families 
from former French overseas territories (Body-Gendrot 2005, 20-21). As discussed in 
Chapter 3., there is a tendency to compare the current situation of the banlieue 
population within French society with the subordinated position of a population 
under the rule of colonization. At the same time, the association with colonial times is 
also a historical source for the justification of violence which was used by the subjects 
of colonization to free themselves from oppression. Since other means of 
communication or the negotiation of demands are not experienced as an option, 
young inhabitants of neighborhoods like Grigny express their discontent in a violent 
confrontation with the police, who are seen as the primary representatives of the 
unjust institutions which influence their lives. In the context of the violent events in 
Paris in 2005, Kokoreff even speaks of the first political entrance into the political 
domain by a category of French citizens who had been ignored until that moment. 
Since their words are not taken seriously as a legitimate voice in the political discourse, 
acting out in a controversial but undeniable way seemed to be the only means of being 
heard for young banlieusards (Kokoreff 2008, 93-94). The only way these young people 
see to show that they are not completely powerless victims of the injustices that are 
inflicted upon them is to make a fearsome and disruptive intervention in public space. 
At the end of the previous chapter, I already stated that riots seem to be the only tool 
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which youngsters from Grigny find to press for their demands and express their 
frustration about a lack of equality, in relation to institutional political representatives. 
It is precisely such an act of disagreement with the governing order that has political 
significance, when following Rancière’s understanding of politics.  
 
6.1.2. The spontaneity of riots 
Riots are usually an instant reaction to an unexpected disaster that takes place in the 
neighborhood, and are therefore not planned as a deliberate militant action. Many of 
my interlocutors used the expression raz le bol to describe the sentiments that fuel a 
riot. The feeling of being fed up with recurring incidents of humiliation and 
provocation can explode in a violent reaction, once the last straw breaks the camel’s 
back. Malik, Dayo and Nourredine emphasized that riots are never organized 
beforehand, and can therefore not be compared with a demonstration that turns 
violent, for example. This explains why riots always start in the direct living 
environment of the involved youngsters. In an act of spontaneous rage, rioters go out 
onto their own streets and start burning the cars of their neighbors and trashing local 
shops. Moussa admitted that it is quite unjust for the car owners, who are often 
acquaintances, to see their property destroyed at the hands of youth from their own 
area. However, such actions could be justified when thinking about the message that 
is sent to the government, he said. By burning cars and causing disorder and 
confusion on the streets, the young rioters indirectly attack the government, as he 
explains it. A message is delivered that more could be burned, reaching those with 
state power as soon as images of burning cars are broadcast by the media.  
 
According to Dayo and Mustafa, a similar threat is delivered by destroying places of 
public services in the neighborhood, like schools and libraries. These places are 
property of the state and therefore also symbols of “their” power, which has to be 
attacked because the youth of the neighborhood feels unjustly treated by the state. 
However, pragmatic arguments like the pursuit of maximum effect with a minimum 
of effort, knowledge of the terrain and a reduction of the risk of getting caught are 
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just as important. Libraries, for example, are an easy target because all of the book 
paper can quickly cause a massive fire, as Mustafa explained. Planning an attack in an 
unknown area requires a preparation which does not correspond to the spontaneity of 
instantly emerging riots. Several of my partners in conversation mentioned the feeling 
that the chances of fighting the police in their own neighborhood are higher than in 
the center of Paris, where security measures are more intense and where they would 
be punished more severely for any damage done. Dayo explained that the risks are 
perceived as less in a familiar area, where the police will not go at great lengths to 
track down the perpetrators of a few burned cars or looted stores. However, if one 
were to go to a richer neighborhood with a better reputation, police repercussions 
would be more severe. Dayo said: “For a few burned cars, they don’t run so fast, but 
if it is a train, you get the whole secret service on your back.”147  
  
6.1.3. The lesser impact of rioting in Kanaleneiland 
Other than in Grigny, where riots are a frequent occurrence, Kanaleneiland is a 
relatively calm area in relation to cases of urban violence. The riots that did take place 
were, like in Grigny, primarily related to the tense and hostile relation between young 
inhabitants and the police. In 2007, several clashes took place between local youth and 
the police, in which the youngsters explicitly targeted the surveillance policy in the 
neighborhood, amongst other things, by destroying security camera poles in public 
space.148 After intensive efforts by the police to restore relations with the local youth, 
peace returned. Leisure events are occasions during which the tension between the 
police and youngsters can easily rise, with a riot as a result. During the annual New 
Year’s Eve celebrations, there is usually an agitated atmosphere in the neighborhood, 
with some skirmishes between the police or street coaches and local youth, and 
several burned cars. In the summer of 2011, a large group of adolescent boys threw 
stones at the police during a local cultural festival. The atmosphere had been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Dayo might have referred here to the Tarnac Nine, a group of anarchist activists who were arrested 
for the alleged sabotaging of the French rail network and were accused of terrorism at the end of 2008. 
148 See: “Politie te slap bij overlast.” AD, http://www.ad.nl/utrecht/stad/article1368012.ece (accessed 
May 11, 2011). 
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boisterous already, and when the police intervened after a group of youngsters 
bombarded a rapper with eggs on the stage, the crowd turned against them.149 In all 
these cases, one can see that the riots are a product of tension between youth and the 
police which spontaneously emerges. The use of riots as a means of pressuring the 
local government is unknown in the area, and riots are a far from standard reaction to 
perceived injustices committed by the police. The topic of rioting therefore also hardly 
came up in the conversations I had with the focus group in Kanaleneiland. The boys 
did not consider rioting as an obvious measure to confront the police.  
 
One of the reasons could be that the Dutch approach to migrant integration has led 
to less pronounced oppositional tendencies than in France (Entzinger 2009). Another 
reason could be that relations between young inhabitants and the police are less tense 
and hostile in the Netherlands than in France, as my respondents in Kanaleneiland 
themselves explained. The police in the Netherlands have quite a lot of personal 
contact with young people on the streets, and do not patrol the neighborhood in 
teams geared with heavy material, like the CRS do in France. However, when France 
was mentioned in the focus group in Kanaleneiland, the boys often referred to the 
images they saw in the media of riots. With a certain respect and excited curiosity, they 
spoke about the brave but crazy acts that French youth were willing to commit in 
relation to the police. The burning of cars in their own neighborhood during New 
Year’s Eve was presented as a habit that was inspired by the images the boys had seen 
of the hundreds of cars burning during the famous Parisian riots of 2005 and the 
French annual New Year’s Eve celebration. The reputation of French riots seemed to 
impress the Dutch boys. When we visited Grigny with the focus group from 
Kanaleneiland, the boys from both neighborhoods discussed their experiences with 
riots. The young inhabitants of Grigny were surprised to hear that it was not a 
common practice in Kanaleneiland to chase away an all too impudent police patrol 
from the neighborhood with the force of numbers and aggression. The boys from 
Kanaleneiland speculated that they lacked a majority of young people who were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 See: “Rellen tijdens ARK festival.” De Nieuwe Utrechter, June 19, 2011. http://dnu.nu/artikel/4670-
rellen-tijdens-ark-festival-update 
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willing to violently confront the police in their neighborhood, since the hatred of the 
police and the experienced insults are not as widely shared in Kanaleneiland as they 
are in Grigny. In addition, they had the impression that the boys in Grigny shared a 
strong kind of solidarity, which made them operate more easily in union, than would 
be possible in Kanaleneiland.   
 
6.2. The senselessness of autotelic violence 
Sophie Body-Gendrot recognizes urban violence as one of the only means that 
suburban youth from France have to make their voice heard. 
 
(…), my assumption is that ‘urban violence’ in France is the voice of a minority of 
disenfranchised youths of Muslim and post-colonial immigrant origin, unable to 
emancipate themselves from marginalized spaces and insert themselves in the 
mainstream, in part due to specific characteristics of the French Republican model of 
social integration. Voice is one of the few choices they have with exit to be heard. The 
threats this form of voice conveys are largely overblown and the excessive security 
policies displayed deroute more essential questions. (Body-Gendrot 2005, 5) 
 
However, in many analyses of riots, the felt need to be heard is covered up under a 
presentation of rioters as victims of either their socio-economic situation or their 
criminal, distorted minds (Lapeyronnie 2009, 22). Such accounts of victimization 
inhibit a presentation of young rioters as agents. A focus on their passive suffering of 
various abnormalities makes it impossible to seriously consider the voices of the 
rioters themselves and make political sense of their expressions. According to Mehdi 
Belhaj Kacem, the claims of rioters are generally misunderstood because the 
expressions of the youngsters cannot be inscribed in a traditional political conscience 
(2006). Their behavior does not fit within the context of rational and constructive 
political agency, but rather seems to oppose such agency. However, it is not in the 
proposal of an alternative political order where the political sense of rioting 
disturbances can be found. Belhaj Kacem speaks of a political “inoperativeness” that 
is expressed by the youngsters (ibid., 10) – a certain “unworking” of political 
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structures. Their actions are testimonies of precisely those aspects of the political 
system that do not work, at least not for them. As far as explicit claims can be read in 
acts of rioting, such events allude to something that is radically missing. This is a 
fundamentally different mode of expression than that of an organized political 
insurrection. Such uprisings usually make claims which are set in the frame of a clearly 
formulated political agenda, positively stating those things which must be established 
in contribution to a new political order.  
 
Peter Sloterdijk emphasizes the ineffectiveness of riots as an uprising against 
perceived injustices, because no alternative order is proposed (2010). In contrast to 
Beljah Kacem, he sees this ineffectiveness as exactly the reason for a lack of political 
significance in the events. According to Sloterdijk, enraged actions only make political 
sense when they are efficiently applied to reach a reasonable goal. Only in such a case 
can the “romanticism of violence” be effectively operationalized (ibid., 62). He takes 
the case of the Parisian riots in 2005 as an example, and states that a lack in the 
political system was painfully presented, but no political agenda was established. The 
rioters rage and “hatred against the status quo” were not effectively channeled by 
existing political movements and could therefore not be translated into one 
overarching project of transformation. The dispersed capital of anger could not be 
collected in one “bank” which could contain the total sum and multiply its value, in 
order to make it profitable beyond individual endeavors, serving a general interest 
(ibid.). No political parties took up the task to convert the violent and destructive 
energy of the riots into a constructive political strategy (ibid., 206). The rioters 
therefore remained stuck in a senseless destruction of territory, infected by an 
“epidemic of negativity” (ibid., 211), as it was expressed in the intensification of a 
symbolic pattern with a repetitive nature, since cars are burnt every year in the French 
banlieues (ibid., 207-208). Sloterdijk concludes that it remains senseless to destroy 
telephone booths or burn cars, if one does not aim to inscribe these acts of vandalism 
both in a historical perspective and a centrally directed pursuit of collective political 
and social efficiency (ibid., 63). He explicitly blames this lack of political 
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operationalization of rage on politicians who remain too much in the middle of the 
road and refuse to take a clear position from which they could “recruit” youth adrift 
such as the rioting banlieusards. With this placing of the responsibility explicitly on 
actors within the field of organized politics, Sloterdijk even more strongly deprives the 
rioters of a possible political agency. For Sloterdijk, the demonstration of a lack in the 
existing political order has no political meaning in itself. It is only in a profitable 
operationalization for actual and effective change that the violent expression of anger 
and frustration can make sense. He therefore makes a distinction between useless, and 
thus senseless, violent expressions of inoperativeness, and the profitable 
operationalization of violence for a higher goal.  
 
Sloterdijk’s distinction between senseless violence, which stands alone, and purposive 
violence as a means to an end is a good example of many analyses of the political 
meaning of public, violent agency, as I shall discuss in the following section. My 
respondents in Grigny recognized a similar distinction. They noted that riots which 
are not associated with an organized social or political movement are easily 
criminalized as acts of vandalism without a broader significance in relation to society. 
Ali remarked that the difference made in political discourse and the media between a 
demonstration and a riot depends on the level of organization and the presence of 
clearly formulated statements. “If a riot has a clear aim and is better organized, they 
suddenly call it a manif,” he said. Nabil made a similar point and lamented that the 
political significance of riots is often ignored. 
 
When the fishermen march through Paris150 and caused a million euros of damage by 
turning cars upside-down and hitting policemen, people say that it is a political 
movement. When it is the young people from the quartiers, people say that it is a 
criminal movement. Or even an indigenous movement. People apply double 
standards in France. That’s not normal. (Nabil, 34 years old) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Nabil is alluding to the protests of fishermen against growing oil and fuel prices in Paris in May 2008. 
They violently clashed with the riot police in the governmental district of Paris. 
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The application of such double standards, and related discrimination and racism, is 
facilitated because the acts of rioters are not recognized as having any political value. 
The more riots emerge as singular events, without instrumental value in relation to an 
external, recognizable goal, the easier they are discredited as acts of senseless 
vandalism. 
 
6.2.1. The threat of autotelic violence 
It appears to be complicated to speak of the political sense of riots as a singular event, 
precisely because of the violence they imply. A possible meaning with a broader 
societal value is either ascribed to the origins or the goals of the riots, but not to the 
violent events themselves. This is not surprising, since violence itself has the form of 
such an unmediated experience that it is often only the intentions or effects which can 
be rationally traced, while the act of violence itself escapes any rationally constructed 
interpretation (Welten 2006). The question of whether violence makes “sense” is 
therefore usually not directed at the act of violence alone, but rather at the external 
reasons which legitimize the use of violence, the context in which it takes place and 
the effects that it will bring about. Especially when discussing the use of violence for 
other purposes, such as political purposes, it is questionable whether the violence 
itself can be sufficiently addressed. We tend to speak most directly about violence in 
itself when discussing cases of violence which are least understandable to us. Since we 
cannot rationally trace the emergence of such violence, we characterize it as 
“senseless.” The context in which it takes place does not precondition the violence 
and its effects come to us as a total shock and surprise. Such violence cannot be 
inscribed in a certain structured rationality of cause and effect, motivations and 
intentions. Any understandable reference to certain goals or reasons outside of the act 
of violence itself is absent. That which is left to speak about when we attempt to 
analyze such acts of violence is only the violence itself, apart from its context, origin 
or end.  
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Most examples of what we know as senseless violence “just” happen, because the 
perpetrator felt like doing it, because the opportunity was there, because the 
adrenaline took over or because the violence itself turned out to be irresistible. It is 
this “autotelic” aspect of senseless violence that is the most frightening and the least 
understandable (Schinkel 2010). According to Schinkel, every kind of violence is at 
least partially inspired by a certain attraction to violence itself and is therefore partly 
autotelic. Not every aspect of violence can be caught in a rational framework of causes 
and effects, and it is precisely those elements that escape such rational explanations 
which are autotelic. Autotelic violence is pure and immediate since it is not focused on 
anything other than its own performance (ibid., 100). Because the emergence of 
senseless violence is inexplicable and unpredictable, it is often the source of generally 
lived anxieties. The feeling that anyone, at any time, could fall victim to an incident of 
senseless violence and that one cannot prepare oneself to avert this danger is 
associated with an imagination of senseless violence as a grave societal threat. 
Senseless violence is therefore a primary cause of moral panic (Schinkel 2008). In the 
previous chapter, I stated that disturbing public interventions that are ascribed to 
young urban troublemakers are generally perceived as such a cause of moral panic. 
This effect is strongest in the case of violent public disturbances, such as riots. Cases 
of urban violence can easily be seen as examples of autotelic – and therefore senseless 
– violence because of their sudden, unpredictable appearance, irrational development 
and lack of clear focus. It is the random element of destruction and also the apparent 
enjoyment of the violence by its instigators which makes them an ideal cause for 
moral panic amongst the general public. The fact that urban riots seem to defy all laws 
imaginable, even those of militant strategies, makes them intensely threatening. The 
general public cannot understand the motivation underlying the riots and is shaken by 
its effects. The riots’ autotelic element clarifies comments which describe them as a 
danger to national security, civil peace and shared solidarity and makes measures like a 
declaration of national emergency understandable (Goodwin et al. 2012, Ossman and 
Terrio 2006, 6). 
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6.2.2. Political sense beyond instrumentalization 
The question, however, is if riots are rightly seen as a form of autotelic violence, since 
it is not only the intrinsic attraction of violence as a goal in itself which lies at the basis 
of these violent events. If we only focus on that autotelic element, we neglect the 
causes of riots, which are embedded in a larger social and political structure. It is these 
causes which are mostly emphasized in the accounts of those who identify with acts 
of riots, but which are least resonating in the public reception of riots. Intentionally or 
unintentionally blinded by moral panic, general reactions to riots tend to disregard the 
motives that underlie their emergence and the implied references to social and 
political demands. The representation of riots as apocalyptic celebrations of pure 
violence therefore grow to grotesque proportions, without adequately representing the 
actual experiences of the perpetrators.151 In addition, the perception of violence as 
purely autotelic is questionable in general. Willem Schinkel rightly notes that the idea 
of a form of pure violence is a paradox. If we understand violence as destructive, a 
pure form of violence would destroy everything, including itself (Schinkel 2010, 102). 
A form of violence which had nothing other than pure destruction as a goal in itself, 
and which would be only fully realized by its own performance and repetition, would 
immediately annihilate itself. Schinkel gives the example of gunmen who randomly kill 
people in high school massacres and take their own lives as a completion of their 
actions. Such cases are rare and signal a desperate desire to reach a level of purity in 
violence itself which can never be reached in a living condition. Most violent actions 
are therefore not only directed at themselves, but also at something else. When we 
look at urban violence as senseless, autotelic violence, we ignore the non-autotelic 
aspects of this violence that can make sense to us despite their random appearance. 
We ignore the fact that the riots are connected to something which is external to its 
violence, namely experiences of injustice and inequality. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 See for example: “London burning: history just went sci-fi. Images of the city’s looted, burnt-out 
streets conjure not so much the 1980s Brixton riots, as a new dystopian reality,” Guardian, August 8, 
2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/jonathanjonesblog/2011/aug/08/london-riots-sci-fi-
dystopian 
 368 
Violence, which is understood as political, is usually merited for its outcome (Bosi & 
Giugni 2012). Political violence is understood as a means, which is used to establish a 
preconceived end. Political agency in the form of a spontaneous violent disruption of 
the institutionalized system of governance cannot be translated into institutionally 
endorsed political participation or into traditional forms of revolutionary political 
activism. A radical confusion of tongues is a consequence, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter in relation to Rancière’s thought. Unruly political agency with a 
violent character escapes the accepted means-end logic, with which the possible 
political significance of violent actions is traditionally understood. Unruly political 
agency is neither purely autotelic, nor instrumentalized in the light of the creation of a 
new political order. Its inoperativeness, including its autotelic elements, has to be 
understood from a different, but politically charged, perspective. Before I can further 
develop such a different perspective, I will first analyze in what way spontaneous 
violent riots, which signal a certain inoperativeness, differ from violent actions that are 
clearly inscribed in a means-end logic for political purposes. Whether political ends 
can be met with violent means has been historically contested, but the frame of this 
discussion has defined the way in which we are used to discussing the possible 
political significance of violent agency.  
 
6.3. Violently change the world for the better? 
As I have stated in reference to Sloterdijk, amongst others, the political aspect of riots 
is quickly associated with the extent to which they contribute to the realization of a 
clearly formulated political agenda. Before I return to the different, unruly political 
meaning of inoperative urban riots, I will first give insight into a theoretical debate 
which has shaped a more conventional understanding of the political sense of 
violence as either an acceptable or an unacceptable strategic tool. Discussions on the 
political meaning of violence are often understood in a relational setting between 
means and ends, revolving around the question of the legitimacy of an instrumental 
use of violence in light of a higher political goal. The central question here is whether 
violence can be legitimized as a temporary tool to be used in the project of the 
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creation of a better, more equal and more just world, in which the very violence itself 
can later be completely abolished (Welten 2006). Very divergent answers have been 
given to this question. The reflections of Hannah Arendt, Jean-Paul Sartre and Franz 
Fanon on the use of violence in a political context show how this means-end logic can 
offer different reasons for either accepting or rejecting violence as a political strategy. 
However divergent the conclusions of Arendt on the one side and Sartre and Fanon 
on the other side, their positions demonstrate the dominance of an instrumental 
approach to violence, for the sake of conceptualizing its political significance. This 
same instrumental approach returns in the analysis of contemporary urban riots by 
thinkers such as Michel Wieviorka, Étienne Balibar and Jean Baudrillard, all of whom 
emphasize the incapacity of young rioters to convert their violent disruptions into a 
constructive and effective political agency. Because of this lack of a working political 
strategy, young urban troublemakers are not considered to be political agents. I will 
move beyond this interpretation in the next section, in which I will further specify the 
political sense of the inoperative violence of these troublemakers. 
 
6.3.1. The use of violence inside or outside of the law 
The question of whether the use of violence is legitimate in pursuit of a certain 
political goal brings me first of all to the question of who is entitled to use violence 
and who is not. Because the act of violence itself remains difficult to analyze, 
discussions around the legitimacy of the use of political violence usually start with the 
position of the agents or institutions which carry out the act of violence. The 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence is made in relation to the state 
and its role as the protector of law and order, and the revolutionary power of the 
people, who in certain cases feel the moral duty to replace the existing state with a 
better one. The monopoly of the use of legitimate violence lies in the first place in the 
hands of the modern state. The legitimacy of the use of violence by the state is 
determined by its duty to protect the people. In order to regulate social interactions in 
society, state authorities need to be able to use violence as a means. In the case that 
certain groups or individuals threaten to harm the general peace and well-being of 
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society, state-inflicted violence is legitimized to stop them. The preventive or 
reactionary actions of the state should be proportionate in relation to the perceived 
threat. “The violence of the state is justified by being merely a ‘reaction’ against a 
spontaneously ‘active’ private violence” (Schinkel 2010, 32). Seen from the perspective 
of the monopoly on violence by the state, illegitimate forms of violence are literally 
illegal: they break the law and threaten the order of society. In this context, violence 
that is inflicted by the state is often not described as violence, but rather as the 
exercise of power (ibid., 30).  
 
At the same time, violence can also be inflicted by those who are not legally entitled to 
enforce law and order, but who are nevertheless inspired by the protection and well-
being of society. A central point of discussion in debates about political violence is 
whether the people are entitled to use violence in order to break the state’s monopoly 
on violence, in case they find that the state operates unjustly. In such a case, violence 
which does not have an “official” legitimate status would be justified. Here, we enter 
the domain of revolutionary or militant violence. Such forms of violence share certain 
characteristics of “unruliness” because they are directly opposed to the existing rule of 
law. This violence is not legitimized in relation to the law, but rather in relation to a 
non-formalized sense of justice and morality. However, in contrast to the violent 
expressions of unruly politics I have described earlier, militant or revolutionary 
violence is carefully organized and directed at a clear goal of constructive 
transformation. It is not intended to be unruly and leave it at that, but it is rather used 
in an attempt to establish new and more just laws. The distinction between lawful and 
lawless violence leads to the question of whether a political transformation of society 
can be brought about by violent means in contestation of the law, or whether the law 
should be respected as the final resource of justice, and politics as a practice, which 
can only be performed through deliberative means. The writings on violence by 
Hannah Arendt, on the one hand, and Franz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre, on the other 
hand, represent these two opposed positions in the debate. 
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6.3.2. The difference between violence and power 
Hannah Arendt is one of the thinkers who have critically evaluated the legitimacy of 
militant and revolutionary violence. In her book “On Violence,” Hannah Arendt 
makes a distinction between “power” and “violence” (1970). She associates power 
with legitimate actions of state authorities, and violence with illegitimate actions of 
dissident groups and people. In her opinion, violence is always instrumental, set in a 
means-end relation. In the use of violence, Arendt recognizes the danger that the 
means will exceed the envisioned end (ibid., 4). Since it always remains uncertain 
whether the envisioned goal will be reached in the future, violent means are usually of 
most influence on human interactions and start to look like they have a purpose in 
themselves. Arbitrariness thus threatens to characterize violent human actions (ibid.). 
Power, on the other hand, is the shared ability of a group to act together and form a 
political community (ibid., 44). This ability is a goal in itself. The formation of a 
political community is the first and most important goal for a group of people, or a 
society, according to Arendt. Arendt understands political power as the ability to 
execute the laws which have been agreed upon by the whole of a political community. 
Violence is a means which can either threaten or enforce this goal, and it therefore 
needs a legitimation in the light of power. Violence is only acceptable if it is a 
necessary and direct means of self-defense for the power of a political community. 
Violence that is used to destroy power can never lead to the establishment of a new 
power that can legitimize itself sufficiently (ibid. 56). Such violence can be efficient, 
but never legitimate for Arendt.  
 
Where power is based on the consent of the people, violence is enforced upon people 
without their consent. Where power has to depend on the support of the largest 
number of people, violence presses for the advantage of an individual or a small 
number of people, since it does not recognize the interests of the majority. “The 
extreme form of power is All against One, the extreme form of violence is One 
against All” (ibid., p. 42). Arendt recognizes that situations can emerge in which state 
authorities lose the support of the majority of the people. Such a situation opens space 
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for violent revolutions, but violence is not a necessary reaction to a power vacuum152. 
Such a resort to violence is a human reaction, which Arendt saw as taking place more 
and more often in her time, but is nevertheless uncivil and “anti-political,” since those 
who take the law into their own hands in order to repair/re-establish the law go 
against the principles of a civil society in which the general interest of the people is 
represented (ibid., 64). Arendt explicitly rejected the atmosphere of the glorification of 
violence which she recognized when she wrote “On Violence” at the end of the 
1960s, a decade which was characterized by various violent struggles, from the 
Vietnam War and the Chinese Cultural Revolution to anti-colonial struggles, student 
uprisings and the Civil Rights Movement in America. In the same line, Arendt spoke 
skeptically about the presence of Black Power activists on American universities at the 
time, which she saw as a rebellious interference in favor of particularist demands and 
the “lowering of academic norms” rather than a minority exercising the right to stand 
up against the laws of the majority (ibid., 18). Especially the fact that a minority of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 People who are not in a position of power have other means to control and criticize the state. Civil 
disobedience can be expressed when citizens doubt the constitutionality of the measures of government, 
or if they can no longer sufficiently influence the government by standard means of participation. Civil 
disobedience should always be non-violent, directed at the laws and policies of the government, and 
openly expressed in public according to Arendt. Civil disobedience becomes permissible when it is 
expressed by “organized minorities that are too important, not merely in number, but in quality of opinion, 
to be safely disregarded.” (Arendt 1972, 76). Here Arendt emphasizes that it is not only the majority 
which can criticize and influence state authorities. Equality before the law should safeguard a plurality 
within civil society, which consequentially means that minority groups have the same rights to express 
their grievances as the majority. The consent upon which political society relies does not depend on the 
rule of the majority, but on a horizontal representation of a variety of citizens. What makes the 
expression of civil disobedience different from unacceptable and violent rebellion, is the fact that civil 
disobedience does not violate established authority in general, nor the general legitimacy of the system of 
law, according to Arendt. Jacqueline Rothfusz proposes to stretch the criteria that Arendt defined for 
civil disobedience, in order to include expressions of discontent which are violent and not directly 
addressed at governing authorities (2012, 24). The expressions of dissent of young urban troublemakers 
could thus be labeled as civil disobedience, according to Rothfusz. I do not use the term civil 
disobedience in relation to the dissent of young urban troublemakers, since they do not represent an 
accepted minority voice within the public debate, but rather have the position of outsiders to the very 
domain of civil participation. Given the characteristics of their expressions, and the fact that they are not 
accepted as a valuable part of civil society, it is not civil disobedience but rather “uncivil” disobedience, 
which is expressed by young urban troublemakers. In addition, it is exactly the general legitimacy of the 
system of law which they put to the test because they do not feel they belong to it. It is not laws in 
general which are contested by young urban troublemakers, as I will explain further on in this chapter, 
but the dominant laws in society fail to do justice in their opinion. Lastly, the disruptive interventions of 
young urban troublemakers are very distinct from other, more activist-oriented examples, which are 
understood as civil disobedience – such as the Occupy movement and feminist movement FEMEN – 
because of their spontaneous and chaotic character, as well as their lack of a clearly formulated 
organization and political agenda. 
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students tried to violently impose an equal treatment not only before the law, but also 
in social interactions and according to academic standards exceeded what can be 
permitted within the realm of political action, according to Arendt. In a critically 
received text, Arendt opposes enforced desegregation in American education, 
claiming that such measures would cover up natural inequalities between students 
with different capacities and different preferences, rather than safeguard the equal 
access to education of students from a different race. Social difference should not be 
fought under the pretext of political actions, since it is only the letter of the law that 
can be changed in the domain of politics according to Arendt (Arendt 1959). 
Discrimination before the law should be contested by political actions, but 
discrimination which takes place in society, within the social sphere, cannot be 
eliminated by political actions, especially not by political violence, according to her153.  
 
6.3.3. The liberating force of political violence 
In “On Violence,” Arendt directly positions herself against other thinkers who 
perceive violence as a constructive form of political action. She especially attacks the 
work of Franz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre, who speak of the constitutive force of 
political violence in relation to anti-colonial struggles. Their understanding of violence 
as constructive is very unrealistic and even more dangerous to Arendt. She blames 
Fanon for trusting “gangsters” to be able to lead the population towards liberation 
and thereby loosing sight of responsibility and the realistic development of actual 
struggles and revolutions (Arendt 1970, 20). Particularly in Sartre’s preface to Fanon’s 
book “The Wretched of the Earth” (2004 [1963]), Arendt recognizes the glorification 
of violence in its most threatening and intense form. For Sartre and Fanon, the 
constitutive effect of political violence is not only a theoretical or utopic idea, but very 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 These statements can be related to Arendts concern that the social sphere would take over the political 
sphere and reduce the political strive to safeguard plurality in the public domain to the promotion of 
individual interests. In order to promote their self-interests, people tend to focus on the “homogenization 
and leveling of people” in the social sphere, at the expense of the political protection of equality before 
the law (Borren 2009, 158-159). However, while Arendt is focusing on this difference between the social 
and the political, she tends to overlook the fact that social differences are not only caused by social 
“factuality”, but also by political decisions and legislative acts which enforce racial segregation, for 
example (Locke 2013). 
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real. It is even the most effective and direct means by which oppressed people can win 
their freedom from a dominant power. Such a struggle, which is characterized by very 
unequal power dynamics, becomes explicitly apparent in the fight of the colonized to 
win their freedom from colonial powers. Fanon states that decolonization is always a 
violent event (Fanon 2004, 2). The idea that decolonization could be realized through 
a “gentlemen’s agreement,” in which the existing legal and political order is left intact, 
is no realistic option. The governance of colonizers is “naked violence,” which can 
only be stopped in a confrontation with greater violence (ibid., 23). Under colonial 
rule, those who are colonized cannot speak or think for themselves. Those who 
remain non-violent adopt a passive attitude that silently consents with this dominant 
colonial framework and only seek minor adjustments of a status quo, which remains 
inherently exploitative. Within a violent struggle against colonial oppression, the 
colonized find their own voice to fight against their degradation to a non-human 
status in the colonial mindset and to speak about humanity on their own terms. 
 
In both Sartre’s and Fanon’s argumentation, the idea is emphasized that revolutionary 
violence always takes place in reaction to a primary form of violence that is executed 
by state authorities. Fanon speaks of a “compartmentalized” world which is divided 
into a wealthy and well-developed colonist’s sector inhabited by white people and a 
famished and over-crowded “native” sector where “niggers” and “towelheads” try to 
get by with the little they can find (ibid., 4-5). The different parts of this world are 
strictly separated and kept in place by the force of state authorities. In this world split 
in two, divisions along racial lines go hand in hand with economic inequalities and 
state repression. The violent terror of the state that is imposed on the colonized 
subjects causes in the first instance a repressed rage and sense of alienation. The 
marks that are left by such state-inflicted violence, which tears the colonized apart, can 
only be eliminated by counter-violence. It is not only political organization which 
should be changed in this process, but the total social fabric of society. In contrast to 
Arendt, Fanon states that political violence cannot only be used to change the law, but 
explicitly serves to change inequality and injustices in the social sphere. According to 
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Fanon, the political and social sphere cannot be separated, like Arendt tends to 
suggest. The kind of social segregation that she describes as a natural product of 
people’s choice is a sign of exploitation and submission under colonial rule in the eyes 
of Fanon.  
 
The violence which governed the ordering of the colonial world, which tirelessly 
punctuated the destruction of the indigenous social fabric, and demolished unchecked 
the systems of reference of the country's economy, lifestyles, and modes of dress, this 
same violence will be vindicated and appropriated when, taking history into their own 
hands, the colonized swarm into the forbidden cities. To blow the colonial world to 
smithereens is henceforth a clear image within the grasp and imagination of every 
colonized subject. (ibid., 5-6) 
 
For the colonized, who feel that they have nothing to lose, all means which could be 
used to change the situation are legitimized. This necessity could be extended beyond 
the situation of colonization. Fanon could see the use of violence continue to be a 
necessary means in struggles for liberation, even after all colonial territories have 
gained their independence. Minority groups who feel repressed could feel they have 
no other choice but to apply violence as a means of securing humane treatment by the 
authorities (ibid., 39).   
 
6.3.4. A political subject constituted through violence 
Even stronger than Fanon, Sartre focuses on the constructive force of violence. In a 
situation in which state powers have stripped people of their own power to act and 
determine their lives, violence is a means of re-appropriating their potentiality for self-
determination. Through violence, “man reconstructs himself” (Fanon 2004, lv), 
according to Sartre. When the repressed rage of the colonized explodes in violence, 
this is not an irrational act, but rather a coherent act of self-affirmation. “Either one 
must remain terrified or must become terrifying” (ibid.). Where Hannah Arendt sees 
violence as a threat to political communities, Sartre sees violence as their breeding 
ground. The formation of a political community made up by free man is established in 
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the act of anti-colonial revolt. Sartre is willing to accept the most extreme 
consequences of such a revolt. 
 
For in the first phase of the revolt killing is a necessity: killing a European is killing two 
birds with one stone, eliminating in one go oppressor and oppressed: leaving one man 
dead and the other man free; for the first time the survivor feels a national soil under his 
feet. In that moment the nation does not forsake him: it is there wherever he goes and 
wherever he is – always by his side, it merges with his freedom. (Fanon 2004, lv) 
 
It is through violence that not only the inflicted wounds of oppression can be healed, 
but it is also through violence that a new political community can constitute itself, 
according to Sartre. Under colonization, treacherous claims are made about the 
universal rights of humanity, while reality under colonial rule is marked by the 
divisions of racism. Standing up against such injustices and inequalities in a violent 
revolt enables the colonized subject to become an emancipated political subject. Here, 
Sartre explicitly stresses that violence is not only a justified means of achieving a 
revolutionary political goal, but that it is also through violence as a constructive force 
that an emancipated political subject can realize itself. Such an emancipated political 
subject acts collectively through the empowering effect of violence.  
 
The sense of solidarity that emerges in a revolutionary struggle against an oppressor 
shapes a community in which individual interests become of minor importance. A 
sense of fraternity emerges in the violent revolt which makes people aware of their 
shared needs and goals (Sartre 2004 [1976]). This fraternity is not based on a shared 
blood bond, but on shared experiences. It is through shared experiences of both 
oppression and revolt that people realize that they are one another’s equals. When one 
declares to be faithful to this realization, a bond of fraternity is created, together with 
a sense of shared humanity. An intense dedication and decisiveness is expressed in the 
awareness that everyone is equally willing to accept the necessity to defend this bond, 
as well as the ultimate consequences of a violent defense, which could result in one’s 
own death. This violent appeal to humanity and the idea of the formation of a political 
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subjectivity through the use of violence was controversial in a time in which Sartre 
positioned himself in favor of the FLN in the Algerian war of independence and 
showed his interest in the terrorist activities of the RAF.  
 
6.3.5. The political sense of floating subjects 
Despite the fact that I have also noted that solidarity can emerge out of shared 
experiences, even when they are negative, in the case of young urban troublemakers, 
the intentional application of violence in order to constitute an emancipatory political 
subject does not apply to their community of experience. A higher political goal that 
exceeds individual interests is not systematically pursued or propagated, and therefore 
also does not play a clearly visible role in the cases of urban violence in which they are 
involved. Despite the fact that young urban troublemakers make references to the 
colonial period, the cases of urban violence in which they are involved cannot be 
directly compared to an anti-colonial struggle. These cases are not only set within a 
different historical context, but are also characterized by another self-awareness than 
the urban violence of anti- and post-colonial struggles, as referred to by Sartre and 
Fanon. In the case of contemporary urban riots of youth of migrant descent, violence 
is not strategically deployed in order to overthrow the existing political order and 
install a new one. In this sense, these riots escape the means-ends logic posed not only 
by Sartre and Fanon, but also by Arendt. In the light of Arendt’s reflections on 
violence, these riots could be seen as irrational expressions of rage, more than the 
kind of violence glorified in her time, which was capable of destroying power. The 
ideas about violence as a political strategy that I have thus far discussed in the 
previous sections do not suffice to explicate the political sense of senseless urban 
violence. Instead, these reflections on violence demonstrate how this violence can 
easily be disregarded because it does not bear witness to the deliberate agency of a 
subject which is consciously involved in its militant self-formation and positioning 
within a political ideology. Because of this lack of a conscious political subject 
formation, young urban troublemakers seem incapable of liberating themselves from 
the unjust power structures against which they express their discontent on their own 
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force. If we follow the means-ends logic of the use of political violence, this would 
indeed mean that their actions make no political sense because they do not lead to a 
constructive political project of liberation or transformation. 
 
Michel Wieviorka characterizes those who are involved in urban violence as “floating 
subjects” (2005, 292-293). These young people who react to police brutality, a 
prejudiced justice department, discrimination and social exclusion with an explosion 
of violence are denied the chance of profiling themselves as respected subjects or 
engaging in recognized social, political or intercultural relations. The floating subject is 
not capable of translating his or her social demands into actions, which make sense 
within a socio-political frame of reference. Hence, the violent behavior of such a 
“floating subject” seems to be adrift, devoid of any connection to the rest of society. 
The possibility of constituting a political subjectivity through violent means emerges 
in the case of clearly formulated political goals or ideologies. However, the floating 
subject remains powerless because s/he feels inhibited in following up on 
preconstituted political or social principles. The floating subject seems to signal a 
“lack of sense,” and is characterized as non-social and non-political by Wieviorka.  
 
Étienne Balibar makes a similar analysis of the subjectivity of young rioters, with a 
slightly different conclusion. According to Balibar, the young rioters who were 
involved in the 2005 riots around Paris find themselves in a contradictory position 
with regards to society. They have an official citizenship status, but are not treated as 
respected citizens. They speak French as their mother tongue and are schooled in the 
French education system, but they suffer from discrimination and social exclusion on 
a regular basis. They cannot be characterized as complete outsiders or “outlaws,” 
because they officially form a part of the recognized French citizenry, even though in 
practice they are perceived as deviant elements and a threat to civil peace. These 
contradictions bring Balibar to the conclusion that the position of these youngsters 
should be characterized with the paradoxical term of “internal exclusion,” which 
works through in the experience of their own subjectivity (Balibar 2007, 51). A similar 
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contradictory position becomes apparent when we look at these youngsters as 
potential political actors. Involvement in riots can only be seen as a form of political 
subjectification if we understand it as a manifestation of “antipolitics” (ibid., 62), 
according to Balibar. Antipolitics is a sign of the fact that a group is denied 
representation within the political system and is therefore denied to belong to the 
legitimate nation (ibid.). The political order fails to represent the demands of a part of 
the population and the legislative order fails to represent the rights of this same part 
of the population. When citizenship is thus emptied of its content, we can speak of 
“antipolitics.” The revolt of rioting “rebels without a cause” is in the process of 
becoming political, according to Balibar (2007, 65). What makes it not yet political is 
its lack of traversing the boundaries of the singular situation of the ones involved in 
the riots and collectivizing demands by searching the connection with other groups in 
society which suffer from similar injustices and mechanisms of exclusion.  
 
Baudrillard similarly characterizes the rioters of 2005 as “savage analysts” of the decay 
of French society (Baudrillard 2006). 
 
This society faces a far harder test than any external threat: that of its own absence, its 
loss of reality. Soon it will be defined solely by the foreign bodies that haunt its 
periphery: those it has expelled, but who are now ejecting it from itself. It is their 
violent interpellation that reveals what has been coming apart, and so offers the 
possibility for awareness. (ibid.) 
 
According to both Balibar and Baudrillard, young urban troublemakers give testimony 
of the dissolution of a society, which falsely pretends to include everyone as equals. 
The desire to be seen as a presence in society, and the game which is played with the 
mass media in order to win airtime on television and visibility in the papers, forms a 
part of a search for a new representation of politics which cannot yet be found. An 
effective reformation of this lacking institutional politics can only be established by an 
organized, general popular political subject. We see here that they understand 
emancipatory political agency in a similar sense as can be seen in the work of Laclau 
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and Mouffe, which I introduced in Chapter 3. However, if we understand politics in 
line with Rancière’s notion of politics as disagreement, a singular disruption of the 
systemic political order is already political in itself, and it is in the performance of the 
disruption that a political subject emerges. Here, the testimony of the experienced 
falsehood of societal equality and inclusion has a political meaning that lies in the act 
of disagreement itself, even if its expression in disruptive and violent interventions is 
not placed in a deliberately thought-out, strategic perspective. Following this line of 
thought, I characterize the disturbing interventions of riots as unruly politics instead 
of as anti-politics. Here, the choice is made to recognize the political sense of urban 
violence before a revolutionary change of the political order has taken place and is 
converted into an effective political strategy. Urban violence that is performed by 
rebels, who are seemingly without a cause, may not contribute to the formation of a 
classical emancipatory political subject as we know it from militant or protest 
movements, since it is neither inspired by a strongly defined ideology, nor aimed at 
the realization of a clearly formulated political agenda. However, when we look at the 
agency of young urban rioters as an indictment of the injustices of society, their 
actions might seem “adrift,” but certainly do not lack political sense. In the following 
two sections, I will look in more detail at the political sense of such a violent 
indictment of experienced injustices. 
 
6.4. Contesting a dominant framework of “sense” in riots 
Sartre and Fanon emphasize that illegal violence can be legitimized as a means to an 
emancipatory or liberating political end. Within this context, political agency is 
ascribed to subjects who intentionally and deliberately use violence to counteract a 
certain state of domination. This reasoning becomes complicated when those who 
commit violent acts do not explicitly and publicly make clear in what way their 
violence could be instrumentalized for a political goal. The question therefore remains 
in what way we can make political sense of the inoperativeness of violence which is 
committed by “rebels without a cause.”  
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6.4.1. Riots indicative of a problem instead of a solution 
Not only Mehdi Belhaj Kacem, but also Slavoj Zizek emphasizes that such an 
inoperativeness is not devoid of political significance, even though we cannot inscribe 
this significance in a traditional framework of emancipatory political agency. Zizek’s 
analysis helps me to further formulate the sense of senseless urban violence without 
immediately resorting to a certain higher or deeper sense which transcends the 
singular event of the riot itself. In his book “On Violence,” Zizek, like many other 
commentators, describes the riots that took place around Paris in 2005 as a wild and 
uncontrolled outburst of violence without a future perspective of transformation 
(2008). This “outburst with no pretence to vision” seems to be an illustration of the 
“post-ideological” times in which we live (ibid., 63). The enthusiasm for revolutionary 
movements and militant action groups which was still present in the time in which 
Fanon and Sartre discussed the legitimacy of insurrectional violence has long passed. 
Since the atrocities of the Soviet regime tempered the left wing excitement over a 
possible new communist world order, the grand narratives of social and political 
change seem to have made way for a general acceptance of the pragmatic and 
individual lifestyle of neoliberal capitalism. For Zizek, this lack of grand ideologies is 
present in all contemporary street protests in the Western world, from the alter-
globalization movement to Occupy, with its most clear absence in the urban violence 
caused by youngsters with an immigrant background from deprived neighborhoods.  
 
In the 2005 French riots, no demands were made, no banners were carried, no clear 
message was delivered. No realistic alternatives were proposed for experienced 
injustices; only an uneasy feeling of resentment without explanation was transmitted. 
If there was any message to be taken from the riots, it was up to the own 
interpretation of scientific, political or media commentators to distinguish it. In order 
to deduce its threat, a wide variety of explanations was offered for the events by an 
even wider variety of experts. According to Zizek, it is precisely not by means of such 
explanations that we can truly grasp the significance of the riots. We should be wary 
of trapping ourselves in a search for a deeper logical meaning for random violent 
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outbursts in order to make them fit into a rational framework and hence make them 
manageable. 
 
What is most difficult to accept is precisely the riots’ meaninglessness: more than a 
form of protest, they are what Lacan called a passage a l’acte – an impulsive movement 
into action which can’t be translated into speech or thought and carries with it an 
intolerable weight of frustration. This bears witness not only to the impotence of the 
perpetrators, but, even more, to the lack of what cultural analyst Frederic Jameson 
has called “cognitive mapping,” an inability to locate the experience of their situation 
within a meaningful whole. (Zizek 2008, 65) 
 
The meaninglessness which Zizek mentions here should be understood in reference 
to a dominant framework which only ascribes meaning to rational, discursive and 
utilitarian actions. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, a whole range of 
incentives and motives can be recognized in relation to the riots, especially when 
speaking to the rioters themselves. However, these incentives and motives are 
generally not recognized as politically meaningful, since they do not connect to a clear 
political program of transformation. However, even before thinking of the 
instrumental use of violence in order to reach a higher political goal or expressing the 
wish for the realization of a new utopian society, the young rioters first and foremost 
wish to be recognized as present in the existing society. Zizek sees the riots as a 
“direct effort to gain visibility” (ibid., 65) of those who are excluded from the domain 
of social and political organization. These young banlieusards feel ignored as part of the 
French citizenry, and stress their presence in a way which no longer can be ignored. 
“[T]hey found themselves on the other side of the wall which separates the visible 
from the invisible part of the republican social space” (ibid., 66). Here, violence 
becomes significant not in order to offer a solution, but in order to indicate a 
problem: the problem of those banned from society and confined to a status of the 
“outlaw.” Therefore, it is precisely in the riots’ senselessness where their political 
sense can be found, in the analysis of Zizek. 
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The claim to be recognized as a citizen with the right to be equally and justly treated is 
so basic that it precedes the formulation of a further political agenda or alternative 
political order. Robert Castel equally states that it is exactly there where the political 
sense of such riots becomes apparent; riots can be seen as a desperate call for 
attention of those who are not recognized as full citizens in possession of political 
agency (Castel 2006). The fact that the rage and uncontrolled revolt in the act of 
rioting did not make sense to the general public precisely indicates the distance which 
exists between the community of experience of young banlieusards and respected 
French citizens. The uprising154 of these young urban troublemakers is a message in 
itself, which is impossible to inscribe within the existing cognitive structure in which 
we understand the meaning of justified and legitimate political action. In order to 
recognize these adolescents as political actors, the very framework in which civil 
participation and political action can be understood should be transformed. Such a 
transformation goes beyond the question of whether certain acts of violent revolt can 
be understood as justified means for seeking adjustment of the existing political order.  
 
6.4.2. Systemic violence 
The political sense of contemporary senseless urban riots lies in the incentive they 
offer to reconsider the very framework in which political sense is normally 
understood. A similar critical reconsideration of the framework in which the 
distinction between legitimized and non-legitimized meanings is constructed could be 
undertaken not only for the distinction between political sense and non-sense, but 
also for the distinction between what is considered as violence and what is considered 
as non-violent. This question is important, because the marginalization and 
stigmatization of young urban troublemakers is not only entwined with the lack of 
political sense which is ascribed to their agency, but also with the perceived non-
violent nature of the system of governance from which they are excluded. Sartre and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 In his article “Uprisings in Banlieues” (2007), Balibar notes that the term “uprising” was hardly used to 
describe the riots of 2005, since it reminds of a deliberate revolutionary tradition of oppressed classes 
rising up against dominant powers. Such an uprising seemed irrelevant to most commentators in the case 
of the riots, since no traditional revolutionary political statements were made.  
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Fanon also stated that it is not only the question of who is entitled to use violence, but 
more so who is recognized as committing violence in the first place. When the 
systemic violence applied by authorities is perceived as the exercise of power and 
hence as a neutral means of governance, the violence of revolt which opposes such 
governance can be easily perceived as radical, since the systemic violence is not 
recognized as violence at all. When systemic violence is perceived as part of normal 
circumstances in society, the standards by which violence is distinguished from non-
violence become a means of violence in themselves. “[W]hen we perceive something 
as an act of violence, we measure it by a presupposed standard of what the ‘normal’ 
non-violent situation is – and the highest form of violence is the imposition of this 
standard with reference to which some events appear as ‘violent’” (Zizek 2008, 55).  
 
When systemic violence is not recognized as violence, but is seen as the necessary 
exercise of power, counter-violence easily seems to be out of proportion and 
irrational. Slavoj Zizek describes violence inherent in a system of governance as not 
only “direct physical violence, but also the more subtle forms of coercion that sustain 
relations of domination and exploitation, including the threat of violence” (ibid., 8). 
Such violence could be described as seemingly “objective” violence, since it presents 
itself as a part of the natural course of events in the social sphere and as a contribution 
to the sustenance of the general socio-political order, rather than as an intentional 
disruption of that order. Those who perform such objective violence remain in the 
shadows, since they form the anonymous parts of a general bureaucratic system in 
which the logics of the overall valuation of social interactions, including acts of 
violence, is fabricated.  
 
In relation to the logics of objective violence, counter-violence can be understood as 
subjective violence in Zizek’s analysis. This is violence that can be ascribed to a 
specific actor with specific intentions, who often seems outraged, evil or desperate if 
he/she is valued according to the dominant standards of the systemic order. Violent 
acts of revolting political subjects are often understood as isolated outbursts, since 
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their reaction to another, more insidious form of violence is ignored. A similar 
detachment from its relation to a system of governance, which is perceived as unjust, 
is noticeable in the case of contemporary urban riots. The perceived senselessness of 
revolting violence is caused here by a lack of recognition for the systemic violence 
against which it is opposed. The subject who commits this revolting violence is seen 
as standing alone, is designated as radical and deviant, and as irrationally disturbing a 
reasonable and just political order. However, once we realize the extent and gravity of 
the systemic violence against which it rebels, it becomes possible to recognize the 
political implications of such violent acts. 
 
6.4.3 An indictment of experienced injustice 
Zizek’s analysis contributes to an understanding of “senseless urban violence” of 
“rebels without a cause” as making sense in relation to a governing system which fails 
to do justice to everyone. The political sense of senseless riots lies not in their 
potential to overthrow this system, but in their demonstration of the flawed nature of 
this system for certain excluded people. A deeper political meaning does not need to 
be added to this demonstration. Hence, the political sense of both the autotelic 
element of said riots, and its relation of discontent with state politics has now become 
clearer. The violent disruptions of young urban troublemakers are not detached from, 
but stand in close relation to the organization of society. Nevertheless, their political 
sense has to be merited within the singularity of the events themselves, without 
reference to an external political ideology. In order to make sense of this violence, we 
have to let go of the means-end perspective on violence and acknowledge its singular, 
destructive force, without describing it as purely autotelic. Violence that is performed 
by “rebels without a cause” seems to be a means without a clear end.  
 
In order to further explore the idea of violence as a means without an end, and 
examine whether this idea indeed applies to the case of violence committed by “rebels 
without a cause,” I will resort to the work of Walter Benjamin in the next section. He 
explicitly draws a relation between violence as a means without end and the failure of 
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the law to protect people against injustice. I have already stated that riots can be seen 
as an indictment of experienced injustices within society. In the following section, I 
will take a closer look at the relation between violence, justice and the law. The 
experiences of injustice that precede riots do not only lead to an unmediated 
explosion of violence, but also result in an extreme loss of faith in the justice of the 
principles of law and order which underlie the political organization of society. As we 
have seen in the words of the young inhabitants of Grigny, not only do the political 
institutions and their representation in the neighborhood by the police lose their 
credibility and authority, but the letter of the law does as well. In a way, the riots can 
be seen as a direct, very real and violent attack on a legal and political order which has 
lost all of its validity to the rioters. The “unruly” character and the disorder which 
riots imply seem senseless from an organized perspective on politics, but make 
political sense if we look at them as a violent condemnation of an order which has 
become unacceptable because of the injustices it produces. “Law becomes oppression, 
and legitimate methods of maintaining social order disintegrate (Janowitz 1968). An 
“injustice frame” thus replaces the “legitimating frame” and opens the possibility for 
action (Lapeyronnie 2009, 31). In reference to Benjamin, I will further investigate the 
idea that justice is not always covered by the law. 
 
6.5. Destructive violence in the name of justice 
In Section 6.3., I showed that violence that is committed in name of the protection of 
the law is often neutralized as the exercise of power. Such violence can fail to 
represent justice, while it is nevertheless legitimate. Violence which, in the case of 
such failure, is intended to restore the representation of justice by imposing an 
alternative set of laws is often perceived as dangerously radical and illegitimate. The 
one form of violence intends to protect an existing set of laws, the other form of 
violence intends to establish a new set of laws. In both cases, a clear goal is envisioned 
and judgments about the legitimacy of violence in order to reach that goal depend on 
whether we see justice sufficiently reflected in the existing laws or not. However, this 
debate does not help us understand violence which is inoperative or destructive in 
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relation to both the existing law and possible juridical alternatives, but which 
nevertheless appeals to a certain sense of justice and the lack of it in the present 
domain of the law. Such violence which emerges as a means without an end is 
described by Walter Benjamin in his much acclaimed and much critiqued text 
“Critique of Violence” (2004 [1921]). In this text, Benjamin not only describes 
violence that is used to protect the law and violence that is used to establish the law; 
he also gives insight into the political impact of violence that escapes a means-end 
logic and is directed at the destruction of a legal order which is perceived as unjust, 
without immediately presenting an alternative order. “Critique of Violence” is a 
complicated text, and in order to relate Benjamin’s ideas about violence as a means 
without an end in a fruitful way to my own thesis, I will first engage with his 
propositions in more detail.  
 
6.5.1. Violence is inherent in the law 
For Benjamin, the question of the relation between violence, justice and the law is a 
question of moral relations, their reflection in rules of law and interventions within 
this system of reference (2004, 236). We speak of violence in case an event disturbs 
the order of things, which we perceive to be morally correct and just, or in case an 
intervention is used to protect a certain established moral order against a disturbance. 
Benjamin’s own anarchic moral preferences clearly resonate within “Critique of 
Violence,” a text with a revolutionary taste. Benjamin warns against the threat of state 
violence which legitimizes itself by reference to the protection of the law, while justice 
is not necessarily safeguarded. He expresses his suspicion of the authority of the 
police and the ambiguity of state power, which is enforced upon citizens, rather than 
representing the interests of citizens. 
 
Benjamin understands every moment of creation of a certain structure in which our 
understanding of the morally right and just is framed as a moment of violence, since it 
necessarily annihilates any previous structures of legal order and moral meaning. As 
Jacques Derrida notes in a comment on “Critique of Violence,” Benjamin’s choice to 
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relate the establishment of the law, and its consequent protection, to violence is an 
obvious one, since the relation between violence and law is already present in Gewalt, 
the German word for violence (Derrida 1990). Gewalt is both used to describe 
violence and legitimate power or justified authority. For example, the term Staatsgewalt 
can imply violence that is used in name of the state as well as the authority of the 
state. Benjamin therefore notes that any action of both establishment and protection 
of the law cannot be detached from a certain extent of violence (2004, 243). The 
excessive and decisive elements of law-establishing violence are often forgotten in an 
institutional context, because the monopoly on the use of violence of the state is taken 
as an obvious necessity. The practice of parliamentary politics is therefore wrongly 
presented as inherently non-violent (ibid., 244). ). Compromises reached in parliament 
always entail a coercive and therefore violent element which is hidden under the 
pretext of a clean and non-violent political discussion. Benjamin illustrates this neglect 
of the violent character of state law and politics not only in reference to parliamentary 
politics, but also in reference to the authority of the police (De Wilde 2008, 19-22). 
The police also install the rules and regulations which they enforce, and therefore 
embody the omnipresent nature of law-establishing violence. Hence, the ends of 
police violence do not always reflect the ends of general law, but rather seem to serve 
the reaffirmation of the power of the body of the police itself. Since police violence 
does not refer back to a more essential goal, it becomes self-referential and both 
intangible and all-pervasive, despite a rhetoric which justifies it as a security 
measurement in light of the general interest (Benjamin 2004, 243).  
 
This example of the ambiguous position of the police hints at a recurrent internal 
contradiction of the law (ibid.). Both law-establishing and law-preserving violence is 
often exercised by the same power, while these two forms of violence are legitimized 
by a moral distinction and distancing between the two. A reaffirmation of the own 
powers of those in charge of the cycle of lawmaking and law-preserving violence can 
obscure the principle of justice in a process, which is, at least rhetorically, designed to 
realize justice in a socio-political context. Benjamin stresses that the relation between 
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justice and the order of law does not always imply that justice is truly done to the 
principle of justice. The cyclic connection between law-establishing and law-
preserving violence in which the protection of the principle of justice should be 
actualized subordinates this same principle of justice to a means-end relation, which 
can be easily corrupted. Law-establishing violence is a means which serves the end of 
the protection of justice in human interactions and law-preserving violence is a means 
which serves the end of the enforcement of the order of law which has been created. 
This cycle makes the principle of justice always dependent on the violent means which 
are installed to either promote or protect it, and hence of a certain manifestation of 
power of those in charge of the exercise of violent means, in light of the order of law. 
“Lawmaking is power making, and, to that extent, an immediate manifestation of 
violence” (ibid., 248). The means therefore seem to win priority over the end, in the 
case of the establishment and maintenance of a legal order. As a consequence, it is not 
primarily the exercise of justice which is central to the cycle of lawmaking and law-
preserving violence, but the preservation of the cycle itself, and the exercise of 
authority and power of those who hold the monopoly on both lawmaking and law-
preserving violence. 
 
6.5.2. An unmediated perspective on justice 
It is difficult to criticize a situation in which state powers are more interested in 
consolidating their own position, than in safeguarding the representation of justice in 
the legal system, since such a critique would have to be developed outside of the state-
induced legal order. Nevertheless, Benjamin explores the possible emergence of 
violence which comes precisely from this extra-legal position and which is exercised 
directly in the name of justice, without a mediation in a legally accepted means-end 
logic. In every legal tradition, it is assumed that the distinction between the just and 
unjust use of violence can only be made according to a pre-constituted legal order. 
Benjamin therefore concludes that all violence that is used as a means is either 
lawmaking or law-preserving. “If it lays claim to neither of these predicates, it forfeits 
all validity” (ibid., 243). A fundamental justification which stands apart from a legal 
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order and which is based on the principle of justice alone is not considered to be a 
possibility (Van Rooden 2010, 8-9). In addition, when we look at the relation of 
violence to the law as a means to an end, this perspective allows us to judge the use of 
violence, but not violence as a principle in itself.155 It is not possible to imagine a form 
of violence that falls outside of the framed domain in which the relation between 
justice and the law is captured. All social interactions, and especially conflicting human 
interests, are regulated precisely by the grace of a general respect for the translation of 
the principle of justice in the order of the law. The healthy political organization of 
society depends on a general acceptance of this relation. Political counteractions can 
aim to establish a new order in which the principle of justice is re-inscribed, but the 
altogether abandonment of the relation between justice and the law is not possible. A 
necessary consequence is that neither lawmaking violence nor law-preserving violence 
can truly form a critique to the relation between justice and the law. For such a 
critique, one would have to be able to adopt an outsider’s perspective, which does not 
originate in the principle of the law. Such an outsider’s perspective is impossible to 
imagine if one holds on to the idea that justice necessarily has to be reflected in a 
certain order of law, since it cannot be preserved outside of the domain of the law or 
in a situation of “lawlessness.”  
 
In order to escape such an impasse, Benjamin sheds light on a form of pure, 
unmediated violence in the name of justice which is neither law-establishing nor law-
preserving, but which is destructive in relation to the existing legal order when it fails 
to serve justice as its final goal. This violence is located outside of the cycle of 
lawmaking and law-preserving violence and can therefore touch upon the principle of 
justice in an unbound, more direct way. In this sense, it is arguable to what extent 
Benjamin really speaks of a “pure” form of violence here, since it is not purely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Both Mark de Wilde and Willem Schinkel point in this respect at the limitations of Benjamin’s text 
itself. Schinkel states that Benjamin is ultimately unable to shed light on violence as a principle in itself. 
The ultimate goal of his text is justice and not violence. Benjamin therefore fails to give a description of 
violence as a thing in itself, with no other reference. De Wilde notes that the causes of violence are not 
discussed. Benjamin does not speak of the “why” of violence, but only of its “how” (Schinkel 2010; De 
Wilde 2008). 
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focused on its own manifestation, but strongly related to the principle of justice. It is 
therefore not a form of autotelic violence. Nevertheless, Benjamin states that this 
violence should not be understood as a means to an end because it does not serve the 
legal order (ibid., 247). This violence should make political sense outside of the 
domain of legal and political institutions and therefore be revolutionary. In a 
revolutionary defiance of the existing legal order, the violence of state institutions that 
upholds the law can be critically confronted. In order to be truly critical, this 
revolutionary violence has to explicitly contest what is permitted or encouraged 
according to the law. “Indeed, doing the right thing according to established law is 
precisely what must be suspended in order to dissolve a body of established law that is 
unjust” (Butler 2006, 203). 
 
Benjamin finds inspiration in the work of George Sorel to envision this revolutionary 
violence, which withdraws itself from a means-end logic. In his “Reflections on 
Violence,” Sorel designates the proletarian general strike as a form of political action 
which could lead to a total revolution, while it rejects any kind of program or utopia 
(2004, 291-292). The proletarian general strike differs from the political strike, which 
is organized within the boundaries of the legal system. The political strike is aimed at 
making the existing system stronger through transformation, and is motivated by a 
willingness to make concessions if working conditions are sufficiently modified to be 
profitable. In contrast to the political strike, the general strike does not envision the 
strengthening of state power through its reformation, but rather has the destruction of 
state power as its sole task. It aims to liberate working life completely from the control 
and power of the state. Since state power can only represent the interests of the ruling 
class, the proletarian revolution, which is carried out through the general strike, does 
not aim to establish an alternative legal and political order. In contrast to the wishes of 
what he calls “orthodox Marxians,” Sorel does not wish for a proletarian state to take 
over the middle-class state (ibid., 175). The establishment of a new authority, which 
will have the same form as the previous one, will lead eventually to the return of 
problems of inequality. The new leaders in proletarian parliamentary politics will 
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eventually start to behave out of their own individual interests, like their middle-class 
predecessors did (ibid. 176). The revolution envisioned by Sorel should not result in 
the transmission of power from one privileged class to another, but should do away 
with the privileges of power altogether. In the act of the destruction of the order of 
force, the subordinated proletariat is able to establish its own freedom.  
 
6.5.3. Divine violence 
No reformation, but total transformation of the power structures in which justice is 
attached to a legal order is the singular revolutionary inspiration which Benjamin takes 
from Sorel’s account of the general strike. It becomes difficult to even name this 
revolutionary gesture as violent, according to Benjamin, since we understand violence 
by measuring its effects, while no familiar standards can be applied for the measuring 
of the violence of the general strike. This violence evades a measurement in terms of 
cause and effect, means and ends, utility and legality. It strikes unexpectedly, 
apparently out of nowhere. This is the reason why Benjamin characterizes this law-
destructing violence as divine violence. Divine violence annihilates the boundaries of 
the domain of the legal order, which serves to frame our understanding of the 
justification of violence. It stands outside any framework of legal justification and can 
therefore be seen as unbound. Divine violence may also be called sovereign violence 
(Benjamin 2004,,252). It could perform the act of radical critique of the lack of 
consideration for justice within the legal order, which cannot be performed in law-
establishing or law-preserving violence, precisely because of its sovereignty with 
respect to any legal system. Divine violence could open up access to a pure invocation 
of justice, which precedes the entanglement of justice in power relations that circulate 
in legal and political institutions. In the manifestation of divine violence, primary and 
ultimate justice is done to the principle of justice, in its full sovereignty, unbound by 
any systemic framing or power struggle, according to Benjamin.  
 
Benjamin refers to divinity here to express “the irreducible singularity of each 
situation” in which this violence manifests itself (Derrida 1990, 1023). Just like the 
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monotheist God of modern religion keeps his distance from human interactions and 
the laws which regulate these interactions, divine violence stands outside of every 
system of regulation. In contrast to the Ancient Greek gods, as they appear in myths, 
the monotheist God does not directly interfere in human relations to regulate them, 
but only strikes on very rare occasions to establish a total transformation of the whole 
structure in which the power of the law is embedded. In similar vein, divine violence 
emerges in a sudden, momentary event, heralding a total transformation of our 
relation to the law. Benjamin distinguishes this divine violence from mythical violence, 
which seems to be just as unmediated and detached from the cycle of law-establishing 
and law-preserving violence, but which actually directly establishes its end in its own 
manifestation, and is therefore a form of law-establishing violence. Benjamin uses the 
myth of Niobe as an example to clarify this mythical violence (Benjamin 2004, 248).  
 
By bragging about her many children and valuing them above the divine twins of 
Apollo and Artemis, Niobe called for faith to punish her. Artemis and Apollo 
slaughtered her children, but left her to live, petrified in stone and eternally weeping 
for her loss. The fact that she is left to live while her children are killed is a sign of not 
only a punishment, but the setting of a general example against an arrogance that 
challenges the power of the gods. Niobe’s punishment hence serves as the 
establishment of a law, marking the difference between the gods and men. This 
example shows that mythical violence is not truly sovereign, since it coincides with a 
manifestation of the power of the authority who establishes what is legally permitted 
and what is not. Mythical violence establishes a law in the immediate manifestation of 
the power of the gods. Divine violence, on the other hand, is never regulative, but 
manifests itself without apparent reason or goal. Other than mythical violence, which 
is a manifestation of the existence of the gods, divine violence does not need a 
reference to the status of its instigator in order to secure its impact. It can be seen as a 
pure means in itself which does not require any justification. While the establishment 
of the law is aimed at imperatives with a general form which can be applied and 
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reproduced in various situations, the address of justice in divine violence is always 
singular, manifesting itself in a unique situation (Derrida 1990, 949).  
 
Just as in all spheres God opposes myth, mythical violence is confronted by the 
divine. And the latter constitutes its antithesis in all respects. If mythical violence is 
lawmaking, divine violence is law-destroying; if the former sets boundaries, the latter 
boundlessly destroys them; if mythical violence brings at once guilt and retribution, 
divine power only expiates; if the former threatens, the latter strikes; if the former is 
bloody, the latter is lethal without spilling blood. (Benjamin 2004, 249-250) 
 
Since divine violence always manifests itself in a revolutionary moment, an entirely 
new “historical epoch” could be heralded with it, in which justice and the law are 
related to each other in entirely new ways (ibid., 252). However, Benjamin warns that 
this does not mean that divine violence can be deliberately chosen as the basis for 
utopic visions. Divine violence always remains singular, elusive and momentary. It can 
never be recognized with certainty in the moment in which it takes place. Its effects 
can only be noted afterwards, when the divine violence itself has already passed and 
the revolutionary impact of its moment has already lost its glow to a new cycle of law-
establishing and law-preserving violence. The moment of divine violence in which the 
existing legal order is destroyed can not be prolonged, but creates space for a new 
foundation of a new legal order. The moment in which the new law is yet to come is 
divine, but disappears as soon as the foundations of the new law itself are laid. This 
elusivity of the moment of divine violence makes Laclau and Zac wonder whether we 
should relate such violence to actually possible historical events (1994, 25). They 
notice an important distinction in the way in which Sorel and Benjamin speak about 
the proletarian strike as an example of a “politics of pure mediacy” (ibid., 26). Sorel 
seems to see the proletarian strike not so much as an actual historical event, but rather 
as a possible horizon, towards which the revolutionary struggle can direct itself. Sorel 
therefore merits the mythical potential of the proletarian strike more than its actual 
arrival (ibid., 25). Benjamin, on the other hand, clearly distinguishes divine violence 
from mythical horizons, which he associates with mythical violence. He explicitly 
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abandons this mythical dimension by seeing the overthrow of the legal order in an 
event of pure violence as the opening of a new historical period. However, how we 
should conceive of the actuality of such an event of pure violence remains unclear in 
his analysis. 
 
6.5.4. The political can be violent 
When I bring Benjamin’s description of violence as a means without end in relation to 
my own description of the inoperative violence of young “rebels without a cause,” it 
becomes clear that certain characteristics are shared, while the possible revolutionary 
impact of Benjamin’s divine violence remains far removed from the practice of 
contemporary urban riots. Benjamin’s description of divine violence explains what 
kind of political impact singular violent events in the name of justice, without a 
program or organizatory model, can have. Such singular violent events strike the 
established legal order from the outside, and can only have an unbinding effect on this 
order. In that sense, Benjamin’s divine violence is a form of inoperative violence, 
which nevertheless makes political sense. It is singular and fleeting. As soon as an 
alternative order is proposed, the divine moment has passed and a new cycle of 
violence related to the law commences in which violence is again operationalized as a 
means to a certain systemic end. This explains the fact that riots often come to an end 
after the governing authorities have declared a state of exception, in which state 
powers are expanded. The political sense of divine violence lies in its fundamental 
critique on the order of law, where it fails to do justice.  
 
This description is fruitful for me in further explicating how an “illegal” event of the 
political can critically disrupt the regulative order of politics. Benjamin’s analysis of 
divine violence shows that events of the political can also take a violent form. I see 
similarities between my description of the “founding fictions,” which legitimize the 
current status quo in Western European politics as introduced in Chapter 1., and the 
“mythical” foundations of the legal order, as described by Benjamin. Benjamin 
emphasizes that these mythical foundations attest to a violence of their own, which 
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should be acknowledged. Benjamin also emphasizes that the governing system based 
on such mythical foundations cannot always guarantee that justice is safeguarded. 
When justice is not done, singular, violent and disruptive events can take the 
governing system out of its seemingly neutral position and confront it with its own 
boundaries. As I see it, this “unruly” sense of violence as a critique of a governing 
system which fails to do immediate justice is present in urban riots. In the chaos and 
violence of riots which seem to strike out of nowhere, a problematic lack of justice 
within the order of politics manifests itself. Not everyone can equally benefit from the 
rights that we deem to be of equal importance to everyone in society. Zizek states: 
 
When those outside the structured social field strike “blindly,” demanding and enacting 
immediate justice/vengeance, this is divine violence. (Zizek 2008, 171) 
 
Within the undermining disruption of urban violence, it becomes clear that the 
existing legal and political order is always caught up in an attempt to cover the 
disruptive and undermining potential of its own constitutive lack. The political sense 
of such a violent disruption lies in the hope of regaining sight on a more just situation, 
without the militant or revolutionary capacity to bring about this new situation by 
one’s own force. 
 
Leaving the revolutionary stakes of divine violence aside, the expression of 
powerlessness occupies a central place in Zizek’s interpretation of divine violence. 
According to him, we should not see divine violence as a manifestation of material or 
symbolic power, but rather as an expression of powerlessness, since power is only 
associated with those who maintain the legal order. Divine violence is a sign of God’s 
own impotence and those who carry out divine violence act in full awareness of this 
impotence. According to Zizek, divine violence is not a means of establishing a 
situation in which pure justice is reflected, but rather a sign of impotence in realizing 
such a state of pure justice. 
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[T]he opposition of mythic and divine violence is that between the means and the 
sign, that is, mythic violence is a means to establish the rule of Law ( the legal social 
order), while divine violence serves no means, not even that of punishing the culprits 
and thus re-establishing the equilibrium of justice. It is just the sign of the injustice of 
the world, of the world being ethically “out of joint.” (Zizek 2008, 169) 
 
The sign of injustice of the world is first and foremost expressed in frustration and 
anger. Such an explosion of anger has no other object than to show itself (Derrida 
1990, 1025). Although I do not wish to speak directly of divine violence in relation to 
the violent and disturbing public interventions of young urban troublemakers, I see 
them as a similar manifestation of powerlessness. 
 
The unruly sense of inoperative violence as a disruptive critique of a ruling order in 
the name of justice is shared in both the divine violence of Benjamin and the urban 
violence I have described here. However, other elements of Benjamin’s description of 
divine violence do not correspond to my own account of urban violence. Despite the 
fact that urban violence also strikes from a certain “outside” position, it does not hold 
the radically autonomous, almost miraculous position which Benjamin ascribes to 
divine violence. In addition, urban violence does not have a similarly total, destructive 
force which could set a revolution in motion and instigate a whole new historical 
epoch. The large, all-encompassing claims Benjamin makes in relation to the scope of 
divine violence, its anarchic autonomy and its revolutionary force are quite unrealistic 
with respect to contemporary cases of disruptive urban violence. I would like to 
return here to the critical reflections of Laclau and Zac, who wonder whether divine 
violence as it is described by Benjamin should be seen as a real-life phenomenon, or as 
an imagined horizon for concrete struggles against an unjust state of affairs. This 
question is relevant in relation to other critical reviews of Benjamin’s text, in which 
the idea of an attainable, yet unmediated form of justice is equally criticized. The 
question remains whether the pure and unmediated principle of justice, as Benjamin 
seems to envision it, can relate to any real political situations, and whether an appeal 
to such a pristine principle of justice actually has the critical force which Benjamin 
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seems to ascribe to it. In addition, the extent to which divine violence itself is in fact 
pure and unmediated could be questioned. In the following sub-section, I will engage 
with some of these critical remarks before returning to the political sense of 
contemporary inoperative violence. 
 
6.5.5. The perils of pure violence 
First of all, Benjamin’s text seems to contain a complicated inconsistency. On the one 
hand, divine violence is set completely outside of the means-end rationality of 
violence, yet it has a clear purpose: the demonstration of justice outside of the law. If 
divine violence seeks justice, but does not work as a means to an end, how can we 
understand the relation between justice and divine violence? (Schinkel 2010, 97) The 
pursuit of justice seems to justify the manifestation of divine violence, and therefore 
makes the description of divine violence as a pure means without end dubious. The 
end that justifies the use of violence seems to have merely shifted from the order of 
law to the principle of justice. The question is therefore whether Benjamin is not 
referring to a pure end, instead of a pure means, in his analysis of divine violence. This 
would be in accord with some of his own expressions: “Justice is the principle of all 
divine end making, power the principle of all mythical lawmaking” (Benjamin 2004, 
248). Secondly, the idea of purity, as described in Benjamin’s text, could be 
problematic. Dutch philosopher Hans Achterhuis calls the pursuit of a pure form of 
justice a dangerous utopian thought which could have terrible consequences (2008, 
598-599). In Benjamin’s notion of divine violence, he sees the desire to make an end 
to all other forms of impure violence with pure, and divine violence. Since all other 
forms of violence in some way support the exercise of power upholding a legal order, 
the manifestation of divine violence would be a sort of final, absolute act of justice. 
The pursuit of such an absolute act of justice is utopic and dangerously unrealistic in 
his opinion, since it disregards the value of attempts to do justice within a legal 
framework. The sovereignty of divine violence, which Benjamin seems to prefer over 
the lawful cycle of mythical violence, clearly has a dictatorial character, according to 
Achterhuis.  
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Achterhuis’s comments resonate with the concerns expressed by Derrida in the 
postscript to his text “Force of Law,” in which he comments on Benjamin’s “Critique 
of Violence” (1990). Derrida speculates on the reaction of Benjamin to the “clean” 
and “bloodless” violence of the “final solution,” as it was proposed by Nazism. 
Benjamin had written his text well before the Second World War, so in a way this is 
not a fair question to ask, but it is nevertheless important to apply his propositions to 
a discussion of the violence applied by Nazism, according to Derrida. When we see 
the final solution as an extreme consequence of the logics of Nazism, we could say it 
consists of a radical performance of mythical violence. Nazism implies the totalitarian 
radicalization of a logics of the State and a simultaneous fatal corruption of 
parliamentary and representative democracy (ibid., 1041). This development is 
enforced by an omnipresent police force. Nazism represents the total inseparability of 
the body that sets the laws and the body that carries out its enforcement, without any 
mechanisms of control implied in the legislative system. The dissociation of right and 
justice is complete in the case of Nazism, and this divergence is covered up by a 
strong discourse with mythical tendencies, focusing on the foundation of ends which 
legitimize extremely violent and mechanically applied means. On the other hand, the 
final solution can be seen as the absolute and final act which Achterhuis envisions in 
divine violence. It is the final solution, which will make an end to the necessity of the 
strict organization of the Nazi political and legal system, since the problem, which 
legitimized its installation, will be solved. The final solution will therefore dissolve the 
mythical order of law which characterizes Nazism. We cannot understand the 
uniqueness of the violence of the final solution within the framework of Nazism’s 
own legal system, but only as an external and final dissolution of this system (ibid., 
1042).  
 
However, the final solution is final in an even more terrible way. In the final solution, 
all people who could bear witness to the atrocities of the Nazi system are 
exterminated, and along with their lives, the possibility to demand for justice outside 
of the legal order. This effacement of testimony enables a variety of secondary 
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interpretations of the historical events of the Holocaust, with sometimes painful 
consequences. It therefore seems difficult to give an account of these historical events 
that does justice to the full scale of their impact. However, it would be even more 
painful to follow Benjamin’s description of divine violence and conclude from its 
singularity and externality to a given juridical order that it lies not in the power of man 
to given any interpretation or judgment of the events of the final solution. Derrida 
reads in Benjamin’s text a temptation to “think of the holocaust as an uninterpretable 
manifestation of divine violence insofar as this violence would be at the same time 
nihilating, expiatory and bloodless” (ibid., 1044). The messianic character of divine 
violence, its boundlessness and elusiveness, and the way it strikes like the hand of faith 
with an irreversible finality opens the possibility of thinking of extreme and unique 
events of violence like the Holocaust as divine interventions which can neither be 
rationally understood nor properly judged by human beings. An acceptance of, or awe 
for, such exceptional manifestations of fate is a danger, which is reinforced by 
Benjamin’s text. 
 
6.6. Taking the law into one’s own hands 
In returning to the issue of riots that are instigated by young urban troublemakers 
with an immigrant background, the above-mentioned critical considerations have to 
be taken into account. Such instances of inoperative violence cannot be seen as 
manifestations of a form of pure violence, such as divine violence. The element of 
almost messianic purity that lies in the radical autonomy, the revolutionary appeal and 
the uninterpretability of divine violence is absent in contemporary urban riots. One of 
the reasons for this is that such urban riots neither have the capacity, nor the intent, to 
permanently destroy the existing legal order, but take place in a more complex relation 
with that order. Their unruliness should not be interpreted as a form of pure anarchy.  
 
Even though these violent events are not driven by a clear imagination of an 
alternative legal and political order, the hope for a better representation of justice in 
the letter, as well as the exercise, of the law is nevertheless present. Even though the 
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violent disruptions of young urban troublemakers are instigated from an outsider 
position to the legal order and the practice of institutional politics, the young rioters 
wish to be included in a better, more just order. My young interlocutors, who identify 
with riots, do not wish to live in a permanent state of lawlessness. They hope for 
different and better laws, despite the fact that they do not have clear ideas about the 
realization of such laws. Their violent interventions are therefore not only related to a 
certain pure and unmediated principle of justice, but rather to more justice, directly 
inscribed in the domain of the law and the political organization of society. These 
young troublemakers do not appeal to a sovereign form of justice which is detached 
from, and elevated above, the real and messy world of power struggles. They wish to 
see justice embedded in the field of power and its impact on their daily experiences. 
As far as their violent critique of experienced injustices and violent expression of 
frustrations about a lack of alternatives has an unruly character, this unruliness is no 
pure means in itself. In a situation in which the officially established, institutional legal 
order cannot guarantee their just treatment as equally merited citizens, the idealized 
goal is not a continuation of a total lack of rules, but a creation of one’s own rules. If 
the existing laws do not correspond with the principle of justice, it is permitted to take 
the law into one’s own hands, according to the youngsters. 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, idols like Tony Montana who appeal to young 
urban troublemakers may appear to represent complete lawlessness when we perceive 
their behavior from the perspective of state regulations and authorities. However, it is 
precisely Tony’s drive to establish and uphold his own laws which is admired. In the 
eyes of the youngsters, Tony Montana is a gangster figure, who is comparable to the 
“social bandit”, as described by Hobsbawm in relation to a much earlier historical 
period. The social bandit breaks the law, but is not considered to be a criminal 
according to the “own” laws of the people who admire him (Hobsbawm 1965, 16). 
The social bandit has no great revolutionary aspirations. He is no leader of a large 
organization, nor transmitting developed ideologies. He is not dreaming of an entirely 
new or perfect world, but would rather see the existing world become one in which 
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people are justly treated (ibid., 5). Benjamin also notes that a figure like the “great 
criminal” who commits violence and stands completely outside of the law often gains 
the secret admiration of the people (Benjamin, 2004:239). His violence is both 
threatening and appealing because it implies a manifestation of individual agency 
which freely takes place outside of – and defies – the boundaries of the law. In the 
case of the great criminal, his goals might be despised, while the violence he commits 
leaves the people impressed. However, contrary to what Benjamin suggests, I believe 
that it is not the manifestation of the violence itself that fascinates, but the capacity of 
the “great criminal” to set his own rules. Belhaj Kacem has noted that the “outlaw” 
finds himself in the same position as the sovereign. Both stand outside of the 
dominant legal order and can therefore set their own standards in relation to the 
exercise of justice. Both the gangster and the sovereign can therefore be seen as a law-
establishing authority. Whether the authoritative power of the gangster or the 
sovereign appears to be more legitimate depends on one’s position in society.  
 
Even though riots and other cases of urban violence manifest themselves outside of 
the ruling legal order, they do not lack every relation to the law. Such violent events 
emerge out of a discontentment with – and therefore a direct engagement with – that 
legal order, rather than a complete detachment from that legal order. One of the 
incentives of riots might even be a frustration over the fact that the instigators cannot 
sufficiently deploy the capacity to change the laws, in contrast to the example of the 
great criminal, acting in the name of justice. Despite their emergence in singular 
events with an autotelic element, cases of urban violence should not be seen as purely 
singular, external and sovereign acts. In the following and last part of my dissertation I 
will therefore characterize the disturbing interventions of young urban troublemakers 
not as purely singular events, but rather as singular-plural events, which are singular in 
their occurrence and inoperativeness, but nevertheless rooted in a plurality of 
experiences which keep repeating themselves in relation to the dominant system of 
governance. The disturbing public interventions of young urban troublemakers 
emerge in singular events, which nevertheless evoke a plural community of 
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experience. In addition, I will conclude that these occurrences of unruly politics are no 
pure disorder in themselves, but rather take place at the threshold between the 
dominant order of politics and disruptive interventions of the political.  
 
An other reason why urban violence cannot be directly compared to divine violence, 
is the need for informed interpretations of the events. Even though their singularity 
and inoperativeness cannot be fully grasped by a posteriori reasoning, an 
interpretation of urban riots which starts with the accounts of the instigators about 
experienced injustices in the face of ruling authorities should not be avoided. In line 
with Derrida, I would argue that such disruptive interventions should not stand above 
and beyond any interpretation, but actually need to be actively interpreted in order to 
emphasize their inextricable relatedness to society as a whole. Only if others actively 
engage with the events and try to understand their impact, the role of unequal and 
unjust societal structures in causing the riots can be uncovered. Such an interpretation 
should first of all open up the accounts of the actors involved and leave room for 
their testimonies of injustice. At the same time, such an interpretation should also 
acknowledge the spontaneity, the lack of organization and the lack of 
instrumentalization of the expressed violence, and hence the autotelic elements in its 
emergence. 
 
This focus on the testimonies of injustice and the agency of the actors involved – 
even if this agency seems mostly powerless – is important if we wish to speak of a 
political subjectivity in relation to unruly politics. Such unruly politics does not spring 
out of nowhere. In reference to Sloterdijk, Wieviorka, Baudrillard and Balibar, 
however different their position, I have stated that young urban troublemakers are not 
seen as political subjects because they manifest themselves differently than more 
traditional, emancipatory political subjects. Those who express inoperative violence 
and manifest a certain powerless indictment of injustice are instead seen as “floating” 
or “anti-political” subjects. However, I have argued in this chapter that the violent 
agency of such “rebels without a cause” makes political sense outside of a strategic 
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means-end logic, as a critique of the existing legal and governing structures which do 
not treat everyone equally. 
 
In the act of urban violence, the subject who is accountable to the law is set aside in 
order for an agency to emerge, which makes political sense in an “unruly” way. How 
this agency contributes to a certain precarious but nevertheless political subjectivity 
will be explored in the next and final part of my dissertation. In the next chapter, I will 
explore the emergence of an unruly political subjectivity which is rooted in a situation 
of precariousness and which manifests itself in particular situations on the streets. I 
will focus on the appeal of such a precarious political subject to a shared political 
agency which cuts across identity boundaries, but nevertheless always remains situated 
and momentary. Such a shared political agency could emerge in the light of a 
transformation of society based on a demand for more justice and equality. The 
unease that is provoked by the disruptive impact of urban violence could make others 
reconsider the justness of social relations and the political order, if they are willing to 
listen to the testimonies of young rioters as truthful counter-narratives. 
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 Part 4 
             
 
Encounters and counter-actions 
between politics and the political 
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Prelude 
 
 
 
Politics? To me that’s just strategies to get elected. There is the official idea of politics – 
it’s like a movement of thought, there is the left, the right, communism and all these 
things. That’s politics like it is supposed to be, like you learn it from the books in 
school. But in reality the right is a bit left and the left is a bit right. They say one thing 
this year, and after they are elected they say something else. It’s all just the personal 
interest of the politicians. I think for us, the young people from the banlieues, we are not 
really interested in politics. They’ve lied too much to us. I personally don’t give a shit at 
all. The only thing we share here in the neighborhood is the aim that everyone leads a 
good life for himself. Everyone just strives to live the right life. That is: making enough 
money to go on holidays sometimes as well, to make a living and do some nice stuff 
sometimes on the side. For the rest I don’t really care. I also don’t think that things like 
demonstrations help to change stuff. I would never go there. But I like concrete 
projects, like going to Africa to help poor people, for example. If there would be a 
project for my education in Africa, I would be the first one to go. But politics is not 
real. 
 
A real alternative for politics would maybe be if “us” and “them” could be reconciled 
by re-establishing the truth. If people could see that the banlieues are not so closed and 
that there are also young people who live here with whom you can have a normal 
conversation, maybe then they would change their votes. Maybe they would start to 
think differently about all those security measures, for example. And then the good 
things about the banlieues could be shown. But also the guys here should be a bit more 
open to the outside world. Maybe this could be something real to work on at specific 
places, but certainly not everywhere in France. (Ladji, 21 years old, Grigny) 
 
I have the last word. And what I think is also on behalf of the group. What I want to 
say to you all is not for just one person, it is mostly really for the neighborhood. All 
these boys here, the stories I bring to you come both from outside and from myself. 
This is the image of the neighborhood itself. And what I want to say last is… well, I 
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feel a bit strange now, you know… I never sat at a table for a meeting like this. This is 
my first time. And now I can finally say my own words. Finally, I can give the words. I 
am proud of myself that I can finally give the words for my friends. And I hope that 
something will happen with it. (Driss, 18 years old, Kanaleneiland156)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 final statement at the end of the expert meeting for professionals working with youngsters in 
Kanaleneiland, organized to share the experiences we had during the exchange trip to Grigny. Two boys 
from the focus group were present, and Driss was one of them. Earlier, he spoke about his vision on the 
youth work in the neighborhood and his personal experiences with his education and internship. 
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Chapter 7 
             
Encounters with a precarious and scandalous political subject 
 
 
 
 
So democracy is not itself unless it is scandalous right to 
the end. (Bensaïd, 2011:43)  
 
 
Throughout the previous chapters, I have shown that young urban troublemakers 
from neighborhoods like Grigny and Kanaleneiland are not easily perceived as a 
collective emancipatory political subject. In a dominant analysis, these adolescents’ 
actions are portrayed as countering the very idea of what can be recognized as 
legitimized or civilized political agency due to their unorganized, destructive and 
aimless character and lack of involvement with general societal interests. Instead, the 
figure of the rebel without a cause, who displays disruptive or violent behavior 
without clear political claims or aims, is characterized as a “floating” subject, or an 
“anti-political” subject, as I stated in Chapter 6. (Wieviorka 2005, 292-293; Balibar 
2007, 62). I have also argued that the counter-actions of young urban troublemakers 
have an undermining effect on any efforts to integrate the boys into a structure of 
legitimized community building, accepted societal engagement or regular political 
participation. In reaction to institutionalized efforts at normalization, the boys react 
with a hostile attitude and disruptive or sabotaging interventions, as I stated in the 
first part of this dissertation. The fact that these youngsters do not seem to be 
working collectively on effective political practices or strategies calls their status as a 
political subject into question. Despite this dominant analysis, the unruly actions of 
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young urban troublemakers are confronting the political order. The disruptive events 
in which these troublemakers manifest themselves signal a lack of representation 
within the political domain, and a lack of equal access to citizenship as a social 
practice, exceeding a formal, legal status. In reference to Rancière I have argued that 
young urban troublemakers uncover persisting inequalities within the political order. 
In reference to Benjamin and Zizek I have argued that young urban troublemakers 
express an indictment of injustices related to the legal order. Their expressions of 
disagreement with experienced inequalities and injustices make political sense 
regardless of their disturbing nature. However, the signalling of a lack in the political 
and legal order, without the proposal of alternatives, is not considered as sufficient for 
them to be seen as a political subject. 
 
In this last part of my dissertation, I will explore another form of political subjectivity 
which can be ascribed to young urban troublemakers and in fact emerges in their 
unruly actions. This political subjectivity takes other forms than a traditional political 
subjectivity because it is not directed at a clearly envisioned alternative political order, 
nor founded in a clearly formulated, coherent identity. I will present young urban 
troublemakers here as a precarious political subject. The precarious political subject 
does not precede the unruly actions of young urban troublemakers, but emerges 
within these actions. Instead of an already established, pre-constitutive entity from 
which agency is deliberately initiated, this subjectivity is opened up within situated 
actions and relations with others. This openness to, and emergence in, the dynamics 
of actions and encounters with others makes this subjectivity inherently precarious on 
an ontological level. It is never stable or certain of its own identity, and it is always 
vulnerable to the impact of others. The precariousness of this subjectivity not only 
takes place on an ontological level; it equally characterizes the social position of those 
living under precarious circumstances. I also speak of a precarious political subject 
here because I aim to describe the subject position of the ones without a part in the 
socio-political structure framing peoples recognizability as a political subject. Despite 
its outside position to dominant socio-political structure, the precarious political 
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subject has its own status: the subjectivity of the ones without status, without power 
and without connections.  
 
Despite its inherent precariousness, the political subjectivity I describe here is not just 
futile. It is able to cause a considerable impact in the existing political order. Within 
unruly actions, the denunciation of an unjust and unequal division of power that 
affects the marginalized has political impact without immediately proposing a new 
political order. This political impact is valuable because of its critical potential, and 
because of its potential appeal to others who do not necessarily share the same 
precarious social position with those instigating disruptive interventions, but who 
nevertheless recognize a certain shared ontological status of precariousness. 
Precarious political subjectivity emerges in such recognition, as well as in the actions 
of those who take matters into their own hands and do not wait until justice and 
equality are given to them. The simultaneous dependency and disruptive interaction 
between the community of experience of young urban troublemakers and society at 
large has an “unworking” or “inoperative” effect on any foundational imagination of a 
political community or citizenry. It is precisely in this unworking effect that the 
political sense of this agency lies, since the disruption of such foundational 
imaginations enforces awareness upon others of the necessary coexistence with those 
who have no legitimate place in the order of society.  
 
The precarious political subject is shaped in an interaction between its own unruly 
political actions and its encounter with others. The distinction between “self” and 
“other” is here somewhat misleading, since both the acting one and the recognizing 
other become part of the same precarious political subjectivity if both are willing to 
acknowledge the possible political impact of their shared situation. The distinction 
between self and other does not mark an inside and an outside, but indicates and 
internal dynamics within the discussed political subjectivity itself. When various 
people of both precarious and privileged status acknowledge that they are potentially 
exposed to similar risks of deprivation and loss within society, a shared commitment 
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to the opening of another world becomes possible. In the following two chapters, I 
will describe the characteristic dynamics of this political subjectivity which is shaped in 
the space in between deregulating and scandalous agency, on the one hand, and the 
active acknowledgement of the political value of this unruly agency, on the other. The 
precarious political subject does not own its own agency alone, because it always 
emerges in a relation with others. Nevertheless, this inherent relationality does not 
render the precarious political subject to a state of passivity; it acts, and in its agency it 
can become aware of its own transformatory potential.  
 
I will start this chapter by exploring the informal political agency in which a precarious 
political subjectivity could emerge. People living in a precarious situation often aim to 
establish a dignified life for themselves through informal channels and make 
themselves heard on the streets. It is within this domain, and within such particular, 
situated actions, where a political subjectivity can emerge which has no homogeneous, 
but an internally differentiated character. The first thing that binds the various people 
who share a precarious political subjectivity is the fact that they share a social situation 
with each other. In line with the work of Jean-Luc Nancy (2000, 1991), I will state that 
an acknowledgement of our necessary coexistence in the same world with others, who 
are totally different from us, and even in opposition to us, forms the ontological 
background to the political subjectivity I envision here. Where this necessary 
coexistence is discredited in the ascription of privilege to some parts of the population 
at the expense of others, an egalitarian revolt is justified. Martin Crowley’s 
understanding of this egalitarian revolt (2009) helps me concretize Nancy’s political-
ontological considerations within an agency perspective, embedded in societal power 
struggles. Both the thoughts of Martin Crowley and Judith Butler (2004, 2010) 
support my assumption that the political impact of this egalitarian revolt 
simultaneously depends on two things: an act of solidarity of those who are in a 
privileged position and are willing to recognize the fact that they share society with 
those who might express their indignation in uncivil and subversive ways, on the one 
hand, and the uncivil, unruly agency which incites this act of solidarity, on the other 
 413 
hand. The possibility of such solidarity is opened up if one is first of all willing to 
listen to uncomfortable truths about the inequalities and injustices experienced by 
those who do not have a part in a political community, which imagines itself to be 
complete. Both discursive and non-discursive disruptive interventions of young urban 
troublemakers can be seen as counter-narratives with a subversive truth value that is 
easily overlooked. I turn to the later work of Michel Foucault in order to explain that a 
confrontation with such counter-narratives can have a political impact. He speaks of 
certain scandalous truths as parrhesiastic gestures, which can critically confront ruling 
authorities. The claims of various respondents in Grigny that other truths about life in 
the banlieues need to be heard serve to illustrate the political impact of such counter-
narratives. An interest in life as a scandal of truth could open the door to a shared 
unruly political agency in which there is place for various counter-actions performed 
by people with different social positions.  
 
In Chapter 8. I will focus in further detail on this possibly shared unruly political 
agency. If the counter-actions of young urban troublemakers could confront and 
coincide with the counter-actions of well-respected citizens, a new critical perspective 
on society could be developed which could eventually open the door to a radical 
democratic transformation of the existing political order. Here, I envision an unruly 
political agency which is not only reserved for young urban troublemakers, but which 
expands to include others who dare to express their solidarity with “the part of those 
who have no part,” to quote from Rancière.  
 
7.1. Informal politics taking the streets 
Even when young urban troublemakers do not seem to make up an affirmative 
political subject with a deliberately developed political strategy and a clearly envisioned 
goal, they form a precarious political subject which emerges in the act of disruption 
itself. By acting out in alternative, often subversive, temporary community structures, 
young urban troublemakers “counteract” the imagination of society as a 
homogeneous body of civil citizens and simultaneously stress the necessary 
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confinement to sharing the same social situation with others who are radically 
different. These community structures arise from unruly actions in public space, at 
specific sites of contestation with dominant regimes of governance. As I have argued 
above, agency is constitutive for a precarious political subjectivity. Young urban 
troublemakers may be powerless within institutional political structures, but they have 
the power to create a dignified life for themselves on their own terms. This power is 
expressed in active, locally situated, particular struggles for a dignified life, which test 
the boundaries set to institutional political agency. Take, for instance, the different 
endeavors of the community of experience to uphold pride and dignity in the 
neighborhood and find a means to make a living, as described in Chapter 3.. These 
struggles are no part of a consciously formed political movement, which proposes an 
alternative model for society, but are instead engaged to meet the needs of specific 
people in a specific time and place, without losing sight of a general political-
ontological claim to justice and equality. These struggles take place in the streets, 
aiming to attain a real future for people who are not automatically offered one.  
 
7.1.1. Street politics 
In order to envision the political agency which emerges from “unworking” 
communities like the community of experience of young urban troublemakers, I will 
take a closer look at what Asef Bayat calls “informal politics” in his book “Street 
Politics” (1997). Bayat explores the political agency of those who have no 
“institutional power of disruption” (ibid., xii), but still disrupt institutional power 
constellations with their day-to-day struggles to – sometimes literally – gain a place in 
society. Those in question are poor, ordinary people in precarious circumstances, 
looking for ways to make a living, feed and educate their families, create a home basis 
and freely express their religious or cultural traditions, while suffering from a “lack of 
an institutional mechanism through which they can collectively express their 
grievances and resolve their problems” (ibid., 9). These people live perforce without 
the support of official state institutions, yet, at the same time, they often deeply 
distrust any state interference in their lives. Out of fear of being regulated, controlled 
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or disciplined by formal state procedures, they search for alternative ways to sustain 
themselves and gather in informal communities in which they are free to mind their 
own business.  
 
In a movement of street politics, the urban poor and marginalized look for ways to 
gain access to those material and social goods and economic opportunities that lie out 
of their reach through official or legal channels. In this endeavor they literally take the 
streets, re-appropriating parts of public space and public resources of which they are 
deprived, sometimes stealthily, sometimes out in the open and by force. They illegally 
tap water and electricity, they set up stalls on the side walks of shopping streets, they 
claim abandoned plots of land and they occupy vacant houses. The streets are the 
domain where they meet and form occasional alliances, where shared actions can 
emerge from a coincidental encounter between different people who happen to find 
themselves in a similar delicate situation, happen to have common interests, or wish to 
defend themselves against a common threat (ibid., 17). Bayat illustrates this form of 
politics with the stories of poor people’s struggles to make a worthy living in Iran 
around the period of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. These urban poor were not the 
political heroes who became known as the ones who carried the movement of the 
revolution. Their struggles were not recognized as having made a large contribution in 
the major political upheavals of their time, but nevertheless they had a significant 
effect on the development of society during and after the revolution in Iran. 
 
7.1.2. Collectively fighting singular hardships 
As Bayat understands it, informal politics originates in ordinary practices of everyday 
life and are not organized in a structured or programmatic way. Poor people who are 
deprived of formal possibilities to make a living invent their own informal and illegal 
methods to safeguard the bare necessities. Communities that live in self-constructed 
settlements or squatted homes, the unemployed who collectively develop informal 
safety nets and street vendors who create their own place for business in public space 
are all protagonists of what Bayat calls informal politics or “street politics.” These 
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people are used to autonomously creating an infrastructure to provide for their needs 
without relying on the assistance of official institutions. Community formation in light 
of these informal politics emerges spontaneously and often develops in very quiet and 
discrete ways. People who are involved in this kind of informal politics are first and 
foremost concerned with their individual interests and do not oppose state politics in 
a direct and public way, as would be the case in a protest movement. They often feel 
the need to remain under the radar of state officials because of their clandestine 
activities and value their personal safety and well-being above sharing knowledge and 
experiences with other precarious groups. They do not feel the urge to make publicity 
for any claims of general interest or to recruit allies in the perspective of a general 
transformation of society. Nevertheless, their actions are aimed at achieving social 
progress and often also manage to establish significant social changes.  
 
The urban poor are not only fighting against the injustices inflicted upon them by the 
dominant classes, but are also pro-actively creating their own opportunities for a 
better life, which can restrain the privileges of the same dominant groups. In this 
sense, the direct actions of such precarious groups are not only defensive, but also 
highly offensive (ibid., 6). According to Bayat, it is important to acknowledge the 
force of this “quiet encroachment of the ordinary” in the light of social change, since 
in times of political transformations like the Iranian Revolution the power to establish 
social change is often undeservedly fully ascribed to general, organized political 
campaigns and pressure groups.  
 
A totalizing discourse suppresses the variations in people’s perceptions about change, 
diversity is screened, conflicts are belittled, and instead a grand/united language is 
emphasized. This suppression of difference by the dominant voice of the leadership has 
usually worked against the discourse of the ordinary, the powerless, the poor, 
minorities, women, and other subaltern elements. (ibid., 5) 
 
Precisely by looking at the everyday actions and interactions of a group of people in a 
precarious position – the urban poor – Bayat aims to move the understanding of the 
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notion of politics past the options of either well-organized state structures in relation 
to which the poor are mere victims of their life circumstances or the promise of a 
totalizing revolution in relation to which the poor are the promised heroes of absolute 
change. What brings people together in a movement of street politics is not 
necessarily a consciousness of a collective identity, world view or political dream, but 
rather the shared determination to overcome singular hardships and develop a self-
chosen mode of survival.  
 
Fundamentally, it is the will to survive and a strong resilience in the face of hardship 
that motivates the poor to change the pattern of their lives. By doing so, they also 
change the social environment in which they live and hence the nature of politics. It is 
true that often, though not always, they proceed individually and quietly, but these 
individual and quiet actions entail collective and noisy consequences, involving issues of 
power and politics (ibid., 44) 
 
The informal politics of the urban poor differs also significantly from what we know 
as “social movements,”157 according to Bayat. In contrast to social movements, the 
urban poor do not form a coherently structured collective around clearly formulated, 
shared political claims or a collective ideology. Bayat rather speaks of 
“nonmovements”, in reference to “the collective actions of noncollective actors; they 
embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but 
similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are rarely 
guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations” (Bayat 2010, 14). 
In the informal politics of the urban poor, “action” prevails over “meaning” (Bayat 
1997, 7). Conflicting convictions and agendas are common in the domain of street 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 In new social movement theory, in particular, an emphasis is placed on identity claims, which are 
enforced in order to plead for equal rights for deviant groups. The struggle of new social movements no 
longer only takes place in the area of the class struggle, but it also addresses social exchange and cultural 
production (Melucci 1996). New social movements no longer only fight economic inequalities, but all 
sorts of unequal treatment before the law, and within societal life. The feminist movement, 
environmental movement and civil rights movement resort to a shared culture and collective identities in 
order to push for political change (Castells 2009). This emphasis on a shared culture and identity, which 
provides a shared meaning and position to the movement, is absent in the informal political actions of 
the urban poor as described by Bayat. 
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politics, and strong leadership is absent. In general, established political pressure 
groups like labor unions, political parties or activist organizations do not influence the 
actions or strategies of the poor who look for ways to get by by doing it themselves, 
outside of any institutional structure. The actions of the urban poor could be 
mobilized for the support of a more developed general political program, but in that 
case the spontaneous character and the force of direct and unpredictable interventions 
would be lost. In such a case, the political agency of the urban poor could transform 
into the construction of a social movement, but would lose its self-productivity and 
unarticulated dynamics.  
 
7.1.3. The pluriform relation between formal and informal politics 
Partially quoting Gramsci’s “Prison Notebooks,” Bayat describes the movement of 
the urban poor as follows. 
 
[A]n open and fleeting struggle without clear leadership, ideology, or structured 
organization, one that produces significant gains for the actors, eventually placing them 
in counterpoint to the state. By initiating gradual “molecular” changes, the poor in the 
long run “progressively modify the pre-existing composition of forces, and hence 
become the matrix of new change”. (ibid., 7-8) 
 
However, distancing himself from Gramsci, Bayat states that the activities of the 
urban poor are not part of a conscious political strategy, but are rather born out of 
necessity to survive and live a dignified life (ibid., 8). An opposition to state powers 
can be part of the struggle, but it is not a goal in itself. It is in the moment when 
outrage emerges because of injustices caused by state authorities that people join 
forces to resist a common enemy. On the other hand, deals or coalitions with 
institutional partners are not seen as morally despicable, as long as they serve the 
practical goals of those looking for improvement in their daily endeavors. Street 
politics is first and foremost a movement of ordinary people who wish to secure the 
necessary means to make a living for themselves and their close ones; at the same 
time, the fact that many people struggle simultaneously for their personal survival 
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makes it possible for a shared political sense in these singular struggles to emerge. It is 
not a deliberate, intentional choice that is made from the start to change society in 
favor of precarious groups; instead, it is the similar, undeniably pressing circumstances 
of the moment and the situation that can be traced in a variety of daily challenges that 
make political sense.  
 
The urban poor who are involved in street politics seem to develop their own 
community structures parallel to the structures of society from which they are 
excluded, or which they deliberately denounce as unjust or worthless. At the same 
time, their informal community structures interact with, and sometimes actively 
counteract with, the broader framework of society. State authorities display an 
ambivalent attitude towards such informal communities. Governments often 
simultaneously support self-sufficiency and responsibility for the social welfare of 
citizens, while carrying out disciplinary and restrictive policies in order to monitor the 
permissive participation of citizens in society. The interaction of informal 
communities and formal structures is therefore characterized by “a combined and 
continuous process of informalization, integration and reinformalization” (ibid., 12). 
The fact that the urban poor do not form a deliberately organized political movement 
that envisions a total revolution, but instead act out of a felt necessity to survive 
makes the relationship between formal and informal politics complex and pluriform. 
It is not a clear-cut opposition between state institutions and the people’s movement 
that is at stake here, and therefore one cannot simply speak of the “destructive 
behavior of the dangerous classes” in relation to street politics (ibid., 4).  
 
7.1.4. Informal communities arise from unruly actions 
While the street politics Bayat describes takes place amongst the urban poor in 
developing countries, which are often ruled by undemocratic regimes, the 
characteristics of the informal politics he describes can also be found in a Western 
context and a democratic setting. Moreover, a lack of institutional representative 
mechanisms in Western European societies can give certain groups the perceived need 
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to find a solution to their problems in unruly ways and through informal community 
structures. The voiceless in the institutional domain also generate pressure on the 
streets in the West when they do not gain access to established political organizations 
or social movements. The lack of programmatic and clearly articulated demands, the 
focus on individual interests above general interests and the ambiguous and 
sometimes instrumental relationship towards state institutions Bayat describes can be 
related to the communities of experience of Western-European urban troublemakers. 
Bayat’s analysis clarifies how communities of experience that do not organize 
themselves into political pressure groups or social movements can nevertheless make 
political sense in an unruly way. Out of the “silent repertoire of individual direct 
actions,” collective demands can emerge which fully depend on a shared situation of 
vulnerability. This situatedness, the precarious life circumstances of the actors in 
question and the spontaneous and non-thought-out character of its organization can 
also be recognized in the case of the “unworking communities” of young urban 
troublemakers from neighborhoods like Grigny and Kanaleneiland. These are also 
communities of highly diverse individuals who, despite their differences, nevertheless 
share the same concerns. 
 
In the case of young urban troublemakers in European cities, their encroachment 
upon authorities can become less quiet and more destructive than the cases described 
by Bayat. In contrast to the urban poor, who are primarily looking for shelter and a 
means to make a living, these “rebels who are denied a cause” often publicly seek 
recognition of their right to existence as dignified participants in society. It is the right 
to be noticed as a worthy person, the right to make use of urban space, the right to 
find access to formal education and jobs, the right to be justly treated by the forces of 
law and the right to be respectfully addressed by fellow citizens that all play a part in 
their often disruptive and destructive presence in the public domain. At the same 
time, these boys also form their own informal community structures in the shadows 
of the larger society. The rules of interaction, the illegal ways of making a living and 
the spaces they occupy to pass free time all form part of their own world, which 
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spontaneously emerges at the moment of an accidental meeting on the streets. 
Nevertheless, it makes sense in itself, because it enables them to structure their lives. 
At the same time, this world has a strong unworking effect as soon as it interacts with 
the rest of society.  
 
In the case of such spontaneous, almost casually emerging, communities of 
experience, we cannot speak of a subject as a deliberately structured whole that 
precedes one’s actions. Both in the case of street politics of the urban poor and in the 
case of a community of experience of Western young urban troublemakers, one can 
recognize this lack of a positively constructed identity or subjectivity underlying 
political actions. The subjectivity of such communities emerges in actions that are 
undertaken within a situated context and in interaction with others who share this 
situation and who co-shape any subjective expressions and experiences. This relational 
subjectivity, which does not precede, but emerges within action, has a specific 
ontological character that requires further specification. The possibility that people 
declare their solidarity across identity groups and socio-economic classes within this 
political subjectivity, and temporarily join forces in order to fight existing injustices 
and inequalities, is created by these ontological conditions and plays an important part 
in the critical attitude and transformation of the democratic practice, which I will 
describe in the next chapter. Before I describe that transformation, I will first focus in 
more detail on the non-singular, relational character of this subjectivity, which enables 
a temporary political declaration of recognition and solidarity between radically 
different people in an initial state of coexistence. 
 
7.2. A political ontology of shared existence 
The precarious political subjectivity that I see reflected in the unruly interventions of 
young urban troublemakers has a complex and ungrounded ontological status. This 
subjectivity is characterized by a lack of a founding ontological entity. I am therefore 
speaking here, in a complex twist, of a subject without subject-basis, which is 
immediately immersed in relations and confrontations with others, and immediately 
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acts upon these relations and confrontations. In the case of a precarious political 
subject, it is not the subject that precedes the agency, but rather the agency that 
enables a sense of subjectivity to arise. It appears within a relation and is therefore not 
characterized by a purely singular, autonomous substantiality forming its identity. It is 
also not absorbed in a plural entity (e.g. “society,” “people,” “class”) that would give 
the subject a collective substantiality forming an identity. In order to analyze these 
ontological characteristics, I turn to Jean-Luc Nancy’s analysis of singularity and 
plurality as interconnected modalities of being in his book “Being Singular Plural” 
(2000). For Nancy, the interconnectedness between singularity and plurality 
characterizes every form of being; the singular is always already plural, the plural is 
always already singular and hence finite and temporary. Each instance of being only 
takes place once in its particular configuration, therefore being is always characterized 
by a finitude, which should be understood as a very concrete form of temporality. In a 
perpetuating dynamics between singularity and plurality, being is constantly ending 
and beginning anew in a different form. The singular-plural being is itself an 
irreducible relation that cannot be traced back to an initial entity. “Being cannot be 
anything but being-with-one-another, circulating in the with and as the with of this 
singularly plural coexistence.” (ibid., 3). Nancy emphasizes that everything which 
exists always exists together with something else. In existence, we therefore always 
share the world (ibid., 29). We are always already together with others. Even in the 
case in which we define ourselves as unique and autonomous subjects, we have to do 
this by distinguishing ourselves from others. Being therefore always takes place in 
diversity instead of unity.  
 
At the same time, each instance of being and each configuration of differences is 
always unique and therefore singular. Being singular plural is a constantly oscillating 
movement between the position in which a self is defined as unique and singular and 
the exposure to others. This can only take place if there is something other from 
which a self differs – there is a dimension of necessary plurality which cannot be 
denied. This oscillation between a singular and a plural dimension makes clear that 
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each identity, each community, each understanding is always created at a threshold, a 
sort of space in-between (ibid., 40). The process of singular plural being can never be 
fixed or brought to its final end, since the threshold is not a place where we repose, 
but a place which we traverse, constantly moving from one destination to another, 
without ever arriving. Similarly, we cannot speak of one origin that marks the starting 
point of being, from which a further development is set out. The threshold between 
origins and destinations marks a continuous shift in position.  
 
[W]hat we receive (rather than what we perceive) with singularities is the discreet 
passage of other origins of the world. What occurs there, what bends, leans, twists, 
addresses, denies – from the newborn to the corpse – is neither primarily “someone 
close”, nor an “other”, nor a “stranger”, nor “someone similar”. It is an origin; it is an 
affirmation of the world, and we know that the world has no other origin than this 
singular multiplicity of origins. The world always appears [surgit] each time according 
to a decidedly local turn [of events]. Its unity, its uniqueness, and its totality consist in 
a combination of this reticulated multiplicity, which produces no result. (Nancy, 
2000:9) 
 
7.2.1. Being is coexistence 
The “with” is therefore at the core of being itself. Being-with others is not a relation 
which is added up to an autonomous state of being-by itself, as the origin of being 
often tends to be understood according to Nancy (ibid., 30-31). Subjectivity should 
therefore not be understood in the Carthesian sense. “The singular is an ego that is not 
a ‘subject’ in the sense of the relation of a self to itself” (ibid., 32-33). We do not 
become a subject when we become aware of ourselves in a solipsist way, but rather 
when we experience something “other” than ourselves. Each subject position in this 
singular plural being is related to an experience of something “other” which is 
necessarily related to a “self”; related and yet different and distant, because it is 
positioned as distinct from the self.  
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Since being always means coexistence, we always already think and interact within a 
certain form of community. The subject does not precede an intersubjective relation 
(ibid., 44). Just like the notion of the subject, this notion of community should not be 
understood as a certain natural or originary entity, which forms a certain foundational 
point of departure for social interactions and the political formation of a society, as 
one can find in romantic interpretations of Rousseauian ideas about a “natural 
community.” 
 
Such a thinking constitutes closure because it assigns to community a common being, 
whereas community is a matter of something quite different, namely, of existence 
inasmuch as it is in common, but without letting itself be absorbed into a common 
substance. Being in common has nothing to do with communion, with fusion into a 
body, into a unique and ultimate identity that would no longer be exposed. Being in 
common means, to the contrary, no longer having, in any form, in any empirical or 
ideal place, such a substantial identity, and sharing this (narcissistic) “lack of identity.” 
(Nancy 1991, xxxviii)   
 
“Togetherness and being-together are no equivalent” (Nancy 2000, 60). Community is 
essentially ungrounded in its lack of identity, in Nancy’s understanding. We do not 
produce community, as if it were a piece of work, an opus, but we rather experience it 
in its “inoperativeness,” or its unworking impact (Nancy 1991, 31). Community is 
instead what “happens to us in the wake of society,” neither as a pure form of shared 
intimacy, nor as a deliberately constructed agreement (ibid., 11). Therefore, the 
ungrounded community does not need to imply a sense of consensus or harmony. 
Being together takes place also when one recognizes a lack of common goals or 
frames of identification. Being together in all its uneasiness and uncertainty is already a 
community in itself, without any previous or further meaning which can be ascribed 
to it.  
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7.2.2. The political affirmation of equality in difference 
This experience of coexistence in an inoperative community, which always confronts 
us with the limits of an autonomously operating, substantial subject with a strongly 
defined identity, is political according to Nancy. Nancy’s notion of the political 
exemplifies the distinction I already drew between politics and the political in Chapter 
1.. The political designates an unpredictable dimension in human interactions, or 
being-in-common, which both precedes and interrupts the all-encompassing 
tendencies of a systemically constructed organization of politics. The political in 
Nancy’s interpretation is not based on a shared organization, program or identity 
which brings individuals together in a collective body, but on the understanding that 
we necessarily coexist with others with whom we share no necessary similarities. This 
understanding disturbs any formation of a political subjectivity or political claim. 
“‘Political’ would mean a community ordering itself to the unworking of its 
communication, or destined to this unworking: a community consciously undergoing 
the experience of its sharing” (ibid., 40). What we share is first of all a lack of a 
substantive identity. For Nancy, being in common is more about the surprising 
activity of sharing than about what we share. Consequentially, the political is not 
about the establishment of a coherent order amongst like-minded people. The 
drawing of horizons, boundaries or frontiers, which create a division between a 
familiar whole and its strange outside, should instead be questioned. In Chapter 1., I 
argued that Nancy understands the political as a disruption of any unitary or 
essentializing claims about community, identity and subjectivity. In Chapter 5., I 
presented Rancière’s idea of politics as dissensus, which also encompasses an idea of 
the political as disruption. However, Nancy does not focus on the political only as a 
radical disruption in which all mechanisms of politics are suspended. The political 
disrupts existing structures, while it simultaneously opens up new possible 
connections. I return to the notion of the threshold here that I mentioned in Chapter 
1.. Jean-Christophe Bailly speaks in a joint publication with Nancy of a thinking of the 
political as a thinking of thresholds instead of boundaries (Nancy & Bailly 1991, 20). 
In his interpretation, a threshold does not divide the community, but rather creates a 
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connection of co-appearance (comparution), which at the same time does not negate the 
initial differences that exist within each community. A threshold is not a strict barrier 
which separates a homogeneous entity from its outside; instead, it is the place which 
indicates the difference between inside and outside and which at the same time invites 
one to pass from one dimension into the other. The idea of the threshold marks the 
necessary connection between any inner and outside space. The threshold opens the 
inside to the outside and the other way around. 
 
Where the political marks the necessary connection and interdependence between 
inside and outside, it can make us aware that we are together in the world despite our 
differences. The “other” can never be an essentialized or radical other, because this 
other is always already together with us in the same world.  
 
The world has no supplement ...... This follows as an essential consequence: the 
being-other of the origin is not the alterity of an “other-than-the-world”. It is not a 
question of an Other (the inevitable “capitalized Other”) than the world; it is a 
question of the alterity or alteration of the world. (Nancy 2000, 11)  
 
In sum, otherness makes up a fundamental part of ourselves. Superficial, binary 
judgments between a certain sameness, or similarity which is good, and an alterity 
which is evil, can be contested from an awareness of the irreducible coexistence in the 
world. When we act upon this awareness, we act politically. Political agency is not an 
act of formation of a people around a specific programmatic claim, but rather the 
initial affirmation of the equality of all in an irreducible difference. 
 
An appeal to equality should not be confused with an “egalitarian demand founded 
upon some generic identity” (Nancy, 2000:24) It is precisely the recognition of the 
lack of such a shared generic identity which makes up the political. This recognition is 
not of a reasonable, deducible or calculable kind, but rather of a common interest (in 
the sense of the Latin interesse, being in-between or being amongst) in the shared co-
appearance in the world without any further shared essentials (Nancy & Bailly 1991, 
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99). Since this is the first and most basic understanding we can have of the world and 
our position in it, “there would be nothing more bare than the political” (Nancy & 
Bailly 1991, 100). For Nancy, the political is not a prescription that we have to believe 
in – it is an infinite regime of meaning that we find again and again in the common 
being in a single world, and that precedes any valorization of this common being. 
Before we decide whether or not the being-in-common is beneficial to us, or whether 
we should support or enhance it, we realize that this initial state of being is the only 
state of being in which we are together on a completely equal basis. An awareness of 
our shared ontological status as beings is political before anything else. This bare 
interpretation of politics leaves space for the actions of those who have not reached a 
particularly organized strategy or affirmative revolutionary potential to be politically 
meaningful. When considering the political meaning of the unruly interventions of 
young urban troublemakers, this is a very helpful thought.  
 
When I take these political-ontological considerations back to the notion of the 
precarious political subject, it becomes clear that this subject is characterized by the 
lack of a constitutive identity because it is inextricably bound to its relation with 
others who influence its appearance in the world. It is, in a certain way, a subjectless 
subject. The precarious political subject is a subject in retreat, retreating itself from the 
substance of a certain subject-organism, or of a certain influence in the order of 
power relations (Nancy & Bailly 1991, 96-97). Retreat should not be understood here 
as a movement into complete disappearance, but as a continuous movement of re-
evaluation or re-creation. The subject is in constant retreat, and can therefore never be 
understood as an entirely clear or certain entity because it is both differentiating from 
itself and re-forming itself. The notion of “self” in the subject is therefore always in 
retreat. It never emerges on its own, but always appears in a community where it 
experiences its own limitedness, because its co-appearance implies a fundamental 
vulnerability to the effects of this relation. Nancy therefore speaks of a community 
which is without subject (Cadava, Connor & Nancy 1991, 8) and of a community of 
those who have no community, which counts essentially for all of us (Nancy 2001, 
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40). At the same time, this vulnerable and subjectless subject is not passive. Its 
emergence opens up the possibility to critically confront the imagination of a pure or 
homogeneous community. This confrontation is inherently political. The temporary 
and situated assemblies of young people on the streets who act out against injustices 
or inequalities endorsed by state authorities bear the signs of such a confrontation. 
These young people are not members of a political organization, nor do they 
necessarily share the same identity. They find each other in a specific place and 
situation because of shared lived circumstances and a shared indignation regarding 
these circumstances. Within this situated and temporary community of experience, 
they express a shared claim for equal treatment despite peoples’ differences, directed 
at anyone who is not willing to acknowledge the fact that we equally occupy a place in 
the same world.  
 
7.2.3. The inscription of claims to equality within power structures 
Nancy’s interpretation of politics, starting at an ontological level of shared 
coexistence, offers insight into a general condition of human interrelatedness and its 
political sense. This bare ontological status precedes all materializations into either 
organized cooperation or antagonizing conflict. Nevertheless, the initial affirmation of 
equality, which Nancy emphasizes as inherently political, is always uttered within a 
social context that is deeply rooted in power dynamics. This appeal to equality is of an 
ontological status, preceding any classification of the world we share, but this appeal 
never emerges in a context without classifications. It emerges within everyday 
practices like the street politics described by Bayat. Coexistence which “happens in the 
wake of society” can never be taken out of society and placed on neutral ground. An 
affirmation of equality in spite of people’s differences is therefore never uttered in a 
harmless environment, without taking risks. Even if an appeal to equality presupposes 
a common interest in coexistence, this common interest is not self-evident, but has to 
be claimed within a struggle between forces of oppression and forces of 
emancipation. It would therefore be beneficial to further articulate how the initial 
affirmation of equality is translated in concrete power struggles within the field of 
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political practices and institutions. The work of Martin Crowley (2009) helps me 
further specify what implications Nancy’s political-ontological claim to equality could 
have for concrete practices of resistance against an unjust political status quo. Agency 
in which the political-ontological position, as Nancy describes it, is explicitly 
expressed, often finds itself in direct conflict with authoritative forces, and can take 
the form of an “egalitarian revolt.” This agency emerges on the side of those who are 
excluded and marginalized, and who find themselves without legitimized tools to 
influence the field of politics but can instigate a critical awareness of experienced 
injustices. Crowley’s perspective on the egalitarian revolt explicates that an appeal to 
equality is not acknowledged without an explicit push for recognition. In an act of 
revolt, a claim to general equality is materialized in a specific situation, shedding light 
on specific cases of power abuse and the casualties it causes. Such a revolt can serve as 
the impulse needed for others in wider society to actively become aware of the 
suffering that is taking place, as well as the need to collectively rise up and demand 
that the situation change. Here, it becomes clear that real unruly agency is needed in 
order for a generic claim to equality to be recognized. In addition to Crowley’s 
description of the egalitarian revolt, I will focus on Judith Butler’s discussion of the 
unequal distribution of precarity in the following section. The fact that the privileges 
of some are safeguarded at the expense of others makes it even more pressing to 
understand the ontological condition of interrelatedness between people within the 
context of power relations. The consequence of this interrelatedness is that the 
benefits of some cannot be detached from the suffering of others. In the light of such 
existing and interconnected inequalities, an appeal to equal human value becomes all 
the more necessary.  
 
7.3. The egalitarian revolt of “man without” 
The awareness that claims to equality necessarily entail entanglement within power 
relations, and that these claims are consequently materialized within concrete and 
everyday practices of revolt against dominant norms, is strongly present within the 
work of Martin Crowley. Crowley uses Nancy’s interpretation of the political as a 
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recognition of an initial co-appearance in the world as the starting point for an 
egalitarian revolt in his book l’Homme Sans (2009). This egalitarian revolt is a very 
concrete form of emancipatory politics, in his opinion. Crowley’s description of the 
egalitarian revolt could therefore be seen as a more theoretical description of the kind 
of agency and practices that are described by Bayat as informal politics or street 
politics. All concrete unequal treatments of both people and animals can be fought on 
the grounds that they do not correspond with the “ontological equality” (ibid., 12), 
which exists in the originary co-appearance of all living beings in the world, according 
to Crowley. An appeal to this ontological equality should cause an awareness that we 
do not only equally co-appear in the world, but that we are also equally vulnerable to 
an end to this co-appearance, to a finitude of our existence (ibid., 23). We are exposed 
to this finitude, but cannot generally control it or appropriate it. Regardless of our 
background or social position, we share the fact that finitude can strike us 
unexpectedly and irrevocably. The awareness that we can be equally affected by 
finitude should bring about, in turn, a solidarity with those who cannot protect 
themselves from finitude, because they have lost all affirmative power or all rights to 
act (ibid., 124). As soon as finitude becomes something to be exercised and decided 
upon by some at the expense of others, this is a sign of abuse, which should be 
contested (ibid., 12). The deliberately differentiating of exposure to finitude along 
certain lines of privilege is an act of injustice (ibid., 24). An egalitarian revolt should 
fight such injustices in the name of the equally shared ontological status of vulnerable 
coexistence in the world. The point here is not to save people entirely from their 
exposure to finitude, but to safeguard its equal sharing. Crowley names the anti-
capitalist and the anti-colonial struggle as two concrete examples of political struggle 
in which the exploitation of people who are considered to be less human, and 
therefore less valuable, is contested (ibid., 80). 
 
7.3.1. A necessary declaration of solidarity 
In Crowley’s interpretation, egalitarian politics does not necessarily start with an 
autonomous act of resistance of those who are repressed, but with an act of solidarity 
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of those who are in a better position. Crowley’s notion of an egalitarian revolt does 
not depend on one political subject, which has the capacity to act autonomously. It 
implies solidarity between those who no longer have the capacity to act in their own 
defense and those who refuse to remain passive at the sight of the abuse and 
oppression of others. As a consequence, oppression can and should be contested not 
only by those who actively suffer from it, but also by those who witness, but are not 
personally affected. Crowley fears that too strong of an emphasis on the autonomous 
powers of those who are not justly or equally treated comes at the expense of those 
who are living in the most precarious circumstances. To allow the possibilities of 
political agency to completely depend on people’s own force to act would be an act of 
negating everyone’s equal vulnerability to finitude. In that case, a vulnerability to 
finitude would not be presented as a common state of being, but as the proper 
responsibility of a certain group of people who do not know how to defend 
themselves (ibid., 13). The exposure to finitude cannot be assigned to certain people 
while it is withheld from others. Politics should not be based on specific capacities 
which enable people to safeguard their position in society, but rather on an shared 
incapacity to protect oneself from any possible finitude. Based on an initial equality, 
this position should lead to a denouncement of all dehumanizing processes of 
exclusion. This denouncement can be instigated by those who find themselves in a 
precarious position, but they do not necessarily have to be the first to act. The 
egalitarian revolt could also be instigated by those who are in a more privileged 
position, but nevertheless feel the responsibility to act out against the precarization of 
others, with whom they declare themselves to be solidary. In any case, the egalitarian 
revolt is instigated in a dynamics between agency of resistance in the light of 
vulnerability and a recognition of the value of that resistance, in the awareness that the 
exposure to vulnerability can exceed specific situations and affect everyone. 
 
Such is the politics of “man without” (l’homme sans) (ibid., 173-174). The claim to 
solidarity which can be derived from this bare status of humanity is firstly of political 
value. This claim is not expressed in an affirmative political activity alone, but already 
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in the exposure of the existence of those in a precarious situation. The request for 
recognition of this existence just because it is there, and because it should not be 
denied, makes it politically meaningful. An egalitarian politics would already be the 
appeal to a certain shared ontological status of vulnerability to finitude, there where 
that equality is not given (ibid., 19). A politics of man without does not need to be 
built upon the subjectivity of capable people, who eloquently manage to get their 
message across. Those who are “without words” (ibid., 22) and those who are 
“defaced” as a “capitalized Other,” and hence treated as a “subaltern”158 being (ibid., 
33), should also have a place within this politics. We see here again that politics can be 
instigated by a figureless subject. The man without does not have a substantive 
identity; he/she is often the one who is deprived of an identity. Solidarity with the 
man without therefore does not originate in a recognition of his/her specific character 
traits, background or particular life circumstances. We also see that in Crowley’s 
argumentation the idea of a highly differentiated precarious political subjectivity, 
including people across class and identity boundaries, is further developed.  
 
The “man without” can be the man without an affirmative power to cause a classical, 
all-encompassing political revolution, but also the man without a say in the public 
debate; the man whose words are not taken serious because he/she is not seen as a 
meaningful member of the polis (Rancière 1999). It can also be the man without any 
legal protection, the man who is reduced to its bare biological existence (Agamben 
1998). It can also be the man who is excluded from the benefits of modernity and 
lives a “wasted life,” as an “undesired” or “illegal” immigrant, “underdeveloped” poor 
or “pre-modern” and “non-civilized” religious minority, as Zygmunt Bauman 
describes it (2003). In a Marxist discourse, this “man without” could go under the 
name of the proletariat. The political struggle against injustices and inequalities which 
was led by the proletariat were important not because of their heroic character, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Crowley uses the term “subaltern” here, not only in reference to a colonial, or anti-colonial context, 
but in its broader, more literal significance; in a situation of hegemony, certain people are not only 
perceived to be other than the norm prescribes, but also valued as lesser human beings because of their 
difference from the norm. The term “subaltern” describes this status of a simultaeneous othering and 
devaluing of certain groups of people. 
 433 
because they invoked a “zero degree of humanity” as their grounds of existence upon 
which to build a political agency, according to Crowley (ibid., 92). It does not matter 
who this man without is exactly; the fact that he/she is a fellow human being should 
suffice in declaring one’s solidarity with his/her suffering. This solidarity does not 
originate in a certain noble human nature, but in a naked coexistence in the world, 
when one is deprived of all other qualities. Crowley’s perspective on politics explains 
how we can revolt against the maltreatment of people with whom we do not identify 
at all, with people whom we might not know at all, because they might be state-less or 
paper-less, or in any other way might have become faceless under the circumstances 
created by the existing system of political governance.  
 
7.3.2. Opposing the unequal distribution of precarity 
A similar appeal to solidarity, which originates in full awareness of the consequences 
of certain power hierarchies, and the recognition of a resulting status of deprivation, 
can be found in the work of Judith Butler. Butler describes the vulnerability to loss as 
an initial condition of precariousness which is common to all human lives (Butler 
2004, 2010). The risk of injury or termination to life cannot be permanently 
prevented. We are all equals in our exposure to such risks. In line with Nancy and 
Crowley, Butler stresses that this common human vulnerability co-emerges with life 
itself, and therefore precedes the constitution of an “I” (2004, 31) and a social 
contract (2010, xxvi). In our equal status of vulnerability to loss, we are also bound to 
and dependent on others who could influence or take our lives and the lives of our 
dear ones, even if we do not know them. Our lives are always partly in the hands of 
others and precariousness is a “generalized condition of social ontology” for Butler 
(2004, 19-20). In an experience of mourning, we become fully aware of the influence 
our relation with others has on our sense of self. When we lose someone, a part of 
ourselves is lost as well. Such an experience of loss confronts us with the shared 
precariousness of life. Butler explicitly stresses the power dynamics which emerges in 
each shared coexistence and which causes the exposure to an initially shared 
precariousness to be unequally distributed amongst different groups of people. 
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Butler proposes a politics that is rooted in a fundamental understanding of people’s 
interdependency and vulnerability to loss, and therefore in the awareness of a shared 
precariousness. Her analysis therefore comes very close to the politics of “man 
without” as described by Crowley. Butler recognizes the same exploitation of human 
finitude as an incentive to act out politically in defense of those whose lives are 
considered less valuable than the lives of others. The ways in which we value a life 
worthy to be preserved or worthy to be mourned in case it is lost are always 
influenced by certain power mechanisms and, as such, always political. However, in 
political processes the precarity of some tends to be minimized at the expense of 
others. 
 
Precarity designates that politically induced condition in which certain populations 
suffer from failing social and economic networks of support and become 
differentially exposed to injury, violence, and death. Such populations are at 
heightened risk of disease, poverty, starvation, displacement and of exposure to 
violence without protection. Precarity also characterizes that politically induced 
condition of maximized precariousness for populations exposed to arbitrary state 
violence who often have no other option than to appeal to the very state from which 
they need protection. (Butler 2010, 25-26) 
 
Precarity is thus differentiated, while precariousness as an initial human condition is 
not always respected by those political institutions which should guarantee people’s 
equal exposure to it. Hence, we should be critical towards the social and political 
conditions that make some human lives more vulnerable than others, and some 
human lives more grievable than others (Butler 2004, 30). “Part of the very problem 
of contemporary political life is that not everyone counts as a subject” (Butler 2010, 
31). The answer to this problem is not the evocation of a certain identity politics that 
presupposes a strong, substantial subject, but to evoke a precarious political subject 
that is made up by unlikely alliances across identity-markers, between those who 
recognize a shared and vulnerable coexistence despite their differences. We should see 
this subject as a “dynamic set of social relations” (ibid., 162). Where Crowley already 
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shed light on a shared precarious political subject across identity and class boundaries, 
Butler explicitly focuses on the interdependence of highly differentiated people within 
a precarious political subjectivity. These differences are not effaced in order to 
construct an internally homogeneous sense of subjectivity, but are rather valued as 
characteristic for a singular plural sense of subjectivity, which never leaves the 
dynamics of transformation. 
 
7.3.3. A two-fold recognition of the other 
Judith Butler explicitly focuses on the role that recognition across identity-based 
groups plays in a political agency that confronts a governing system with its blind 
spots regarding the unequal and unjust treatment of certain marginalized people, while 
certain ongoing antagonisms are kept in place. As Butler notes, within institutional 
politics it is often shared identity markers which make people recognizable and 
therefore protected by the state, because they are valued as worthy citizens, while 
others are overlooked or explicitly excluded. The voices of certain lives cannot be 
heard in the political domain because they are not recognized as the voices of those 
who are politically meaningful. The political process is hence formed by those who are 
recognized on common grounds, and are therefore of similar value. The ascription of 
such a similar value to those who are familiar, while others who are unfamiliar are not 
even recognized as a valuable life, can result in the public debate only being open to 
those who are also of similar opinion (Butler 2004, xix-xx). This homogenizing 
process should, according to Butler, be traversed by a political solidarity which is 
based not on a recognition of what we have and wish to defend against others who 
could threaten us, but on a shared vulnerability to lose what we have, which can never 
be completely averted at the expense of others. This recognition precedes identity-
based political strategies, and can bring people together who are essentially different 
from each other and have essentially different particular interests. We might not 
recognize each other in what we have, since this can be of a completely different 
nature and of a completely different magnitude. We can, however, all recognize each 
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other in the experience of loss, since we have all lost things or are afraid to lose things, 
regardless of what it is exactly that we lost or are afraid to lose (Butler 2004, 22-23).  
 
Butler pleads for an ethos of shared precarity.159 In reference to Levinas, Butler states 
that this ethos of precarity can only be developed if a two-fold recognition between 
people takes place. The first recognition is the very basic recognition of the other as a 
human being. If the other is not recognizable as a human being, it becomes 
impossible to feel a political solidarity with that person. The recognizability of the 
other is not an objective ontological given, but a social and historical construction 
which depends on different factors. These factors are normative and frame the 
conditions and categories in which we give meaning to others (Butler 2010, 5). In this 
sense, she adds a moral dimension to the political-ontological attitude as it is described 
by Nancy. Our equal coexistence in the world might be an ontological given, but once 
we acknowledge this ontological given in a public space that is defined by power 
relations, our ontological equality is placed within a certain hierarchy. In questioning 
that hierarchy, we acknowledge that we do not have the right to live alone, but that we 
always share this right with others, even if we do not feel affiliated to those others. We 
make a moral choice; in an encounter we can see the other either as a complete alien 
or as a recognizable life with a certain value, which we can either harm or respect. For 
Butler, the question is how categories and conditions of recognizability can be framed 
in such a way that they include as many people as possible in the most egalitarian way 
(ibid., 6) The framing of such inclusive norms of recognizability is a political process 
which depends on power relations in a social field. In order for this political process 
to become emancipatory, others should not only be recognized for what they are, but 
also for what they strive to become. This is the second recognition which should take 
place. In situations in which repressive mechanisms are at work, it does not suffice to 
recognize the other as a human being. An intention to change the status quo in which 
certain human beings are less worthy than others should also be recognized. Others 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 As mentioned in a lecture during the Intensive Program of the Center for Humanities, University of 
Utrecht, Utrecht, February 1, 2010. 
 
 437 
can then be recognized as human beings with an equal value to our own, an equal 
vulnerability to precarity and therefore an equal right to existence.  
 
This recognition of the others right to existence is a moral demand which can be 
placed upon us without us expecting it (Butler 2004, 139). It is not only the other who 
is responsible for safeguarding its own existence, but also us, the self, who has to give 
recognition to the other. Emancipation is therefore not a completely subjective and 
autonomous endeavor, but a reciprocal relation in which the one in need of 
recognition is demanding something that the other should be willing to give. In this 
relational process, both parties change as soon as the demand for recognition is 
noticed.  
 
When we recognize another, or when we ask for recognition for ourselves, we are not 
asking for an Other to see us as we are, as we already are, as we have always been, as 
we were constituted prior to the encounter itself. Instead, in the asking, in the 
petition, we have already become something new, since we are constituted by virtue 
of the address, a need and desire for the Other that takes place in language in the 
broadest sense, one without which we could not be. (Butler 2004, 44) 
 
Since we are always interdependent on each other because we coexist in the world, the 
moral claim for recognition that the other lies upon us cannot be denied. We are 
affected, undeniably touched, by the realization that we are all equally vulnerable to 
loss and dependent on the other’s will not to harm us and to recognize our equal 
worth. 
 
7.3.4. Bringing the egalitarian demand to the streets 
In a similar sense, “man without” could be seen as a vulnerable political subject, 
fighting against the injustice of exploitation, but without immediately proposing an 
affirmative political alternative, based on a shared identity or a shared vision of 
society. The egalitarian revolt described by Crowley appeals to only one general 
demand: to do justice to the equal vulnerable coexistence of all. With the revolt of the 
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man without, Crowley attempts to envision a political agency that emerges from the 
being-in-common of coexistence in the world, without limiting or effacing this being-
in-common by creating particular interest groups (2009, 108). Since an appeal to a 
most basic status of coexistence is already political, we should deny the existence of 
condemnations of misery which are not yet political (ibid., 160, 166). It is not the 
scope, effect or level of organization which define the political nature of an act of 
revolt. Political agency, which is associated with the revolt of the man without, should 
not be seen as a militant operation that is carefully planned and organized; it remains 
inoperative (ibid., 119). The revolt envisioned by Crowley already starts with public 
denunciations of the unequal distribution of precarity, as Butler describes it. By a 
display of inoperativeness, these actions can manage to break into coherently 
constructed operations of exploitation and oppression. In such a moment or event of 
rupture, new possibilities for justice are opened. “To be in the streets: not to colonize 
them, but rather by opening a future there. To open it exactly to the egalitarian 
demands of all those who cannot find it there yet” (ibid., 123). That is what needs to 
be done, according to Crowley. These same streets are the place where young urban 
troublemakers speak out against the unjust and unequal treatment of those who are 
not recognized as equally valuable members of society. Their unruly and disruptive 
interventions can be seen as expressions of a street politics which is instigated by an 
initial, intuitive appeal to an egalitarian revolt.  
 
7.4. The risky business of speaking the truth 
A precarious and singular plural political subjectivity can be expressed in the unruly 
and disruptive interventions of young urban troublemakers because these 
interventions can open public space up to the egalitarian demands of marginalized 
groups, regardless of their identity, mode of expression or social position. When this 
space, which is opened up within societal relations, is not immediately closed out of 
fear of its deregulating effect, the unruly actions of young urban troublemakers could 
make a wide range of people aware of unequal distributions of precarity in society and 
the need for a broadly shared rejection of that unequal distribution. The provocative 
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effect of such unruly actions does not need to make people look away in fright or 
disgust, but could incite new and unexpected forms of recognition. In this section, I 
will further investigate how the unruly actions and the relational nature of the 
precarious political subject can reinforce each other. The fact that the precarious 
political subject is both relational and confrontational at the same time does not 
necessarily reduce the possibilities of an egalitarian revolt – in fact, it may increase 
them. The recognition of a shared vulnerability that was discussed in the previous 
section can be incited by unruly actions. Young urban troublemakers can make others 
aware of their coexistence in society in subversive and scandalous ways. Even before a 
clear political program is initiated, the awareness that their co-presence in society is 
often denied could create a common ground for an egalitarian revolt between those 
who feel left out and those who choose to condemn exclusionary tendencies.  
 
Here, I will take a first step to answer the question of how a disruptive intervention 
which is explicitly confrontational and perhaps even scandalous in nature can 
nevertheless set a shared solidarity into motion, bringing those at the top and bottom 
of the societal ladder together in a joint political agency, without this in turn leading to 
consensus-politics in which the scandal is immediately effaced. Such a joint political 
agency depends on the insight that the struggle for a more just and egalitarian society 
should not only be left up to those who find themselves in a subordinated position. At 
the same time, this joint political agency should not immediately lead to the adaptation 
of troublemaking into a prescriptive form of accepted citizen’s behavior in order to 
establish one carefully composed strategy of consensus. It should be acknowledged 
that radical alterity does not need to be dissolved in a new homogeneous political 
entity. The question is how existing injustices and inequalities could be contested in a 
shared effort, in which civilized political interventions are not necessarily valued over 
uncivil political interventions. The recognition of the value of other, often overlooked 
perspectives on society, which critique dominant social “truths” in a sometimes very 
explicit and subversive way, lies at the basis of such an internally diversified, non-
programmatic and situated political agency.  
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In this section, I turn to the later work of Michel Foucault in order to envision how 
scandalous, subversive agency can incite a recognition of the shared coexistence in 
society of both the accepted, well-behaving citizen and the subversive other. 
Foucault’s analysis of the practice of telling subversive truths about social relations in 
the polis clarifies how an unexpected and scandalous truth about society can be found 
in the unruly actions of young urban troublemakers. A recognition of such scandalous 
truths can be actively opened up in disruptive interventions which are instigated by 
young urban troublemakers, but which can only be understood as politically 
meaningful if others acknowledge the fact that these events not only concern the 
community of experience of its instigators, but society at large. The practice of telling 
scandalous truths can lead up to the recognition of a shared responsibility for the 
exposure to precarity, which I discussed in relation to the work of Martin Crowley and 
Judith Butler. 
 
Like Jean-Luc Nancy, Michel Foucault implies a postfoundational perspective on 
subjectivity. Foucault places a strong emphasis on power dynamics, as they directly 
emerge in agency and simultaneously shape subjectivity. This emphasis on power 
dynamics can be a valuable addition to Nancy’s ontological analysis of political 
subjectivity. Foucault’s understanding of the subject once again clarifies how a sense 
of political subjectivity emerges in the action itself, and does not precede agency as 
some kind of foundational entity. Foucault stresses that the subject is simultaneously 
bound and unbound by experiences (Foucault 2001, 241). Experiences are always 
constructed in relation to others, and in relation to certain power configurations. What 
I call the community of experience of young urban troublemakers therefore does not 
come after the subject, but is rather the context in which any sense of subjectivity is 
formed. The subject forms itself within power relations and truth games, in which 
knowledge about oneself and others is produced. This subject formation is always 
open to changes, depending on the situation and the company in which one finds 
oneself. In relation to one’s work, family, friends, religion or the state, one can display 
different forms of subjectivity. Foucault therefore states that the subject should rather 
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be understood as a form than as a substance (Foucault 2004, 195). However, the 
choice of form is never taken autonomously. In its formation, the subject is 
influenced by regimes of knowledge and truth which define which experiences are 
accepted as truthful and which are excluded as subordinated expressions of 
knowledge and truth. Any subjectivity is immediately inscribed in a dynamics of 
power and knowledge production, in which the equal ontological status of different 
people and experiences is overruled by a classification according to the norm. A claim 
to the equal coexistence of sameness and otherness is therefore never neutral, but 
always implies a confrontation with dominant players in the game of truth and power.  
 
7.4.1. Parrhes ia , or expressing subordinated truths 
Foucault’s description of the practice of parrhesia, or the risky business of telling 
controversial truths in public, brings me closer to an answer to the question of how 
uncivil interventions could be recognized for their political value, and how this 
recognition opens a perspective on a solidarity between those who not necessarily 
share the same level of precarity, but recognize that a vulnerability to precariousness is 
a matter for all of us. Parrhesia is the agency which can instigate this solidarity. 
Foucault studied the concept of parrhesia during the last years of his life. He discusses 
parrhesia at length in the final lectures which he delivered at the Collège de France 
between 1982 and 1984 (Foucault 2010, 2011), and in the lectures which he delivered 
in Berkeley in 1983 (Foucault 2001). In his analysis of the concept, he refers to the use 
of the term within the Classical Greek democratic tradition and in the New 
Testament. Here, I mostly look at the references Foucault makes to the use of the 
term within a Classical Greek, political context, particularly within the tradition of the 
cynics. In the practice of parrhesia subversive truths are expressed, which have a critical 
effect on the polis in its entirety. In order for this effect to come across, others have 
to take the truths that have been spoken seriously, despite their unconventional, and 
often shocking nature. Parrhesia can therefore be easily related to a subjectivity which 
is characterized by its relationality and singular-plurality, and which is not only formed 
within its own, autonomous agency. Unlikely alliances can emerge out of a 
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confrontation with parrhesiastic truths, between people with different identities and 
social positions. A pre-given image of the good citizen who stands at the foundations 
of politics is therefore disturbed by this form of unruly political agency. What makes 
the precarious political subject the protagonist of unruly politics is not only the 
disturbing actions of the troublemakers themselves, but also a collective critical 
investigation of the ways in which justice and equality are reflected in the polis, by all 
those who directly coexist with each other. This critical investigation should start by 
taking into consideration the uncomfortable, yet truthful counter-narratives of those 
who experience a lack of justice and equality.  
 
In his later work, Foucault focuses on the space one has to direct one’s subject 
formation freely against the tide of dominant regimes of truth and rules of behavior. 
The speaking of parrhesia, or truth-telling, can become a practice of freely expressing 
subordinated truths and, through this speech act, forming a subject which 
“liberates”160 itself from dominant moral prescriptions. Parrhesia “is used on the 
border of what could be called individual guidance and the political field” (Foucault 
2010, 46-47). The act of parrhesia has a critical political potential because it intends to 
question the privileges and dominant position of authorities within the power plays in 
which we are embedded. In this sense, parrhesia opens the possibility of critique within 
an embedded and dependent situation in the organization of institutional politics. This 
critique does not pretend to criticize the political status quo from an independent or 
outsider position. A discussion of this notion will therefore help me understand both 
the subject-formation and the political agency of the precarious political subject. In 
such a subject-formation, one stays within the realm of truth games and power plays, 
but one is able to direct the course of the power configurations in which one is 
embedded.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Foucault is sceptical about the use of the term “liberation.” To him, the term has the connotation of 
bringing the human subject back to a certain essential nature, from which it has been estranged by power 
relations. However, we can never be completely liberated from power relations. Foucault prefers to speak 
of “freedom practices,” in which the subject determines itself consciously and affirmatively in relation to 
power mechanisms. However, Foucault also states that liberation from domination is sometimes 
necessary to be able to perform freedom practices. This can be the case with repressive normativity 
around sexuality, for example. (Foucault 2004, 184-186) 
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7.4.2. The subject shaped in a coherent lifestyle 
Before I look at the impact the act of parrhesia can have on the polis, I will first 
consider how parrhesia stands in relation to subject formation. In the performance of 
parrhesia, a person gives an honest account of oneself. For Foucault, this subject 
formation is always realized in relation to others, but nevertheless bears witness to a 
greater autonomy than subject formation in the light of a set of externally binding 
moral rules. Any kind of subject formation always takes place in relations of power, 
but it depends in what way and to whom the subject is subjugated or subjugates itself. 
One can become a “subject to someone else by control and dependence,” or one can 
become an individualized subject, “tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-
knowledge” (Foucault 2000, 331). In both these cases of an individualized subject and 
a dependent subject, the subject is subjugated to certain techniques of power. In the 
act of parrhesia, one can contest the normative dominance of both dependence and 
individualization. Subject formation in a parrhesiastic light implies a struggle against 
“subjection” in the sense of submission to dominant or exploiting powers, as well as 
to the individualizing techniques of modern governance. Another possible kind of 
subjectivity revolves around a courageous composition of experiences and seeks the 
borders of what is acceptable, instead of involving in a subjection to a certain kind of 
civilized and containable individuality. A parrhesiastic subject formation always grates 
against the limits of the norm and is often expressed in uncivil and scandalous ways. 
Instead of being “overruled” by the norm, one enables oneself to rule one’s own 
agency according to one’s own ethical standards (Vintges 2012, 7). This subjectivity 
should consist of a continuous experiment in becoming someone other than one 
already is or was, while engaging in experiences which do not only define oneself as a 
subject, but at the same time detach oneself of fundamental identity markers. This 
courageous attempt to form one’s life in the best possible way, according to one’s 
own standards, is a crucial aspect of the care of the self, according to Foucault 
(Foucault 2011, 160-161). At the same time, one undertakes this care of the self always 
in relation with others. 
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Here, again, instead of being something which precedes our actions as an already 
established entity, the subject is composed in the act of performing one’s lifestyle in 
everyday utterances, relations and routines. In the care of the self, one gains 
knowledge of the prevailing norms and codes of conduct, in order to then consciously 
decide whether one wants to follow these norms, or reject them and design one’s own 
guidance of behavior instead (Foucault 2004, 188). In this way, one develops a 
coherent ethos, whereby one’s being as a subject is reflected in one’s agency and in 
everyday expressions of behavior, like the clothes one wears and one’s style of 
movement. Foucault sees such an ethos as everyday praxis emerging for the first time 
in antiquity. In those days, when Socrates went around the gymnasia to ask young 
men whether they took good care of themselves, one’s ethos made one recognizable 
and valued in a certain way by the outside world. One could become a respected 
person because of the expression of one’s ethos (ibid., p. 189). 
 
The way in which one can develop such an ethos is described by Foucault as a 
conscious, arduous, and often very intellectual activity. One actively gains knowledge 
about oneself, and attempts to master one’s behavior through training, in an act of 
self-governance, while constantly critically evaluating the sincerity of the result. 
Specific self-techniques, such as the keeping of diaries, meditation and dialogues with 
oneself and friends, contribute to the shaping of an ethically sound self (Vintges 2012, 
5). The development of this self takes shape in its agency; for this reason, Foucault 
speaks explicitly of freedom practices. For Foucault, subject formation does not depend 
on the emphasis of strong identity markers. In the case of young urban troublemakers 
from neighborhoods like Grigny and Kanaleneiland, we see that they engage in the 
development of a carefully composed sense of self, but not completely as Foucault 
envisions it. This sense of self is expressed in everyday style and behavior which 
reflects one’s self-chosen ethical principles and which often is opposed to the 
dominant influence of the “civilized” norm. A particular lifestyle takes shape in dress 
codes, graffiti tags, rap texts and street slang, to name but a few clearly visible and 
audible examples. This lifestyle offers the opportunity to gain respect from others, if it 
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is expressed in a conscious, coherent and openly recognizable way. The making of a 
familiar world of shared experiences can thus be understood as part of a process of 
intentional subject formation, which is simultaneously taking place in opposition to 
the “civilized” outside world. Here, it is important to stress again that the 
intentionality of this subject formation has to be seen within a relational setting. In a 
confrontational tension with other parts of society, a distinct agency and presentation 
of self takes place which cannot be traced back to an autonomous, originary and 
essentialized identity. Notions of what it means to be a “good citizen” are contested 
by this lifestyle and the world of experiences in which it is developed. In this sense, 
these adolescents consciously attempt to transform dominant cultural and normative 
conventions, instead of affirming prevailing codes of behavior. “Freedom practices 
are about a collective and individual ‘work on the limits’ of one’s culture, inventing 
new subjectivities and self-techniques by critically reworking the present ones.” 
(Vintges 2012, 7).  
 
However, in the case of young urban troublemakers, the composition of a lifestyle and 
image is not developed in a similarly self-conscious and intellectual way as Foucault 
describes the crafting of an ethos. Evaluating self-techniques, which are exercised 
individually, are not a common practice, and the achievement of an always coherent, 
ethically sound self does not always stand at the top of the agenda. Those adolescents 
who instigate trouble in neighborhoods like Grigny and Kanaleneiland often display 
behavior that contradicts their own ethical values, and they do not commonly critically 
evaluate their actions in relation to an envisioned ethos. Despite this divergent relation 
to ethical aspirations in the sense of a Foucauldian ethos, a lifestyle is developed as a 
coherent expression of a self, which has its own dignity, reflecting the truth of one’s 
convictions and experiences in a lived world, and is deliberately distinguished from the 
goody-goody and adapted behavior of the average good citizen. This sense of self 
therefore seems to define a particular form of pride and dignity in defence against, and 
as a consequence of, the humiliating effects of exclusion from the dominant 
framework of good and civil behavior. The development of an uncivil and scandalous 
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self therefore seems to be more of a forced strategy to define one’s identity firmly in a 
situation in which one is constantly threatened with losing one’s self-worth in relation 
to the norm, instead of a deliberate choice to constantly become someone else than 
one already is, in a free act of denunciation of normative codes and societal privileges, 
like the Greek parrhesiasts did, from whom Foucault derives his understanding of 
freedom practices, or ethical self practices. Now, I wish to focus in more detail on the 
role of parrhesia in questioning the relation between justice and the polis. This is a 
slightly different application of parrhesia than the parrhesia which plays a role in the 
styling of an individual self, as opposed to the individualization which is proposed by 
the norm. Despite the fact that the ethical effects of parrhesiastic gestures described by 
Foucault are not completely reflected in the community of experience of young urban 
troublemakers, the political effect of parrhesia should be recognized in their case. Their 
“uncivil” lifestyle and unruly agency show how politics can also explicitly take place at 
sites where the trouble starts. 
 
7.4.3. Courageously telling the truth 
Political sense-making can take the form of trouble-making. Foucault has made this 
very clear in his interpretation of the Ancient Greek notion of parrhesia, or free-
spokenness, in relation to the polis. I will take a closer look at the characteristics of a 
parrhesiastic act before I consider its disturbing political effect. The notion of parrhesia, 
as Foucault understands it, is closely related to governmentality, the conducting of 
oneself and others, as described in Chapter 4. In order to conduct oneself and others 
in the right way, it is of importance to be able to speak the truth. To display an ethical 
and responsible mode of governance, one should know oneself without any 
restrictions and have the courage to confront others with the truth about oneself and 
the relations one has. At the same time, one should be open to receive the truth 
others have to tell about the relationship of governance between oneself and the other 
(Foucault 2001, 22). Parrhesia does not necessarily lead to pleasant interaction; it can 
be confrontational because it issues a strong critique with respect to dominant truths 
or convictions.  
 447 
The truth that becomes evident in the act of parrhesia is not a truth in the enlightened, 
Cartesian sense. Foucault states that we usually consider a truth to be something that 
needs external and objective evidence (Foucault 2001, 14), as mentioned in Chapter 2. 
However, parrhesiastic truth is proven by the conduct of the person who expresses it. 
Its truth value is first of all determined by the fact that the one who performs parrhesia 
truly believes that he/she is speaking the truth (Foucault 2010, 64). The value of a 
parrhesiastic truth is created within an interaction between the agency and speech of the 
person who performs parrhesia and the reception by the person(s) to whom this agency 
and speech is directed. We cannot consider this truth to be an objective given which is 
revealed to us from a space outside of inter-subjective power relations. To convince 
others of the value and validity of such a truth, the experience of this truth has to be 
sensed by others. Therefore, we can understand parrhesiastic truths as immersed in a 
relational agency-perspective similar to the precarious political subject. The truth value 
of the parrhesiastic truth depends on recognition that can only take place in a relation. 
Someone initiates parrhesia by telling the truth, but this truth can only be considered as 
truthful if someone else recognizes its value. Within the act of parrhesia, a 
confrontational relation takes place between different actors. This confrontational 
relation requires courage and strength from the person who transmits his or her truth. 
Self-knowledge and a critical attitude is required in order to perform this task. The 
parrhesiast does not convince others because of his/her social status, but because of 
his/her sincerity (Foucault 2010, 65-66). 
 
Telling the truth here means being straightforward and saying it like it is without 
polishing or flattery. What is most important is how one behaves in the act of 
parrhesia, not necessarily the content of the truth one is telling (Foucault 2010, 52). 
Parrhesia forms a part of the consciously constructed balance of the self, which forms 
an integral part of one’s lifestyle and relations with others. In contrast to rhetorics, 
parrhesia is not a strategy of persuasion in which it does not matter if one truly believes 
in the statement one makes as long as one composes one’s discourse in such a way 
that it will convince one’s partners in conversation (ibid., 53). Parrhesia should directly 
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reflect one’s true convictions. Courage is needed to apply such an unmediated way of 
speaking as in parrhesia, since the truth is not always easily accepted by the other party.  
 
Foucault emphasizes that there is a “rough, violent, abrupt aspect of parrhesia” (ibid. 
54). Since parrhesia is part of one’s true lifestyle, the parrhesiast feels an internal 
obligation to speak the truth, also in circumstances in which it would be unwise or 
maybe even dangerous to do so. The parrhesiast “throws the truth in the face of the 
person with whom he is in dialogue” (ibid.). This direct speech act cannot be escaped 
and can confront the other with unwanted insights, possibly resulting in rejection, fury 
or even violence. The speaking of parrhesia is therefore often expressed in an agonistic 
relation between two parties with completely different initial standpoints. The one 
who has the courage to stand up and speak the truth feels the need to get something 
off his/her chest regardless of the effects it will have on the situation. Again, in this 
case one should not necessarily imagine a debate in which two different parties try to 
convince each other of a different truth. The parrhesiast just needs to bring a truth out 
into the open, even if there is no reaction or the reaction will be so violent that one 
can no longer speak of an equal or respectful interaction after the truth has come out. 
In this sense, speaking the truth involves risk. “[T]here is always parrhesia when telling 
the truth, and the fact of having told it, will, may, or must entail costly consequences 
for those who have told it” (ibid., 56).  
 
The speaker is willing to take risks for his/her own well-being in order for the truth to 
come out. These risks can reach as far as entailing the death of the parrhesiast, 
according to Foucault. The parrhesiast therefore explicitly places him/herself in a 
precarious position. The precariousness of a political subjectivity that was discussed 
earlier is actively taken up here as part of one’s agency. Hence, this precarious agency 
could be seen as the explicit acting upon the shared ontological precariousness which 
I already identified in relation to the work of Nancy, Crowley and Butler. The 
parrhesiast is willing to put his/her own life on the line because the free-spokenness 
he/she applies is more valuable to him/her than life itself (Foucault 2001, 16). The 
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particularity about a situation in which parrhesia is performed is that the proceedings 
are laid completely open by the act of parrhesia itself. All possibly predictable effects 
which could follow a formally arranged conversation are turned upside-down at the 
moment a parrhesiast speaks the truth. This radical opening of the situation can have 
serious and unexpected frictions as a consequence. “Parrhesia does not produce a 
codified effect; it opens up an unspecified risk” (Foucault 2010, 62). The opening up 
of such a risk for the one who performs the act of speaking frankly is an essential 
element of parrhesia. Parrhesia can never be a completely safe and neutral activity for 
the ones who are involved. At the same time, parrhesia should feel as a necessity to the 
one who performs it, since the speaking of the truth in which one truly believes is the 
most independent way of constituting oneself as a subject. 
 
In short, parrhesia, the act of truth, requires: first, the manifestation of a fundamental 
bond between the truth spoken and the thought of the person who spoke it; [second], a 
challenge to the bond between the two interlocutors (the person who speaks the truth 
and the person to whom this truth is addressed). Hence this new feature of parrhesia: it 
involves some form of courage, the minimal form of which consists in the parrhesiast 
taking the risk of breaking and ending the relationship to the other person which was 
precisely what made his discourse possible. In a way, the parrhesiast always risks 
undermining that relationship which is the condition of possibility of his discourse. 
(Foucault 2011, 11) 
 
7.4.4. Running a risk by speaking the truth 
In the historical tradition in which the term parrhesia emerged for the first time, it had 
not only an ethical connotation related to the care for the self and others, but also a 
strong political connotation. In a political context, a clear act of parrhesia would be for 
someone who is not in the position to possess any legitimate or institutional power to 
face a tyrant and tell this person the truth about his/her ruling. This example can be 
found in the case of the cynics, whose tradition is extensively analyzed by Foucault. 
They usually lived an ascetic lifestyle, which was contrary to the normal behavior of 
their times. From their position as deviant outsiders, they permitted themselves daring 
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critiques of the existing legal and political order. They dedicated their time to certain 
deliberate and reflexive practices of the self, which were reflected in speech and 
writings. In this way, they aimed to establish a direct connection between their way of 
life and the telling of the truth (Foucault 2011, 165). The cynics explicitly denounced 
any official social or political status in society, and could therefore also be 
characterized as self-proclaimed subversive outsiders. They abstained not only from 
material goods and wealth, but also from any fixed social position or responsibility. 
Nevertheless, they had the courage to critically examine and question the sincerity of 
the ruling authorities in their society. It is precisely from this relatively independent 
position that the cynics instigated a bare and direct confrontation between the 
institutional powers and the freely spoken discourse of truth. The cynics aimed to live 
their lives as truthful men not only for their own good, but also in a conscientious 
relation to the power structures in which they found themselves. This attitude of free-
spokenness did not always have a civilized form and often contested the accepted and 
prevailing mores of their time. The incivility of their behavior often brought them into 
conflictuous relations and dangerous, even life-threatening situations. However, it 
enabled them to address situations of injustice that would otherwise have been 
tolerated under the pretext of existing policies and hierarchies. Foucault names several 
examples of such situations.  
 
The legendary tales about Diogenes show how a performance of parrhesia can be 
highly provocative and disturbing for those confronted by it. How moral conventions 
can be contested by the parrhesiast in an explicitly scandalous way is illustrated by the 
account of Diogenes masturbating in a public market place while stating that 
“masturbation satisfies a need, just as eating does” (Foucault 2011, 171). With this 
statement, Diogenes aimed to hint at “those things which alone are indispensable to 
human life or which constitute its most elementary, rudimentary essence” (ibid.), 
independent of any formal conventions or artificial restrictions. Here, Diogenes shows 
how one’s lifestyle can become a direct expression of a disturbing truth. Cynicism, as 
it was lived by Diogenes, serves as an example of how one’s acts and one’s very life 
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can become a “manifestation of truth” (ibid., 172), even if this manifestation implies 
agonistic frictions, scandalous disturbances or uncivil expressions. 
 
The impact that this attitude can have on the ruling authorities becomes apparent in 
the account of the encounter between Diogenes and Alexander the Great, which 
involves a struggle between authoritarian political power and the power of truth, 
which makes political sense without any claim to authority or status (Foucault 2001, 
120-133). One day, Diogenes is sitting in his barrel enjoying the sunshine, when 
Alexander comes to visit him. Diogenes, who finds himself both literally and 
symbolically in a lower position, nevertheless dares to ask Alexander, who stands in 
front of him, to move aside, out of the light, in order to let him enjoy the sunshine in 
an unmediated way. Diogenes, who has no worldly possessions and has nothing else 
to reckon with other than his own personal dignity, continues to mock Alexander and 
discuss the legitimacy of his status as a king. Alexander is impressed by Diogenes’ 
statements because he acknowledges that Diogenes is in essence more free to do as he 
pleases than himself, precisely because he is not attached to any ruling obligations and 
responsibilities. Diogenes’ courage, freedom and lack of attachments makes him the 
most likely person to speak the truth, and nothing but the truth, to him as a ruler. 
After offending Alexander until it becomes almost unbearable, Diogenes continues by 
saying “you can kill me, but if you do so, nobody else will tell you the truth” (Foucault 
2001, 129). Diogenes here explicitly displays his courage by risking his own life for the 
sake of exposing the truth, and it is precisely this courage that impresses Alexander 
and makes him accept Diogenes’ statements as trustworthy.  
 
Similar unmediated evocations of injustices by the powerless and weak in the face of 
authoritarian powers can be found in different times and circumstances, according to 
Foucault. Parrhesia is always performed by someone who is less powerful and more 
vulnerable than the one to whom he/she addresses him/herself. Therefore, parrhesia 
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always comes from “below” (Foucault 2001, 18).161 Speaking the truth in a situation in 
which one has nothing to lose does not entail an act of parrhesia. Parrhesia thus always 
takes place in a situation in which the one who is subordinated and has everything to 
lose is very aware of the power struggles in which he/she finds him/herself and 
nevertheless takes the risk to criticize those who are in the powerful or privileged 
position. The notion of parrhesia can be used to describe agonistic discourses in which 
the powerless publicly and shamelessly call the powerful to account for their actions, 
since they do not have any other means in their possession to avenge the injustices 
inflicted upon them (Foucault 2010, 133). The one performing parrhesia here always 
takes a risk by standing up before the other who holds the beneficial side of a 
profoundly unequal situation, and therefore displays his/her own bare vulnerability in 
its full extent. “For someone who is both the victim of an injustice and completely 
weak, the only means of combat is a discourse which is agonistic but constructed 
around this unequal structure” (ibid.). It is this direct display of the bare existence of 
those who have nothing more than their own indignation as a means to struggle that 
can make an act of parrhesia all the more confronting and disturbing. By expressing 
oneself in a directly confronting way, those who feel unequally treated can force the 
privileged to take notice of their indignation.  
 
I see such a direct display of bare indignation as taking place in the spontaneous 
disruptive interventions of young urban troublemakers. It has to be noted here that 
young urban troublemakers hold a different position in contemporary Western society 
than the cynics did in the classical Greek city-state. These young troublemakers do not 
deliberately refuse a privileged position within society to become a parrhesiast. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 On another occasion, Foucault speaks of parrhesia as “a discourse spoken from above” (2010:104). 
Here, he speaks about the fact that parrhesia cannot be derived from ones status as a citizen. The official 
or legal status one has within the polis does not guarantee that one is automatically speaking the truth. A 
parrhesiastic truth elevates the speaker above his or her citizenship status, so to say. In the context of 
democratic rule, parrhesia is not the exercise of power, but rather a discourse which is elevated above the 
designation of people as legitimate or non-legitimate players in the democratic game. The parrhesiastic 
discourse could therefore be seen as spoken from above. Within this discourse, those who possess a 
lower social status speak out frankly regarding their own truth and hence elevate themselves above their 
marginalized status. Despite the opposing choise of words, Foucault seems to hint at a similar exercise of 
parrhesia, as in the case in which he mentions parrhesia as coming “from below.”  
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contrast to the cynics, who chose to give up their respected social position, these 
youngsters are forced into the position of a parrhesiast on account of their life 
circumstances. Their gestures of parrhesia are born out of frustration over, and as an 
indictment against, their marginalized position, rather than being an intentionally 
chosen political strategy in opposition to the ruling authorities. Nevertheless, events 
like riots and “chaos” have a parrhesiastic effect on the political organization of society 
because they uncover in a confrontational way those who are not included in the 
order of society. One could say that such disruptions have a similar scandalous effect 
as Diogenes masturbating in public. The civic order is disturbed by an act of uncivil 
behavior which forces spectators to recognize the fact that they share a social situation 
with those who cause the scandal. This recognition might open space to reconsider 
the seemingly self-evident character of certain norms of civility and the effect that 
these norms have on the exclusion of the “uncivilized.” This opening of a critical 
evaluation of civic standards forms a first step on the way towards a precarious 
political agency in which disruptive interventions of the “uncivil” have an equal share 
next to the critique of accepted, “civil” citizens. 
 
7.5. The truth as we live it 
Besides directly confrontational events such as riots and chaos, less directly 
confrontational public appearances of the community of experience of young urban 
troublemakers can also be understood as expressions of parrhesia, as displayed in 
lifestyle, street art, music and leisure activities on the streets. Especially in the area of 
rap and spoken word, personally experienced truths about life in the “banned” areas 
of society are often deliberately expressed in frank and sometimes shocking ways. 
Such uncomfortable interferences in civilized interactions and discursive and non-
discursive expressions of a deviant lifestyle confront society with the fact that there 
are different truths to be told about different communities of experience underneath 
the myth of national unity and solidarity. A recognition of a different kind of truth 
about a different kind of life can be enforced upon others in a rather confronting, 
scandalous way, just by the display of the divergent community of experiences of 
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young urban troublemakers in its everyday appearance in public space. Such 
parrhesiastic gestures show how the generally shared ontological condition of 
coexistence does not emerge as an equally shared life in an equally shared world, 
under equally shared circumstances. They show how the world is made up of radically 
different worlds in which people live through radically different experiences which are 
often overlooked in a general representation of community life in society. In this 
sense, the lived world, or the lived community of experience of young urban 
troublemakers, can be seen as an emergence of “life as a scandal of the truth” 
(Foucault 2011, 185). With this statement, Foucault makes it explicitly clear that 
troublesome agency can contain a truth value; parrhesiastic truths are always lived 
truths, and expressions of an unconventional life can be seen as parrhesiastic gestures. 
Truth and lived experiences cannot be detached from each other in the act of parrhesia.  
 
7.5.1. The truth about life in the neighborhood 
The need to express lived truths that tell a story of different experiences which are 
usually obscured in the public debate often came up in the conversations I had with 
my respondents in Grigny and Kanaleneiland. In various conversations with my focus 
group in Grigny, the need for recognition of the truth about lived experiences in the 
neighborhood, as perceived by the young inhabitants themselves, was a recurring 
topic. The unequal power dynamics between “us” and “them” could only be changed 
if “they” who live the comfortable life of the French bourgeoisie are willing to listen to 
the truth as it is experienced by those who live in the different world of the banlieues. 
Hernan thinks that the one-sided image of the banlieues as a violent “Wild West” in 
which cars are burned at a daily basis obscures a deeper understanding of the misery 
and poverty which characterizes the life of the families around him. The media does 
not expose the truth about the daily struggles of the co-inhabitants in his 
neighborhood and this lack of information restrains others from developing a certain 
consciousness of the suffering experienced in neighborhoods like Grigny. Hernan is 
convinced that the difficult sides of daily reality in the banlieues must be exposed in 
order for people to become aware of the social hierarchies that exist in society. As he 
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expresses it: “once you are high, you don’t look down anymore.” People should 
therefore be forced to look down.  
 
Saïd and Aboubakr agree with Hernan and think that there are many injustices which 
others – themselves not confronted with these injustices – prefer not to see. 
Especially within the institutional political domain such injustices are often neglected. 
Demba adds that everyone (tout le monde) should be told that truths are quite often 
emphasized which are not the truth of the youngsters from the banlieues. In this 
respect, Hadj reckons that many youngsters tend to keep their own truth to 
themselves, since they do not trust the outside world to take their words and 
experiences seriously. Karim, who is very active as a rapper, has another opinion. He 
feels the explicit urge to bring his truth out into the open through his rap texts. He 
wants to use his music to give people a “kick in the ass” and make them aware of the 
necessity to move things in a different direction and bring an end to the injustices 
experienced by young people in his neighborhood. Karim doesn’t have problems with 
raising this awareness by writing provocative texts that reflect the violence as it is 
experienced by young people around him. He thinks that people sometimes need a 
little shock to come to new insights and actions. His aim is to incite people to form 
their own opinions about life in the banlieues in an autonomous way, free of the clichés 
represented in the mainstream media. He wants to transmit a message of truths which 
are easily forgotten. But, despite the easy forgetfulness of people, “the truth of the 
word is lasting,” as he expresses it. Here, Karim seems to hint at a consistency with a 
parrhesiastic lifestyle, in that it is formed by the telling of truths in which one truly 
believes, regardless of the convenience of the exposure of such truths under the given 
circumstances.  
 
7.5.2. Parrhes ias t i c  truths can make political sense 
In Grigny, the political potential of the recognition of uncomfortable truths and 
counter-narratives was explicitly brought up by my respondents, as is apparent from 
Ladji’s quote at the beginning of this chapter. He clarifies that the practice of 
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institutional politics makes no sense to him since it does not relate to the experiences 
of real people dealing with real difficulties in their lives. Personal endeavors in search 
of the satisfaction of basic needs are all the more real to him. His words relate to the 
domain of Bayat’s street politics, a political practice which is expressed in particular 
struggles. For him, experiences of everyday struggles to live a dignified life in the 
banlieues make more political sense than policies formulated in parliament. The only 
collective political enterprise that would make concrete sense to Ladji would have to 
start with the re-establishment of the truth about such experiences of the people 
around him. Here, he is not referring to a transcendental truth. Instead, he emphasizes 
that the exposure of subordinated truths is always embedded in a specific situation, at 
a specific place and time. The recognition of such lived truths will not easily be 
elevated to a general level of understanding. 
 
A prerequisite for a parrhesiastic truth to make political sense is that it does not fall on 
deaf ears. The situated recognition of subversive and subordinated truths and counter-
narratives depends both on the taking of a parrhesiastic risk by the one who speaks out 
and on the willingness to listen of those who are implicitly or explicitly addressed. The 
exposure of such parrhesiastic truths can be both confronting and liberating at the same 
time, as we can see in Driss’s last statement during the expert meeting in 
Kanaleneiland quoted in the prelude to this chapter. The ability to put one’s 
experiences and true convictions into words that are taken serious by an audience can 
create a profound feeling of dignity, even though the telling of the truth might be a 
disturbing activity for all parties involved. 
 
During the expert meeting in which these words were spoken, Driss found himself in 
a company of people who do not form a part of his community of experience, but 
usually take up the role of those who work on disciplining and guiding him and his 
friends in a certain direction. His words were therefore coming from “below,” and 
addressed “upwards,” to express things in Foucault’s terms. For the first time, Driss 
found himself addressing an audience of “people with power,” who were open to 
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listen to his words out of interest in his opinion on certain developments in the 
neighborhood, and without immediately aiming to steer his behavior and expressions 
in a certain desired direction. Driss knew that the purpose of the meeting was not to 
agree on a new strategy or policy regarding the supervision of “at-risk boys” in the 
neighborhood. Nevertheless, he initially feared that his behavior or attitude would be 
under evaluation. Before the meeting, Driss had a lot of doubt about participating. He 
told me many times that he was not sure that any good could come from such a 
meeting, and that he felt uneasy about speaking in front of a group of unfamiliar 
adults about his own experiences. He was afraid that his expressions could be used 
against him and his friends to once again reinforce the negative image of their group 
in the neighborhood. However, despite his hesitation, Driss felt that it would be 
important that one of the boys would give an account of all the discussions we had 
had during the focus group meetings in the presence of people who are involved in 
the policy around youth and safety in the neighborhood.  
 
During the meeting, Driss became more comfortable about giving his account 
regarding the community of experience of his peers, because he experienced that the 
other participants were interested in hearing him speak. In his last statement, we can 
read an honest surprise and satisfaction that he was able to express his truthful and 
uncensored testimony on issues that are quite sensitive in the neighborhood, such as 
clashes between his peers and supervisors in the youth center. It should be noted here 
that Driss talks about “giving” the word instead of “taking” the word, as would be the 
correct expression in Dutch to say that someone takes the floor. This choice of words 
might reflect that Driss experienced the transmission of the truth about his own lived 
world to others, who he usually sees as hostile and disciplining forces to be kept at a 
distance, as a gift to those who are usually unaware of his side of the story. Driss also 
stressed that he not only intended to share his own words, but wished to pass on the 
words that were previously uttered and analyzed during the various conversations we 
had with the whole focus group. By speaking out during this meeting, and giving an 
unrestricted, and sometimes confrontational account of the truth about his 
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experiences, and his perception on relations between youngsters and local authorities 
in the neighborhood, Driss took the risk of getting himself into trouble. His address 
can therefore be perceived as an act of parrhesia. Driss spoke honestly to people who 
have the power to judge him and make his life difficult. Nevertheless, he shared his 
side of the story with them. In return, his words were taken seriously by the audience. 
Finally, Driss expressed the hope that his testimony of a truth, which up to that 
moment had been subordinated, would lead to a change in the situation in which he, 
his friends, and the audience are bound to each other. He thereby seemed to express 
the hope that his parrhesiastic gesture would lead to a profound societal transformation. 
 
7.5.3. Interest in sharing the world 
Both in the example of Driss’s final address and in Foucault’s description of parrhesia, 
there is an emphasis that the political effect of the parrhesiastic act depends both on the 
courageous agency of the instigator and the willingness to listen of those addressed. 
The agency of the precarious political subject can have a profound critical impact on 
society and its political order, if others are interested to hear its often unheard truths 
about experienced injustices and inequalities. Only when others are willing to listen to 
the parrhesiastic truths can solidarity emerge – something which could ultimately lead to 
the transformation of the political organization of society. This willingness to listen 
could be part of the first stage of the development of an unruly political agency and a 
shared precarious political subjectivity in which both civil and uncivil counter-actions 
and counter-narratives have a part. 
 
Unruly actions can incite others to listen to often unheard of truths, despite their 
possible scandalous nature. In order for such unruly agency to be recognized as 
politically meaningful, a willingness to be touched by the scandal is required. 
Recognition of the fact that we share the world, and society, with young urban 
troublemakers, even if we come to denounce their actions or behavior, begins with an 
attitude of interest. This attitude of interest also includes the openness and patience to 
listen to the truths and words of those troublemakers, who seem to have little 
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coordination in their statements or little engagement with others, before passing 
judgment on their actions and statements. This interest should take place at a 
threshold on which a door can be opened to a genuine recognition of the “here and 
now” of an “us” which refuses to be immediately opposed to a “them.” Out of this 
interest, one can critically examine the formation of sets of rules and regulations 
regarding the “treatment” of young urban troublemakers that originates in an explicit 
positioning of these youngsters as problems to be contained. Such a critical attitude 
should be enabled by an openness to the often dissonant voices of young urban 
troublemakers in the public domain, an initially non-judgmental attitude towards 
divergent identities and convictions and a genuine interest162 and curiosity towards the 
way others perceive and experience the world.  
 
An attitude of interest could open up the power dynamics between state authorities 
and young urban troublemakers for re-evaluation in the light of equality and human 
dignity, but the expression of such an attitude should not be seen as a deliberately 
developed strategy of communication. Our co-appearance in the world is 
characterized by Nancy as an event (Nancy & Bailly 1991, 8). This event cannot be 
grasped in a modus of thought or speech. “The event surprises or else it is not an 
event,” as Nancy states (2001, 167). The event-ness of the event can therefore never 
be captured in our thoughts or expectations. The meaning of the world emerges 
together with us in this event, and is therefore not external to this world (Nancy 2007, 
43). It is only that which comes out of the event, its results, which can play a part in 
our imagination or planning. An attitude of interest can therefore not be formulated 
as part of a policy toolkit prescribing the treatment of problematic youth groups. The 
event is not “what is produced or could be shown” as the outcome, or even the entry, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Henk Oosterling also notes that subjectivity consists of being in-between or interesse. This being in-
between implies interactivity, an attitude which is not first of all self-centered, but open towards an 
outside that is always already connected to the inside by a space in-between. Subjectivity takes place in 
this atopic and atemporal space in-between. For Oosterling, the interesse within subjectivity also implies as 
sensibility for heterogeneity and contigency. Interesse here both implies a Nancyean singular-plural 
ontological subject-position, never captured in one definite substantive place, but always in touch with 
something other, and an initial form of interested engagement with others. This interested engagement 
forms the first, basic step towards solidarity (Oosterling 1999). 
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of guided human interactions, but rather the very happening of the unexpected (ibid., 
169). Perhaps an attitude of interest in its most stripped form should be understood as 
a susceptibility to our sharing of the world which could surprise us in many different 
ways. In order to allow ourselves to be surprised, we should deliberately try to let go 
of prejudices, expectations or contempt for the other who differs from us and also put 
aside the wish to strive for an ideal communication based on initial interest. This also 
means that there is not only one ideal world, but a “multiplicity of worlds” (Nancy 
2007, 109). No first origin can be designated as the point out of which the world 
emerged. There is nothing other than the “happening” of the world itself which takes 
place in each instant, in each situation. As such, the world itself is also no “effect of 
some particular operation of production,” but it “springs from all sides” (Nancy 2001, 
83).  
Each existent belongs to more groups, masses, networks, or complexes than one first 
recognizes, and each also detaches from them and from itself, infinitely. Each opens 
and closes on more worlds and in it, as outside of it, hollowing out the outside inside 
and reciprocally. What is appropriate is thus defined by the measure proper to each 
existent and to the infinite, indefinitely open, circulating and transforming community 
(or communication, contagion, contact) of all existences between them. (ibid., 110) 
 
What we find appropriate in interactions with others depends on our community of 
experience and the truths we value.  
 
In the next chapter, I will show how a certain recognition of the lived truths of young 
urban troublemakers can emerge in momentary events, in which we suddenly come to 
realize that we share the world with those from whom we radically differ in our 
identity, social position, and experiences. I will clarify how an evocation of our shared 
coexistence in the same world – despite the fact that this world is made up by many 
differentiating worlds of experience – can lead to a solidarity which sets a shared 
political agency for transformation in motion. The next and final chapter opens up a 
perspective on a potentially shared political agency which casts off an imagined 
national political community of similarly civil citizens in favor of the imagination of an 
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inoperative, post-national community of diverse citizens, who recognize their sharing 
of a world which can never be fully protected from precariousness. This shared 
political agency opens up a singular plural political subjectivity in which both those 
who are seen as civilized and those who are seen as uncivilized are included, and 
which is not pre-constitutive of agency, but instead appears in the wake of a sudden 
event that sets new possible forms of agency in motion. The diverse agents who 
express this political agency find each other in different unruly counter-actions which 
contest the dominant political order. Certain alliances of solidarity between unruly 
political agents can initiate a struggle against oppression, a related state-induced 
foundationalism and coercion of the good citizen. I will propose to let ourselves be 
inspired by a future scenario to bring about another, shared unruly politics, and 
another shared world, in what follows.  
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Interlude 
 
 
 
There's still such a well-drawn line between the Paradise Estate where I live and the 
Rousseau housing development. Massive wire fencing that stinks of rust it's so old 
and a stone wall that runs the whole length of the divide. Worse than the Maginot 
Line163 or the Berlin Wall. On the project side, the divider is covered in tags, drawings 
and concert posters and flyers for different eastern-themed evenings, graffiti praising 
Saddam Hussein or Che Guevara, patriotic signs, VIVA TUNISIA, SENEGAL 
REPRESENT, even rap lyrics with a philosophical slant. But me, what I like best on 
the wall is an old drawing that's been there for a really long time, long before the rise 
of rap or the start of the war in Iraq. It's an angel in handcuffs with a red cross over 
its mouth. (Guene 2006, 81-82) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 The Maginot Line was a defence line of military fortification which the French erected on its border 
with Germany in order to prevent a German invasion after the outbreak of the Second World War. The 
reference to the Maginot Line and the Berlin Wall in Guene’s text evokes the impression that living in a 
banlieue is comparable to living in a permanent state of war, in which communities are strictly divided and 
living under military control. The reference to physical separations of communities by walls in conflict 
zones also brings to mind more contemporary examples, such as the wall built within Palestinian 
territory. 
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Chapter 8 
          
“Banl ieue 13”  
A counter-narrative of shared unruly politics 
 
 
 
Thus, once myth is interrupted, writing recounts our history to us again. But it is no 
longer a narrative – neither grand nor small – but rather an offering: a history is 
offered to us. Which is to say that an event – and an advent – is proposed to us, 
without its unfolding being imposed upon us. What is offered to us is that 
community is coming about, or rather, that something is happening to us in common. 
Neither an origin nor an end: something in common. Only speech, a writing – shared, 
sharing us. (Nancy 1991, 69)      
 
Precarious political subjectivity, as presented in the previous chapter, emerges in the 
disruptive interventions and everyday struggles on the streets of young urban 
troublemakers, and the recognition of such disruptive events as politically meaningful. 
In the space in between the expression and reception of certain subversive and 
subordinated truths about experiences of injustice and indignation, an opening can be 
created to shared counter-narratives and counter-actions which confront and criticize 
existing power structures. A parrhesiastic event in which disruption and recognition go 
hand in hand can be the spark that creates a shared unruly political agency which 
contests dominant and coercive forms of good citizenship and political participation. 
Such a potentially shared unruly politics is not only performed by troublemakers, but 
by all those who choose to reconsider the foundational imagination of a 
homogeneous community of good citizens. In this chapter, I will further explore the 
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possible counter-actions, which lie at the basis of such a shared unruly politics. These 
counter-actions emerge in unexpected events and directly contest the mythical status 
of identity and ethnicity, as it is associated with a unitary, national political community. 
They can therefore shed light on a post-national and radical democratic practice of 
politics. I wish to speak here of counter-actions in which institutional politics and 
unruly politics both collide and interact with each other.  
 
In order to envision the counter-actions of a shared unruly politics, I will address a 
future scenario in this chapter which was mentioned in several conversations I had in 
Grigny, and which is derived from the storyline of a popular French action movie: 
Banlieue 13. This movie was mentioned by several of my respondents in describing the 
expected future destiny of French society and the position of the banlieues in it. My 
respondents focused mainly on the dark side of the story. As I noted earlier, it is 
difficult for these youngsters to imagine a future in which things will be different, or 
better. The movie’s storyline illustrates the expectations of my interlocutors that the 
existing distribution of power and privilege in society will be reinforced and 
intensified along polarizing lines in the future. A potential political praxis, which 
would ameliorate the position of young banlieuesards in society, their recognition as 
worthy citizens, and the reputation of their neighborhood, seemed utopian in the eyes 
of my respondents. However, in our conversations we also discussed hopes for the 
future, such as the wish that the truth about life in so-called “problem 
neighborhoods” would be re-established. In addition to the negative depiction of the 
general life circumstances in the banlieues, the narrative of Banlieue 13 also invites one 
to imagine a political practice which connects to this hope and which is able to change 
existing injustices by unruly means.  
 
This is the side of the story I will focus on. My reading of the narrative of Banlieue 13 
is not directly derived from the lived experiences and the words of my interlocutors in 
Grigny and Kanaleneiland, but is an attempt to highlight a different, hopeful and 
fruitful side of this narrative, one which imagines agency, coalitions and collisions 
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which could potentially transform the political organization of society. I interpret 
elements of the story differently than a first, obvious reading of the narrative would 
suggest. The story offers me the inspiration to imagine, firstly, how foundational 
fictions around the right kind of citizenship and political participation could be de-
mythicized and, secondly, how new counter-narratives could be imagined about an 
unruly politics that is shared by both those who suffer from an unequal distribution of 
precarity and those who choose to contest such an unequal distribution from a more 
privileged position, in the name of another world. An analysis of the movie’s narrative 
offers me the opportunity to illustrate my theoretical perception of shared unruly 
counter-actions, which emerge from an unexpected event, shared across identity and 
class boundaries, and in which institutional politics and unruly politics are both 
confronted and connected with each other. 
 
8.1. Welcome to Banl i eue  13 
 
Paris 2010. The suburbs or banlieues are divided from the center of Paris by a large 
concrete wall with many heavily controlled checkpoints, like the wall that once 
separated East and West Berlin. In the neighborhoods on the wrong side of the wall, 
an extreme form of survival of the fittest reigns. Various gangs fight each other to 
control the drug business, which offers the only way of making a living. Buildings are 
dilapidated, covered with graffiti; none of the elevators are working. No public 
services or facilities are present anywhere in the banlieues. Schools and shops are 
closed and the last police station is packing its boxes to get out safely before it is too 
late. People rely on their own rules of the neighborhood to guide social interactions. 
The French law has lost its grip completely over this remote part of French 
territory.164 
 
This scenario forms the backdrop to the action movie Banlieue 13, which premiered in 
French cinemas in 2004. Banlieue 13 is packed with dazzling combat scenes and flashy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Throughout this chapter, I will recount parts of the movie in my own words, while also directly citing 
the words as spoken by the characters in the movie. Like here, I will use the format of fieldnotes and 
citations for these pieces of insight into the movie’s narrative. 
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car chases, accompanied by pumping hip-hop music. The story is thin, like it is 
supposed to be in an action movie, the characters lack psychological depth and 
dialogues with a substantial content are rare. The movie became known for its 
promotion of the extreme action sport parkour, in which all kinds of obstacles in an 
urban area, including flat buildings, are traversed as fast as possible by running, 
climbing and jumping.165 The movie has two protagonists: Damien, a super-cop with a 
strong sense of justice and martial arts ability, and Leïto, an anarchistic Robin Hood 
figure, who desperately tries to keep his neighborhood, Banlieue 13, clean of drugs. 
Damien receives the assignment from the French government to infiltrate in the 
uncontrollable banlieue 13 to recover a newly developed neutron bomb, which has 
been stolen by a criminal gang. Leïto, who is confined to prison for severely injuring a 
corrupt police officer, is chosen to serve as his guide. Leïto is not eager to help 
Damien to fulfill his job since he does not trust the government or the cops. 
However, Leïto wants to rescue his sister, who has fallen into the hands of the same 
gang that has stolen the bomb. The two protagonists end up having to face the gang 
together, forced to fight through the situation in order to achieve their own goals. 
From the moment the bomb is activated, they have exactly 24 hours to solve their 
problems before the whole neighborhood will explode… 
 
Except for the fact that the malfunctioning of elevators is a recurrent problem in the 
Parisian banlieues, the actual situation in these areas is far removed from the picture 
drawn in the movie. There are no walls and no checkpoints; the banlieues are not 
entirely closed ghettos, left to their own mercy by the government. Nevertheless, 
Banlieue 13 was immensely popular among young inhabitants of the area codes around 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 David Belle, the actor who inpersonates Leïto, one of the protagonists of Banlieue 13, is considered to 
be the inventor of this discipline. He applied elements of his father’s military training in Vietnam to 
develop a new discipline of displacing himself in an urban environment. David Belle formed a group of 
practitioners named Yamasaki, and through video footage of their skills, the group became publicly 
recognized. Belle started to act in movies, like Banlieue 13. The philosophy behind parkour is considered by 
many practitioners to be a crucial element of the activity. Parkour is described as a way of reclaiming one’s 
own force in overcoming obstacles as a human being, as well as the urban space in which one moves 
around. Through the practicing of parkour, one aims to master one’s own physical capacaties in order to 
achieve a sense of freedom and self-improvement. These elements have brought Sophie Fuggle to state 
that parkour can be considered as a contemporary form of “care of the self” in a Foucauldian sense. See 
Fuggle 2008. 
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Paris, precisely because they saw their own lived reality reflected in the story. When I 
did field research in Grigny, the sequel to the movie, Banlieue 13 Ultimatum, had just 
come out. In various interviews I conducted, my respondents referred to the movie 
when I asked how they envisioned the future of their neighborhood. Like Faiza 
Guene describes in the interlude preceding this chapter, the neighborhoods where 
they live are often divided from richer parts of the banlieues by physical barriers that 
create not only a spatial divide, but also a strong symbolic one between a part of the 
population which is seen as a threat to national security and “normal” French citizens. 
Even if the wall is not physically there, these young people feel like they are living in a 
symbolically enclosed space, and taking the metro to the center of Paris feels like 
traveling to another reality. In addition, they feel just as much left alone by the 
government as the inhabitants of banlieue 13 in the movie. In their eyes, not much 
more has to change in order for the future scenario of Banlieue 13 to become a reality. 
However, my respondents did not only think that the scenario of Banlieue 13 could 
become reality, they also recognized the values of the banlieue population as they are 
presented in the movie. The conflict between Leïto, who wants to save his sister, and 
Damien, who wants to protect national interests, reflects the opposition between “us” 
– the banlieuesards – and “them” – the bourgeoisie and their protectors, les keufs (slang for 
policemen) (compare: Lapeyronnie 2008, 166-173). The following comment on the 
movie from a web page for movie reviews mirrors this line of thought. The author of 
this comment highlights three key elements of values which are typical for the banlieues 
in his/her opinion; loyalty, respect and family. These same three were amongst the 
first words that my focus group in Grigny designated as meaningful in describing their 
life experience. 
 
We just came back from watching B13, and we found it excellent and very realistic. It 
is enough to live in a banlieue to understand what’s happening. So those who say that 
it’s worthless or a comic book issue, just come and live in the banlieues. For us it’s 
loyalty, respect and family.166  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 My translation of: ‘Nous venons d'aller voir B13, et nous l'avons trouvé excellent et plein de réalisme. 
Il suffit de vivre dans une banlieue pour comprendre ce qui se passe. Alors ceux qui disent que c'est un 
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However, Banlieue 13 did not gain a reputation amongst movie critics and the general 
public as a serious reflection on life and social problems in the troubled suburban 
areas of France. This is in contrast to the cult movie La Haine, for example, which has 
been praised for its realism and society criticism. Despite this lack of general interest, 
the fact that youngsters from the banlieues think that Banlieue 13 gives a realistic 
representation of the agonistic tension between life in the banlieues and the accepted 
order of French society makes the movie worthy of further investigation.  
 
8.2. A contemporary counter-narrative 
It might seem strange to choose the story of a vulgar action movie to envision a 
potential political practice which critically confronts the political organization of 
society, but traditions of popular storytelling are important in shaping our 
understanding of the origins and development of societies and the place people have 
in them. In Chapter 1., I already stated that standards of good citizenship are 
embedded in founding fictions about an imagined political community. Such founding 
fictions serve to justify the origins, shared values and identity of society (Schinkel 
2007, 38). In a similar way, we tend to understand politics through a mythological 
structure, as Van Rooden states (2010). Following from Nancy’s analysis (1991), Van 
Rooden notes that politics cannot be seen separately from certain founding fictions, 
which are constructed to account for a coherent organization of society. Myths lead us 
back to an invented origin of society, which makes us believe that all being-together-
in-the-world is not characterized by a random chain of events, but rather by a 
coherent and significant totality.  
 
In myth the world makes itself known, and it makes itself known through declaration 
or through a complete and decisive revelation. (Nancy 1991, 48) 
 
Certain myths or founding fictions aim to explain the force driving a political 
community in which we can believe. In Nancy’s view, one of these founding fictions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nanar ou une sortie de BD, n'a qu'à venir vivre en banlieue. Nous c'est : loyauté, respect et famille.’ 
Source: http://www.premiere.fr/film/Banlieue-13-Ultimatum/(affichage)/public. 
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is the formation of the social contract. Nancy interprets the Rousseauian perspective 
on the social contract. In Nancy’s interpretation of Rousseau, society is understood as 
a collective of individuals who are tied together in a community by a chosen social 
bond. Those who previously each lived their own lives sign an imaginary contract in 
which they agree to take each other into consideration in order to make living 
together safer and easier. Individually, they profit from this collective agreement. 
Society therefore seems to be, first of all, a means of facilitating the interests of the 
individual. At the same time, the thinking about society in the tradition of the social 
contract seems to be haunted by a nostalgic longing for a “natural” community, which 
is not born out of individual interests, but originates in a pure sense of togetherness. 
The feeling of “loss of communitarian intimacy” plays an important role in our 
historical understanding of the relation between community and society, according to 
Nancy (1991, 9). Where society is a construct in order to deal with political interests, 
as “a simple association and division of forces and needs,” community is a pure body 
in which people are bound together by sincere intimacy and harmonious relations 
(ibid.). Where the community enables people to identify themselves with their human 
“brothers and sisters,” society is a deliberately constructed instrument to facilitate 
political processes in which public interests can be managed. The construction of 
society gives validity to our being-together in the world, despite the loss of a natural 
sense of community. 
 
Van Rooden defines politics as every act or statement which claims a certain validity 
(2010, 102). Political acts or thoughts claim to propose the most right or just way to 
be related to each other in society. The same claim to validity that can be found in 
politics can also be found in myths, since these stories tend to demonstrate to us how 
the world works and what place we have in it. The mythical structure of politics offers 
firm explanations for the way humans interact with each other, which are more 
comforting than the ungrounding experience of being-together in the world, as it 
immediately presents itself to us in coexistence. Myths therefore offer us a structured 
and explicitly formulated way of giving directions to human interactions, both in a 
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moral and a political sense. Myths translate the logical structure and purpose of society 
into a narrative which is appealing and understandable to all. People can identify 
themselves with myths, and through this identification they can grasp a vivid 
understanding of the texture of the social and political power constellations in which 
they have their place. The narratives of myths clarify which identities, behavior and 
relations are permitted, and which ones are unaccepted. By making this distinction, 
they also clarify the seemingly natural and purposive bond between good citizens, and 
their opposition to bad outcasts. In this sense, myths support the imagination of a 
natural community of good citizens. As I stated in Chapter 1. and Chapter 5., such 
myths are often transmitted through popular culture, but they also play a role in 
political debates. Myths are always about a community (Nancy 1991, 51). “Neither 
dialogue nor monologue, myth is the unique speech of the many, who come thereby 
to recognize one another, who communicate and commune in myth” (ibid, 50). 
 
While founding fictions offer an explanation to make our being-together in the world 
understandable, it is exactly the bare experience of this being-together which is 
obscured in these founding fictions. Our co-appearance in the world is 
instrumentalized and related to something other than itself (Nancy 2000, 59). On the 
other hand, experiences of this same bare being-together can also have an unworking 
impact on community as it is presented in founding fictions. In Chapter 7., I 
presented Nancy’s perspective on the “inoperative” community, which is neither a 
natural given, nor intentionally produced, but “happens” in everyday interactions. 
Each inoperative community contests the idea of a social contract, and shows that the 
event of our shared coexistence in the world precedes any formation of a particular, 
homogeneous social order. The story of Banlieue 13 speaks of such an unexpected 
event of shared coexistence in which seemingly obvious community structures are 
unbound, while new possible alliances of contestation emerge. In this sense, Banlieue 
13 is a story of popular culture, which can be interpreted as undermining the myth of 
a homogeneous political community upon which society is built. The story does not 
present us with a political community with a shared origin and end. Instead, it tells us 
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of those who cannot be a part of the original bond which is usually described in 
myths. In this sense, it might be more appropriate to describe the narrative of Banlieue 
13 as a counter-narrative, since it tells the story of those people who interrupt a vision 
of French society as a coherent and well-structured community. Just like the counter-
narratives of young urban troublemakers disrupt the vision of a society which equally 
does justice to all, the narrative of Banlieue 13 interrupts the vision of France as a 
nation state which is built upon a unitary and uncontested political community. The 
counter-narrative of Banlieue 13 implies a demythicizing critique and presents us 
another, alternative narrative. Instead of presenting a recognition of a unitary bond, it 
presents a complex shared experience of difference and dissensus. What is shared is 
the experience of living on the disadvantaged side of a divided society, and the shared 
urge to rise up against the ones in power who are unwilling to change the existing 
unequal distribution of precarity and privilege.  
 
Banlieue 13 presents us with a story in which those who are seen as young urban 
troublemakers recognize their own position in society as outcasts. In Banlieue 13, we 
see a radically split society, which has cast a certain part of the population away as 
outsiders in the banlieues. As immigrants, the inhabitants of the banlieues display a 
difference in origin, and their deviant norms and values also indicate that they belong 
to a different kind of community. Rather than presenting a unified French political 
community, the story of Banlieue 13 makes clear that such a unified political 
community is not possible in French society. The solution to this radically split society 
is not sought in the re-establishment of one body of citizens who share the same 
culture and lived experiences; instead, it is sought in a shared political agency which 
does not resolve identitary antagonisms, but which denounces the abuse of power by 
a government which does not intend to represent the interests of all who make up 
society. This narrative, which counters a mythicizing vision of society, is reflected in 
the relation between the two protagonists, who have strongly divergent identities, life 
stories and interests. Despite the fact that they experience and evaluate the society in 
which they live in a completely different way, they eventually decide to jointly 
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confront a system of governance which values the preferences of an elite over the 
equal protection of all. In the following section, I will describe the narrative function 
of the crucial event of recognition which takes place in Banlieue 13, and which radically 
changes the relationship between the two protagonists, as well as their political agency. 
It will become clear how a plot with a strong mythical structure could provide 
inspiration to imagine a demythicizing critique on founding fictions of national unity.  
 
8.3. From agonistic tension to a sudden event of recognition 
The story of Banlieue 13 seems to follow the pattern of opposition between “us,” the 
young and disturbing banlieuesards who are outsiders to the dominant political order, 
and “them,” the alliance between bourgeoisie and authorities – those who wish to 
protect the dominant political community, as I described in Chapter 3.. In line with 
this opposition, the two protagonists of the movie constantly struggle with each other. 
They seem to represent an opposition between general and particular interests. Leïto 
wants his family to be saved, while Damien wants the people of France and the 
respect for the law to be saved. While fighting the gang, the two also fight with each 
other, which results in heated discussions about the strategy to be applied, lots of 
swearing and an occasional hook to the jaw. In one of the rare more substantive 
dialogues in the movie, Leïto engages in a discussion with Damien.  
 
Leïto tells Damien that he did not learn about liberté, égalité and fraternité on the streets, 
like Damien did at the police academy. There, he learned more about hate and the 
lack of water, gas and electricity. Since Leïto does not believe that everyone is treated 
equally before the French law, he growls at Damien that the only means youngsters 
from his neighborhood have to make themselves be heard is to burn cars. Damien 
tries to convince Leïto that it is his job as a police officer to see to the equal 
application of the law, but Leïto laughs at him and tells him he is just a pit bull who is 
trained to bite on command.  
 
This scene reflects various elements of the conversations I had with youngsters in 
Grigny about the antagonistic relationship between “us” and “them” in French 
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society, such as the burning of cars as a means for banlieuesards to be heard by the 
authorities and the comparison of the police with a trained dog who lack the capacity 
to think autonomously and critically. It is only towards the end of the movie that the 
antagonistic dynamics between the two protagonists change. Around ten minutes 
before the end of the movie, a crucial scene takes place in which the two suddenly 
come to realize that things are not as they thought they were.  
 
After fighting through the territory of gangster boss Taha, Leïto and Damien finally 
find the bomb and Leïto’s sister. The two are tied together on the roof of a flat 
building. When Damien tries to tap in the code to deactivate the bomb at the crucial 
moment before it will explode, Leïto suddenly stops him. He has the revelation that 
things might have been the other way around from what they have been thinking all 
the time. What if the bomb had not gone missing, but was actually placed on purpose 
in the middle of banlieue 13? What if the government did that because the authorities 
want to get rid of this whole neighborhood which is causing the country such a 
headache? What if they sent Damien out in the wilderness behind the wall to 
detonate the bomb instead of stopping it from going off? Damien does not believe 
Leïto’s speculations because he firmly believes in the rightfulness and honesty of his 
superiors. Leïto tries to convince him, but the basic distrust between the two stands 
in the way. Damien believes that a French government would never take such 
horrible measures to get rid of a deviant part of the population. Leïto replies to him 
by somewhat improperly referring to the Second World War. “It already happened 
that six million people were killed because they did not have blue eyes and blond 
hair,” he snaps at Damien. The two engage in a violent struggle, in which Damien 
tries to tap in the code and Leïto attempts to stop him. Leïto’s suspicion turns out to 
be true when the timer on the bomb goes off before Damien can tap in the code. 
Nothing happens and Damien buries his face in his hands in disbelief. Leïto sighs 
that it is all over now, but Damien says that it is not quite over yet. The two decide to 
finally truly join forces and strike back…. 
 
This scene shows how the discovery of a previously hidden side of the story changes 
the relation between the two protagonists. Where the two had first been battling each 
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other in distrust, after the encounter with the bomb they gain new insight into their 
shared situation. Despite their obvious differences, they find new grounds for 
solidarity and shared counter-actions in this situation.  
 
8.3.1. A plot of mythical proportions? 
To understand how an agonistic relationship such as the one between Damien and 
Leïto can change in a crucial moment of recognition, I will take a look at this 
contemporary counter-narrative through an Ancient Greek lens. The aforementioned 
crucial scene in Banlieue 13 can be analyzed by means of the two concepts of peripeteia 
and anagnorisis, which Aristotle introduces in his “Poetics” to describe the necessary 
ingredients of an interesting plot (2002). This might seem a strange move, since I will 
make use of an instrumentarium which is closely related to the analysis of myths. 
However, it will become clear that the plot or mythical element in the story of Banlieue 
13 leads to the interruption of a mythological thinking about a unified French political 
community. The sudden twist in the story clarifies how certain events can take place 
in which people with opposing identities, positions and interests suddenly come to 
evaluate their relation in a completely different way because they discover a dimension 
that had been obscured until the very moment of the event. The discovery of this 
dimension can open up new possibilities for a shared resistance against a commonly 
recognized enemy. 
 
Aristotle explains how a relation of agon, battle, and a moment of anagnorisis, 
recognition, are often combined in the plot of a good tragedy. The mythical element 
of the story, muthos, or plot, is the “soul” of the tragedy and defines whether the 
spectacle will capture our imagination or leave us untouched. The motives on which 
the story is based should be convincing, and the spectators should be moved by the 
fortunes and adventures of the characters, and struck by the tension of the course of 
events. In order for a theater play to be a coherent totality, it should revolve not 
around a person, but around an action, situation or event with different aspects, 
according to Aristotle (Aristotle 2002, 25-26). When the development of the situation 
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presented does not unfold in a consecutive order, peripeteia and anagnorisis can bring 
suspense into the narrative by clarifying the logical order of events where the elements 
of the situation are entangled. Peripeteia is a sudden twist of events which turns the 
situation into its opposite. Someone’s happiness is turned into sadness, or a danger to 
a character is turned into its rescue, for example. Anagnorisis is “a change from 
ignorance to knowledge, by which a relation of either congeniality or antagonism is 
revealed, between the persons whose situation was described as either happy or 
unhappy” (Aristotle 2002, 30). In the best plays, peripeteia and anagnorisis are combined 
with each other in the plot. The anagnorisis, which takes place in a moment of peripeteia, 
is a sudden recognition between different characters who are strongly affected by this 
sudden twist of events and of relations (peripeteia), either in a positive or in a negative 
way. The recognition, which Aristotle envisions with the moment of peripeteia and 
anagnorisis, is usually framed in terms of identity. The moment of recognition reveals a 
person’s true identity which had been hidden. A famous example is the moment in the 
story of Oedipus, when the protagonist understands that the man he killed was 
actually his father and the woman he married is his mother. It is necessary that the 
recognition works both ways, so all characters in the situation have to recognize each 
other, even though the recognition might not take place simultaneously. For example, 
in Euripides’ play “Iphigeneia in Tauris,” Orestes first recognizes his sister when she 
says her name in a letter she recites to his friend Pylades. Iphigeneia only recognizes 
her brother afterwards, when he proves his identity to her.  
 
The conditions which Aristotle lays out for a good tragedy are explicitly suitable for 
analyzing mythical narratives, which aim to give a clear explanation for human agency 
as it is destined to develop from a certain origin towards a certain end. Such narratives 
have a teleological character, since they lay bare the consistency of a certain course of 
events, as they are destined to be, despite the errancies of the characters. Literary 
theorist Northrop Frye notes the carefully structured character of plots as Aristotle 
envisioned them. Frye states that it is in the plot that “the unifying shape of the whole 
design becomes conceptually visible” (1963, 25). Some elements of the narrative 
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which have been there all along are brought to light in the plot. The moment of 
recognition is also the moment of identification between characters, “a hidden truth 
about something or somebody emerges into view” (ibid., 26). This identification does 
not remain restricted to the internal structure of the story. It is not only the characters 
who recognize each other, but also the spectators who recognize the true significance 
of the story. “Anagnorisis is the clarification for the audience of the sequence of cause 
and effect which determines the outcome; it is an epistemological event, but one 
which includes moral and metaphysical considerations” (Cave 1988, 195) This effect, 
which is produced outside of the story, is already mentioned by Aristotle in his Poetics. 
When we look at a poetic representation we learn something about human agency, 
because we tend to compare our own agency with that of the people we watch in the 
spectacle. The people who act in a tragedy or comedy are either doing the right things 
or the wrong things in our eyes, so we also learn about the moral aspect of human 
agency (Aristotle 2002, 5).   
 
8.3.2. A de-mythicizing interpretation 
In the case of Banlieue 13, the mythical element of recognition in the plot could bring 
the spectator to recognize not the obvious myths of national unity, but a critique of 
such founding fictions. The storyline of Banlieue 13 meets the requirements of a strong 
plot, while it simultaneously opens possibilities for a de-mythicizing interpretation. 
The plot of Banlieue 13 meets almost all the necessary conditions to be convincing, 
according to Aristotle’s guidelines, except for the fact that it is not a hidden identity 
that is revealed, but a hidden side to the relation between the protagonists and their 
enemy. While they are adversaries with their own agenda before the sudden twist of 
events, they realize in a moment that they have both been tricked by a party they had 
not recognized as a common enemy before. In the crucial moment in which Leïto 
realizes that Damien is about to detonate the bomb, peripeteia is joined by a moment of 
anagnorisis or recognition. Both Leïto and Damien become aware that they are victims 
of the government’s abuse of power. This new understanding makes them look at 
each other in a different way. The two understand that they are bound to each other 
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in a situation of more important misfortune than they thought, and that they now 
have a real common battle to fight, despite their differences. Even though Leïto has 
come to this realization earlier than Damien, both recognize that they are in an 
undeniable relation to each other. They decide to voluntarily join forces this time, to 
fight back. 
 
This mythical element in the plot of Banlieue 13 invites the spectator to consider the 
story as a counter-narrative criticizing the seemingly self-evident unity of French 
society. It is precisely the absence of an identity-based recognition which interrupts 
the possible mythological interpretation of the plot. The storyline has a strong 
mythical plot, but the truths about the course of events which are revealed in the plot 
have a counter-productive effect on any mythological identification outside of the 
movie. Those who recognize their real lived circumstances and values in the narrative 
of the movie are the ones who do not have a place in the mythical, founding fictions 
about the French political community. The twists in the story do not lead to a 
conclusive discovery of a certain unitary community, with a commonly shared, final 
destiny. This point is enforced by the fact that the two protagonists have completely 
different identities and represent opposing groups within society. Nevertheless, he 
protagonists both become aware of a fundamental breach of trust between a group of 
marginalized and disregarded citizens and the authorities of the state. The story 
therefore reveals the inoperative state of French society and its political organization. 
The moral and, even more importantly, the political aspects of human agency 
presented in the story point to the essential lack of a shared identity or destination in 
our coexistence in the world. The event of peripeteia does not lead to the discovery of 
definite answers, but rather opens up the awareness of a complicated problem. 
Nevertheless, the suddenly emergent awareness that the protagonists share this 
problem forms a strong, but hazardous motivation for a joint political agency, despite 
all their obvious differences. This political solidarity is motivated by the recognition of 
a common vulnerability to loss, instead of a common identity. Furthermore, this 
political solidarity is expressed directly in a shared agency, i.e. confronting a common 
 480 
enemy, and not in an identification preceding that agency. Hence, a certain form of 
shared unruly political agency, directed at unjustly operating ruling authorities, is 
opened up in the recognition of a situation of shared precarity. In the following 
section, I will explain that the event of peripeteia and anagnorisis in the movie illustrates 
the kind of precarious political subjectivity which I described in the previous chapter, 
and which is first of all reflected in agency, rather than in identity. Such unruly 
political agency explicitly opposes the idea that a strong unitary identification is 
needed to become politically active. I will state that the sudden twist of events in the 
movie illustrates how people can engage in joint counter-actions across borders 
between privileged and under-privileged groups in society, without necessarily sharing 
an identification, general political framework or consensus that extends beyond their 
specific shared situation.  
 
8.4. Shared unruly politics without identification 
 
In the last scene of Banlieue 13, we see Leïto and Damien burst into the office of the 
French president in the Élysée while carrying the bomb between them. They drop the 
bomb on the president’s desk and make it clear to him that his malicious plans have 
been revealed. The president tries to defend the decision of the government to 
destroy Banlieue 13 by claiming that tax payers are scared and tired of paying fortunes 
for the misbehaving racaille167 from the banlieues. The Banlieue 13 neighborhood had 
become uncontrollable and the government had therefore decided to dispose of it. 
The president admits that this is not the most democratic measure to take, but he 
sees it as the most effective. After threatening to detonate the bomb right there and 
then, Damien jokingly comforts the president and says that Leïto and himself have 
thought of a more democratic solution than the use of violence. He emphasizes that 
it is the president’s job to see to the equal application of the law for everybody; tout le 
monde. They have taped the whole conversation they just had and the president is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 President Sarkozy used the same word to speak of the banlieuesards involved in the Parisian riots in 
2005. While the movie came out one year earlier, this incident elicited the remark from the director of 
Banlieue 13 that the real French president took too much of an example from the fictional one in his 
movie. The future scenario of Banlieue 13 thus seemed to come true sooner than expected. 
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forced to see himself repeat the death verdict of Banlieue 13 over and over again on 
television.  
This aftermath of the event of peripeteia and anagnorisis in Banlieue 13 can be seen as a 
shared political action, set in motion by a moment of recognition which transcends 
the boundaries of otherwise strictly divided communities. Despite their differences in 
identity and social status, Damien and Leïto discover they have a common enemy. 
This discovery brings them closer together and creates a level of understanding and 
solidarity which enables them to act together. It becomes possible for Damien and 
Leïto to engage in a shared counter-action directed at the corrupt government after 
they have recognized that they share a common vulnerable position in a situation 
which extends beyond their personal endeavors. Their lives have become instrumental 
and disposable by means of the government’s project to protect the interests of a 
French elite at the expense of the marginalized banlieue population. They realize that 
the government has deliberately exposed certain parts of the population to a 
heightened level of precarity. This sudden awareness of a shared risk of 
dehumanization leads to a common political demand for justice. Despite their obvious 
differences, the two protagonists come to realize that they share a wish for social 
change, and a better, more democratic, political organization of society. Despite this 
common wish for a more democratic future, the opposing points of view and interests 
of Damien and Leïto are not effaced, nor do they develop a lasting friendship. Their 
cooperation remains highly situated. 
 
Despite their joint efforts to rearrange the political framework in their national 
context, Leïto and Damien’s different convictions on the matter of the application of 
the law keeps them from a permanent union at the end of Banlieue 13.  
 
In the epilogue of Banlieue 13, Leïto and Damien bid each other farewell at the 
checkpoint which forms the gate between the center of Paris and banlieue 13. After 
the unmasking of the president, the government has changed and a new future is 
promised for the banlieues. The wall will be demolished and the schools will be re-
opened. Damien invites Leïto to stay on his side of the wall since he will now be able 
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to afford a nice apartment in the center of Paris. But Leïto wants to return to his own 
community in the neighborhood where he was born and raised. He is doubtful about 
the promises the government has made. Leïto still distrusts the national authorities, 
while Damien’s trust that they will see to the just application of the laws for 
everybody is completely restored. Leïto departs to the other side of the wall 
wondering aloud which neighborhood is actually the most dangerous: his own or 
Damien’s? 
 
Here, it becomes clear that the political agency shared by Leïto and Damien remains 
situated within a specific context. 
 
Precarity cuts across identity categories as well as multicultural maps, thus forming 
the basis for an alliance focused on opposition to state violence and its capacity to 
produce, exploit, and distribute precarity for the purpose of profit and territorial 
defence. Such an alliance would not require agreement on all questions of desire or 
belief or self-identification. It would be a movement sheltering certain kinds of 
ongoing antagonisms among its participants, valuing such persistent and animating 
differences as the sign and substance of a radical democratic politics. (Butler 2010, 
32) 
 
In line with these words of Butler, the shared political agency which follows the 
moment of peripeteia and anagnorisis in Banlieue 13 does not imply a substantial political 
program which resolves the antagonistic relation between the protagonists. As I 
already stated in Chapter 7., Butler emphasizes that political recognition should not 
depend on shared identity markers, but that it instead originates from a shared 
vulnerability to state abuse of power. Leïto and Damien decide to jointly confront the 
government with its deceit, despite the fact that they do not identify with each other. 
A shared exposure to precarity can lead to the awareness that one shares a common 
enemy. However, this awareness does not directly lead to one to collective will and a 
strong popular political subject, like Ernesto Laclau proposes, as discussed in Chapter 
3.. The shared political agency of Damien and Leïto is not embedded within a 
common constitutive political framework, nor in a shared identity. The diversity of 
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particular demands is not exceeded in a general hegemonic position in this shared 
political agency. What is shared does not replace existing particular interests and 
opposing views. The hope for a more just society is shared, but this hope serves as a 
common inspiration, rather than as a specific blueprint for a general political program. 
Despite the fact that Leïto and Damien agree on the importance of equally applied 
laws to guide social interactions between people, they disagree on the way in which 
these laws should be formulated and enforced, because they come from different 
backgrounds and have different affiliations and convictions. Leïto does not trust any 
officially recognized political institutions, while Damien condemns Leïto’s lack of 
participation within the national framework and his attitude of “own local interests 
and own community first.” Their respective particular and general interests continue 
to clash with each other, despite their cooperation in the given situation. A lasting 
consensus which extends beyond this situation is therefore not reached between the 
two.  
 
Since the story of Banlieue 13 draws our attention to a moment of recognition which 
takes place in a shared situation before a common political program, community or 
identity is constructed, it is a valuable story for understanding how political alliances 
can coexist with antagonisms regarding convictions, lifestyles and identity markers. 
The evental character of both the recognition which takes place and the joint counter-
actions that follow does not entirely resolve the opposition between Leïto and 
Damien. A twist of events in which peripeteia and anagnorisis are combined, in a story 
with a strong plot therefore does not only serve to uncover hidden truths about 
certain pre-constituted identities, but can also serve to open new perspectives on 
agency in which the vulnerable sides of identification are disclosed. Philosopher 
Patchen Markell states that, as strong plot elements, anagnorisis and peripeteia explicitly 
serve to reveal the interdependence and precariousness at an ontological level of the 
characters in a story (2003). 
8.4.1. Recognizing the hazardous sides of recognition 
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The twist of events in Banlieue 13 shows that recognition does not always imply a 
sovereign act of affirmation of the pre-constituted identity of others. When we think 
of recognition, we often think about different groups who affirm each other’s right 
and capacity to fully express their already defined identity and lifestyle within a shared 
political framework. This is often the case in the tradition of politics of recognition, as 
it is associated with thinkers such as Charles Taylor and Nancy Fraser.168 In the cases 
of an identity-based as well as redistributionist view on politics of recognition, an 
autonomous subject, which may or may not act in the context of a shared political 
community, is presupposed. In this understanding of politics of recognition, an 
identification with the other as autonomously operating within a shared framework of 
political belonging is ultimately desired. However, people’s radical dependency on 
others for their subject-formation, and their lack of autonomy in their political 
positioning within society is not sufficiently acknowledged in the tradition of what we 
understand as “politics of recognition” (Markell 2003). This tradition of understanding 
recognition in a political sense is therefore less useful in understanding the political 
agency of a precarious political subject, which is not an autonomous subject, but an 
interdependent subject, as I stated in the previous chapter.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 In the case of politics of recognition, one usually speaks of a political practice which is aimed at the 
permanent incorporation of minorities with a divergent cultural identity or social status in an inclusive 
political order. Discussions on politics of recognition are often characterized by a strong focus on the 
moral dimensions of identity formation and the impact of institutional political frameworks on identity 
formation (Appiah 2005; Benhabib, Shapiro & Petranovich 2007; Kenny 2004; Parekh 2008). Since the 
1990s, debate on the political implications of multiculturalism, the concept “politics of recognition” has 
usually been associated with a recognition in society of the identity of marginalized groups which are in 
need of emancipation (Gutmann 1994) and an inclusion of these groups in the institutional framework 
(Habermas 1998). In debates on multiculturalism, the term “recognition” has been used to plead for a 
respectful acceptance of cultural diversity (Taylor 1994). Ethnic and cultural minorities should be allowed 
to express their own identity freely in the public domain and be recognized as full citizens (Kymlicka 
1995). This focus on identity formation has been challenged by scholars who emphasize the influence of 
socio-economic structures on politics of recognition (Fraser & Honneth 2003). Those who are 
characterized as “redistributionists” emphasize that a recognition which is only focused on identity 
cannot provide for a true emancipation of marginalized groups. A preoccupation with identity can cause 
a neglect of social solidarity, which could be organized around questions of the just and equal access to 
means for making a living. Besides a recognition of identity, an egalitarian redistribution of wealth and 
social goods, like affect, education and free time, is also necessary for emancipation (Rawls 2001; Walzer 
1984). Nancy Fraser proposes to integrate politics of recognition with a politics of redistribution, while at 
the same time taking account of the full complexity of group identities (Fraser 2000).  
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The account of shared unruly politics presented in Banlieue 13 does not speak of a 
constituent subject with a potential for autonomous agency, but rather of an 
experience of inter-dependency which transcends each subject formation, but which is 
nevertheless directed at a common adversary. As Patchen Markell rightly notes, the 
Aristotelian moment of recognition, or anagnorisis, does not always give reason for the 
celebration of fulfillment. It often makes the protagonists of a tragedy realize what 
they have lost or are about to lose (Markell 2003, 62). In particular, the loss of 
sovereignty plays an important part in anagnorisis. In general, the moment of anagnorisis 
makes the protagonists aware that they have not been fully sovereign in their agency 
because they lacked knowledge of certain crucial elements of the situation they were in 
before the event of revelation took place. They become aware that their actions were 
unknowingly influenced by other people and hidden circumstances. In Banlieue 13, it 
was especially Damien who thought that he agreed upon an important mission out of 
free will, but unexpectedly learned that he was carrying out a completely different 
mission than he intended to. Without him realizing the impact of his agency, he 
almost involuntarily put to death the population of an entire neighborhood. 
Anagnorisis is therefore first and foremost a recognition of the limited autonomy of 
people’s agency, and the fact that people’s agency is necessarily bound to specific 
situations which are shared with others. We cannot choose to oversee every origin and 
consequence of our actions on our own terms. We therefore never completely “own” 
our agency (ibid., 63-64).  
 
As much as people cannot be in control over the impact of their own agency, they 
cannot control the influence others have on both their agency and their identity. In a 
moment of anagnorisis, the protagonist of a play therefore always comes to realize that 
potential tragic suffering can never be fully prevented on his/her own responsibility. 
In a tragedy, doing and suffering are inextricably bound to each other (ibid., 79). 
Others do not only have the capacity to make us suffer, but always co-shape the 
meaning of our actions. Since we are only limited masters of our own agency, 
Aristotle, as noted earlier, concludes that the actions which make up a plot are of 
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more importance than the characters in a tragedy (Aristotle 2002, 25-26) . The 
audience learns from a tragedy first of all about the potential impact of human agency, 
rather than of human identity. This analysis leads Markell to the conclusion that it is 
not only an identity that is hidden up until the peripeteia which is usually recognized in 
anagnorisis, but also the conditions which define our actions. 
 
If the priority of action over ethos and identity is an occasion for reversal and thus for 
anagnorisis, then perhaps the “shift from ignorance to knowledge” involved in 
anagnorisis is best understood not only as the discovery of someone’s true identity, but 
also and more fundamentally as what I would call an “ontological” discovery, a shift 
from ignorance to knowledge about the real conditions of one’s own existence and 
activity, and especially about the very relationship between ethos or identity and action. 
(Markell 2003, 86) 
 
When we look at the event of peripeteia and anagnorisis in this way, it has the capacity to 
disrupt certain identity formations, which had seemed to be self-evident and coherent, 
because it confronts us with the inescapable finitude of our own sovereignty, and our 
ontological coexistence with others. Therefore, it is not a concrete, constitutive 
identity guiding peoples actions that is revealed in such a moment of recognition, but 
rather a precarious, hazardous and unpredictable configuration of shared agency, 
which can never give full and lasting guarantees for the future. This explains why the 
event of anagnorisis does not necessarily have to lead to a positively valued, lasting 
consensus between the identity and convictions of the characters involved. 
 
To envision identity as a fait accompli (ibid., 14) means to overlook the temporality of 
recognition, which implies an intersubjective process of change – not only gesturing at 
the past, but also seeking to enclose new forms of interactions in the future. Human 
actions are always situated in a context of relationality with effects that go beyond the 
sovereign decisions of the subject. Human interactions are therefore always uncertain 
and open-ended (ibid., 7). Markell emphasizes that an acknowledgement of the limits 
to one’s own agency should precede the recognition of the identity of the other (ibid., 
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36). Such a “politics of acknowledgement” is more directed at the interdependencies 
of the agency of selves and others within a situated context than at a constituent 
identity which extends beyond every situation and the influence of others. It is built 
on the realization that we cannot, and should not, fixate other people’s identities and 
positions in order to secure our own sense of sovereignty or invulnerability. Human 
interactions always remain risky and uncertain, since we can never be sure of the 
impact intersubjectivity has on our sharing of the world. A recognition of our sharing 
of the world can therefore never fully guarantee that conflicts and alienation are ruled 
out. This acknowledgement implies an acceptance that recognition does not always 
lead to a positive mutual understanding, but can still fail to overcome hostility, painful 
confrontations and incomprehension. In full awareness of these hazards, a twist of 
events and recognition can incite forms of shared agency in which coalitions are 
formed, while simultaneously confrontations continue to take place.  
 
8.4.2. A story told from the edge 
Since this shared, yet risky, unruly and confrontational agency cuts across identitary 
communities and interest groups, it also disturbs the dream of a homogeneous 
political community that sustains the nation state. The disturbance of this dream is 
caused by the sudden and unexpected emergence of alliances between those who 
might radically disagree, except for the fact that they no longer wish to tolerate the 
neglect and/or exploitation of certain parts of the population by state authorities. The 
existence of this neglect and exploitation already clarifies that the nation state is not 
sustained by one unitary community, but that there is a split between those who are 
merited to be worthy to take part in a certain national union and those who are not. 
Banlieue 13 is therefore not a “founding fiction” (Nancy 1991, 53), but rather a 
counter-narrative of momentary, situated and inoperative recognition of those who do 
not share a common foundation.   
 
Just like communities are constantly interrupted by our bare being-in-common, myths 
are interrupted by stories which do not tell us of a structured totality or an expected 
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origin or destiny. Jean-Luc Nancy states that it is in the moment that we realize that 
myth is a myth, that the coherent totality of mythical thinking can be interrupted. 
Simultaneously, our understanding of community as a coherent totality is interrupted. 
In the interruption of myth, community is confronted with its own incapacity to fulfill 
itself in an ultimate communion (Nancy 1991, 60). Once we realize that the clarifying 
force of myths, which tell us about our shared origin and destiny, is an invention, we 
can recognize our bare and vulnerable coexistence in the world. This recognition does 
not come about in a new myth, but in its interruption. The voice of the interruption 
of myths is a literary voice, in which community tells itself of its own being-in-
common, which can never become a common being (Nancy 1991, 63). In the 
interruption of myth, there is still a story told. The interruption of myth is therefore 
closely related to myth itself. The voice of the interruption communicates something 
to us, but it is not a new story that is told. It is a disruptive echo, which both resonates 
in the old story and interrupts its consistent, logical unfolding to make something 
heard which was unheard before. 
 
This voice seems to play back the declaration of myth, for in the interruption there is 
nothing to be heard, there is no new myth breaking through; it is the old story one 
seems to hear. When a voice, or music, is suddenly interrupted, one hears just at that 
instant something else, a mixture of various silences and noises that had been covered 
over by the sound, but in this something else one hears again the voice or the music 
that has become in a way the voice or the music of its own interruption: a kind of 
echo, but one that does not repeat that of which it is the reverberation. (Nancy 1991, 
62) 
 
Precisely because there is no new story told, a mythical interruption can also resonate 
within a story with a strong plot. The narrative of Banlieue 13 could be read as a myth, 
part of an “old” genre of stories in which we hear an “old” structured plot echo. But, 
in the instant of peripeteia within this plot or muthos, we suddenly hear the unexpected: 
a recognition of our bare vulnerability in a radical equal existence in the world, a 
radical equality which had been covered by the orderly course of events and which will 
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be covered again as soon as the events take back their orderly course. It is this echo of 
a bare and vulnerable coexistence simply presenting itself in a crucial moment that 
makes it possible to simultaneously read the narrative of Banlieue 13 as a counter-
narrative, interrupting any identification with a mythological thinking about 
community.  
 
I propose to see the narrative of Banlieue 13 as a contemporary literary voice, which 
interrupts the mythological thinking about French society as a coherently structured 
political community. It is not a written story, but a visual, cinematographic one, which 
easily resonates with the young inhabitants of the banlieues. It speaks to us of those 
edges of identity formations which collide with each other, and which constitute and 
undermine each other in their coexistence in the world. In Banlieue 13, Damien and 
Leïto both traverse the wall that separates their communities and identities to join 
each other in a moment of political recognition, to be later separated again by this 
same wall. They both come to the realization that each formation of a coherent and 
autonomous political subjectivity can always be interrupted by a shared socio-
ontological status of vulnerability.  
 
Interruption occurs at the edge, or rather it constitutes the edge where beings touch 
each other, expose themselves to each other and separate from one another, thus 
communicating and propagating their community. On this edge, destined to this edge 
and called forth by it, born of interruption, there is a passion. This is, if you will, what 
remains of myth, or rather, it is itself the interruption of myth. (Nancy 1991, 61) 
 
Banlieue 13 is an interruptive story which speaks to us about inoperative political 
communities that emanate from a vulnerable coexistence in the world, and which 
extend beyond any community founded in a coherent identity. When the political 
value of this interruption is recognized, it can lead to new perspectives on another, 
more just organization of society. A perspective on shared political agency, while 
maintaining ongoing differences, can be opened up in the interruption. The 
recognition of an equal status of vulnerability can communicate a shared passion, and 
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motivate people to act politically together upon this recognition. While opposing each 
other in antagonistic frames of belonging, people can find each other in specific 
situations, at specific moments, to fight specific practices of oppression or injustice. 
The moment of recognition that Leïto and Damien share with each other can lead the 
spectator to recognize a need to fight oppressive practices of dehumanization on the 
basis of an ontological equality as vulnerable human beings because everyone could be 
equally affected by such practices. This recognition opens the door to a shared 
political agency which does not deny antagonisms and even does not presuppose a 
shared understanding of a legal order.  
 
Such a shared political practice makes sense when we find ourselves at the edge, when 
we think of the impact of the imaginary walls which separate the banlieues from the 
dominant order of French society and which at the same time constitute the identity 
of those banlieues and that dominant order. It is a form of unruly politics which takes 
place at the edge of a homogeneous national political community, where the good and 
accepted citizens and the disapproved outcasts are confronted with each other and see 
themselves obliged to engage with each other. This confrontational unruly politics 
might prove to be a very important political practice with respect to acting against 
forms of injustice which we necessarily have to fight in our contemporary world. We 
co-appear in the world with young urban troublemakers, even if they burn cars, seem 
to belong to a different community and do not subscribe the legal order of our 
society. Just like them, we could find ourselves at a sudden moment in an unexpected 
vulnerable situation. This awareness should suffice for us to act out against their 
stigmatization and exclusion. In the following sections, I will state that the event of 
recognition in the story of Banlieue 13 illustrates a possible unruly political agency 
across identity boundaries and classes of privilege, in which confrontations and 
coalitions both take place. If social injustices and inequalities are incorporated and 
enforced in the institutional domain, such mechanisms could be critically evaluated 
and pressured to change. The proposition of the initial equality of everyone implies a 
critique on democratic political practices which are only open to those who are 
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considered to be members of a certain defined national community. In the following 
section, I will consider the potential of a radical democratic practice which is 
embedded with such unruly political agency because it transcends not only the borders 
of identity groups, but also those of nation states in order to plead for a recognized 
sharing of the world, despite everyone’s differences.   
 
8.5. Democracy for tou t  l e  monde 
The moment in which Damien and Leïto burst into the office of the French president 
in order to hold him accountable for his betrayal of the population of banlieue 13 can 
be seen as an unruly counter-action against a failing system of governance by two 
unlikely allies, who both wish to protect the dignity of the French population. Not 
only the lives of the inhabitants of banlieue 13 were put on the line by the president, 
but the confidence of France in its totality was jeopardized, as Damien makes clear in 
the aforementioned scene. The president proved that he did not intend to secure 
governance in name of the best interests of tout le monde, or everybody. The well-being 
of banlieue 13 is therefore not only a matter of personal engagement for Leïto, as an 
inhabitant of that particular neighborhood, but also for Damien, who has a more 
privileged position in society, but who has sworn to protect the equal application of 
the law for everyone. Damiens’ tout le monde also includes the inhabitants of banlieue 13, 
who do not even recognize the authority of the French law. Just like Damien, Leïto 
relies on a sense of justice and equality which is stripped bare from any adherence to a 
specific juridical order, but which is rather related to an equal socio-ontological status. 
By expressing this sense of justice and equality, he is able to make his companion see 
beyond the “official” rules and regulations. All people, or tout le monde, are of equal 
worth and should also be of equal worth to the government. This ontological sense of 
equality, which is derived from a shared coexistence in the world, seems to be very 
preliminary, but it already has in itself strong political implications. It makes Damien 
feel obliged to “switch parties,” so to speak. From someone who defends the 
dominant political and legal order, he becomes a defender of the “underdog.” This 
transformation takes place upon realizing that something more fundamental is at 
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stake, something that transcends the supposed importance of his initial mission. He 
starts to relies on his own sense of justice, even when it makes him break the law and 
turn against his superiors. 
 
In the name of a shared demand for justice, the two do not hesitate to violate certain 
laws which they find to be of lesser importance. They violently break into the office of 
the president and use unconventional measures to force him to resign. Their action 
interrupts legitimate political participation and the normal state of affairs in the 
domain of institutional politics. Despite the obvious, deeply rooted differences in 
world view and identity between the two allies, they are brought together by an unruly 
disruption of the existing legal order at the center of institutional political governance 
in this militant action. They form a temporary militant coalition that includes not only 
the most precarious, but also the more privileged. Damien clearly crosses the line of 
his jurisdiction as a law enforcer. He resorts to unruly actions, since he has discovered 
that the frames of action that have been set out for him by his superiors do not suffice 
in openly expressing an indictment against injustices caused by the state. He thereby 
performs an act of solidarity as envisioned in the egalitarian revolt of Martin Crowley, 
which I described in the previous chapter. In this case, it is not only the one who 
already lived in precarious circumstances who resorts to unruly actions, as they are 
associated with the domain of street politics, or informal politics, as envisioned by 
Bayat. Damien and Leïto find each other in a mission intended to break the deceptive 
spell of exclusionary, authoritarian power plays, with a compelling appeal to lived 
truths of lacking justice and equality. Where official institutions fail to protect those in 
the most precarious position, they show that a coalition of usually antagonistic 
community representatives can take matters into their own hands in order to re-
establish the dignity of a seemingly disposable part of the population.  
 
Together, Damien and Leïto contest the state’s unacceptable devaluation of the lives 
of those who are already in a precarious position. By boldly threatening the president 
and reminding him that justice should be upheld for everyone, tout le monde, they 
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perform an act of parrhesia. They take the risk of speaking up to a powerful authority 
from an inferior position. In the movie’s final stand-off, they not only reveal the evil 
scheme of the government to kill an apparently “disposable” part of the population; 
with the detonated bomb, they also lay a lived truth on the table which transcends any 
authoritarian position and legislative power. They appeal to a sense of justice that does 
not allow itself to be founded in, nor restricted by, a corruptible letter of the law, but 
simply presents itself in a shared situation of precariousness, which is both confirmed 
and traversed in parrhesiastic gestures and unruly agency. By doing so, both critically 
confront the existing practice of democratic politics for not sufficiently taking into 
account the claims of groups who are confronted with disproportionate precarity. 
Damien and Leïto’s parrhesiastic and unruly counter-action illustrates a radical 
democratic practice which presupposes the ontological equality and interdependency 
of everyone, regardless of societal status, while simultaneously differences in lifestyle, 
convictions and political expressions are not evened out. By focusing on the 
democratic consequences of such a counter-action, it becomes possible to further 
conceptualize its effects on the domain of institutional politics.  
 
8.5.1. A radical democratic practice open to unofficial activities 
Judith Butler explicitly connects a recognition of precarious circumstances, which cut 
across identitary boundaries, to the emergence of a renewed practice of radical 
democratic politics in which antagonisms are not negated, but valued as a necessary 
condition of difference. The analysis of the storyline of the counter-myth of Banlieue 
13 contributes to an understanding of the kind of event of recognition, or counter-
action, in which such a radical democratic politics emerges. Butler perceives 
antagonisms as a productive political force (Butler 2010, 144). A radical political 
practice based on this understanding cannot be reduced to a politics of recognition 
which strives to incorporate groups or individuals who deviate from the norm into an 
already existing normative and legal framework of citizenship. Instead, this political 
practice aims to develop new discourses about civic values and norms of political 
participation in which a contestation of state-induced regimes of exclusion and 
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subordination can be effectively formulated (ibid., 146-147). “Coalitions” of very 
divergent people can find each other in the process of shaping such new discourses of 
dissent. “What is necessary is that those engaged in such coalitional efforts be actively 
involved in thinking through the category of the ‘minority,’ as it crosses the lines that 
divide citizen from non-citizen” (ibid., 147).  
 
When I relate my analysis of the story of Banlieue 13 to the narratives of my 
respondents who recognized their lived experiences in the movie, I think that the 
often scandalous and unruly political agency of young urban troublemakers could play 
a similar role as the counter-actions of the protagonists of the movie in inciting a 
practice of radical democratic politics. The parrhesiastic counter-narratives of young 
urban troublemakers about lived injustices can help others indeed critically “think 
through the category of the minority” and question the political distinctions which are 
made on the basis of this category. In the unease which is provoked by disruptive 
events of recognition, we can become aware of testimonies of injustice and inequality 
which force us to look beyond the border of our own subject-position within society. 
This unease could be instigated by a confrontation with the counter-narratives and 
counter-actions of young urban troublemakers. Those who are willing to take these 
counter-narratives and counter-actions seriously could feel encouraged to declare a 
solidarity with these young people, who have been forced into a marginalized position. 
If this happens, a precarious political subject of a coalitional nature could emerge 
which speaks out in favor of a radical democratic transformation, while conceiving 
democracy not as the self-governance of a sovereign, national political community. In 
the awareness of the inter-dependence of completely divergent people, with divergent 
identities and social positions, it could open a perspective on “democratic citizenship 
not as the self-control of the people, but as a matter of taking part in the activity of 
politics, where taking part can refer not only to participation in authoritative 
deliberative and decision-making bodies, but also to a range of unofficial activities, 
both quotidian and extraordinary, through which authoritative acts are subjected to 
the unpredictable responses of those whose lives they touch” (Markell 2003, 188). 
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Here, “taking part” also includes those who have no part in a practice of democracy, 
which is perceived as limited to formal, institutionally endorsed decision-making 
models, because it recognizes the everyday unruly practices of so-called minorities 
seeking a dignified life as inclusive to the domain of democracy.  
 
8.5.2. A “postnational” political practice  
This radical democratic politics could transcend not only the identity boundaries of 
groups and individuals, but also those of nation states. Since this political practice 
does not manifest itself in imagined national political communities, but instead 
contradicts the mythically founded imagination of such communities, it could be 
described as “postnational.” For young people with an immigrant background, in 
particular, forms of shared unruly resistance against exclusion stem from a sense of 
solidarity that is based not on national and/or ethnic affiliations, but on similar lived 
experiences in marginalized urban areas (El Tayeb 2011). Solidarity is expressed in an 
urban youth culture which crosses the borders of nation states, and therefore leaves 
the concept of the nation as something which is both traversed and left behind. For 
these young people, the city – not the nation state – is the domain of political agency. 
Communities of experience, as I described the shared lived experiences of youth in 
deprived and stigmatized neighborhoods in Chapter 3., often share similar struggles, 
values and lifestyles across national contexts, despite their rootedness in a specific, 
local urban context. New “diasporic” coalitions (ibid., xxxv), which are both global 
and local, set in specific situations and appealing to universal values, are constructed 
around commonly recognized experiences of being treated as an illegitimate outsider 
in relation to an imagined national identity. A particular, localized sense of belonging 
goes hand in hand with a transnational appeal for justice for youth who live in a 
comparable urban context, under comparable social circumstances, all coming from a 
migrant background.  
 
The term “postnational” is often understood as a means of indicating the diminishing 
importance of nation-state borders within a system of governance which is 
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increasingly globalized. In such a postnational situation, citizenship no longer depends 
on the realm of the nation state and is more and more replaced by a multiplicity of 
legitimations for political membership which are transnational, as we see in the case of 
the European Union (Soysal 1994). Here, the postnational seems to be first of all 
understood as transnationalism. 
 
[T]he suggestion is that the nation-state and the forms of nationalism that 
underpinned it, while they have not been dissolved, are being empirically and 
normatively superseded. This claim of supersession rests on two key arguments which 
typify the postnationalist perspective: that the nation-state is being relegated as an 
effective political institution by processes of globalization, and that national identity is 
being outstripped and displaced by the rise of alternative forms of identity (Breen & 
O’Neill 2010, 3). 
 
Fatima El Tayeb has a different interpretation, which is more suitable for my analysis. 
She warns that seemingly inclusive, transnational political communities, such as the 
European community, are not as neutral as they seem. The European community 
tends to hide its ethnicization and racialization under the pretext of being pluralistic, 
but simultaneously excludes those of color or with a non-European background (El 
Tayeb 2011, xx). In resistance to such obscured practices of exclusion, various 
coalitions of urban youngsters with an immigrant background apply strategies to 
“queer” ethnicity and national identity. In El Tayeb’s understanding of the post-
national, the focus lies on queering national identities, rather than on transcending 
national identities in another, merely larger unitary community. Queering is, in this 
context, not a reference to sexual orientation, but a practice which both intersects and 
disrupts various social subject formations. A queer practice is defined by El Tayeb as 
“a revised definition of political agency as well as national identification, and a 
reassessment of the relationship between community, space, and identity in a 
postethnic and translocal context” (ibid., xxx). The shared unruly politics that I 
describe here could be understood as a similar postnational, queer practice, since it 
also contests a sense of belonging that is pure and singular. Forms of postnational 
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resistance are not founded in a strong subject position with a homogeneous identity, 
but are nourished by an experience of a “failure of identification” with the dominant 
majority (ibid., xxxiii). El Tayeb refers here to the notion of “disidentification,” which 
was introduced by José Esteban Muñoz to describe political strategies of minority 
groups to both cope with and disrupt continuous mechanisms of stigmatization and 
exclusion (1999).  
 
Within such mechanisms of disidentification, minorities do not fully neglect or reject 
dominant culture and citizenship, but engage with these in a critical and 
confrontational way. In applying subversive strategies, those who are stigmatized as 
outcasts aim to claim a space for themselves within the nation state by actively 
appealing for a sense of community and culture which transcends that same nation 
state and by actively contesting a dominant form of citizenship which confines people 
to their assigned place. This sense of community is “based on the shared experience 
of multiple, contradictory positionalities” (El Tayeb 2011, xxxvi), and could therefore 
also be characterized as inoperative. It is precisely this unrooted and subversive sense 
of community which can attack “the myth of colorblindness” (ibid.) that is still so 
firmly upheld in Europe. It is within “situational communities” which “offer no return 
to an unconflicted origin,” and which are always momentary and the sites of 
“entanglement” between various conflicting identity models, where a resistance 
against state-induced mechanisms of exclusion can begin (ibid., 172). 
 
In a similar sense, Nancy insists that democracy only makes sense if it presumes the 
possibility of being together with others, regardless of the recognition of any defined 
authority, be it institutional or normative (Nancy 2008, 29). For Nancy, democracy is 
first of all a willingness, or a way of thinking, which acknowledges the irreducible 
being together of people in the world, despite their differences. This 
acknowledgement seems to be impossible to translate into a democratic political 
practice, according to Nancy (ibid., 34). Each political practice, including democratic 
politics, presupposes a certain division in our coexistence in the world, as it is 
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conceived in the notion of the nation state, or a people, which is defined in a certain 
identifiable form, instead of presented in a generic ontological-status. Democracy 
seems to revolve around the institutionalized power of a people, instead of around the 
unique value of people in their singular plurality, outside of any institutional 
measurement (ibid., 46). In strict equality, which precedes particular identifications, we 
can acknowledge the unique value of each and everyone, as this equality 
simultaneously emerges in such particular identifications. Such a generic claim to 
equality seems indeed impossible to translate into political agency, precisely because of 
its indeterminateness, and its unrootedness. However, I think it is precisely a claim to 
the radical inclusivity of coexistence in the world, in full awareness of the mutual 
existence of enumerable differences and antagonisms, which can inspire a practice of 
political, egalitarian revolt.   
 
8.5.3. Sharing the world 
The terrain of an unruly political agency, which is expressed in coalitions that 
transcend the borders of identity groups, social status groups and nation states, and 
which has the capacity to critically evaluate existing practices of democracy, might be 
the world as we share it in the initial ontological status of coexistence, according to 
Nancy. This sharing of the world takes place without pretentions to efface differences 
in a homogeneous environment, but in full realization of the fact that we always relate 
to each other, even if this relation is expressed in incomprehension, confrontation, 
opposition or neglect. A recognition of this coexistence in the world, preceding the 
sharing of specific political communities with a certain binding identity structure, 
origin or end is expressed by Damien in Banlieue 13 when he says that the laws should 
be based on the equal treatment of all, tout le monde. In Damien’s statement, the whole 
world is included, despite the obvious differences between people. Damien speaks not 
of an equal treatment before the law of all citizens, or of all Frenchmen; instead, he 
speaks of tout le monde. The use of the phrase tout le monde expresses a claim with 
universal value, while it is at the same time clearly situated in the world. It is precisely 
this claim with a universal value which is betrayed by proponents of democracy who 
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falsely pretend to include tout le monde, while in fact their version of democracy is only 
open to those who have the right papers, the right income and the right ethnicity. 
Contemporary democracy is in practice only reserved for “the right” democrats, and 
tout le monde does not ultimately include everyone (Badiou 2011). 
 
To Nancy, being situated in the world means being in relation to others (1997, 8-9), 
and being localized (ibid., p.156), since being itself also immediately means co-existing 
and being there. To evoke tout le monde would be a very general ontological recognition 
of sharing the world with others to whom we are related. However, the question is 
also how we orient ourselves in the world, how we shape our being-related to others – 
in other words, how we actively form a world (Nancy 2007, 34). If we do not actively 
and consciously engage ourselves with our being in the world, the world makes no 
sense to us. To Nancy, the world is sense, and sense is the world. Sense belongs to the 
structure of the world and cannot be found outside of it, as some kind of supplement 
(1997, 55). Being situated in the world therefore means making sense of it in a most 
general way. We can draw the conclusion here that political sense, as it is reflected in 
laws and models of governance cannot be based on certain transcendental principles, 
but should directly reflect an engagement with coexistence in the world, as it takes 
place in everyday interactions, in specifically localized situations.  
 
A world: one finds oneself in it (s’y trouve) and one is familiar with it (s’y retrouve); one 
can be in it with “everyone” (“tout le monde”), as we say in French. A world is precisely 
that in which there is room for everyone: but a genuine place, one in which things can 
genuinely take place (in this world). Otherwise, this is not a “world”: it is a “globe” or a 
“glone”, it is a “land of exile” and “vale of tears” (ibid., 41-42).  
 
Being situated in the world simultaneously signifies a plural coexistence with everyone 
else, and the experience of a singular sense of belonging to a specific, local context 
which can be shaped and transformed. The right of everyone to jointly form a world, 
as it is expressed by Damien and Leïto, is set in a specific time and place and is not 
inspired by abstract sentiments or transcendental ideals. Their felt need to shape this 
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shared coexistence in the world in the most just way has implications for the way the 
relation between unruly politics and institutional politics can be perceived. In the 
following section, I will explain how the both coalitional and confrontational counter-
actions of agents who are associated with different spheres of political agency can 
inform a refined analysis of the interaction between institutional politics and unruly 
politics. In line with my analysis of the coalitional and confrontational counter-actions 
of Damien and Leïto, I will state that a transformation of the political order emerges 
from an agency in which institutional politics and unruly politics mutually touch and 
confront each other. 
 
8.6. The contr’action of institutional politics with unruly politics 
Counter-actions, which emerge from a situated, coalitional effort of those who are 
usually seen as belonging to the domain of the privileged, as well as those who are 
seen as belonging to the domain of the precarious, can form the basis of a shared 
unruly politics, as I have stated. The coalitional efforts of Damien and Leïto transcend 
identity and class boundaries, and by doing so, they shed new light on the interaction 
between what is seen as accepted political agency and what is seen as disruptive and 
unruly political agency. The story about the coalitional efforts of Leïto and Damien 
shows that shared unruly political agency does not only imply the disruptive effect of 
chaos and rioting instigated by troublemakers, and nor is it exclusively made possible 
by the recognition of the political meaning of such chaos and rioting by the ruling elite 
or law enforcement. Leïto, who could be perceived as the stereotypical subversive 
troublemaker, and Damien, who could be perceived as the stereotypical enforcer of 
institutional law and order, join forces in order to criticize and transform existing 
power configurations. Within their joint venture, change of the political order is not 
instigated from a complete outsider position, nor is it achieved by a co-optation 
strategy within existing power plays. The shared unruly politics of Damien and Leïto 
both relates to and transforms existing institutional politics. The example of their 
shared counter-actions shows that both those who are seen as “good” citizens and 
those who are seen as “troublemakers” can find each other in a practice of unruly 
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politics without resorting to a strongly formulated, shared identification. Such a 
practice of unruly politics does not completely stand outside of or at a distance from 
existing power structures. It can enforce a change in the fabric of institutional politics 
by means of actions which tune into the relational field of governance, without 
resorting to an identity-based subject position. Unruly politics seeks radical change in 
a direct interaction with the political order, as its aim is not to totally abolish any kind 
of order, but to transform and open the boundaries of that order. 
 
8.6.1. Counter-conduct 
The notion of counter-conduct, which was introduced by Michel Foucault in a 1978 
lecture at the Collège de France, can help explain how unruly practices of resistance 
interact with institutional politics (2007). Foucault uses this term to describe a mode 
of resistance against governmental power structures which are designed to conduct 
the thoughts and behavior of people in a certain way. Counter-conduct expresses the 
wish to be conducted in a different and self-chosen way, by other leaders and towards 
other objectives (ibid., 194-195). Foucault emphasizes the creative aspect of counter-
conduct, which is not limited to the resistance of existing modes of conduct, but also 
produces new power relations. Counter-conduct therefore “goes beyond the purely 
negative act of disobedience” (ibid., 200). Conduct can be carried out in order to 
repress people and mold them into a specific pattern of expectations, but it can also 
be carried out to gain personal or collective freedom in the pursuit of a voluntary 
conduction of the self.  
 
In general, power relations always necessarily imply the possibility of resistance, 
according to Foucault. In each power relation, there is the option of turning around 
the relation between different involved parties (Foucault 2004, 197). In this sense, 
“protest and government are mutually constitutive, and thus … forms of resistance 
have the potential to reinforce and bolster, as well as and at the same time as, 
undermining and challenging dominant forms of global governance” (Death 2010, 3-
4). Developing counter-conduct can therefore involve the choice of being disobedient 
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towards certain institutionalized forms of conduct, while voluntarily subjecting oneself 
to a different kind of conduct which could lead to a sense of freedom and self-
mastery. Power relations never follow the same black-and-white pattern of a simple 
division between the oppressor and the oppressed (Thompson 2003, 117-118). Power 
relations can take various forms, but always entail a certain element of friction which 
can evolve into resistance. Resistance, in turn, can create new forms of conduct. In 
this sense, the development of counter-conducts means engaging in the “struggles 
against subjection” and “for a new subjectivity” (Davidson 2011, 37).  
 
Counter-conduct has an ethical dimension; it means to constitute oneself as a moral 
subject in opposition to dominant moral codes. At the same time, counter-conduct as 
ethos cannot be seen separate from political implications. Foucault explains this by 
looking at military desertion as an example. Refusing military service means not only 
refusing to bear arms, but also refusing to accept certain principles of civic education, 
society’s values and an expected form of political participation in light of the desire to 
be directed differently (Foucault 2007, 198). Foucault also refers to secret societies, 
like freemasonry, as actors of counter-conduct, in clarifying how counter-conduct is 
not only an act of resistance against existing power constellations, but also an act of 
proposing a new social or political structure with alternative rituals, convictions and 
hierarchies (ibid., 199). Counter-conduct can therefore not only be seen as the project 
of an individual subject, but also as the formation of alternative communities in 
opposition to a certain governing authority (ibid., 208). Foucault sees the neglect of 
the importance of a governing authority emerge in a shift from politics to the political, 
in as far as this shift denies “the political game as a field of experience with its rules 
and normativity” (Foucault 2010, 159). Governance should not be denied altogether, 
but one should take care that governance is exercised in the right way. Expressions of 
parrhesia can help keep the relation between the law and politics truthful. Counter-
conduct is therefore not only expressed in counter-actions, but also in counter-
narratives which present different, often subversive political truths about power 
relations in society. 
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Counter-conduct does not take the form of a classical political revolt against a 
sovereign leader. It does not wish to do away with leadership altogether, but wishes to 
propose a different kind of leadership, direction or conduct. “Conflicts of conduct 
will occur on the borders and edge of the political institution” (Foucault 2004, 198), 
and not completely outside of it. Counter attacks against the governing of state 
institutions emerge from the same need for conduction, and are also sites of power 
production. Revolts of conduct and governmental conduct always develop in reaction 
to, and in direct confrontation with, each other and not at a distance from each other. 
Counter-conduct is never autonomous, but is always related to various broader 
societal developments. For this same reason, Foucault states that he does not wish to 
choose the word “dissidence” for describing the kind of revolt he envisions. The 
word “dissidence” would lead us too easily to centralize the dissident, the subject who 
is carrying out the dissidence as a heroic or sanctified figure. It is precisely because 
Foucault does not wish to enhance this kind of heroism that he proposes the term 
“counter-conduct.” This term leaves space for also evaluating the disruptive and 
resisting acts of those – for example, delinquents, patients or mad people – who are 
not easily seen as deliberate political revolutionary subjects.  
 
There is a process of sanctification or hero worship which does not seem to me of 
much use. On the other hand, by using the word counter-conduct, and so without 
having to give a sacred status to this or that person as a dissident, we can no doubt 
analyze the components in the way in which someone actually acts in the very general 
field of politics or in the very general field of power relations; it makes it possible to 
pick out the dimension or component of counter-conduct that may well be found in 
fact in delinquent, mad people, and patients. (Foucault 2007, 202) 
 
Here, Foucault makes clear that the political relevance of counter-conduct is captured 
in the agency, and not in the identity of the agent. While counter-conduct implies the 
conscious and moral shaping of the self, it is not the subject-position that is central 
here, but the dynamics of agency between governing structures and counter-actions of 
resistance, as Foucault envisions it in his description of freedom practices. 
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8.6.2. Contr’actions 
Since Foucault stresses the imminent relation of conduct and counter-conduct, the 
notion of counter-conduct can help imagine forms of shared political agency that are 
developed in resistance to state institutions, but that do not take place at a miraculous 
distance from the production of power relations and hierarchy.  
 
Conduct and counter-conduct share a series of elements that can be utilized and re-
utilized, re-implanted, re-inserted, taken up in the direction of reinforcing a certain 
mode of conduct or of creating and re-creating a type of counter-conduct. (Davidson 
2011, 27) 
 
In the cooperation between Leïto and Damien, disorder or disruption and law 
enforcement collide and merge with each other in a transformatory counter-action. 
This counter-action leads to a change of institutionalized governance, because both 
those who are associated with the civil domain of order and those who are associated 
with the domain of uncivil disorder directly engage in a relation with each other. A 
direct confrontation between unruly resistance and the structured system of law 
eventually sparks an effective resistance against unjust practices of governance. In this 
confrontation, a political event of unruly disruption collides and interacts with the 
rules of engagement in institutional politics. I propose to use the word “contraction” 
to describe this event, or action, in which the dominant political order simultaneously 
clashes and intermingles with unruly politics. Contraction signifies a movement of 
merging, concentration and intensification, but I also read it here as a contracted 
description of counter-action or contra-action. It thus simultaneously signifies an 
intensified relation, and a form of oppositional agency. The word contraction should 
here be read as “contr’action,” a word, which itself is a contraction of the notions 
“contra” and “action.” As the word itself shows, in a movement of contr’action 
something is lost while something else emerges, which is symbolized with the 
omission of the first “a”, and the replacement of that a with an apostrophe, which 
spans the gap between the words “contra” and “action”. It is precisely this space 
between the two separately existing words that is both emphasized in a movement of 
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friction and pulled together or concentrated in the emergence of a new word: going 
from contra-action to contr’action. In this sense, the movement of contr’action blurs 
the boundaries between different entities, and makes it difficult to clearly distinguish 
the “inside” from the “outside.” This contradictory and simultaneous movement of 
concentration or intensification and confrontation or opening can be found in general 
in the various uses of the notion of contraction. Linguistically, the notion of 
contraction indicates the loss of a syllable, which distinguished two words from each 
other, while a new word is composed from the previously separate words. In the 
context of labor, contractions of the uterus enable the dilation which is necessary for 
the emergence of new life. In both cases, a movement of pulling something together 
enables an opening for something new to emerge. 
 
Contr’action is a notion that is related to Foucault’s concept of counter-conduct (contre 
conduit), in the sense that it can be used to describe the imminent relation between 
power relations and resistance. Contr’action does not indicate a relation that 
eventually will lead to a consensus or a fusion of different parties into one body. 
Instead, it indicates a tense relation in which contradictions and confrontations are not 
solved but endured in a constant movement of approaching and rebounding. It can be 
used to express the coextensive relation between power relations and resistance, and 
describes a resistance against existing power relations, which at the same time 
produces new power relations. It is a movement of both agonistic tension and the 
intensification of human interactions out of which new relations and codes of conduct 
can emerge. Counter-actions show how sites of power production are inextricably 
connected to each other, but nevertheless form the basis for harsh critique of 
institutionalized power. In the contr’action of institutional politics with unruly politics, 
a certain organization of society can be interrupted and resisted, while another 
organization of another world can emerge. Counter-conduct therefore has the shape 
of a movement of contr’action, instead of a movement of distancing.  
 
This same movement can be seen in the case of the interruptions in society that are 
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caused by young urban troublemakers. Boys from neighborhoods like Kanaleneiland 
or Grigny, who “make chaos” or riot on the streets, find themselves in the middle of a 
contr’action of institutional politics with unruly politics. Their actions are directed 
against a political order from which they feel excluded and are at the same time 
embedded in an alternative community of experience which has specific codes of 
conduct and which reflects a specific sense of belonging and solidarity. Their 
disruptive interventions do not aim to completely do away with political governance 
or the system of law, but are an appeal for a different, more just application of the law 
and a different, more just political governance. In the absence of a more just system of 
governance, they develop their own informal rules and governance. As I explained in 
the previous chapter partly in reference to Bayat’s description of street politics, unruly 
political actions do not deny the existence of an institutional mode of governance, but 
aim to transform it, bend it or negotiate it to the benefit of forgotten parts of the 
population, and sometimes even instrumentalize it to meet the needs of those who are 
excluded from official routes of decision-making.  
 
Young “rebels without a cause” are not deliberately working towards the formation of 
an organized and militant political subject. In this sense, it can be questioned if they 
practice a form of counter-conduct, since the deliberately chosen practices of self-
containment and self-formation inspired by a clear ethos and strong convictions, 
which can be found in the case of alternative political communities, like the 
freemasons, are not found in the community of experience of these boys. Instead, the 
community of experience of these rebellious adolescents happens in a complex 
interplay between the needs and the desires of the boys and the influence that the 
order of society has on their life. It is not an intentionally constructed community with 
clear aims as one can find in the domain of secret societies or social movements. 
Nevertheless, these boys develop their own power structures, which manifest 
themselves in hierarchies inspired by specific values and leading to normative 
measures, regulations of behavior and means of punishment. Elements of a societal 
structure are not absent from the way the boys relate to each other and the world 
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around them. The community of experience of the boys is developed in a movement 
of counter-action against the existing order of society, and is at the same time highly 
influenced by and contr’acting with this same order.  
 
8.7. Hope for another world 
The contr’actions of different actors, who are usually seen as either privileged or 
precarious, can make up a practice of unruly politics which boldly expresses the hope 
for a significant transformation of the existing political order. This practice of unruly 
politics transcends prefixed subject positions, as we see in the story of Damien and 
Leïto. Their story illustrates the force of an unruly politics that is not only limited to 
the disruptive actions of young urban troublemakers, but which includes acts of 
resistance of those who are usually depicted as “good” citizens. Contr’actions lead to a 
necessary confrontation with others and other experiences, as well as to a necessary 
awareness of the interrelatedness between all who are willing to instigate trouble in the 
one-dimensional imagination of good citizenship, regardless of their previous 
reputation as good citizen or bad rebel without a cause. The unruly political actions of 
all these different people who share a precarious political subjectivity go beyond 
acknowledging the sharing of the world in that it involves an active and courageous 
forming of a different, more just world. A hope for another world speaks from their 
disruption. The event of sharing the world with others can open up hopes for changes 
in the future of the injustices and indignation which take place in the current status 
quo.  
 
In these hopes for the future, a change of the world is at stake, or, rather, the hope for 
the creation of another world (Foucault 2011, 287). Foucault recognizes in various 
forms of militancy, including the lifestyle of the Cynics, the urge to change the world, 
in which one can live a life which is “scandalously other” (ibid.). Such militancy does 
not strive for another life which can be lived for one’s personal happiness in 
sovereignty; it strives for another life which is shared in another world. The surprising 
event of a confrontation with other people, other convictions, other governance, 
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other conduct and other truths can lead us to believe that a whole other world is 
possible. This lesson was already taught by the Cynics, who Foucault describes as the 
ones who scandalously confronted others with the possibility of change. By exposing 
others to their different lifestyle and unheard truths, they make a change of the world 
imaginable. Foucault emphasizes that truth can only be established in the form of “the 
other world and the other life” (ibid., 340). It is the listening to other truths, other 
words, that could open our view to a monde autre, another world. We need a 
confrontation with irreducible otherness to make change possible.  
 
In a similar sense, Nancy states that “the unity of a world is nothing other than its 
diversity” (Nancy 2007, 109). The world is formed in our sharing of a singular-plural 
coexistence. Contrary to what myths would have us believe, we cannot trace the world 
back to a certain origin that lies outside of this coexistence. Instead, the world 
“happens” in our everyday interactions (ibid., 112). Just like the world has no external 
origin or end outside of its happening, justice can also not be founded outside of 
coexistence in the world. The creation of a more just world therefore begins with a 
struggle against injustices as we perceive them in our direct environment. The fact that 
there are more worlds possible also opens the possibility of disagreeing with the one 
in which we find ourselves and engage in a struggle to improve it. It is precisely the 
recognition that no blueprint for the world can be made which can form the basis for 
a struggle against injustices created by an ordering of the world which pretends to 
assign people to unequal, but seemingly natural positions. A single “true” arrangement 
of the world would be a foundational illusion with the unjust pretention to generate 
order. 
 
To create the world means: immediately, without delay, reopening each possible struggle 
for a world, that is, for what must form the contrary of a global injustice against the 
background of general equivalence. But this means to conduct this struggle precisely 
in the name of the fact that this world is coming out of nothing, that there is nothing 
before it and that it is without models, without principle and without given end, and 
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that it is precisely what forms the justice and the meaning of a world. (Nancy 2007, 54-
55)  
 
Justice is co-created in the formation of the world; it cannot be given to us from the 
outside, while we remain passive. We can therefore conclude with the adage that “the 
world is what we make of it”. When we recognize this statement to be true, just as 
much as the fact that we can never “own” the world because we make up a world 
together with countless different others, we can actively work to change a world 
which excludes certain people for being “uncivil,” “subversive” or “deviant.” 
Listening to the uncomfortable truths and counter-narratives of young urban 
troublemakers who struggle to find a dignified place in society is already a step in this 
direction. A transformation of the world could start with the acknowledgement that 
the enraged and frustrated reaction of young urban troublemakers to their over-
exposure to precarity is entwined with the efforts of others to protect themselves 
from the envisioned threat which these “criminals” or “outlaws” could pose to their 
safety. Public disturbances and urban violence of young troublemakers actively disrupt 
myths of invulnerability and bring those who do not have a part in these myths to the 
center of social and political attention. A recognition of the political significance of 
this rupture could lead to a shared effort to create another world which can do 
without mythicized accounts of its cultural or moral foundation and which is opened 
up in a solidarity based on the recognition of a shared status of precariousness.  
 
 A change of the world should not only depend on the struggles of the excluded to 
create room for themselves in a society, which tends to discredit them as undesired 
elements. An open, respectful and active engagement with the disturbing testimonies 
and interventions of troublemakers by those who hold a more privileged position 
could be a catalyst in transforming an exclusionary world into a truly shared space of 
belonging. This engagement can only take place if we acknowledge that exclusive 
privilege for some often produces excessive precarity for others. The struggles of the 
marginalized to lead a dignified life are therefore not only their own business, but also 
part of the responsibility of those at the center of social and political power. 
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Disruptive interventions of young urban troublemakers should not be seen as 
completely detached from the order of society, but as a direct reaction to the way in 
which our commonly shared world is organized.  
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Interlude 
 
 
 
 
Please 
 
Let me 
follow my dream. 
First wake 
the dream, 
then me.169 
 - Rodaan Al Galidi 2009, 37. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 My translation. Original text: Alsjeblieft/Laat me/mijn droom volgen./Maak eerst/de droom 
wakker,/daarna mij. 
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Final Contr’actions 
             
 
 
My research involved a step-by-step exploration of the political meaning of disruptive 
interventions instigated by urban youth of migrant descent. The conversations I had 
with young people in Grigny and Kanaleneiland, as well as my theoretical reflections 
on the dynamics between politics as structured organization and the political as 
spontaneous disruption, helped me analyze and conceptualize a practice of unruly 
politics. In the last part of this dissertation, I focused on a possibly shared unruly 
politics in which young urban troublemakers are recognized as political agents by 
representatives of accepted, civil participation. Together, various actors could interpret 
disruptive interventions of urban youth as politically meaningful, and act upon this 
insight in order to change existing political privileges. I presented the notion of 
“contr’action” as central to my understanding of the relation between disruptive 
political events and institutionally endorsed forms of political participation. In my 
final remarks here, I would like to return to this notion of contr’action and indicate 
how it can be applied to the theoretical framework I have presented. In particular, I 
will explain how contr’action serves to clarify the relation between politics and the 
political that structured the theoretical argumentation of this book. 
 
1. Looking back 
The question of how politics and the political relate to each other is a common thread 
in all the chapters of my dissertation, as is the question of whether young urban 
troublemakers can be seen as unruly political agents who criticize an unjust state of 
affairs in the current political order. In Chapter 1. I elaborated on the political 
difference between politics, a state-oriented and institutionalized strategy for the 
organization of society, and the political, an ontological dimension of social processes 
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which is unexpected, pluriform, disruptive and/or agonistic. Placing myself in a 
postfoundationalist tradition, I set out to investigate in what ways non-institutional, 
informal and unruly agency could be understood as emerging events of the political, 
which disturb the current affairs in politics. I explored in what way events of the 
political could shed light on experiences of injustice and inequality in the name of 
those who have no part in the institutional political process.  
 
In the second part of my dissertation, I introduced young troublemakers of immigrant 
descent from deprived urban areas as people who do not have a part in the 
institutional political process, but who form a community of experience, which is in their 
eyes explicitly opposed to more privileged parts of the population. The young people 
of this community of experience have an antagonistic vision of society and perceive 
institutional politics as protecting the privileged at the expense of precarious parts of 
the population. State representatives develop institutional policies in order to monitor 
and discipline boys who are at-risk, in the hope of integrating them into the domain of 
“good citizens,” with various evasive and sabotaging tactics as a response. In this part 
of my dissertation, the image arises of an institutional political domain which does not 
represent young urban troublemakers, but which nevertheless intends to influence and 
control the lives of those who do not feel represented by it.  
 
In the third part of my dissertation, I focused on the agency employed by young urban 
troublemakers to critically confront or disrupt the civil and political order from which 
they feel excluded. I explored the political sense of practices like “making chaos” and 
urban violence, which can be seen as spontaneously emerging, non-organized 
expressions of disagreement with a form of political governance that is perceived to 
be unjust and exclusionary. In this way, I presented the chaos and urban violence of 
young urban troublemakers as concrete events of the political, which cannot be 
understood as a consciously developed political strategy with a clearly formulated 
program or traditional political subject position, but should rather be seen unexpected 
ruptures of the dominant, institutional organization of politics. 
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In the fourth part of my dissertation, I emphasized that such unexpected events of the 
political can nevertheless give rise to a form of precarious and unruly political 
subjectivity, which is, unlike traditional notions of political subjectivity, defined by a 
vulnerable relation with others, a diverse and diffuse mix of identities and social 
backgrounds and a momentary, situated agency, which simultaneously confronts and 
intermingles with institutional politics.  
 
While I mostly focused on the tension and the confrontation between politics and the 
political in the second and third part, I used the last part of my dissertation to explain 
how the interaction between the two can open space for a form of unruly political 
agency that both transcends and cuts across various boundaries. I make it clear that 
the relation between the unexpected disruption of the political and the institutional 
organization of politics should not be seen as separately existing domains. The analysis 
of the counter-narrative of Banlieue 13 in Chapter 8 illustrates this point. The 
cooperation between protagonists Damien and Leïto is instigated by an event of 
recognition, which is followed by an unruly counter-action illustrating how politics 
and the political could both merge and collide with each other in specific situations. A 
practice of shared unruly politics emerges in an event of contr’action of politics with 
the political.  
 
2. A revolt for justice in the space between politics and the political 
The notion of contr’action signifies the complex interplay of power dynamics present 
in a shared practice of unruly politics. In an event of contr’action, the dominant 
political order and unruly political agency both collide and coincide with each other. 
As analyzed in Chapter 8., unruly politics brings together political agents from the 
perceived domains of the precarious and the privileged. However, it does not only 
transcend the boundaries of social classes and identity groups; it simultaneously blurs 
and sharpens the boundaries between institutional politics and disruptive political 
interventions. I presented the narrative of the movie Banlieue 13 as a counter-narrative, 
which criticizes the myth of a national, homogeneous community, in order to imagine 
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such a practice of shared unruly politics. The two protagonists engage in a situated 
coalition, despite their obvious differences in identity and social position. Damien 
could be associated with the domain of institutional politics as an official law enforcer, 
while Leïto could be seen as someone who has no part in that domain on account of 
his unconventional and lawless behavior. The cooperation between the two 
exemplifies the fact that institutional politics and disruptive political interventions are 
not necessarily separated from each other within a practice of unruly politics, but 
simultaneously clash and intermingle in an event of contr’action.  
 
A coalition of “civil” and “uncivil” political agents, or rather a coalition of the practice 
of troublemaking and “good” civic participation, could unmask a mythological 
imagination of a society which finds peace and unity in a homogeneous community 
and which scrupulously excludes those who deviate from the norm. As I stated in the 
third part of my dissertation, those who express themselves in subversive ways in 
public space and/or instigate public disturbances and urban violence are symbolically 
placed outside of the community of accepted citizens, so as to give the average, law-
abiding citizen an uncomplicated sense of safety and belonging. As I emphasized in 
the second and fourth part of my dissertation, the excluded tend to oppose these 
exclusionary societal structures and create their own community structures and ways 
of making a living. Such alternative community structures simultaneously counter-act 
broader societal structures and revolve around a self-sustained sense of dignity and 
solidarity. Nevertheless, the symbolic act of exclusion has all too real effects on the 
social position of youngsters with an immigrant background who are easily seen as the 
source of moral panic because of their deviant lifestyle, urban youth culture and mode 
of expression. Such exclusion can be countered and demythicized in a practice of 
shared unruly politics. Within this practice, the political implications of public 
disturbances and urban violence, as well as the precarious status of the instigators, can 
be actively acknowledged. The “chaos” and urban violence instigated by rebels, who 
are seemingly without a cause, could be seen as attempts to shatter the myth of an 
imagined homogeneous political community by those who are placed outside of it. 
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The political sense of said disruptive events is often overlooked, but could be 
uncovered as soon as one acknowledges that the precarious status of said “rebels 
without a cause” is inextricably related to the ontological vulnerability and political 
precariousness of the average, “civil” citizen, even if the latter ignores this state of 
precariousness. In that case, the political subjectivity that emerges in unruly political 
actions is not constituted by a strongly formulated, autonomous and unifying identity 
formation, but held together by the recognition of an ontological status of shared 
precariousness, regardless of further differences in identity and social status. 
 
In listening to the testimonies of lived injustices and inequalities of young urban 
troublemakers, even if they are expressed in a subversive or scandalous way, it is 
possible to recognize this precarious political subject. The precarious political subject 
is neither autonomous nor pre-constitutive, but emerges both in its own agency and in 
the solidarity of others, who are willing to recognize its political right to exist. As I 
stated in Chapter 7., this precarious political subject could be the protagonist of an 
egalitarian revolt, who aims to transform the world based on the equal worth of 
everyone, or tout le monde. As stated in Chapter 8., this political subject manifests itself 
in a postnational world, which is willing to “queer” its own identity time and again. 
The revolting agency it can display is unruly in several ways. It abides by neither the 
rules of parliamentary politics, nor the rules of traditional militant insurrections. It is a 
different type of revolt that feeds on the willingness to transform existing power plays 
in order to create another world without an eternal claim to unity in the sense of one 
people, one nation, one class or one community. Unruly politics will remain in 
contestation with institutional forms of politics, and thus question the workings of the 
political system of representation, while it simultaneously acknowledges the effects of 
existing institutional political power plays on people’s lives. Institutional politics 
should therefore not just be denied or effaced, but transformed in order to benefit 
those who are overly exposed to precarity. Those who perform unruly politics do not 
plead for a situation without rules, in which all organized politics disappears. They 
plead for different rules. The alternative community structures that help them sustain 
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themselves indicate that politics is needed in order for them to lead a dignified life; 
just not the kind of politics that has been endorsed by the state up until now. 
Listening to counter-narratives of young urban troublemakers and recognizing these 
counter-narratives as truthful testimonies in a parrhesiastic sense can be the start of a 
critical evaluation of the polis in which we live. The recognition of the scandalous or 
subversive truth value of such counter-narratives could incite an unruly political 
practice in which institutional politics and the disruptive political confront and engage 
each other, in light of new politics to come.  
 
To take this argument one step further: the parrhesiastic counter-narratives, as well as 
society’s involvement in them by showing interest, listening and interpreting, can be 
the start of a joint creation of another world, in which both troublemakers and good 
citizens are involved. This other world, or monde autre, as Foucault calls it, is not a 
world beyond this world, but a new, different version of our own world. This other 
world is only possible if “everyone” takes part in its creation: a monde autre by tout le 
monde. Scandalous and disruptive agency plays a part in the creation of this other 
world, just like accepted civic participation. In addition, this other world should be 
willing to reinvent itself into something other again if new disruptions emerge and new 
injustices need to be addressed. Standing up and fighting for another world is 
necessary on multiple occasions, under various circumstances and in different places. 
 
3. The relation of politics with the political: creation without foundation 
These reflections on the critical potential of a shared unruly politics, which emerges in 
a coalition of both “accepted” –civil- and “deviant” –uncivil- citizens as well as in a 
contr’action of institutional politics and unruly politics, help in not only putting the 
actions of young urban troublemakers into a political perspective, but also generating 
new insight into the more conceptual discussion of the political difference between 
politics and the political. Politics and the political are inextricably bound in a 
confrontational way. I propose making sense of the interruptive impact of the political 
in the field of politics not as a movement of distancing truthful emancipatory political 
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agency from treacherous institutional politics, but rather as a contr’action of the 
political with politics. Considering the dynamics between politics and the political as 
an event of contr’action can help address the critique of “philosophism” in relation to 
the discussion of the political difference in the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, amongst 
others, as mentioned in Chapter 1.. A mere theoretical evaluation of the notion of the 
political would obscure a fruitful analysis of “real” political struggles for recognition 
and equality which take place within the status quo of politics (Marchart 2007, 81). 
This critique assumes a distance between politics and the political. The political seems 
to be fleeting, impossible to capture in its groundlessness – a pure or romantic notion, 
largely distanced from the messy, dirty and all too real everyday practice of politics. 
Seen from this perspective, the difference between politics and the political seems to 
imply that we should either accept a neatly organized, yet paralyzed system of politics 
or celebrate the continuous disruption of any kind of systematized organization of 
politics.  
 
I have, however, attempted to offer insight into concrete forms of disruptive events of 
the political that contradict the idea of the political as a miraculous event, a romantic 
ideal or a theoretical concept, far removed from real-life confrontations. I have aimed 
to clarify that the interruption of the political in the domain of politics does not 
originate in a divine or transcendental outside, but rather signifies a direct 
confrontation within the fabric of power production itself. In this sense, the political 
is not detached from everyday political struggles which involve both representatives of 
the institutional domain and unruly political agents. The merits of contemporary, 
genuine unruly political practices lie between politics and the political. This between is 
the space of contr’action. 
 
Entering this space of contr’action of politics with the political means recognizing that 
we are with each other in the world even before we can create deliberate alliances 
around certain identity elements or moral and political claims. A certain experience of 
otherness with which we are both confronted and engaged is present in each political 
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practice. By imagining the relation between politics and the political as a contr’action 
of politics with the political, we can envision the crucial role of the space between, the 
space where the word “with” is located: the threshold where both politics and the 
political collide and conjoin, and where the social bond between people could be 
rearranged. Both politics and the political are undeniably bound to each other and are 
“with” each other in the emergence of societal structures and alternative community 
formations, offering a sense of belonging to those who deviate from the standard 
image of the good citizen. This ongoing experience of both relationality and alterity 
shapes political agency, as well as the possible sense of subjectivity and community − 
temporary, local, contingent, finite − that is continuously created by this agency.  
The creation of this sense is never a foundation. This also means that political agency 
itself lacks one original and essential foundation. The subject-position related to 
emerging political agency is always touched, confronted and changed by the other. 
Therefore, the character of the relation between politics and the political is 
postfoundational, as I stated in Chapter 1. in reference to Marchart and Butler, in 
particular. The groundlessness of the political means precisely that it is always 
contr’acting with dominant power structures, in continuous dynamics of opposition to 
and literal ‘inter’action with the status quo of politics.  
 
The recognition of our bare being-together always takes place in a world in which 
power relations already exist and certain political institutions aim to regulate human 
interactions. Acting upon the recognition of this being-together in the world means 
recognizing not only the simultaneous dependencies and ongoing agonistic tensions 
between people, but also the simultaneous dependency and ongoing agonistic tension 
between institutionalized structures of organization and governance in the domain of 
politics and the spontaneous, disruptive and deregulating impact of events of the 
political. The contr’action offering a space for this tension can take unexpected and 
unruly forms: a riot which is fuelled by the feeling of being unjustly treated by the 
police; abstention from voting out of feeling that political parties do not represent 
youngsters with an immigrant background; rap lyrics which describe the rough life in 
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the neighborhood and the anger with the one-sided image presented of so-called 
“problem neighborhoods” in the media; graffiti displaying local area codes on 
buildings to reflect a sense of belonging to the neighborhood rather than the nation; 
an underground economy which is accessible to those who cannot find a job in the 
legitimate economy. The creation of another world, which radically belongs to 
everyone, begins in such movements of contr’action. Both “civil” and “uncivil” 
cohabitants of this world can be involved in its transformation, as soon as they 
recognize the political potential of their coexistence.   
 
4. The apolitical riot? 
The unruly political significance of the disruptive public interventions of young urban 
troublemakers takes shape within the complex contr’action of politics and the 
political.  
 
The same ontological lack of a foundation that characterizes the relation between 
politics and the political also characterizes the political subjectivity of young urban 
troublemakers. This subjectivity is relational and emerging within agency, instead of 
essential and preceding agency. The political agency of young urban troublemakers 
involves a precarious political subjectivity and an inoperative political community. The 
unruly and precarious political subject acts in a singular way, because it is unique, and 
at the same time in plural ways, because it is exposed to and with others, as I 
explained in Chapter 7.. This political subjectivity emerges spontaneously, often 
instigated by enraged reactions to experienced injustices. It lacks intentionally chosen 
and prepared programmatic claims and organization. Despite its critique of the 
political status quo, it does not offer clear-cut suggestions for new ways to organize 
politics. Other than demanding to be recognized as people who equally exist in society 
and who have the right to lead a dignified life, no other explicitly formulated demands 
are usually made. As I have demonstrated throughout my dissertation, these 
characteristics often lead to an evaluation of this agency as apolitical or pre-political. 
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Exemplary for such an evaluation are Alain Badiou’s recent reflections on suburban 
riots, which he analyses in the light of the first stirring of a global popular uprising 
against unjust and dominant regimes of governance (Badiou 2012, 5, 18). I share the 
analysis with Badiou that such riots emerge in the wake of cases of excessive power 
abuse, humiliation and/or neglect caused by dominant regimes of governance. 
However, in contrast to Badiou, I do not think that such riots are too premature to 
hold a political significance. Riots and other civil disturbances, instigated by youth 
with an immigrant background from suburban areas, make political sense because 
they indicate where regimes of governance are failing to represent all people equally. 
They actively make the site of contr’action of politics with the political visible to the 
rest of society. The contra-actions of young urban troublemakers, which confront and 
contr’act with institutional politics, are not considered to be properly political, 
according to Badiou, because of their lack of organization and focus. Badiou discusses 
the notion of contraction in relation to what he considers to be meaningful political 
agency; however, his notion of contraction differs considerably from my notion of 
contr’action. The complex dimension of an agency simultaneously confronting and 
coinciding with existing political structures is missing in Badiou’s notion of 
contraction. Only agency which could lead to a complete overthrow of existing 
political structures, in favor of an entirely new configuration of politics, can be 
considered to be political, according to Badiou. Based on this position, Badiou makes 
it impossible to recognize and declare solidarity with those who could use support in 
the light of a broadly shared egalitarian revolt. Therefore, I fear that the effects of this 
position are more apolitical than Badiou would desire. 
 
Badiou sees an indication of a new historical awakening of revolutionary potential 
emerge in the uprisings associated with the Arab Spring (Badiou 2012). He measures 
the political value of riots related to the Arab Spring, as well as other contemporary 
riots such as the ones around Paris in 2005 and in London in 2011, according to their 
contribution to the “reopening of history” (ibid., 63). With the reopening, or rebirth, 
of history, Badiou envisions a renewed following of the Communist Idea (with capital 
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letters), which he perceives to be the only notion capable of challenging the global 
dominance of capitalism. Capitalist mechanisms of cultural differentiation or class 
differentiation, which lead to the political and socioeconomic advantage for some, and 
oppression or marginalization for others, can only be contested in a renewed political 
practice inspired by the Communist Idea. For Badiou, the Idea of Communism is no 
nostalgic utopia from the past, but a concrete and contemporary pursuit of practices 
and thoughts that will lead to collective emancipation. The Idea of Communism first 
of all prescribes the generic equality of all, despite existing differences of conviction, 
identity or behavior. This Idea could inspire people to completely overthrow the 
existing political order and its inherent inequalities and injustices. Only those events 
which can spark a global revolution in the light of this Communist Idea and hence 
push for a “new situation in the history of politics” (ibid., 27) could be called political, 
according to Badiou. Badiou thus reserves political meaning for events which lead to 
intentionally organized, militant uprisings. Such uprisings require a strong ideological 
proposition, around which the masses can be mobilized, and a strong political 
organization, which follows the initial events of the awakening of the new historical 
situation. Only disciplined and organized politics following the initial event can 
consolidate the affirmation of the revolutionary Idea.  
 
Badiou judges the riots, which he analyzes in the context of these revolutionary 
aspirations, to be pre-political in various degrees. Despite the fact that the riots related 
to the Arab Spring led to the securing of an enduring, central site of protest, such as 
Tahrir Square, and a generic claim of representation of all people by a highly diverse 
minority, they are still of a pre-political nature. To be more precise, they are signs of 
an “intervallic period,” in which the previous revolutionary Idea has exhausted its 
potential, and a new sequence is yet to come (Badiou 2012, 38-39). The events of the 
Arab Spring have not yet led to the political organization of a universal emancipatory 
subject which could do away with “identitary fictions,” as they are applied by the state. 
The aim of such fictions is to separate groups of people with different ascribed 
identities from the generic collective of the people, who could act affirmatively 
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together (ibid., 92-93). Thus, in contrast to my position, Badiou suggests that state-
induced “identitary fictions” can be dismantled by a political subject which is able to 
leave behind any precariousness and vulnerability. Badiou focuses on a political 
subject, which establishes a strongly defined position, prescribing its actions, while I 
emphasize that a recognition of a shared openness to vulnerability and the 
destabilizing influence of others already disrupts identitary fictions before they are 
replaced with new, explicitly formulated ideals. I see the political meaning of riots in 
this light. According to Badiou, however, twenty-first century riots – ranging from the 
upheavals associated with the Arab Spring to violent clashes between youth and police 
in suburban areas – cannot be named political because they are not followed by well-
structured, collective political organization.  
 
Paradoxically, because there will always be people who say that the generic, precisely 
because it is not identity, because it is even the opposite of an identity, does not need 
to be organized; that it must unfold itself freely; that a hundred flowers must bloom 
spontaneously, and so on. But experience shows that the generic does not then 
survive beyond the time of the riot; that in the absence of an active Idea, nothing can 
preserve it. In the absence of the outside-time incorporated by the organization, a 
statist return of identitarian fictions is inevitable. What is therefore needed is an 
organized politics, which will take responsibility for guarding genericity. (Badiou 2012, 
78-79) 
 
Riots instigated by youth from suburban areas, such as those around Paris in 2005 and 
in London in 2011, are not even pre-political, according to Badiou, because organized 
politics lies even further away from these events than from the riots related to the 
Arab Spring, he places such riots in the category of “immediate riots.” They emerge as 
an immediate reaction “in the wake of a violent episode of state coercion” (ibid., 22). 
They have an “impure subject” (ibid., 26) because the intentions of the involved 
actors cannot be ascribed to the same universal revolutionary aspirations. In addition, 
the locality of the riots cannot transcend into a larger movement of uprising, which 
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also appeals to people who are of a completely different identity and social status than 
the instigators. 
 
5. The difference between contraction and contr’action 
Remarkably, Badiou speaks of contraction, as one of the necessary ingredients of an 
event of uprising with genuine political value. “The historical situation contracts 
around an active, thinking minority whose provenance is multifaceted” (ibid., 91). 
Within an effective political organization, one needs a dedicated, trustworthy and 
active core, forming an example for others to follow. This core is a minority, which 
should nevertheless reflect the whole variety of people with diverse characteristics and 
identity markers, who should be inspired to join the revolution. Within this exemplary 
role, this core collective forms a sample of the generic collective of the people who 
need to be organized (ibid., 64, 91). Contraction means that within every historical 
event an active and efficient minority both exemplifies and represents the general 
revolutionary movement to be established. The core of activists on the occupied 
square or in the underground militant organization mirrors on a micro-level what is 
aimed to be established on a global level.  
 
Badiou’s use of the concept of contraction is radically different from what I have 
defined above as contr’action, despite the close similarity between both words. With 
contraction, Badiou hints here at an intensification of the revolutionary event in a 
small setting, which is representative for the situation in its totality. His use of the 
notion of contraction focuses on the concentration of a certain form of political 
agency in a specific exemplary group, clearly distinguished from its outside. 
Contraction is a necessary element of a revolutionary political organization. It 
symbolizes an intensification of the transformatory potential of the political, which 
will eventually completely replace the existing political order, and hence form a new 
status quo of politics. This notion of contraction addresses an intensified 
transgression from an essentialized presentation of the political into a new 
essentialized presentation of politics. It indicates that the disruptive potential of the 
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political can eventually be solidified and boiled down to a new solid organization: an 
all-encompassing form of politics. The political can be captured and contracted into a 
focused, distilled form of politics. The movement of opening and friction, which I 
aim to express by placing an apostrophe in the word contr’action so as to designate 
the spacing and dynamics within an agency which simultaneously confronts the 
dominant political order with an appeal for change and interacts with that same 
political order, is missing in Badiou’s notion of contraction. The complicated 
dynamics of political order and political change, which mutually inform each other, 
while simultaneously contesting each other, is simplified in Badiou’s understanding of 
contraction. In his view, contraction can only make sense if it contributes to a 
complete overthrow of one situation of politics into a completely other situation of 
politics. Hence, contraction does not only imply a concentration of political value, but 
also a reduction of political value. Events which do not contain contractions leading 
up to the rebirth of history can only lead to political miscarriages. Immediate riots, 
such as the ones in which young urban troublemakers are involved, are therefore 
considered to be apolitical by Badiou. 
 
I disagree with Badiou’s assumption that these riots are apolitical. This judgment 
seems to come from a contraction of political value into an exclusive domain of 
insiders to the revolutionary struggle, while I wish to open up the struggle for a 
transformation of the political order by emphasizing the complex contr’action of 
insiders and outsiders in a re-evaluation of the political game. Badiou’s conviction that 
disruptive events and agency only have political value if they will lead to an overall, 
historically transformative political organization, speaks of a longing for a traditional 
form of revolutionary uprising, strictly organized around an intentionally constituted 
subject. From this perspective, the spontaneously emerging, temporary, situated, 
relational and precarious political subject, which is calling to be recognized in 
disruptive and chaotic events of urban violence, is deprived of any political 
significance. This precarious political subjectivity certainly appeals to an egalitarian 
revolt in the name of a similar generic equality as the one Badiou claims to be essential 
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for any successful, affirmative revolutionary Idea. However, those who pursue an 
affirmative revolutionary Idea should be “pure” in their subjectivity as well as in their 
organization, according to Badiou. The political subjectivity of young rioters is 
dismissed by Badiou because of its impurity, lack of discipline and lack of 
representative claims. Such a dismissal denies the singular plural character of a 
precarious political subject, which derives its political value not only from its 
intentional, autonomous agency, but also from its acknowledgement by others, who 
are willing to complicate the boundaries between “insiders” and “outsiders” to 
effective politics in an affirmative act of solidarity. Badiou’s restriction of political 
meaning to rare historical events inspiring a global, political revolution and to the rare 
militant determination of a political avant garde makes it difficult to open up a 
perspective on a shared political practice across the boundaries between identity 
groups and socio-economic classes. Badiou’s exclusive perspective on political value 
seems to invite us to wait for an exceptional political event to happen, while we 
dismiss various, pressing and direct appeals for a change of the political status quo in 
passing.  
 
6. Riots could indicate an opening to another politics 
Young urban troublemakers could, implicitly or explicity, make clear how a critique of 
state governance could begin from a precarious position and unruly agency. For young 
troublemakers, the actions of state representatives are often not seen as convincingly 
legitimized because they are not grounded in an attitude of responsibility towards 
seeing to the just application of the law for all. Instead, they rely on their own 
judgment about the way justice is done, regardless of what the law and authorities 
prescribe as the right citizen’s attitude. By operating outside of the domain of legally 
accepted civic participation, and by sometimes deliberately breaking the monopoly on 
violence of the police, young urban troublemakers demonstrate a political 
inoperativeness. Their actions are testimonies of precisely those aspects of the political 
system that do not work, at least not for them. It is a lack within the system of 
political representation which becomes painfully clear in their actions of public 
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disturbance, uncivil interaction or street violence, without an immediate proposal to 
fill this lack. Such unruly agency can be seen as an enraged and frustrated reaction to 
the painful distance between an officially recognized political discourse and the 
complicated social reality in which people living in precarious circumstances find 
themselves. This is a fundamentally different mode of expression than that of a 
traditional political insurrection, organized in a structured and programmatic way. It 
makes political sense in a very different way, precisely in its inoperativeness, pointing 
out the flaws in the political system. To make political sense, such agency needs to be 
recognized as political. Others can be pulled out of their comfortable position by the 
appeal of young troublemakers to a widely shared engagement with issues of precarity 
and exclusion.  
 
Without proposing one clear-cut and complete political vision or ideology, the 
acknowledgement of this unruly politics could open the door to other possible worlds 
in which justice and a dignified life for all is brought back to the center of political 
attention. The contr’action of politics with the political can be acknowledged if one 
acknowledges that the designation of existing lacks in the domain of politics is a 
matter of importance to us all – not only to those who suffer from these lacks. Before 
the door to better political alternatives can be fully opened, it is important to first 
acknowledge the confronting events that make us realize what needs to be changed. 
We should merit the political sense of unruly political actions, like riots and public 
disturbances, as acts in themselves, regardless of their outcome. In a situation in which 
structural social changes are hard to imagine for a young generation growing up in 
times of crisis and polarization, one should not measure their political conscience 
according to their ability to propose alternative models for society, but according to 
their ability to open our eyes to the flaws in the existing political model of 
representation. The fact that young urban troublemakers are expressing their 
frustration about the current situation without a vision of clear-cut alternatives does 
not make them apolitical. It merely shows that one should start somewhere to express 
dissent, even if one is not yet sure of the direction one should take. Maybe it is time 
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for us to turn the old sixties’ mantra of political militancy around. It is not the end of 
a utopic political dream which justifies the means of a violent uprising. Spontaneous 
violent riots could be the means that eventually lead us in the direction of a justified 
end: a more just and equal political organization of the world.  
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Summary 
          
 
In this dissertation, I explore the political meaning of disruptive, and even violent, 
interventions of youth with a migrant background in the public domain of France and 
the Netherlands. I relate two qualitative case studies– carried out in one French and 
one Dutch neighborhood– to a theoretical analysis of the political potential of 
seemingly senseless events of civil unrest. The urban areas where my research takes 
place can be characterized as deprived neighborhoods, because of their rundown 
physical appearance and the range of socio-economic problems inhabitants have to 
deal with. These areas, and other comparable “problem neighborhoods” have the 
reputation of being a breeding ground for criminality and aggressive street culture. 
Urban riots and other spontaneous disturbances of the public order which start in 
such areas, and during which commodity goods are stolen, public property is 
demolished and fellow inhabitants are harassed, seem to lack any political sense. Other 
than countercultural or protest groups with a clear political ideology, like social 
movements and identity-based interest groups, the youth involved in such events are 
not seen as political agents, because no spokespeople are put forward to address the 
press and no banners are carried. The emergence of such spontaneous disorder is 
often ascribed by the media and politicians to the individual deviancy of the young 
people involved, as became explicitly apparent in the reception of the riots around 
Paris in 2005 and the riots around London in 2012. In the first reactions to these 
events, young rioters were criminalized and pathologized, while the relation to the 
social and political structures of the society in which they are embedded was often 
overlooked.  
 
It is exactly this reputation of disturbing, non-participative and apolitical citizens that 
makes it easy to label these and similar youth, predominantly boys, as outsiders to the 
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political domain and the community of “civilized citizens.” I raise the question of 
whether these young urban troublemakers are rightly seen as outsiders to the political 
community, or whether their agency is not recognized as political due to a prevailing 
selective understanding of “civil” politics, which is framed by dominant power plays 
and discourses.  
 
I intend to deconstruct the negative moral connotation of the term “troublemaker” by 
bringing to light the productive sides and critical potential of subversive agency. This 
approach results in the insight that trouble disturbs the dominant and usually 
uncontested division between “good citizens” and “deviant young outlaws.” It is the 
young urban troublemaker who takes such dominant presumptions out of their 
untroubling comfort zone and forces others to critically reconsider their political 
implications.  
 
I use the term unruly politics to designate the political agency of troublemakers who are 
not recognized as worthy, or formal, political actors within the domain of institutional 
politics and who express agency which interferes in the political organization of 
society. Unruly politics is a political agency that does not abide by the formal, moral 
and legal rules of accepted practices of civil engagement and political participation. 
The possibility that civil engagement can be subversive and that political agency can 
also take unruly forms is central to the analysis elaborated in my thesis. 
 
My research aims to connect philosophical theory with the narratives of young urban 
troublemakers. I perceive these narratives as counter-narratives because they contest the 
dominance of “mainstream” narratives about active political participation and good 
citizenship. An investigation of these counter-narratives allows me to illustrate how 
established truths about politics and citizenship, as produced in dominant discourses, 
are confronted with completely different gestures of truth-telling. In reference to 
Michel Foucault’s understanding of parrhesiastic truths, I designate these counter-
narratives as examples of experienced and non-conformist truths, which can critically 
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confront fixed, conventional truths and, in this confrontation, take these dominant 
truths out of their comfort zone of seemingly undisputed validity. This confrontation 
between two different kinds of truth has an explicit political significance because it 
illuminates what is lacking in a seemingly complete picture of what is accepted as “the 
norm” within society.  
 
In order to investigate this confrontation between dominant discourses and counter-
narratives, I have conducted a series of interviews with young men, between the ages 
of 15 and 25, and youth workers in one Dutch and one French neighborhood: 
Kanaleneiland in Utrecht and Grigny in the banlieues of Paris. Both cities have been in 
the news in recent years as a result of public disturbances caused by young inhabitants 
from these so-called “problem neighborhoods.” I have chosen to interview people in 
these two particular neighborhoods because they are exemplary for the different 
discussions and problems related to the governing of deprived urban areas. In both 
urban contexts, policymakers and social workers are working to develop different 
strategies in order to prevent new cases of urban disturbances. An encounter with 
both neighborhoods and their inhabitants enabled me to analyze the relationship 
between the disruptive agency of young urban troublemakers and institutional politics; 
this relationship is characterized by both governing policies, which are designed to 
monitor and discipline young urban troublemakers and contain their interference in 
public space, and a mechanism of opposition – “us” versus “them” – in which 
antagonistic perspectives on politics play an important role. 
 
Seen from a theoretical perspective, my research can be situated as an intervention in 
the philosophical debate on what is named a political difference between politics as a state-
oriented and institutionalized strategy for the organization of society and the political, 
an ontological dimension of social processes which is unexpected, pluriform, 
disruptive and/or agonistic. Several critical thinkers who play a role in my research 
have focused in their work on a non-formalized, non-institutionalized understanding 
of political agency as resistance against both a democratic or motivational deficit in 
 560 
politics and the domination of a coercive notion of the good citizen. From an 
ontological perspective, this thinking about the political difference could be 
characterized as postfoundationalist, as noted by Oliver Marchart, amongst others. A 
presentation of an ultimate origin or foundation of the social constellations designated 
as “society” is called into question here. Postfoundational thinking proposes a 
thorough investigation of the dynamics between two radically different, yet related, 
dimensions of social and political reality, which is split from within, so to say.  
 
An awareness of the complex interplay of “inside” and “outside” is a characteristic 
feature of postfoundationalism. It criticizes a thinking, which places certain “others” 
“outside” of the domain of political legitimacy, or even outside of society, on the basis 
of a certain imagined original community with a homogeneous and uncontested 
cultural identity. When critically examining the notion of society from this 
postfoundationalist perspective, it is not the question of completely doing away with 
mechanisms of in- and exclusion, but of realizing how such mechanisms of in- and 
exclusion are developed and how they could be changed. The idea of a political 
element in human interactions that is not already fully captured within politics as an 
institutional model of organization is important to me in formulating my own 
understanding of the practice of unruly politics. In the practice of unruly politics, the 
political emerges in a confrontational relationship with institutional politics.  
 
Different accents in the distinction between politics and the political are highlighted in 
the four different parts of my dissertation. The first part consists of a detailed 
theoretical and methodological introduction of my research.  
 
In the second part of my dissertation, consisting of Chapters 3 and 4, I focus on the 
relation between the “community of experience” of the young inhabitants of Grigny 
and Kanaleneiland, and the domain of institutional politics which influences these 
experiences. I investigate the role of an antagonistic tension between “us” and 
“‘them,” in which the youngsters’ sense of belonging is embedded. Especially in 
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reference to the accounts of my interlocutors in Grigny, I explain how the 
experienced dynamics between “us” and “them” is entwined with a process of 
community formation and identification in the neighborhood. It is experienced 
practices, set in a perspective of power dynamics, which define the community of 
“us,” rather than a pre-constitutive identity, nationality, ethnicity or belief system. The 
more young inhabitants feel that they are excluded and discriminated outside of their 
neighborhood, the more they become proud of, and identify themselves with, the 
values and norms of behavior that count inside of the neighborhood. The world of 
“us” consists of a family feeling and rules of conduct which shape the attitude of the 
youngsters as well as their practices to make a living. From this community of 
experience, institutional politics is perceived as protecting the privileged at the 
expense of precarious parts of the population. 
 
However, the solidarity that exists in the world of “us” is generally not politically 
instrumentalized in order to form a collective identity organized around demands of 
an emancipatory politics in the populist tradition, as Ernesto Laclau envisions it. The 
traditional, working class trust in popular politics has largely disappeared from 
neighborhoods like Grigny and Kanaleneiland. The belief in a radical popular political 
transformation has disappeared under the all-encompassing gaze of governmental 
mechanisms of surveillance and control, which are aimed at disciplining at-risk youths 
in order for them to take individual responsibility for their social situation and display 
a generally accepted form of civic participation. In reference to a body of critical 
theory around neoliberal risk management and the notion of “governmentality,” I 
designate the situation in Kanaleneiland as a penal panopticon. The work of Michel 
Foucault is of key importance for my analyses here. State representatives develop 
institutional policies in order to monitor and discipline boys who are at risk, in the 
hope of integrating them into the domain of “good citizens,” with various evasive and 
sabotaging tactics as a response. In this part of my dissertation, the image arises of an 
institutional political domain which does not represent young urban troublemakers, 
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but which nevertheless intends to influence and control the lives of those who do not 
feel represented by it. 
 
In the third part of my dissertation, consisting of Chapters 5 and 6, I focus on the 
agency employed by young urban troublemakers to critically confront and disrupt the 
civil and political order from which they feel excluded. I explore the political sense of 
practices like “making chaos” and urban violence, which can be seen as spontaneously 
emerging, non-organized expressions of disagreement with a form of political 
governance that is perceived to be unjust and exclusionary. In this way, I present the 
chaos and urban violence of young urban troublemakers as concrete events of the 
political, which cannot be understood as a consciously developed political strategy 
with a clearly formulated program or traditional political subject position, but should 
rather be seen as unexpected ruptures of the dominant, institutional organization of 
politics. Such agency is both distinguished from the aspirations of organized popular 
political movements and state-endorsed political participation. Even though the boys 
whom I interviewed did not speak of their own agency as having political potential, I 
characterize them as contemporary “rebels without a cause,” who might actually be 
“rebels who are denied a cause.” I examine the disruptive character of the agency of 
the “rebel with/out a cause” in light of Jacques Rancière’s theories on politics as 
dissensus. In this perspective, it becomes clear that certain acts of disagreement can 
make political sense precisely because they disturb the hegemonic order of society 
from which certain people feel excluded. By acknowledging this political sense of 
disagreement, it can also be acknowledged that certain seemingly senseless disruptions 
of the civic order are instigated by an underlying, yet unarticulated demand for equal 
recognition and treatment within society.  
 
In addition, I discuss how it is exactly the kind of seemingly senseless violent 
outbursts, as displayed in recurrent urban riots, which can illuminate the shortcomings 
of the dominant legal order. The fact that such actions seem senseless to authorities 
and the general public, and even cause moral panic, proves that those who are 
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involved in these kinds of riots cannot equally take part in the organization of society 
and see violent and disturbing behavior as their only possible recourse for focusing 
attention on their presence and experienced injustices. In a critical discussion of the 
notion of “divine violence” in the work of Walter Benjamin, I characterize young 
urban troublemakers as the agents of an “unworking” violence, which by its 
sabotaging impact serves as a critique of unjust governing structures. Even though 
violent events like the riots that took place around Paris in 2005 and around London 
in 2011 are not driven by a clear imagination of an alternative legal and political order, 
the hope for a better representation of justice in the letter, as well as the exercise, of 
the law is nevertheless present. 
 
While I mostly concentrate on the tension and the confrontation between politics and 
the political in the second and third part, I use the last part of my dissertation to 
explain how the interaction between the two can open space for a form of unruly 
political agency that both transcends and cuts across various boundaries. I clarify that 
the relation between the unexpected disruption of the political and the institutional 
organization of politics should not be seen as separately existing domains.  
 
In this fourth part, consisting of Chapters 7 and 8, I discuss the conditions under 
which recognition could emerge for the political meaning of seemingly senseless, 
disruptive behavior of young urban troublemakers, and how this recognition could 
lead to a critical evaluation of an imagined political community of good citizens. This 
recognition relates back to a vulnerable and always already differentiated co-existence 
in the world, preceding the formation of a specific formal political order, and 
preceding the formation of communities based on one shared culture or identity. At 
the site of this recognition, a precarious political subject emerges which reflects a 
substantial lack of a shared identity, but can nevertheless open a perspective on a 
possibly shared agency. This precarious political subject does not precede the unruly 
actions of young urban troublemakers, but emerges within disruptive events in which 
troublemakers and established authorities both clash and converge with each other. In 
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reference to the work of Jean-Luc Nancy and Judith Butler, I state that this 
subjectivity is opened up within situated actions and relations with others. It does not 
consist of an already established, pre-constitutive entity from which agency is 
deliberately initiated. This openness to, and emergence in, the dynamics of actions and 
encounters with others makes this subjectivity inherently precarious on an ontological 
level. Besides this ontological precariousness, my analysis of the precarious political 
subject aims to describe the subject position of the ones without a part in the socio-
political structure framing people’s recognizability as a political subject.  
 
Nevertheless, this precarious political subject could call for an egalitarian revolt, as I 
state in reference to the work of Martin Crowley. This egalitarian revolt appeals to a 
general demand: to do justice to the equal vulnerable coexistence of all, regardless of 
differences between unruly troublemakers and “civil” citizens. Such a revolt can serve 
as the impulse needed for others in wider society to actively become aware of the 
injustices and stigmatization experienced by young people of migrant descent living in 
a deprived urban setting, as well as the need to collectively rise up and demand that 
the situation change. The political impact of such a possible egalitarian revolt 
simultaneously depends on two things: an act of solidarity of those who are in a 
privileged position and are willing to recognize the fact that they share society with 
those who might express their indignation in uncivil and subversive ways, on the one 
hand, and the uncivil, unruly agency which incites this act of solidarity, on the other 
hand. The recognition of the participation of young urban troublemakers in such a 
possibly shared agency starts with an openness to the often dissonant and uncivil 
voices of these youths in the public domain.  
 
I propose to see the unruly and uncivil disturbances caused by young urban 
troublemakers as what Michel Foucault calls a parrhesiastic gesture, or the act of telling 
uncomfortable truths, which put general conventions of good citizenship on the line. 
Such expressions of a “scandal of truth” confront us with the fact that there are 
different truths to be told about different communities of experience underneath 
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myths of national unity and solidarity. A critical investigation of our imagined, unified, 
political community can start by listening to such scandals of truth. It is at this site of 
active and unruly investigation where the difference between “politics” and the 
“political” materializes. 
 
In the conclusion of my dissertation, I propose that the interaction of politics and the 
political could be seen as taking place in an event of “contraction”: an event in which 
the dominant political order simultaneously clashes and intermingles with the unruly 
political. Contraction signifies a movement of merging, concentration and 
intensification, but I propose to read the word also as a contraction of the notions 
“contra” and “action.” I write the word contraction as “contr’action” in this political 
context. It thus simultaneously signifies an intensified relation, and a form of 
oppositional agency. As the word itself shows, in a movement of contr’action 
something is lost while something else emerges, which is symbolized with the 
omission of the first “a,” and the replacement of it with an apostrophe which spans 
the gap between the words “contra” and “action”. It is precisely this space between 
the two separately existing words that is both emphasized in a movement of friction 
and pulled together or concentrated in the emergence of a new word: going from 
contra-action to contr’action. In this sense, the movement of contr’action blurs the 
boundaries between different entities, and makes it difficult to clearly distinguish the 
“inside” from the “outside.” By imagining the relation between politics and the 
political as a contr’action of politics with the political, I wish to emphasize the space in 
between: the threshold where both politics and the political collide and conjoin, and 
where the social bond between people could be rearranged. Both so-called “civil” and 
“uncivil” cohabitants of society can be involved in its transformation. Contr’action 
does not indicate a relation that eventually will lead to a consensus or a fusion of 
different parties into one homogeneous body. Instead, it indicates a tense relation in 
which contradictions and confrontations are not solved but endured in a constant 
movement of approaching and rebounding.  
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By involving oneself in this movement, one is able to listen to the uncomfortable 
truths and counter-narratives of young urban troublemakers who struggle to find a 
dignified place in society. Such engaged listening is a step towards a reconfiguration of 
the practice of institutional politics and its presumed representativity. 
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Samenvatting 
          
 
 
In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik de politieke betekenis van verstorende, en zelfs 
gewelddadige, interventies in de publieke ruimte die veroorzaakt worden door 
jongeren met een migranten achtergrond in Frankrijk en Nederland. Ik verbind twee 
kwalitatieve case studies – die zijn uitgevoerd in één Franse en één Nederlandse buurt 
– aan een theoretische analyse van de mogelijke politieke implicaties van schijnbaar 
zinloze voorvallen die maatschappelijke onrust veroorzaken. De wijken waar mijn 
onderzoek is uitgevoerd kunnen omschreven worden als achterstandswijken, vanwege 
de verwaarloosde omgeving en de sociaal-economische problematiek waar de 
bewoners mee te kampen hebben. Deze, en andere vergelijkbare “probleem-wijken”, 
hebben de reputatie dat ze een voedingsbodem zijn voor crimineel gedrag en een 
agressieve straatcultuur. Rellen en andere spontane verstoringen van de openbare orde 
die ontstaan in zulke gebieden, en waarbij zaken gestolen of vernield worden en mede-
bewoners worden lastiggevallen, lijken elke vorm van politieke betekenis te missen. 
De jongeren die bij zulke gebeurtenissen betrokken zijn worden niet gezien als 
politieke actoren omdat ze geen perswoordvoerders hebben of spandoeken dragen, 
anders dan in het geval van subculturen, protestgroepen en sociale bewegingen met 
een duidelijke politieke ideologie en politieke belangen. De oorzaken van zulke 
spontane wanorde worden door de media en politici vaak gezocht in het individuele 
afwijkende gedrag van de betrokken jongeren, zoals bijvoorbeeld duidelijk werd in de 
reacties op de rellen rondom Parijs in 2005 en Londen in 2012. Jonge relschoppers 
werden in beide gevallen gecriminaliseerd en gepathologiseerd, terwijl de relatie tussen 
de gebeurtenissen en de bredere sociale en politieke omstandigheden niet in acht werd 
genomen in de eerste reacties.  
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Precies deze reputatie van verstorende, non-participatieve en apolitieke burgers maakt 
het makkelijk om deze en soortgelijke jongeren, vooral jongens, aan te merken als 
buitenstaanders die buiten het politieke domein en de gemeenschap van “beschaafde 
burgers” vallen. Ik dit proefschrift stel ik de vraag of deze jonge stedelijke 
onruststokers terecht worden gezien als buitenstaanders buiten de politieke 
gemeenschap, of dat hun gedrag niet als politiek wordt herkend omdat een selectief 
begrip van “beschaafde” politiek dominant is, dat wordt ingekaderd door heersende 
machtsverhoudingen en vertogen. 
 
Ik streef ernaar om de negatieve morele connotatie van de term “onruststoker” te 
deconstrueren, door de productieve kant en het kritisch potentieel van subversief 
handelen aan het licht te brengen. Deze benadering leidt tot het inzicht dat onrust de 
dominante en doorgaans vanzelfsprekende tweedeling tussen “goede burgers” en 
“onaangepaste jonge overtreders” verstoort. De jonge stedelijke onruststoker haalt 
zulke dominante veronderstellingen uit een probleemloze comfort zone en dwingt 
anderen om de politieke implicaties van zulke veronderstellingen kritisch te 
heroverwegen. 
 
Ik gebruik de term “ontregelende politiek” om het politiek handelen aan te duiden van 
herrieschoppers die niet erkend worden als waardevolle, formele politieke actoren 
binnen de institutionele politiek, en die gedrag vertonen dat een verstorende werking 
heeft op de politieke organisatie van de samenleving. Ontregelende politiek is politiek 
handelen dat zich niet houdt aan de formele, morele en juridische regels van 
geaccepteerde praktijken van maatschappelijke betrokkenheid en politieke participatie. 
De mogelijkheid dat maatschappelijke betrokkenheid subversief kan zijn, en dat 
politiek handelen ook een ontregelende vorm kan aannemen, staat centraal in de 
analyse die ik uitwerk in mijn proefschrift.  
 
In mijn onderzoek verbind ik filosofische theorieën aan de narratieven van jonge 
stedelijke onruststokers. Ik beschouw deze narratieven als contra-narratieven omdat 
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ze de dominante rol van “mainstream” narratieven over actieve politieke participatie 
en goed burgerschap weerspreken. Door het bestuderen van deze contra-narratieven 
kan ik illustreren hoe gevestigde waarheden over politiek en burgerschap, zoals 
geproduceerd in dominante vertogen, worden geconfronteerd met een heel andere 
vorm van het spreken van de waarheid. In referentie naar Michel Foucaults begrip van 
parrhesiastische waarheden, beschrijf ik deze contra-narratieven als voorbeelden van 
ervaren en non-conformistische waarheden, die gevestigde, conventionele waarheden 
kritisch kunnen confronteren. In deze confrontatie kunnen zulke contra-narratieven 
dominante waarheden uit hun comfort zone van schijnbare onomstoten geldigheid 
halen. Deze confrontatie tussen twee verschillende soorten waarheid heeft een 
expliciete politieke betekenis omdat ze aantoont wat ontbreekt in een schijnbaar 
volledige beschrijving van “het normale” in de samenleving. 
 
Om de confrontatie tussen dominante vertogen en contra-narratieven te kunnen 
onderzoeken heb ik een aantal interviews uitgevoerd met jonge mannen, tussen de 15 
en 25 jaar oud, en jongerenwerkers in een Nederlandse en een Franse wijk: 
Kanaleneiland in Utrecht en Grigny in de buitenwijken van Parijs. Beide steden zijn de 
laatste jaren in het nieuws geweest vanwege openbare order verstoringen die 
veroorzaakt werden door jonge bewoners van zogenaamde “probleem-wijken”. Ik heb 
ervoor gekozen om jongeren in deze twee specifieke wijken te interviewen omdat de 
situatie in deze wijken illustratief is voor de verschillende discussies en dilemma’s 
rondom het beleid voor achterstandswijken. In beide stedelijke gebieden ontwikkelen 
beleidsmakers en sociaal werkers verschillende strategieën om nieuwe gevallen van 
openbare onrust te voorkomen. Ontmoetingen in beide wijken hebben me geholpen 
om de relatie te analyseren tussen het ontregelende gedrag van jonge stedelijke 
onruststokers en de institutionele politiek. Deze relatie wordt gekenmerkt door zowel 
bestuurlijk beleid, bedoeld om jongeren te monitoren en disciplineren en hun 
aanwezigheid in de publieke ruimte te controleren, als een oppositioneel mechanisme 
– “wij” tegen “zij” – waarbinnen een antagonistische kijk op politiek een belangrijke 
rol speelt.  
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Bezien vanuit een theoretisch perspectief, kan mijn onderzoek gezien worden als een 
interventie in het filosofische debat over het politieke onderscheid tussen politiek als een 
staats georiënteerde en geïnstitutionaliseerde strategie voor het organiseren van de 
samenleving en het politieke, een ontologische dimensie van sociale processen die 
onverwachts, pluriform, verstorend en/of agonistisch is. Verschillende kritische 
denkers die een rol spelen in mijn onderzoek richten zich in hun werk op een niet-
formeel, niet-institutioneel begrip van politiek handelen als verzet tegen een 
democratisch gebrek of een gebrek aan motivatie in de politiek, zowel als een 
dominante en dwingende opvatting van goed burgerschap. Bezien vanuit een 
ontologisch perspectief, kan dit denken over het politieke onderscheid beschreven 
worden als post-fundamenteel, zoals het wordt benoemd door Oliver Marchart onder 
andere. Het aanwijzen van een ultieme oorsprong of fundament voor de sociale 
relaties die “samenleving” worden genoemd wordt kritisch bekeken vanuit dit 
perspectief. Post-fundamenteel denken stelt een gedegen onderzoek voor naar de 
dynamiek tussen twee radicaal verschillende, en toch gerelateerde, dimensies van de 
sociale en politieke werkelijkheid, die zogezegd intern verdeeld is. 
 
Een bewustzijn van de complexe dynamiek tussen “binnen” en “buiten” is een typisch 
kenmerk van post-fundamenteel denken. Het bekritiseert een denken dat bepaalde 
“anderen” “buiten” het gebied van politieke legitimiteit plaatst, of zelfs buiten de 
samenleving, op basis van een zekere verbeelde originele gemeenschap met een 
homogene en onomstotelijke culturele identiteit. Als het begrip samenleving kritisch 
wordt bekeken vanuit dit post-fundamentele perspectief, is het niet langer de vraag 
hoe we volledig los kunnen komen van mechanismen van in- en uitsluiting. Het is 
eerder de vraag hoe zulke mechanismen van in- en uitsluiting zich ontwikkelen en hoe 
ze veranderd kunnen worden. Het idee van een politiek element in intermenselijke 
relaties dat niet al volledig is ingekaderd in politiek als institutioneel organisatie-model, 
is voor mij belangrijk om mijn eigen begrip van de praktijk van ontregelende politiek 
te formuleren. Het politieke verschijnt in een confronterende relatie met institutionele 
politiek binnen de praktijk van ontregelende politiek.  
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In de vier delen van mijn proefschrift worden verschillende accenten gelegd in het 
onderscheid tussen politiek en het politieke. Het eerste deel bestaat uit een 
gedetailleerde theoretische en methodologische introductie van dit onderzoek. 
 
In het tweede deel van mijn proefschrift, dat bestaat uit hoofdstuk 3 en 4, richt ik mijn 
aandacht op de relatie tussen de “gemeenschap van ervaringen” van de jonge 
inwoners van Grigny en Kanaleneiland, en het domein van de institutionele politiek 
dat invloed heeft op deze ervaringen. Ik onderzoek de rol van de antagonistische 
spanning tussen “wij” en “zij”, waarin het gevoel van thuis en verbondenheid van de 
jongeren is ingebed. Vooral refererend aan de verhalen van mijn gesprekspartners in 
Grigny leg ik uit hoe de ervaren dynamiek tussen “wij” en “zij” verweven is met een 
proces van gemeenschapsvorming en identificatie met de buurt. Geleefde praktijken 
die beïnvloed worden door machtsrelaties definiëren de gemeenschap van een “wij”, 
meer dan een vooraf bepaalde identiteit, nationaliteit, etniciteit of geloof. Hoe meer 
jonge bewoners het gevoel hebben dat ze buitengesloten of gediscrimineerd worden 
buiten hun wijk, hoe meer ze trots worden op, en zich identificeren met, de normen 
en waarden die tellen binnen de wijk. De wereld van “ons” bestaat uit een familie 
gevoel en bepaalde gedragsregels die zowel de houding van de jongeren vormen als 
specifieke manieren om inkomsten te genereren. Binnen deze gemeenschap van 
ervaringen wordt institutionele politiek gezien als een mechanisme om de elite te 
beschermen ten koste van meer kwetsbare groepen in de samenleving. 
 
De solidariteit die bestaat in de wereld van “ons” wordt desalniettemin over het 
algemeen niet politiek ingezet om een collectieve identiteit te vormen rondom 
emancipatoire eisen in de traditie van het populisme, zoals Ernesto Laclau voorstelt. 
Het traditionele vertrouwen in populaire politiek van de arbeidersklasse is grotendeels 
verdwenen uit buurten zoals Grigny en Kanaleneiland. Het vertrouwen in een radicale 
populistische politieke transformatie is verdwenen onder het alziend oog van 
staatsmechanismen gericht op surveillance en controle. Zulke mechanismen zijn er op 
gericht om zogenaamde risico jongeren te disciplineren zodat ze hun individuele 
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verantwoordelijkheid nemen voor hun eigen sociale positie en algemeen geaccepteerd 
maatschappelijk gedrag vertonen. In referentie naar verschillende theorieën over 
neoliberaal risico management en het begrip “bestuurlijkheid”, kenmerk ik de situatie 
in Kanaleneiland als een straf-panopticon. Het werk van Michel Foucault speelt een 
belangrijke rol in deze analyse. Staatsvertegenwoordigers ontwikkelen institutioneel 
beleid om risico jongens te monitoren en disciplineren, in de hoop ze zo te integreren 
in het domein van de “goede burgers”. Deze strategie heeft verschillende ontwijkende 
en saboterende tactieken van de jongens in kwestie tot gevolg. Het beeld van een 
institutioneel politiek domein dat jonge stedelijke herrieschoppers niet representeert, 
maar wel hun leven probeert te beïnvloeden en controleren, rijst op uit dit deel van 
mijn proefschrift.  
 
In het derde deel van mijn proefschrift, dat bestaat uit hoofdstuk 5 en 6, richt ik me 
op het handelen van jonge stedelijke onruststokers dat de maatschappelijke en 
politieke orde waaruit ze zich buiten gesloten voelen op kritische wijze confronteert 
en verstoort. Ik verken de politieke betekenis van praktijken zoals “chaos doen” en 
stedelijk geweld, die beschouwd kunnen worden als spontaan ontstane, niet 
georganiseerde uitingen van onvrede met een vorm van politiek bestuur dat wordt 
gezien als onrechtvaardig en uitsluitend. Ik stel de chaos en het stedelijk geweld van 
jonge herrieschoppers voor als concrete verschijningsvormen van het politieke, die 
niet begrepen moeten worden als bewust ontwikkelde politieke strategieën met een 
duidelijk geformuleerd programma of als traditionele politieke subjecten, maar eerder 
als een onverwachte inbreuk op de dominante, geïnstitutionaliseerde organisatie van 
politiek. Zulk handelen verschilt van het streven van georganiseerde populair politieke 
bewegingen, maar ook van politieke participatie die door de overheid wordt 
gestimuleerd. Ondanks dat de jongeren die ik heb geïnterviewd geen politieke potentie 
zagen in hun eigen handelen, karakteriseer ik ze als hedendaagse “rebels without a 
cause” (rebellen zonder doel), die misschien eigenlijk wel rebellen zijn die een doel 
ontzegd wordt. Ik bekijk het ontregelende karakter van het handelen van de “rebel 
with/out a cause” in het licht van Jacques Rancière’s theorie over politiek als 
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dissensus. In dit perspectief wordt het duidelijk dat bepaalde gestes van onenigheid of 
afwijzing een politieke betekenis kunnen hebben juist omdat ze de hegemonische orde 
van de samenleving verstoren, ten opzichte waarvan bepaalde mensen zich uitgesloten 
voelen. Door deze politieke betekenis van onenigheid of afwijzing te erkennen, wordt 
het ook mogelijk om te erkennen dat sommige schijnbaar zinloze disrupties van de 
publieke orde worden veroorzaakt door een onderliggende, maar ongearticuleerde eis 
van gelijkwaardige behandeling en erkenning binnen de samenleving. 
 
Ik bespreek ook de mogelijkheid dat schijnbaar zinloze gewelddadige uitbarstingen, 
zoals ze voorkomen in recente terugkerende rellen de tekortkomingen van de 
dominante rechtsorde blootleggen. Het feit dat zulke gebeurtenissen zinloos lijken 
voor de overheid en het algemeen publiek, en zelfs morele paniek veroorzaken, laat 
zien dat diegenen die betrokken zijn bij zulke rellen niet op een gelijkwaardige wijze 
kunnen deelnemen aan de organisatie van de samenleving en gewelddadig en 
opstandig gedrag als de enige mogelijkheid zien om de aandacht te vestigen op hun 
aanwezigheid en de door hen ervaren onrechtvaardigheid. In een kritische bespreking 
van het begrip “goddelijk geweld” in het werk van Walter Benjamin, karakteriseer ik 
jonge stedelijke herrieschoppers als actoren van een “ontwrichtend” geweld, dat door 
zijn saboterende effect een kritiek kan leveren op onrechtvaardige bestuurs- en 
beleidsstructuren. Ondanks dat gewelddadige gebeurtenissen zoals de rellen die 
plaatsvonden rond Parijs in 2005 en rond Londen in 2011 niet worden gedreven door 
een duidelijke voorstelling van een alternatieve politieke orde en rechtsorde, is de 
hoop op een sterkere aanwezigheid van rechtvaardigheid in de tekst en uitvoering van 
de wet zeker aanwezig in zulke gebeurtenissen. 
 
Waar ik me in het tweede en het derde deel van mijn proefschrift vooral heb gericht 
op de spanning en de confrontatie tussen politiek en het politieke, gebruik ik het 
laatste deel om uit te leggen hoe de interactie tussen beiden ruimte kan openen voor 
een vorm van ontregelende politiek dat zowel bepaalde grenzen overstijgt als 
doorkruist. Ik leg hier uit dat de relatie tussen de onverwachte verstoring van het 
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politieke en de institutionele organisatie van politiek niet gezien moeten worden als 
twee afzonderlijk van elkaar bestaande dimensies. 
 
In het vierde deel van mijn proefschrift, bestaande uit hoofdstuk 7 en 8, bespreek ik 
de voorwaarden waaronder erkenning zou kunnen ontstaan voor de politieke 
betekenis van het schijnbaar zinloze, verstorende gedrag van jonge stedelijke 
herrieschoppers, en hoe die erkenning zou kunnen leiden tot een kritische evaluatie 
van de gedroomde politieke gemeenschap van goede burgers. Deze erkenning valt te 
herleiden tot een kwetsbaar en altijd al gedifferentieerd samen zijn in de wereld, dat 
vooraf gaat aan het vormen van een specifieke politieke orde, en vooraf gaat aan het 
vormen van een gemeenschap gebaseerd op een gedeelde cultuur en identiteit. Op de 
plek waar deze erkenning plaats vindt ontstaat een kwetsbaar politiek subject dat een 
substantieel gebrek aan een gedeelde identiteit laat zien, maar toch zicht heeft op een 
gedeeld handelen. Dit kwetsbare politieke subject gaat niet vooraf aan de ontregelende 
handelingen van jonge stedelijke herrieschoppers, maar ontstaat in de verstorende 
gebeurtenissen waarin herrieschoppers en autoriteiten met elkaar botsen en 
tegelijkertijd samenkomen. In referentie aan het werk van Jean-Luc Nancy en Judith 
Butler stel ik dat deze subjectiviteit zich opent in relaties met anderen en in een 
gedeeld handelen. Het bestaat niet uit een al vooraf bepaalde entiteit van waaruit 
handelen intentioneel en bewust wordt geïnitieerd. Deze openheid tot, en ontstaan in, 
de dynamiek van handelen en ontmoetingen met anderen maakt deze subjects-positie 
inherent precair op ontologisch niveau. Naast deze ontologische precariteit, wijst mijn 
beschrijving van het precaire politieke subject ook op de subject positie van diegenen 
die geen deel hebben in de sociaal-politieke structuren die bepalen wie als politiek 
subject herkend wordt en wie niet.  
 
Dit precaire politieke subject kan ondanks haar precariteit oproepen tot een egalitaire 
revolte, zoals ik stel in referentie aan het werk van Martin Crowley. Deze egalitaire 
revolte maakt een algemene eis duidelijk: recht moet worden gedaan aan het 
gelijkwaardige kwetsbare samenzijn van allen in de wereld, ongeacht de verschillen 
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tussen ontregelende herrieschoppers en “beschaafde” burgers. Zo’n revolte kan als 
impuls dienen voor anderen in de samenleving om zich actief bewust te worden van 
het onrecht en de stigma’s die ervaren worden door jongeren met een migranten-
achtergrond die in achterstandswijken leven. Zo’n revolte kan ook als impuls dienen 
om collectief in actie te komen en te eisen dat deze situatie verandert. De politieke 
impact van zo’n mogelijke egalitaire revolte hangt van twee dingen af. Enerzijds een 
act van solidariteit van diegenen die zich in een geprivilegieerde positie bevinden en 
die bereid zijn om te erkennen dat zij de samenleving delen met anderen die hun 
verontwaardiging op een onbeschaafde en subversieve manier uiten. Anderzijds het 
onbeschaafde en ontregelende handelen dat een dergelijke act van solidariteit kan 
uitlokken. Het erkennen van de deelname van jonge stedelijke herrieschoppers aan 
een dergelijk gedeeld handelen begint met een openheid voor de vaak atonale en 
onbeschaafde stemmen van deze jongeren in de publieke ruimte. Ik stel voor om de 
ontregelende en onbeschaafde verstoringen die veroorzaakt worden door jonge 
stedelijke herrieschoppers te begrijpen als wat Michel Foucault parrhesiastische gestes 
noemt, of het spreken van ongemakkelijke waarheden, die algemene normen van goed 
burgerschap op de proef stellen. Zulke uitdrukkingen van een “schandaal van 
waarheid” confronteren ons met het feit dat er verschillende waarheden verteld 
kunnen worden over verschillende gemeenschappen van ervaring die schuil gaan 
achter mythen van nationale eenheid en solidariteit. Een kritisch onderzoek van onze 
gedroomde, eenduidige politieke gemeenschap begint met het luisteren naar zulke 
schandalige waarheden. Op deze plek van actieve ontregelende bevraging wordt het 
verschil tussen “politiek” en “het politieke” werkelijkheid.  
 
In de conclusie van mijn proefschrift stel ik voor om de interactie tussen politiek en 
het politieke te zien als een “contractie”: een gebeurtenis waarbinnen de dominante 
politieke orde tegelijkertijd botst en versmelt met het ontregelende politieke. 
Contractie betekent een beweging van samengaan, concentratie en intensivering, maar 
ik stel ook voor om het woord te lezen als een contractie van de begrippen “contra” 
en “actie”. Ik schrijf het woord contractie als “contr’actie” in deze politieke context. 
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Zo laat ik zien dat het tegelijkertijd een geconcentreerde relatie aanduidt, en ook een 
vorm van oppositioneel handelen. Zoals het woord zelf laat zien, verdwijnt er iets in 
een beweging van contr’actie, terwijl er iets nieuws verschijnt. Deze dubbele beweging 
wordt gesymboliseerd door het weglaten van de eerste “a”, en het vervangen van deze 
a door een apostrof, die de ruimte tussen de woorden “contra” en “actie” overbrugt. 
Het is precies deze tussenruimte tussen de twee op zichzelf staande woorden die 
zowel wordt benadrukt in een beweging van frictie als wordt samengetrokken in het 
ontstaan van een nieuw woord: van contra-actie naar contr’actie. De beweging van 
contr’actie vervaagt zo de grenzen tussen verschillende entiteiten, en maakt het 
moeilijk om een duidelijk onderscheid te maken tussen “binnen” en “buiten”. Door 
de relatie tussen politiek en het politieke voor te stellen als een contr’actie wil ik de 
tussenruimte benadrukken: de drempel waar politiek en het politieke botsen en 
samengaan, en waar de sociale band tussen mensen kan worden herbepaald. Zowel 
zogenaamde “beschaafde” als “onbeschaafde” inwoners van de samenleving kunnen 
betrokken zijn bij haar hervorming. Contr’actie geeft geen relatie aan die op den duur 
zal leiden tot een consensus of een versmelting van verschillende partijen in een 
homogeen lichaam. In plaats daarvan toont het een gespannen relatie aan waarbinnen 
contradicties en confrontaties niet worden opgelost, maar juist worden uitgehouden in 
een constant heen en weer bewegen tussen toenadering en afstoting. 
 
Door zich in deze beweging te mengen kan men luisteren naar de ongemakkelijke 
waarheden en contra-narratieven van jonge stedelijke herrieschoppers die worstelen 
om een waardige plek in de samenleving te verkrijgen. Zo’n vorm van betrokken 
luisteren is een stap op weg maar het hervormen van de institutionele politieke 
praktijk en haar vermeende representativiteit.  
  
 577 
Curriculum Vitae 
          
 
 
Femke Kaulingfreks (1981) received her Masters degree in Philosophy at the 
University of Amsterdam and completed her PhD at the University for Humanistic 
Studies in Utrecht. She currently teaches Political Theory at Webster University in 
Leiden and works as a researcher for de Haagse Hogeschool in The Hague. As a 
freelance researcher she also cooperated with partners such as Forum: Institute for 
Multicultural Issues, Hivos, Vrijwilligers Centrale Amsterdam (Association of 
Volunteers Amsterdam) and de Doetank. Besides her teaching and research work 
Femke regularly organizes youth exchange projects and is engaged in activism related 
to housing, migration and social justice issues. 
 
 	  

